Although the State Department argued that the seriousness of the situation had made it necessary, Hurley felt that the mere act of sending the telegram was disloyalty on the part of the diplomatic and military officers, several of whom were subsequently dismissed or posted elsewhere.* Long-time targets of the China Lobby, who were later denounced by Senator Joseph McCarthy, these men were reduced in rank and sent as far as possible from China, thus creating a dangerous vacuum in the State Department of officers with knowledge of and experience in China. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt supported his new ambassador, and the position that the United States could not help the Chinese Communist Party without the approval of Chiang Kai-shek remained U.S. policy.
44
Has China really been sold out at Yalta?
—CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1945
ALBERT COADY Wedemeyer had arrived in Chungking in October 1944, the month in which Stilwell was recalled, and taken over the latter’s positions as commanding general of the U.S. forces in China and Chiang Kai-shek’s chief of staff. Wedemeyer had drawn up the first war plan for the United States in 1941, traveled with Marshall to all the great conferences of World War II, and served in the Combined Anglo-American Southeast Asia Command as deputy chief of staff to Mountbatten. Given the job of turning the Chinese army into a decent fighting force, he was assigned Major General Gilbert X. “Buck” Cheeves to handle military supplies. Cheeves a “hard-boiled, shrewd, driving, don’t-ever-tell-me-why-you-can’t-do-it” commander, had been brought in from India. He is said to have insisted that transport crews always leave the hoods of their vehicles lifted up, his theory being that “an engine left open to constant casual inspection will be kept in tiptop shape by the men responsible for it.”
To handle the soldiers, Wedemeyer had set up the China Training and Combat Command under Stilwell’s trusted comrade Brigadier General Dorn. Like Stilwell, who called Wedemeyer “the world’s most pompous prick,” Dorn found Wedemeyer “sententious” and complained that he was “not a soldier” but “a paper and a theory man.” If Dorn was upset with his new commanding general, Chennault was furious that Wedemeyer had appointed Stilwell’s man Dorn to a position of responsibility and sent Wede-meyer a long letter concerning his old bête noir:
General Stilwell from the first did not trouble to conceal his antipathy to me.… So far as I was ever able to observe, General Stilwell’s dealings with the Chinese leaders were chiefly marked by arrogance, self-righteousness and open contempt.… With the Generalissimo… and the other Chinese leaders… he either bullied or he threatened, seeming to know no means of securing cooperation except to assert that American supplies would be withheld if the Generalissimo did not accede to his demands.… These are the facts of deep military and political significance. The nature of General Stilwell’s relations with the Chinese leaders poisoned Sino-American relations for three years; rendered impossible truly effective Sino-American military cooperation, and was perhaps the basic cause for the disheartening course of events in this area until you assumed command.
Chennault wrote Wedemeyer two more letters, urging the new commander to put aside any “misapprehension or misinformation” he might have about Joe Alsop, who was indeed a trustworthy fellow. Wedemeyer forwarded Chennault’s letters to Marshall with the comment that Chennault “has been built up as a great leader. I believe that he is an outstanding fighter pilot, but it is my conviction that he is not a man of fine character.”
For his part, in keeping with the necessity to improve relations between China and the United States after the nastiness over Stilwell’s removal, Chiang Kai-shek made a few changes in his hierarchy. But, according to left-wing journalist Harold Isaacs, “In the American military establishment there is a great process of weeding out and reorganization in progress. In the Chinese top establishment there is a great deal of talk about weeding out and reorganizing.”
As Wedemeyer wrote Marshall:
The Chinese have no conception of organization, logistics or modern warfare. The Generalissimo is striving to conduct the war from Chungking. The management of affairs of State in itself would require a Disraeli, Churchill and Machiavelli all combined in one. The Gissimo will not decentralize power to subordinates… it is amusing and also tragic to note that many highranking Chinese officials are asking me to facilitate their evacuation to America by air. One very highranking Chinese general stated that he wanted to take forty outstanding Chinese army and naval officers to Europe… to study the European battlefields.… Another Chinese general asked me for permission to send ten Chinese officers to America to study strategy.… Self-sacrifice and patriotism are unknown quantities among the educated and privileged classes.…
The Chinese soldiers are starving by the hundreds… due to graft and inefficiency… the Chinese march an outfit from A to B and make no provision for bivouacs, food, and so forth along the route.… The Generalissimo often asks me to move by air 50,000 men from A. to B, and after… we make appropriate arrangements… he will order a change.… Neither he nor his advisors really understand supply and movement problems.… I have already indicated to the Generalissimo that here in Chungking we must issue broad policies and directives to responsible commanders in the field and that we definitely must not tell them how to carry them out.… I emphasized that it is wrong to direct operations from Chungking. Although he has agreed… he violates his agreement almost daily.… I receive continual reports of the inefficiency of General Ho. Apparently he is a suave self-seeking individual, very rich and dissolute. For political reasons the Generalissimo does not desire to remove him from a position of responsibility in the war effort.
Chiang did finally relieve General Ho of his position as head of the War Ministry but allowed him to retain his post as chief of staff and named him commander in chief of the Chinese armies in the Southwest. Chen Li-fu was removed as minister of education but left in a position where he could continue to function as “one of Chiang’s trusted hatchetmen specializing in ‘youth control.’ ” And Kung, who was “advised to continue his long course of recuperation in the US,” was replaced by one of his faithful acolytes.
Associated in the public mind with graft in high places, illegal speculation, and war profiteering, the Kungs had judiciously withdrawn from the scene, basing themselves in New York. Nevertheless, Chiang, who was still afraid to offend Ai-ling, had made sure that T.V. arranged for a plane to take them to the States.* From there, Ai-ling contacted her younger brother T.A., asking him to wire T.V. to inquire about Kung’s reputation in the press and political circles of Chungking. She received the following wire back in March of 1945: “Elder sister asked for a consensus of opinion on Brother Yong [H.H. Kung]. She mentioned this the last time I saw her. I must not have made myself clear, because now she has asked again. I will be more direct. It is my observation that the public’s attitude towards Brother Yong has not changed for the better.”
The overall situation in China was improving, however, and the condition and morale of the Chinese troops had begun to change. Although Wedemeyer apparently enjoyed “frequent and direct contact with Chiang Kai-shek”—it was said that the general had a telephone in his office with a line directly into the G-mo’s bedroom—his opinion of Chiang was not much different from that of his predecessor. In the summer of 1945, ten months after his arrival, he wrote Marshall that Chiang had “many intricate problems and frankly I have determined that he is not equipped either mentally or in training and experience to cope with most of them.” Nonetheless, Wedemeyer managed to deal with the G-mo and wrote about him without the personal rancor exhibited by Stilwell. The person he obviously admired—and kept up a serious correspondence with long after he left China—was May-ling.
It was clear by now that T.V. had been returned to power at the expense of Kung and that the entire Kung family had become a liability to Chiang and his government. In December of 1944, Chiang named T.V. deputy president (i.e., premier) of the Executive Yuan, of which Chiang himself was president. In a
t least this one instance, the G-mo had finally opted for efficiency over adulation. T. A. Soong, who was apparently the family peacemaker, advised the Kungs, “We are all one family and should cooperate and help each other. The Generalissimo is lucky to have brother [T.V.] to deal with everything. We should support T.V., particularly if there is gossip. Although he is now Deputy President of the Executive Yuan, everything—big and small—is run by Chiang himself. I’m sure this is something of which you yourselves are well aware.”
But Soong’s new status only pointed up his lack of popularity. Harold Isaacs called the new premier “an ambitious, power-hungry, unprincipled politician. His propensity for playing his hand a little too independently in the often bitter struggle for power within the Kuomintang caliphate is what has kept him out of the front rank for long periods of time. The present tangled situation offers him a fresh opportunity. He represents no policy. He represents T. V. Soong.” From the conservative side of the political spectrum, George Sokolsky wrote about T.V. with more understanding: “Madame Kung picked Chiang Kai-shek. T.V. has always wanted to be head of his family.… He resented Chiang and felt that if Chiang hadn’t been brought in he would have become… head of the civilian side of China’s government.”
OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, there was good news of Japanese defeats in the northern Philippines. American planes were now dropping bombs on Japan’s home islands; Japanese troops had made no further progress in southern and southeastern China; transport over the Hump had reached more than 46,000 tons a month; and on January 26, 1945, three months after Stilwell’s departure, the Ledo Road was linked with the old Burma Road, which led to Kunming. In the ensuing celebration, Stilwell’s picture was displayed along with those of Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt. “We have broken the siege of China,” Chiang announced when the first convoy drove into Kunming. “Let us name this road after General Joseph Stilwell, in memory of his distinctive contribution and of the signal part which the Allied and Chinese forces under his direction played in the Burma campaign and in the building of the road.” “I wonder who put him up to that?” Stilwell asked.
Still doggedly determined to bring about a rapprochement between the KMT and the CCP, Hurley traveled back to Chungking via London and Moscow. He arrived in London convinced that some of the British thought a divided China might be better than a united one, since this would enable Britain to keep Hong Kong and its other possessions in the Far East. Churchill, who referred to the position of the United States vis-à-vis China as “the great American illusion,” nevertheless agreed to support the U.S. policy of unification of China, and Hurley left for Moscow feeling that he had achieved what he set out to do.
On April 12, 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt died, and Harry S. Truman was sworn in as the thirty-third president of the United States. Three days later, Hurley met with Stalin, who assured him that he would help bring about unification of military forces to China. Hurley then asked about informing Chiang of the agreements at Yalta, explaining that Roosevelt had told him to keep them secret until Stalin authorized him to tell the G-mo and that Truman had said he would follow the policy laid out by his predecessor. Stalin said he would be ready—politically and militarily—in two to three months’ time, and Hurley said he would check with him before informing Chiang. Stalin assured Hurley that he would not discuss any of this with T.V., who was due to arrive in Moscow in May.
Hurley’s subsequent report to Washington sparkled with unwarranted optimism and self-satisfaction. “Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to America’s policy in China as outlined to him during the conversation,” he said. Averell Harriman, currently the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, did not agree. He flew back to Washington and told Truman and the State Department that Hurley was far too trusting of Stalin and that the Soviet government would probably support the Chinese Communists. George Kennan, left in charge of the embassy in Moscow during Harriman’s trip home, predicted that the Soviet Union would not rest until it controlled Manchuria, Mongolia, and north China. And Mao gave a speech on April 24 in which he said forth-rightly that “our future, our ultimate program is to push China forward to Socialism and Communism.” But Hurley, his head in clouds of wishful thinking, continued throughout the spring and into the summer to believe he could bring the KMT and CCP together.
By the summer of 1945, Wedemeyer had accomplished many of the reforms that Stilwell had tried to effect before he was replaced. About five hundred American officers and the same number of enlisted men were serving in and with the Chinese army, whose soldiers were being paid in cash and given sufficient arms. The Tenth Air Force had been transferred from India and combined with the Fourteenth, and both were under new command. In April and May, the Japanese had made their last serious assault in western Hunan, but they had been driven back by a combination of the now stalwart Chinese soldiers and American planes. Two months later Chiang gave a press conference, his first since 1941, in which he made it clear how pleased he was to have Hurley and Wedemeyer in China. “It is the first time in [the] entire Chinese-American history,” he told reporters, “that action and cooperation have been so satisfactory.”
The economic situation, however, had not improved, and the food supply remained sadly reduced due to the Japanese conquest of the rice-producing areas. Once more, Soong went to Washington to ask for increased shipments of gold to retard inflation. At first, Morgenthau refused, remarking that “the impression has arisen in the United States that the two hundred million of U.S. dollar certificates and bonds and the gold sold in China have gone into relatively few hands with resultant large individual profits and have failed to be of real assistance to the Chinese economy.” But when Soong reminded the secretary of the treasury that on July 27, 1943, the United States had agreed “that two hundred million be made available from the credit on the books of the Treasury in the name of the Government of the Republic of China for the purchase of gold,” Morgenthau felt he must honor the earlier commitment. The advance did little good for the country as a whole, and the Chinese dollar continued to depreciate.
ON APRIL 30, 1945, three weeks after Roosevelt succumbed to cerebral hemorrhage, Hitler committed suicide. One week later, German resistance to the Allies collapsed. Even before that, early in April, the Soviets had told the Japanese that their neutrality pact had “lost its meaning” and would be allowed to lapse. Ignoring the terms of the pact, which stated that it was to remain in effect for a year after such notice had been given, the Russian armies were already moving to the Far East, supplied by American equipment. When news of this transfer of men and arms reached Chungking, Ambassador Hurley thought it was high time he get Stalin’s okay to give the generalissimo an account of what had been agreed upon at Yalta. But when Hurley asked Washington’s permission to go ahead, he was asked to hold off.
There were two reasons for the delay. In the first place, the U.S. government had noticed a definite change in the attitude of the Soviets, who were now openly leaning toward the Chinese Communists. More important, but utterly secret, were recent reports on the atom bomb, which were proving very hopeful and meant that America might not need immediate help from the Soviet army. Meanwhile, Hopkins, sent to speak with Stalin, had managed to get the date of August 8 for Russia’s entry into the Pacific war, provided China accepted the terms of the Yalta Agreement. They had also decided that T. V. Soong was to be called to Moscow to be informed of the Yalta accord, while at the same time Hurley told Chiang in Chungking. Stalin said that the Soviet Union had no territorial claims on China, that if Russian troops entered Manchuria, he would ask Chiang to take over the civil administration and that the generalissimo might set up his government in any area liberated by the Soviets. Both Hopkins and Harriman, who attended the meetings, thought that Stalin was genuine in his offer to work with the United States in China.
T.V. was then advised that Truman wished to speak with him in Washington and that Stalin wanted to see him in Moscow before the first of July. In their meeting, Truman informed him in general ter
ms about the agreement at Yalta without giving him the exact phrasing. Soong went home to Chungking, where Hurley was anxiously awaiting the day he could officially tell Chiang. The G-mo, who had already been informed by the Chinese ambassador to Washington, “clearly indicated his chagrin and disappointment”; he asked that the United States and Britain cosign any agreement between China and the Soviet Union, that Port Arthur be designated a joint naval base for all four great powers, and that the transfer of the islands to the Soviets be subject to further discussion by the same four powers. Hurley was instructed to tell Chiang that these conditions were unlikely to be accepted.
Soong then left for Moscow, where it became only too apparent that Stalin’s attitude toward China had undergone a radical change. Russia now wanted total control over Manchuria, the establishment of a military zone including the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, the independence of Outer Mongolia, and ownership of the Manchurian railways. Meanwhile, Chiang had sent T.V. a list of maximum concessions he was prepared to give the Russians: in return for Stalin’s guarantee to withdraw aid from the CCP and give China full sovereignty in Manchuria, Chiang would grant rights for the Soviet navy to share the use of Port Arthur, accept the establishment of Dairen as a free port under Chinese administration, and join in creating a combined Sino-Soviet company to manage the Manchurian railroads. The two sides were so far apart that Ambassador Harriman could only advise Soong to try to adjourn their meeting on as friendly terms as possible. While Soong was contemplating how to make a decent exit, the Russians suddenly reduced their demands and Stalin declared “categorically” that he would support the KMT and that all military forces in China must be controlled by the Chinese government. This left open the question of control over the ports and railways of Manchuria—provisions that Soong said he could not move on without Chiang.
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