by Paul Ham
You will be informed from time to time of the numbers of troops which will be placed at your disposal in order to carry out your mission, and in this connection you will understand that, owing to the number of different theatres in which we are employed, it may not always be possible to give the information definitely a long time in advance.
The defeat of the enemy by the combined Allied Armies must always be regarded as the primary objective for which the British troops were originally sent to France, and to achieve that end, the closest co-operation of French and British as a united Army must be the governing policy; but I wish you distinctly to understand that your command is an independent one, and that you will in no case come under the orders of any Allied General further than the necessary co-operation with our Allies above referred to.
If unforeseen circumstances should arise such as to compel our Expeditionary Force to retire, such a retirement should never be contemplated as an independent move to secure the defence of the ports facing the Straits of Dover, although their security is a matter of great importance demanding that every effort should be made to prevent the lines which the Allied Forces now hold in Flanders being broken by the enemy. The safety of the Channel will be decided by the overthrow of the German Armies rather than by the occupation by our troops of some defensive position with their backs to the sea. In the event, therefore, of a retirement, the direction of the retreat should be decided, in conjunction with our Ally, with reference solely to the eventual defeat of the enemy and not to the security of the Channel. Notwithstanding the above, our Expeditionary Force may be compelled to fall back upon the Channel ports, or the circumstances may be such that it will be strategically advantageous that, while acting in co-operation with the French Army, it should carry out such a retirement. The requisite steps required to meet this contingency should therefore receive due attention.
In minor operations you should be careful that your subordinates understand that risk of serious losses should only be taken where such risk is authoritatively considered to be commensurate with the object in view.
You will kindly keep up constant communication with the War Office, and you will be good enough to inform me regarding all movements of the enemy reported to you as well as those of the French Army.
I am sure that you fully realise that you can rely with the utmost confidence on the whole-hearted and unswerving support of the Government, of myself, and of your compatriots.
SOURCE: Haig, War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918, p. 514
APPENDIX 4
HIERARCHY OF COMBAT RANKS: BRITAIN (AND DOMINIONS), GERMANY AND FRANCE
The table below provides a (simplified) hierarchy of combat ranks within the British, French and German armies, and gives an idea of the job men at each rank might perform. The reality was considerably more complex. The Dominion armies followed the British structure. The numbers of combat soldiers in the British units tended to be considerably greater than their German counterparts.
APPENDIX 5
SKELETON ORDER OF BATTLE, THIRD YPRES
Guards Division (Major-General G. P. T. Feilding):
1 Gds., 2Gds., 3Gds. Brigades
1st Division (Major-General E. P. Strickland):
1, 2, 3 Brigades
3rd Division (Major-General C. J. Deverell):
8, 9, 76 Brigades
4th Division (Major-General T. G. Matheson):
10, 11, 12 Brigades
5th Division (Major-General R. B. Stephens):
13, 15, 95 Brigades
7th Division (Major-General T. H. Shoubridge):
20, 22, 91 Brigades
8th Division (Major-General W. C. G. Heneker):
23, 24, 25 Brigades
9th (Scottish) Division (Major-General H. T. Lukin):
26, 27, South African Brigades
11th (Northern) Division (Major-General H. R. Davies):
32, 33, 34 Brigades
14th (Light) Division (Major-General V. A. Couper):
41, 42, 43 Brigades
15th (Scottish) Division (Major-General H. F. Thuillier):
44, 45, 46 Brigades
16th (Irish) Division (Major-General W. B. Hickie):
47, 48, 49 Brigades
17th (Northern) Division (Major-General P. R. Robertson):
50, 51, 52 Brigades
18th (Eastern) Division (Major-General R. P. Lee):
53, 54, 55 Brigades
19th (Western) Division (Major-General C. D. Shute acting to 19th June, then Major-General G. T. M. Bridges, wounded 20th September; Br.-General W. P. Monkhouse acting to 22nd September, then Major-General G. D. Jeffreys):
56, 57, 58 Brigades
20th (Light) Division (Major-General W. Douglas Smith):
59, 60, 61 Brigades
21st Division (Major-General D. G. M. Campbell):
62, 64, 110 Brigades
23rd Division (Major-General J. M. Babington):
68, 69, 70 Brigades
24th Division (Major-General L. J. Bols):
17, 72, 73 Brigades
25th Division (Major-General E. G. T. Bainbridge):
7, 74, 75 Brigades
29th Division (Major-General Sir B. de Lisle):
86, 87, 88 Brigades
30th Division (Major-General W. de L. Williams):
21, 89, 90 Brigades
33rd Division (Major-General P. R. Wood):
19, 98, 100 Brigades
36th (Ulster) Division (Major-General O. S. W. Nugent):
107, 108, 109 Brigades
37th Division (Major-General H. Bruce Williams):
63, 111, 112 Brigades
38th (Welsh) Division (Major-General C. G. Blackader):
113, 114, 115 Brigades
39th Division (Major-General G. J. Cuthbert to 20th August, then Major-General E. Feetham):
116, 117, 118 Brigades
41st Division (Major-General S. T. B. Lawford):
122, 123, 124 Brigades
47th (2nd London) Division (Major-General Sir George Gorringe):
140, 141, 142 Brigades
48th (1st South Midland) Division (Major-General R. Fanshawe):
143, 144, 145 Brigades
49th (1st West Riding) Division (Major-General E. M. Perceval):
146, 147, 148 Brigades
50th (Northumbrian) Division (Major-General P. S. Wilkinson):
149, 150, 151 Brigades
51st (Highland) Division (Major-General G. M. Harper):
152, 153, 154 Brigades
55th (1st West Lancashire) Division (Major-General H. S. Jeudwine):
164, 165, 166 Brigades
56th (1st London) Division (Major-General F. A. Dudgeon):
167, 168, 169 Brigades
57th (2nd West Lancashire) Division (Major-General R. W. R. Barnes):
170, 171, 172 Brigades
58th (2/1st London) Division (Major-General H. D. Fanshawe to 6th October, then Major-General A. B. E. Cator):
173, 174, 175 Brigades
59th (2nd North Midland) Division (Major-General C. F. Romer):
176, 177, 178 Brigades
61st (2nd South Midland) Division (Major-General C. J. Mackenzie):
182, 183, 184 Brigades
63rd (Royal Naval) Division (Major-General C. E. Lawrie):
188, 189, 190 Brigades
66th (2nd East Lancashire) Division (Major-General Hon. H. A. Lawrence):
197, 198, 199 Brigades
1st Canadian Division (Major-General A. C. Macdonell):
1 Cdn., 2 Cdn., 3 Cdn. Brigades
2nd Canadian Division (Major-General H. E. Burstall):
4 Cdn., 5 Cdn., 6 Cdn. Brigades
3rd Canadian Division (Major-General L. J. Lipsett):
7 Cdn., 8 Cdn., 9 Cdn. Brigades
4th Canadian Division (Major-General D. Watson):
10 Cdn., 11 Cdn., 12 Cdn. Brigades
1st Australian Division (Major-General H. B. Walker):
1 Aust., 2 Aust., 3 Aust. Brigades
>
2nd Australian Division (Major-General N. M. Smyth):
5 Aust., 6 Aust., 7 Aust. Brigades
3rd Australian Division (Major-General Sir John Monash):
9 Aust., 10 Aust., 11 Aust. Brigades
4th Australian Division (Major-General W. Holmes, killed 2nd July; Br.-General C. Rosenthal acting to 16th July, then Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan):
4 Aust., 12 Aust., 13 Aust. Brigades
5th Australian Division (Major-General J. Talbot Hobbs):
8 Aust., 14 Aust., 15 Aust. Brigades
New Zealand Division (Major-General Sir Arthur Russell):
1 N.Z., 2 N.Z., 3 N.Z. (Rifle), 4 N.Z. Brigades
NOTES
8TH DIVISION:
25th Brigade. Br.-General C. Coffin was awarded the V.C. on the 31st July, 1917.
9TH DIVISION:
27th Brigade. Br.-General F. A. Maxwell, V.C., was killed in action on the 21st September, 1917. Lieut.-Colonel H. D. N. Maclean acting till Br.-General W. D. Croft took over on the 23rd.
21ST DIVISION:
62nd Brigade. Br.-General C. G. Rawlings was killed in action on the 28th October, 1917; Colonel G. M. Sharpe acting till 1st November, when Br.-General G. H. Gater assumed command.
29TH DIVISION:
86th Brigade. Br.-General R. G. Jelf was invalided on the 16th August, 1917. Lieut.-Colonel H. Nelson acting till the 24th August, when Br.-General G. R. H. Cheape assumed command.
41ST DIVISION:
123rd Brigade. Br.-General C. W. E. Gordon was killed in action on the 23rd July, 1917. Br.-General W. F. Clemson (124th Brigade) acting until the arrival of Br.-General E. Pearce Serocold on 3rd August.
49TH DIVISION:
146th Brigade. Br.-General M. D. Goring-Jones left on the 18th October. Br.-General G. A. P. Rennie assumed command.
148th Brigade. Br.-General R. L. Adlercron left on the 24th October; Br.-General L. F. Green-Wilkinson assumed command.
58TH DIVISION:
173rd Brigade. Br.-General B. C. Freyberg, V.C., was wounded on the 19th September, 1917. Lieut.-Colonel W. R. H. Dann acting till 3rd October, when Br.-General R. B. Worgan assumed command.
NEW ZEALAND DIVISION:
1st Brigade. Br.-General E. H. J. Brown was killed in action on the 8th June, 1917, Br.-General C. W. Melvill taking over on the same day.
SOURCE: Brigadier General James E. Edmonds, Official History of The Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium 1917, Vol. 2, pp. 388–95
APPENDIX 6
HAIG’S CASE FOR THE FLANDERS OFFENSIVE, SUBMITTED TO THE WAR CABINET 17 JUNE 1917
O.A.D. 502
To assist the War Cabinet in considering the various possible courses of action open this summer, I submit, in continuation of my O.A.D. No. 478, of the 12th instant, the following, fuller, statement of my views as to the strategical advantages which would be gained by successful operations to secure the Belgian coast.
Even a partial success in the operations for which I am preparing will give very useful results, apart from the effect on the German army and nation of another defeat.
A very limited advance will enable our guns to make OSTEND useless to the German navy, and will, at the same time, render DUNKIRK – one of our most important ports – immune from long-range hostile gunfire.
The enemy’s communications with the coast are not numerous, and run through such a narrow space between our lines and the Dutch frontier that an advance sufficient to bring the ROULERS–THOUROUT railway within effective range of our guns would restrict his railway communications with the coast to those passing through GHENT and BRUGES.
A short further advance, bringing us within effective heavy-gun range of BRUGES, would most probably induce the evacuation of ZEEBRUGGE and the whole coastline.
The consequences of extending our front to the Dutch frontier would be so considerable that they might prove decisive. Following on the successes we have already gained such a failure to stop our advance would leave little room for German hope of successfully opposing our further advance, even if temporary exhaustion imposed a halt on us for a time.
Realizing this, the enemy would find himself faced by a most serious situation. His main lines of retreat run through bottlenecks north and south of the ARDENNES, and any reasonable possibility of our being able to continue the advance on GHENT and BRUSSELS would probably suffice to determine the enemy to undertake a retreat, if not to accept our terms at once, in view of the dangers and difficulties of retreat under such conditions.
In addition, as neutrals would recognize the imminence of a German collapse, it is conceivable that the attitude of Holland towards us might be such as to add seriously to the German anxieties.
At present it is not in our power to give Holland any direct help if Germany committed a breach of neutrality against her. With the Germans driven from the Belgian coast, and our flank resting on the Dutch frontier, however, the situation would be very different; and if Holland then decided to join the allies a way would be opened to turn ANTWERP and the German lines through Belgium completely, and to sever the German Lines of Communication through LIEGE.
Germany would then have to choose between accepting terms, or undertaking a retreat likely to prove disastrous, or attempting to forestall the danger by violating Dutch territory. If she had failed to stop our advance, it is reasonable to assume that she would not have sufficient forces left at her disposal to justify the last mentioned course.
In short, it is clear that very great possibilities will be opened up by the operations now in preparation. These operations have long been recognised as offering the possibilities stated whenever we had sufficient strength to carry them out. If it be questioned whether that time has yet come my considered opinion, as stated in my paper of the 12th instant, is that by concentration of our resources now the operation has sufficient prospects of success this year not only to justify our undertaking it, but – in view of the general situation – to make it most advisable to do so. Even if the full measure of success is not gained I see no reason to doubt that the results attained will at least be sufficient to have a great effect on Germany and her allies, who will realize that, although a respite has been gained, it is likely to be a short one.
Comparing this operation with anything that we might do in other theatres its advantages are overwhelming.
It directly and seriously threatens our main enemy, on whom the whole Coalition against us depends.
It is within the easiest possible reach of our base by sea and rail and can be developed infinitely more rapidly, and maintained infinitely more easily, than any other operation open to us.
It admits of the closest possible combination of our naval and military strength. It covers all the points which we dare not uncover, and therefore admits of the utmost concentration of force; whereas, for the same reason, any force employed in any other theatre of war can never be more than a detachment, with all the disadvantages of detachments.
Even a short advance along the Belgian coast, in addition to considerable moral results, would assist our navy appreciably in securing our lines of communication; while the value of that coast to the enemy as a base for air raids against England would be reduced in proportion to the extent of our advance.
In no part of any theatre of war would so limited an advance promise such far-reaching results on Germany, and through Germany, on her allies and on neutrals.
In short, after the fullest consideration, it is my earnest conviction that the arguments in favour of the course I propose in comparison with the possibilities open in any other theatre of war are incontrovertible. In other theatres we can only employ detachments, seeking to attain results by indirect methods, and under most difficult conditions of maintenance. Time and space considerations would be so unfavourable to us that if any indirect threat appeared dangerous to Germany it would be well within her power to take timely steps to counteract it either by direct attack on us at a more vital point or by moving troops to me
et our indirect threat.
Lastly, while an increase in our forces in the Western theatre would have an encouraging effect on France, where encouragement is of very high importance now, any reduction of our forces here at this juncture might have most serious consequences.
I cannot urge too strongly the importance of a whole-hearted concentration of our forces for the purpose in view.
Amid the uncertainties of war one thing is certain, viz, that it is only by whole-hearted concentration at the right time and place that victory ever has been or ever will be won.
In my opinion the time and place to choose are now beyond dispute. We have gone a long way already towards success. Victory may be nearer than is generally realized if we act correctly now. But we may fall seriously short of it if at this juncture we fail to follow correct principles.
SOURCE: Haig Papers, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh (contained in letter, Haig to Robertson, 17 June 1917)
APPENDIX 7
SIEGFRIED SASSOON’S LETTER OF PROTEST AGAINST THE WAR AND EXTRACT FROM COMMONS DEBATE
