Later that evening he had cause to change his mind. A message arrived outlining the availability of speedy transport, and after a hurried meeting with the Executive Council, he and a small group of delegates left shortly after midnight on the morning of 18 July. They landed at Libreville before dawn, were spotted by Mr Bruce Oudes, a knowing Canadian correspondent on African affairs who had got a tip-off, and the story broke. After breakfast with President Bongo, Colonel Ojukwu flew north in the private jet of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, who had put the aircraft at his disposal.
Addressing the committee, Colonel Ojukwu brought the full force of his advocacy and personality into play. The proposals for one or two mercy corridors by land or sea were reiterated. The Biafran case was stated. The committee, three of whose members represented governments previously hostile to Biafra, indicated their assent, which somewhat dismayed the Nigerian delegation.
On the Friday Colonel Ojukwu left Niamey and flew to Abidjan to see President Houphouet-Boigny and they had talks in private. On Saturday he returned to Biafra, having left Professor Eni Njoku in Niamey to head the Biafran delegation. On the Sunday he held another press conference, this time a relaxed affair in a garden in Owerri, during which he expressed cautious optimism that the forthcoming peace conference at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the most important outcome of his Niamey visit, might produce results.
Meanwhile in Niamey the two delegations discussed relief aid, since the beginning of July a subject of growing concern to the world at large. Various criteria for a relief corridor were agreed upon, but when these criteria came to be applied to the various proposals so far made, it became clear that the Biafran proposal for a river-route was more feasible, cheaper, could carry more bulk in less time, and contained less strategic disadvantage to either side and a greater variety of safeguards against abuse than the Nigerian proposal for a land corridor in the north from Enugu to Awgu. When this became apparent, the Nigerian delegation backtracked fast and it was while explaining why suddenly all the agreed criteria were unacceptable that the Nigerian leader Allison Ayida produced his viewpoint on starving children quoted in the next chapter: ‘Starvation is a legitimate weapon of war, and we have every intention of using it on the rebels.’
From that point Nigeria went steadily backwards on the question of the permissibility of relief aid reaching Biafra, and subsequent minor concessions had to be wrung out, not by British Government pressure or advocacy, but by a growing wave of hostile world opinion stemming from the people in the streets. Nevertheless, an agenda for Addis Ababa was agreed, the order this time being reversed to suit the Nigerians: political settlement first, ceasefire second.
The Addis Ababa conference convened on Monday 29 July. Colonel Ojukwu had left Biafra the previous night and flown straight to the Ethiopian capital, this time with a bigger delegation and in a bigger jet, also provided by the President of Ivory Coast. Predictably General Gowon refused to attend, or was prevented by advisers aware the contrast could hardly be flattering.
The first meeting, to hear the opening addresses by the two delegate leaders, was an open one, with representatives of every African head of state, and some of the heads themselves, the whole diplomatic corps of Addis Ababa, scores of observers and a host of pressmen present. Chief Enahoro sought to have the press excluded, particularly the television cameras. The move failed and he contented himself with a twelve-minute speech.
Colonel Ojukwu rose. He began by what sounded like a plea for the Biafran people on humanitarian grounds. After four paragraphs he revealed that he was quoting direct from the speech Haile Selassie had made to the League of Nations in 1936 over the rape of Abyssinia by the Fascists. The point was not lost. He continued to speak for one hour and ten minutes, describing the history of the Biafran people from its earliest days, the persecution, rejection, separation and subsequent suffering. When he sat down, he became one of the few men in the world to receive from a predominately diplomatic gathering a standing ovation. In seventy minutes Biafra had ceased to belong to Nigeria, or Africa, or the British or the Commonwealth. It had become a world issue. Colonel Ojukwu at thirty-four had become a world figure, an accolade translated into press terms twenty-four days later when his face featured on the cover of Time magazine.
But the Addis Ababa conference got bogged down after the glitter of publicity had died away. Like its predecessors it became lost in a quagmire of delays, stalling, intransigence and ill-will. In all it sat for over five weeks, but world attention, the only thing that might have given it stimulus, swung away to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The Nigerian delegation again had an aim in stalling. Ceasefire was no longer a live issue as on 17 August the Nigerian Third Division crossed the Imo River and threatened Aba, the largest city remaining to the Biafrans. By this time the attitude of the American gun-runner Wharton appeared to have changed. South of Aba Biafran soldiers defended on two bullets per man per day, attacked on five. The ammunition planes broke down, turned back, jettisoned their cargoes over the sea. Despite terrible Nigerian casualties Aba fell on 4 September 1968.
Soon all eyes were on the Heads of State conference of the Organization of African Unity scheduled for 14 September in Algiers. From Lagos frantic messages went out to the commander of the Third Division that Owerri must fall by then, or Uli airport. African states friendly to Biafra let her know that in preparation for Algiers British and American diplomacy was working overtime behind the scenes to persuade Africa that Biafra was finished. Considerable pressure, not excluding financial inducements, was repeatedly brought to bear. It worked.
The agenda committee of the Summit Conference, meeting in Algiers as from 8 September, left Nigeria-Biafra off the agenda. The conference met on 14 September. After an abortive effort to take Uli airport, the Third Division launched an attack towards Owerri on 12 September. Still short of arms and ammunition (the American gun-runner had been fired, but an alterative route had not been completely set up) the Biafrans fought with their usual handful of bullets against a spearhead of British Saladin armoured cars. Owerri fell on 16 September. On the following day the Algiers meeting passed by thirty-two votes to four a hastily appended resolution calling on the Biafrans to cooperate with the Nigerians in restoring the territorial integrity of the Federation: in other words to surrender.
In doing so the organization that prides itself on being the repository of the conscience of Africa washed its hands of the biggest conscientious issue in the continent. It was the nadir of Biafra’s fortunes, military and diplomatic. At that time and for the succeeding weeks it was hard to find a single voice prepared to say Biafra was not completely finished. It took a hundred days before the world realized Biafra was still alive, still fighting.
By that time the situation had changed in most of its aspects. In Biafra there had been a re-surge of morale, of confidence, an increase in the amount of aid coming in or expected. Biafran troops were counter-attacking heavily for the first time in the war. Several nations, by-passing Britain, had declared that they intended actively to seek a means of bringing peace. In Nigeria an agreement with Russia had been signed that opened the door wide to Soviet infiltration of all walks of Nigerian life. In the North there were growing rumbles of discontent from the Emirs, dissatisfied with the government by minority-tribe civil servants who could not fulfil their promises. In the West there had been riots, shootings, mass arrests. In American Mr Nixon had been elected.
The failure of the diplomacy was the failure not so much of the Nigerian front-men whose concern with preserving their own careers was predictable, but the failure of those able to bring pressure to bear to do so. Never once did the Nigerian delegations give an indication that their basic conviction, that a solution through war was feasible and attainable, had been shaken, nor did their supporters once seek to persuade them away from that conviction. The chance was there and it was thrown away.
The year 1938 was no more successful in bringing about a negotia
ted peace than 1968 had been, and still largely for the reasons already stated. Apart from numerous unofficial contacts between diplomats of various countries with the Biafran and Nigerian regimes, there was only one full-scale peace conference during 1969. It took place at Monrovia, Liberia, on 18 and 19 April, and turned out to be as big a farce as its three predecessors of 1968.
The first step was early in April when the Biafran Government received a letter from President William Tubman of Liberia, inviting Biafra to send a peace delegation to Monrovia to discuss peace without pre-conditions. A delegation was composed of Sir Louis Mbanefo, Mr Christopher Mojekwu, the Home Affairs Commissioner, Chief E. Bassey, the Commissioner for Lands and Survey, Mr Ignatius Kogbara, Biafran Special Representative in London, and two officials. They left Biafra on 14 April and arrived in the Liberian capital on the 16th, where they were well and courteously received.
The talks were to take the form of an attempt by the Organization of African Unity Committee of Six to bring about an agreement for peace between the two sides. The six OAU mediators were President Tubman, the host, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Hamani Diori of the Niger Republic, President Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroun, President Joseph Mobutu of the Congo Kinshasa, and for Ghana Mr Charles Harley, Deputy Chairman of the National Liberation Council. The Nigerian delegation was led by the Commissioner of Works, Mr Femi Okunu, and Mr Allison Ayida.
The keynote speech was made by President Tubman, who was followed by the Emperor of Ethiopia. After that the conference went into session. It was the evening of 18 April.
The conduct of the conference was unusual. First the ‘panel’ called the Nigerian delegation and sat in closed session with them for forty-five minutes. Then the Biafran delegation was sent for. Sir Louis addressed the Six with a prepared statement and intimated he had certain proposals he wished to make regarding a ceasefire. These he duly made. One of the Six asked if Biafra was prepared to accept a supervisory force between the two combatants. He replied in the affirmative, providing that there was a truce or ceasefire to supervise.
Later in the evening he was asked to meet two of the Six in closed session. The two turned out to be President Tubman and President Diori. They asked Sir Louis to state the Biafran position, which he did. He explained that Biafra’s primordial concern was her security, and that of her citizens’ lives and property. The Biafrans were prepared to discuss ‘One Nigeria’, but wanted to know precisely what that phrase meant first.
Both listening presidents appeared to show understanding of Biafra’s position. President Diori proposed a formula as a basis for peace talks, which included internal and external security for Biafra with an international presence on the spot to guarantee this. The proposal was made verbally in French, and Sir Louis asked for the proposal in writing in English. President Diori agreed and asked the Secretary General of the OAU, Mr Diallo Telli, who was sitting by his side, to withdraw and prepare what he had said on paper and in English.
Mr Telli went out, but within five minutes was back, speaking in rapid French to the Niger President. Hamani Diori repeated to him two or three times the French phrase ‘securitié interne et externe Telli left again, but seemingly did not carry out the Niger President’s bidding, for ten minutes later he was back to say the two OAU presidents were wanted by their colleagues. They were away for forty minutes, and on their return President Diori produced a document in English which spoke only about discussion of peace on the basis of One Nigeria. There was no mention in it of Biafra’s internal or external security.
Sir Louis replied again that he was prepared to discuss One Nigeria but not on the prior condition of his acceptance of a still unexplained One Nigeria. He said he would accept the document if they would delete the three words that implied Biafran prior acceptance of One Nigeria as a pre-condition. With that the night’s parley broke up.
The following morning President Tubman asked Sir Louis if he had seen the New York Times. The Biafran chief delegate said he had not. Tubman said it contained a report from Lagos to the effect that General Gowon had said if the Biafrans would accept the principle of One Nigeria, everything else would be negotiable. President Tubman thought this might provide the answer. Sir Louis replied that he knew the reporter in question, that Gowon’s statement was nothing new, and that he could hardly envisage major diplomatic initiatives being launched on the basis of a newspaper report.
The day passed with more fruitless talk, the two delegations still separated, and Mr Telli using his offices as a messenger between the conference rooms. Sir Louis finished the day with the distinct impression that Mr Telli was a strong supporter of the Federal cause. That evening both delegations were finally summoned to a plenary meeting of the Six. Emperor Haile Selassie handed over to Sir Louis a document in English, already cleared with the Nigerian delegation, which he begged the Biafrans to accept.
To Sir Louis’s concern it was even worse than the document produced by Mr Telli the previous evening. It made quite clear that any future talks would be on the basis of the Biafran prior acceptance of the phrase One Nigeria, and that alone. Sir Louis rejected the document and explained yet again why. He had been invited to Monrovia, he said, to discuss peace without preconditions. He and his colleagues had found that the same Nigerian pre-conditions existed as before, and were apparently supported by the putative peacemakers.
At a later press conference the Biafran Chief Justice expressed his view that the OAU had neither the will nor the ability to make a breakthrough in the present deadlock. No serious attempt was made later to bring the two sides together.
On 31 July, however, the Pope made a four-day visit to Kampala, Uganda, to canonize posthumously a number of Ugandan martyrs to Christianity. It was hoped that the Pontiff’s presence in the continent might provide the occasion for renewed efforts for peace. General Ojukwu proposed a truce for the duration of the Pontiff’s stay on African soil, but this was rejected from Lagos. Although Pope Paul held separate meetings with representatives of both Biafran and Nigerian regimes while at Kampala, nothing came of the meetings.
Towards the end of 1969 observers were again entertaining faint hopes that, with the lassitude towards the war present in both armies and civilian disturbances mounting in Western Nigeria against the war, the New Year might bring some fresh and more meaningful initiative for peace.
Two things, however, militated against such a breakthrough. One was the lack of a mediator who combined the respect of both sides for his strength and the acceptance of both sides for his integrity. The other factor was the Federal regime’s determination to cling to its original belief that a total and decisive solution to the Nigeria–Biafra problem could be achieved by continuing hostilities. In this its mainstay and support remained the British Government, whose ministerial statements in the closing months of 1969 made clear to observers that the official view in London remained that of sustaining and supporting Lagos for a complete victory over Biafra, to be attained if necessary by starvation in the absence of a victory by force of arms.
CHAPTER 13
The Question of Genocide
Genocide is an ugly word. It is the name given to the biggest crime man is capable of. What constitutes genocide in the modern world? What degree of violence offered towards a people justifies the use of the word? What degree of intent is necessary to justify the description? After years of study, some of the world’s best legal brains assisted in drawing up the definition written into the United Nations Convention on Genocide adopted on 9 December 1948. Article Two specifies:
In the present Convention genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as:
a.
Killing of members of the group;
b.
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c.
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about i
ts physical destruction in whole or in part;
d.
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e.
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article One states that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war, is a crime under international law, and Article Four makes plain that constitutional rulers, public officials or private individuals may be held responsible.
Obviously, in time of war men get killed, and as they belong to a national, ethnical, racial or religious group this paragraph is perhaps too wide to be practicable. It is the use of the phrase ‘with intent’ that separates the usual casualties inflicted during war from the crime of genocide. The killing party must be shown to have had, or to have developed, intent to destroy, and the victims must be a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
There are two other points about genocide that have become habitually accepted in law: one is that intent on behalf of the Head of State of the inflicting party need not be proved. An individual general can direct his troops to commit genocide, and the Supreme Commander is held responsible if he cannot control his armed forces. Secondly, the deliberate decimation of the leadership cadres of a racial group, calculated to leave that group without the cream of its educated manpower, can constitute genocide even if the majority of the population is left alive as a helpless mass of semi-literate peasantry. The society may then be presumed to have been emasculated as a group.
The Biafran charges against the Nigerian Government and armed forces rest on their behaviour in five fields: the pogroms of the North, the West and Lagos in 1966; the behaviour of the Nigerian Army towards the civilian population they encountered during the course of the war; the behaviour of the Nigerian Air Force in selection of its targets; the selective killings in various captured areas of chiefs, leaders, administrators, teachers, technicians; and the allegedly deliberate imposition of famine, which was predicted in advance by foreign experts and which during 1968 carried away an estimated 500,000 children between the ages of one and ten years.
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