Von Starhemberg and Vendôme continued to manoeuvre against each other in Catalonia, but neither achieved a great deal. The French commander died of food poisoning at Vinaroz in June 1712, taking away one of Louis XIV’s best field commanders, but the allies had insufficient strength or the will to push their campaign forward and take advantage of his removal from the scene, other than to attempt a rather ineffective blockade of Gerona. The last British troops left Barcelona in late November. ‘The poor Spaniards, seeing they were left in the lurch, they called us traitors, and all the vile names they could invent, and the common people threw stones at us.’14 Most British and Dutch troops had already been removed from Portugal at the end of 1711, and used to augment the garrisons in Gibraltar and Port Mahon in Minorca, but hostilities along the border stuttered on in a rather aimless way. The following autumn, a late Spanish attempt was made to seize Campo Mayor, near to Elvas on the river Guadiana, before peace brought everything to a halt. The Portuguese garrison resisted valiantly, and reinforcements broke through the Spanish lines twice to reach the fortress, and the besiegers’ main magazine was blown up by a lucky mortar bomb. An attempt to storm the main bastion was made by the Marquis de Bay’s troops on 17 October, but was beaten off with heavy losses, and when news came of a suspension of hostilities the siege had to be lifted, and the Spanish army rather reluctantly withdrew across the border once more. When the remaining British troops made their way to Gibraltar by marching across Andalusia, with Spanish permission of course, it was remembered that the locals showed great hospitality and generosity to the soldiers, who reciprocated by behaving very well on the march. The Portuguese regiments that made their way home from Catalonia received a cooler reception on the way, but were not actively hindered in their progress. The armistice between Spain and Portugal, for that was all it was, had to be renewed every four months until the treaty for peace was ratified by the two countries in February 1715.
Meanwhile, in northern France Eugene was keen to maintain pressure on the French, and the allied army crossed the Selle river on 8 June 1712, accompanied still by a British detachment; Ormonde had agreed to take part in the operation to attack Le Quesnoy, because to refuse would be to publicly declare the duplicitous hand he was having to play. Marshal Villars had been assured that active British operations were at an end while negotiations for peace were ongoing, and he protested at what seemed to be such a breach of good faith. That a far greater breach of good faith was in active play against Ormonde’s own allies in the campaign was of no concern to Villars. Relations between Eugene and Ormonde were understandably under some strain, and when the British general advised the prince to abandon the siege of Le Quesnoy, the tart response was that the operations would instead be pressed with all vigour. ‘The English, for their part,’ Colonel Jean-Martin de la Colonie wrote, ‘did not separate themselves from the allied army, but allowed the siege to progress without participating in the work.’15 The Elector of Hanover remained suspicious of what was taking place behind closed doors, and Queen Anne wrote to her heir and eventual successor on the throne in London on 17 June 1712, in order to reassure him:
You will see with satisfaction how much at heart I have had the true interests of your Family; and that you will be agreeably surprised to see how France’s offers approach towards a just and reasonable satisfaction for all the Allies, while containing great advantages for my subjects, by which they may hope to repay themselves somewhat for the heavy expense of a long and arduous war, of which the principal burden has fallen on them. The opposition which I have met during the course of this negotiation, and the disunion which has so inopportunely arisen among the confederates might have produced the worst consequences; but I hope with God’s blessing, to bring this great Work, already far advanced, to a happy end.16
The queen spoke with perfect truth over who had for much of the war carried the greatest share of the burden, and she would have no more of it. In effect, Great Britain had got what it needed from the war, as had her allies if only they could bring themselves to see it.
Out on campaign, meanwhile, there was a growing conviction that the British troops were no longer to be relied on, additional measures were been taken by Eugene to ensure the security of the allied camp. On 28 June Ormonde sent instructions to the commanders of the foreign troops in British pay to be ready to march and quit the campaign, but the response was immediate and quelling – in effect that they would not march off without express instructions from their own princes. Three days later the 3,000-strong French garrison of Le Quesnoy submitted as prisoners of war, and the British troops left the allied army soon afterwards, marching north to encampments around Ghent and Bruges. Most other towns in the southern Netherlands firmly and with manifest disdain closed their gates to the British regiments, but control of the valuable fortified port of Dunkirk was handed over to the British, pending demolition of the defences, for that was a part of the secret deal that had been struck.
Eugene and his Dutch allies, together with the German and Danish contingents, were still in the field, still flushed with success and confidence. Their French opponents could only look ruefully back at a long list of defeats and setbacks, Le Quesnoy being only the latest over several years of disappointment. The French commander occupied a good defensive position between Arras and Cambrai, however, and would not easily be manoeuvred into the open. To try and achieve this, Eugene struck at Landrecies just to the south of the Forest of Mormal, but his lines of supply and communication back to Douai were lengthy and exposed, while the French still held fortified places such as Mauberge and Valenciennes within striking distance. As Colonel de la Colonie remembered: ‘The siege of Landrecies took him so much further afield that he found his convoys were no longer safe from attack.’17 On 22 July Villars advanced across the Selle river, and by turning quickly northwards within two days had invested the allied-held fortified encampment at Denain. Villars now threatened Eugene’s lines of supply, and the hunted had turned hunter in consequence. Denain was held by a garrison 8,000 strong, under the very capable command of Arnold Joost van Keppel, the Earl of Albemarle. Although Eugene counter-marched from Landrecies with his army to relieve Denain, the French attacked and routed an outpost at Neuville on 24 July, and as they advanced, Albemarle had to draw his garrison in to a close defence of the encampment:
Arrangements were made to invest these entrenchments to a certain degree, and as the enemy’s cannon were firing point-blank at us, the leading brigades were ordered to lie down to avoid the shot as much as possible … In the orders for the assault the front ranks of our troops were directed to sling their muskets and use their sword, so as to have greater freedom in scaling the parapets. Those in rear followed with bayonets fixed.18
Villars attacked with great skill and determination, and Albemarle was forced back upon a single pontoon bridge to try and get his troops across the river Escaut. This structure collapsed under the strain and 5,000 allied soldiers were killed, drowned or taken prisoner by the victorious French. ‘In a moment they were engulfed in the stream, and all that were left of the eighteen battalions were two or three thousand who were cut off and taken prisoner.’19 Amongst the allied prisoners taken were Albemarle, the Prince of Nassau-Siegen, Count Lippe and Count Hohenzollern, while Eugene had been obliged to watch the unfolding catastrophe from the far side of the river, with those few cavalry squadrons he had managed to bring up to try and save the day. The loss in killed and wounded suffered by Villars in achieving this brilliant success was modest by comparison, although several officers of high rank were counted amongst the casualties, such had been the vigour with which they had pressed their attack. Louis XIV was understandably elated at the news of the victory and he wrote to the marshal: ‘Nothing could more favourably advance and assist the negotiations for peace, than to recover this superiority that my troops have had for so long but which they unhappily had lost for the last several years.’20
In the wake of such a defeat Prince Eugene had to a
bandon the operations against Landrecies and fall back to recover his lines of supply and communication. ‘I was obliged to raise the siege of Landrecy, and to approach Mons, for the purpose of subsisting my army.’21 A huge depot he had established at Marchiennes on the river Scarpe fell into French hands, as did the minor fortresses of Mortagne and Saint Amand. Douai was invested by Villars on 12 August, and with only a weak garrison with which to defend the place, the governor had to submit in the second week of September. Eugene would have made an attack to relieve the place, but the Dutch, shocked at the débâcle at Denain and aware that an agreement for peace was in the offing were reluctant to do so. Le Quesnoy was regained by Villars on 6 October, and Bouchain fell fifteen days later. In the space of a few short weeks, the French commander had regained at remarkably little cost almost all that had been lost to the allies in the previous two years, and Louis XIV, both relieved and exultant at this remarkable turnaround in French fortunes, had solemn services of thanksgiving held by the Archbishop of Paris. The grim lesson for the Grand Alliance was that it could not fight on without the British contingents, who had now left the field, or operate without the cash subsidies that had flowed at one time from Queen Anne’s treasury. Great Britain was no longer an active participant in the war, having arranged matters to satisfaction with the French, and it remained for her erstwhile allies to do the same.
The articles for peace having been agreed between British and France, Holland had little option but to follow suit, and this was duly done with the conclusion of what collectively became known as the Treaty of Utrecht. (See Appendix 2 for the treaty terms.) The Dutch got their Barrier once more, partly carved out of French territory gained by Marlborough and Eugene in long years of arduous campaigning. This was an improvement on the old Barrier that had been rashly swept away in 1701, but not as extensive as they had hoped for in 1709.22 Louis XIV regained Lille, Aire Sur la Lys and St Venant, but failed in an attempt to have Tournai restored to France. The King’s ally, the Elector of Bavaria, was restored to his estates, but gained little else from his devious engagement in the war. The King in Prussia was rewarded for his support for the Grand Alliance with the territory of Upper Guelderland, while Nice and Savoy were returned to Victor-Amadeus of Savoy, who also gained Sicily. The thrones of France and Spain were to be kept apart, and the renunciation by Philip V on this key provision ran:
We have determined both to establish this treaty on a firm footing and to spread the boon of peace, thus ensuring the good of all people and the peaceful balance of power in Europe … to accede to the representations made by England and approved by His Majesty, Our Grandfather [Louis XIV] and, so that it shall henceforth never come within the realms of possibility for the Crown to be wed with that of France, to agree to renounce, in Our own Name and in that of all Our descendants, all rights to the French Throne, which renunciation shall be matched by an equal and opposite renunciation [by his younger brother the Duc de Berry] adhering to this fundamental maxim that the balance of power within Europe shall be maintained, all steps shall be taken to guarantee that at no time shall this inheritance fall to the House of Austria, for, should this happen, this House, even without the domains and territories attaching to the Empire, would be made formidably powerful, a factor which in the past made the separation of the hereditary estates enjoyed by the House of Austria from the body of the Spanish Realms a laudable enterprise … In the event of our dying without issue, or of Our line being for any reason interrupted and not enjoying true continuance, the heir to this Our throne shall be the Duke of Savoy and His sons.23
Clearly, the hand of Louis XIV was in this: the old concern at the prospect of Habsburg encirclement of France had not lessened with the passage of the years. As set out in the treaty, if the line of Philip V failed, France agreed that Victor-Amadeus or his own descendants, would inherit the throne in Madrid. It might be thought then, that the wily duke, who had backed first one side and then the other, was the real victor in the war. Portugal gained no Spanish territory as hoped, but her frontiers in South America were made more secure against encroachment. After some late arguing over such details as fishing rights off Nova Scotia and the precise extent of the renewed Dutch Barrier the treaty was signed on 11 April 1713 at Utrecht, firstly between Great Britain and France, then between France, Savoy and Prussia, and lastly between France and Holland. The Treaty was brought to London on 14 April where it was received with enormous acclamation. Peace, however dubiously achieved, and glorious or otherwise, was very welcome: ‘Last night,’ an English lady wrote, ‘we had a vast number of bonfires in every village.’24
Austria tried to fight on alone to gain better terms, but the cause was irretrievably lost once Great Britain and Holland had agreed things with Louis XIV:
The Emperor had made up his mind to continue the war, in order to exact better conditions touching certain points that concerned him in particular so that if, after all, he was obliged to accept peace, it should not be said afterwards that lesser Powers had restricted his demands.25
As it turned out, Vienna was in no fit shape to fight on alone, and little of significant value was achieved. The southern Netherlands were no longer to be the key battleground, and attention switched to the length of the middle and upper Rhine.
Kaiserlauten was captured on 24 June 1713, and Marshal Bezon moved from Alsace to invest the fortress of Landau. Prince Eugene had been hopeful of holding the line of the Rhine, but:
The tardiness of the princes and circles [of the Empire] prevented me from anticipating the French on the upper Rhine … as I clearly perceived that Villars meant to make an attempt on Landau, I ordered lines to be formed at Etlingen, within which I sent one half of my army, and posted the other at Mühlberg, where I hoped my reinforcements would arrive before the fall of Landau; but the Prince of Württemberg was obliged to capitulate.26
Württemberg had put up a creditable defence: ‘A thoroughly well-informed and brave man, who took every possible opportunity of delaying our approaches,’ Colonel de la Colonie recalled.27 The Marquis de Biron was amongst those wounded in the French trenches, losing an arm; good terms were not offered to the garrison by Villars, and they had to surrender ‘at discretion’ as prisoners of war on 20 August.
Having taken this key fortress, Villars once more raided imperial lands in Germany, and began a siege of Freiburg on 1 October. The garrison under the command of Baron d’Arsch fought bravely from well-prepared works, but after a bloodily expensive French assault on the main walls on 2 November had to withdraw into the citadel. ‘What added to the furious and murderous character of this action was the fact that we had pitched upon the same night for our attack that the besieged had themselves elected to make a sortie upon us.’28 Villars made no attempt to storm the citadel, but threatened to burn the town if the garrison did not submit. The baron was permitted to ask instructions from the emperor in Vienna, who directed that he should yield rather than incur such destruction, and accordingly d‘Arsch capitulated on 21 November. With the coming of bad weather and biting cold, the opposing armies tramped wearily off to their quarters
Negotiations to achieve a peace progressed through the winter months, with Eugene and Villars taking a prominent part – they had been old friends and comrades when fighting the Ottoman Turks in Hungary when young and this helped in the discussions. ‘Never did men embrace with more military sincerity,’ the prince remembered, ‘and I may venture to add, with more esteem and attachment.’29 In March 1714 peace was agreed between Vienna and Versailles with the Treaty of Rastadt, and the subsequent treaties of Baden and Madrid. So, at last, quiet came to a weary western Europe. Long critical years of outright war, devastation of land and property, and burdensome taxation were past, and there was understandably general relief that it should be so. Much had been achieved by both sides in the conflict, although ambitions, both spoken and unspoken, reasonable and exorbitant as they might have been, had been so high that much was also lost and regretted. In particular, Loui
s XIV, whose fortunes had been so low in the terrible years 1706 to 1709, could have felt with justification that the subsequent recovery of the French position was remarkable. The Marquis de Torcy wrote:
Who would have said at this time, that the property of the formidable Alliance of the enemies of France and Spain had reached its final limit … these proud warriors, so drunk with their successes, would, confounded in their designs, restore to the King the most important fortresses they had captured, that there would no longer be any question of their demanding hostages to guarantee the inviolable word of a great King, nor of proposing as the foundation of a Treaty odious preliminaries.30
The final sad act of the long war for Spain took place in Catalonia, where the people had taken up the cause of Archduke Charles and alone held firm to their allegiance. They had, of course, at first been reluctant to support the Habsburg claimant to the throne, but with the likelihood of British naval blockade of their ports, and with comforting assurances ‘of the Queen’s support’,31 they had risen in favour of the archduke and remained steadfast to the cause they had espoused when others fell away. A provision of the Treaty of Utrecht stipulated that, once allied troops had left Catalonia, a general amnesty would be offered, but this important provision was not included in the agreement between Great Britain and Spain. When von Starhemberg evacuated Barcelona with the bulk of his Austrian, Dutch and Palatine troops, as required under treaty terms, he contrived to hand the city over to the Catalans and not to the Duca de Populi who had confidently expected to take possession in the name of Philip V. Resentment in Madrid at what appeared to be double-dealing was immediate.
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) Page 26
