by Max Weber
The West, however, has acquired a degree of importance and (something which explains the importance) has produced varieties, forms, and kinds of capitalism that have never existed elsewhere. Throughout the world there have been traders: wholesale and retail traders, local and long-distance, there have been moneylending businesses of all kinds, there have been banks with highly varied functions, but functions which at least in essence resembled our sixteenth-century banks; loans for voyages, commenda, businesses, and associations of the limited-liability type, have been widespread, including those run on a businesslike basis. Wherever public corporations required money to finance their undertakings, the financial backers were there, in Babylon, Hellas, India, China, or Rome. They were required for the financing of, especially, wars and piracy, for sending supplies, and for buildings of all kinds. In overseas policy they appeared as colonial entrepreneurs, plantation purchasers and managers, employers of slave labor, or of directly or indirectly press-ganged workers. They were involved in farming out estates, offices and (especially) taxation, in the financing of party bosses for election purposes, and of condottieri for the purpose of civil wars. Finally, they were active as “speculators” in moneymaking opportunities of all kinds.
These kinds of entrepreneur figures, capitalist adventurers, have existed all over the world. Except where they were engaged in trade or in credit and banking business, their opportunities for profit were essentially either purely irrational and speculative or they were centered upon the acquisition of booty by force, whether in the course of waging war or exacted over time by fiscal means (plundering of subject peoples).
Capitalism of various kinds, whether for industrial expansion or large-scale speculation, whether colonial or modern finance capitalism in peace time, but most of all capitalism which is specifically oriented toward warfare, has these characteristics even today in the West. A few (and only a few) sections of international wholesale trade have much in common with it today, as they always have done.
But in the modern period there has appeared in the West alongside this a quite different kind of capitalism, one that has not developed anywhere else on earth, namely, the rational, capitalist organization of (formally) free labor. Only preliminary stages of this can be found elsewhere. Even the organization of unfree labor only attained a certain level of rationality in the plantations and, to a very limited degree, in the workshops [Ergasterien] of ancient times. It attained a rather lower level in feudal service [Fronhöfen] and estate factories, or the domestic industries of the landed estates with their serfs or bonded laborers in the early modern period. As regards free labor, outside the West there is only here and there definite evidence even of “domestic industries.” The employment of day laborers, which of course could be found everywhere, did not lead to manufactories, and not even to the rational organization of craft apprenticeships of the type that existed in the Middle Ages in the West. There were very few and very particular exceptions (for example, state monopolies), most of which differ greatly from modern forms of business organization.
However, rational business organization, based on the opportunities of the market for goods, and not on speculation that is irrational or based on power politics, is not the sole unique feature of Western capitalism. The modern rational organization of capitalist business would not have been possible without two further important developmental elements: the separation of household and business [Betrieb], which absolutely dominates the business life of today, and, closely connected with this, rational bookkeeping. Physical separation of places of work or sale from residence can also be found elsewhere (in the oriental bazaar and in the workshops [Ergasterien] of other cultural regions). The creation of capitalist associations with separate accounting can also be found in East Asia as well as in the East and in ancient times. But compared with the modern autonomy of commercial businesses, these are no more than first steps. This is particularly because the inner means of this autonomy, both our rational business bookkeeping and our legal separation of business assets and personal assets, are completely absent or are only in the early stages of development. [2] Everywhere else there has been a tendency for commercial businesses to be part of the greater household (the “oikos”) of a ruler or landowner: something which Rodbertus recognized as extremely divergent from, indeed precisely opposed to, the modern organization, however great might be the apparent affinity.
However, all these peculiarities of Western capitalism ultimately derive their present significance from the connection with capitalist labor organization. Even what is usually known as “commercialization,” that is, the development of securities and the rationalization of speculation in the form of the stock exchange, may be seen in this connection. For without rational capitalist organization of labor, all this, including the development toward “commercialization,” assuming it would be possible at all, would not be remotely comparable in scope, especially for the social structure and all specifically modern Western problems connected with it. Exact calculation—the foundation for everything else—is only possible on the basis of free labor. And just as (and just because) the world outside the modern West has known no rational organization of labor, so (in consequence) it has known no rational socialism either.
True, along with city economies, municipal food policies, mercantilism and welfare policies imposed by rulers, rationing, a regulated economy, protectionism, and laissez-faire theories (in China), the world has also known communist and socialist economies of many varieties: communism based on family, or the military, state socialist organizations (in Egypt), organizations based on monopoly cartels, and consumer organizations of all kinds. But just as—although municipal market privileges, guilds, and the most varied kinds of legal distinctions between town and country existed in all places at some time—the concept of the “citizen” [Bürger] was lacking everywhere except in the West, and the concept of the “bourgeoisie”7 was lacking everywhere except in the modern West, so the “proletariat” as a class was inevitably lacking, simply because the rational organization of free labor as a business [als Betrieb] was lacking.
“Class struggles” between the strata of creditors and debtors, between landowners and the landless, serfs or leaseholders, between traders and consumers or landowners—all these have existed for a long time in various constellations. But even the Western medieval struggles between putters-out and domestic workers can be found elsewhere only in embryonic form. And the modern antithesis between large-scale industrial entrepreneur and free waged laborer is entirely absent. For this reason, the matrix of the problematic confronting modern socialism could not exist either.
In a universal history of culture, then, the central purely economic problem for us is ultimately not the development of capitalist activity as such (which varies in form only), whether such activity be of the adventurer type or of the trading type, or that which is oriented toward war, politics, or administration, with their opportunities for profit. It is rather the rise of bourgeois business capitalism with its rational organization of free labor. Or, seen from the viewpoint of cultural history, the rise of the Western bourgeoisie [Bürgertum] and its distinctive character, which admittedly is closely related to the rise of the capitalist organization of labor, but is not, of course, simply identical to it. After all, the “citizen” [Bürger] in the estate sense existed before the development of specifically Western capitalism—but only in the West.
Now modern Western capitalism is obviously very largely determined by, among other things, developments in the field of technical possibilities. Its rationality is today essentially dependent upon the calculability of technically decisive factors, which are the bases of exact calculation. This means, in reality, that it is dependent upon the character of Western science, in particular the mathematically and experimentally exact and rationally based natural sciences. On the other hand, the development of these sciences, and of the technology founded upon them, received, and continues to receive, in turn, a vital impetus
from the capitalist interests [Chancen] that attach premiums [Prämien] to the economic exploitation of these sciences. True, the rise of Western science has not been determined by such interests [Chancen]. Decimal calculation and algebra were practiced by the Indians, the inventors of the numerical series system, which, however, was first employed in the service of the developing capitalism of the West, and created no modern system of calculation and accounting in India. Neither was the rise of mathematics and mechanics due to capitalist interests. However, the technical application of scientific knowledge—and this was vitally important for the conditions of life8 of the masses—was stimulated by the economic premiums that in the West were explicitly attached to it. These premiums, however, emanated from the distinctive character [Eigenart] of the social order of the West. The question that must be asked, then, is “From which constituent parts did they emanate?” as they cannot all have been equally important.
Among those parts whose importance is beyond doubt is the rational structure of the law and the administration. Modern rational business capitalism requires both calculable technical tools as well as calculable law and administration conducted according to formal rules, without which no rational private economic business with standing capital and reliable calculation is possible, although adventure capitalism and speculative trading capitalism and all kinds of politically determined capitalism may be perfectly possible. Law and administration of this kind could only be provided for the economy with this degree of precise legal and formal perfection by the West. The question must then be asked: “Whence does the West derive this law?” Among other factors, capitalist interests also undoubtedly smoothed the path for the legal profession [Juristenstandes], with its specialist training in rational law, to dominate the administration of justice and other forms of administration. Every investigation shows this. But it was by no means only or even predominantly these interests that did this. Neither was it they which created that law from within themselves. Certain quite different forces were active in this development. And why did capitalist interests not do the same in China or India? Why was it that in those countries neither science, nor art, nor the state, nor the economy, developed along the paths of rationalization peculiar to the West?
In all the above-quoted cases of this particular character [Eigenart], we are evidently talking about a specific type of “rationalism” peculiar to Western civilization [Kultur]. Now a great many different things can be understood by this word—as we propose to make abundantly clear in what follows. There are, for example, “rationalizations” of mystical contemplation, that is, of a form of behavior which, seen from the viewpoint of other spheres of life [Lebensgebieten], is specifically “irrational.” And there can equally well be rationalizations of the economy, technology, scientific work, education, war, the administration of justice, and of other forms of administration. Furthermore, each one of these spheres can be “rationalized” from extremely varied ultimate perspectives and aims, and what may be “rational” when viewed from one may be “irrational” when seen from another. There have thus been rationalizations in many different spheres of life [Lebenssphären] in extremely varied forms in all cultures. The difference between them in terms of cultural history, however, lies in the different spheres in which they occurred and in the direction taken by the rationalization. The first problem is therefore once again to recognize the distinctive characteristics [Eigenart] of Western rationalism, and, within this, of modern Western rationalism, and to explain how it came into being. In light of the fundamental significance of the economy, each such attempt at explanation must above all give due consideration to the economic conditions. But equally the reverse side of the causal connection must not be forgotten. For just as economic rationalism is dependent on rational technology and rational law, so also it is dependent on the ability and disposition of people [Menschen] in favor of certain kinds of practical, rational conduct of life [Lebensführung]. Where this was thwarted by mental inhibitions, the development of an economically rational conduct of life also ran up against serious inner resistance. Among the most important formative elements of the conduct of life in the past were always magical and religious powers, and the ethical ideas of duty rooted in the belief in them. We shall be dealing with these in the collected and extended essays that follow.
Two older essays have been included at the beginning.9 These attempt to approach, through one important individual point, the aspect of the problem which is usually most difficult to grasp: the extent to which the emergence of an “economic disposition,” the “ethos” of an economic form, was determined by certain religious beliefs. This will be demonstrated by reference to the example of the links between the modern economic ethos and the rational ethic of ascetic Protestantism. Here we shall only pursue one side of the causal relationship. The later essays on the “Economic Ethic of the World Religions” attempt, in an overview of the relationships of the most important religions of civilization [Kulturreligionen] to the economy and social stratification of their environment, to pursue both causal relationships as far as it is necessary to find points of comparison with the development in the West, which we shall be exploring further. Only thus is it possible to set about identifying more or less unambiguously the causal elements of the Western religious economic ethic that, as distinct from others, are peculiar to it. These essays lay no claim to being comprehensive cultural analyses—or anything like them. Rather, they quite explicitly stress whatever contrasted and still contrasts with Western cultural development in each cultural region. They have been chosen for their relevance to what seems important in an exposition of the development of the West from this point of view. No other procedure seemed feasible given the stated purpose. We must, however, expressly point out the limitations of this purpose, in order to avoid misunderstandings. And in another sense, the uninformed reader should be warned against overestimating the significance of these essays. Scholars in the fields of Sinology, Indology, Semitic studies, and Egyptology will certainly find nothing in them that is substantially new to them. It is merely to be hoped that at least they will find nothing essential that they would have to judge to be untrue to the facts. The author cannot tell to what extent he has succeeded in at least approaching this ideal as closely as a layman is able. It is perfectly clear that anyone who is dependent on the use of translations, and must learn to use and assess monumental inscriptions, and documentary and literary sources, in order to find his way about the often highly controversial specialist literature, the value of which he himself is unable to judge independently, has every reason to be very modest about the value of his achievement. This is particularly true when one considers that the amount of available translations of genuine “sources” (that is, of inscriptions and documents) is, in some areas (particularly China), still very small in relation to what exists and what is important.
From all this it is clear that these essays can only be provisional in character, especially those parts which relate to Asia. [3] A final judgment must be left to the experts. And it is only because, for understandable reasons, expert works of scholarship with this particular aim, and from these particular points of view, have not so far been forthcoming, that my essays have been written at all. To an incomparably greater degree and in a very special sense, they are destined to become rapidly “outdated,” even more so than is the fate of all scientific work. In this kind of work, involving comparison with other specialist areas, it is simply unavoidable that such overlap should occur, however regrettable this may be; but one just has to resign oneself to the consequences in terms of a much lower expectation of success. Nowadays, fashion or the yearnings of the literati encourage the belief that the specialist can be dispensed with or reduced to the level of subordinate provider for the “viewer.” Almost all the sciences owe something to the dilettante; they often owe him very valuable insights. But dilettantism as a principle of science would mean the end of science. Those who desire a “show” should go to the cinema. (The
same principle underlies a vast amount of literary material that is also currently on offer in the same area.) [4] Nothing could be further from the thoroughly sober contents of these studies, which are designed to be rigorously empirical, than this disposition. I should like to add that those who are looking for a “sermon” should go to a chapel.
Not one word is devoted to the value relationship that exists between the cultures here treated comparatively. It is true that the whole course of human destiny swirls like a turbulent sea around the one who seeks to view a portion of it. But he will be well advised to keep his little personal comments to himself, as one does when faced with the sight of the ocean and the mountain ranges—unless he knows that he has a vocation for artistic expression or prophetic utterance and is endowed with the necessary gifts. In most other cases all the talk of “intuition” serves merely to conceal a lack of distance from the object of contemplation, and this should be judged in the same way as a similar attitude toward a person.
