4. Wolf, p. 506.
5. Ibid, p. 500.
6. Nada, pp. 255–6.
7. Wolf, pp. 504–5.
8. Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain, Volume III, pp. 85–6.
9. Langallerie, p. 104.
10. St John, Volume I, p. 182.
11. Cronin, p. 311.
12. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 133.
13. Petrie, pp. 279–81.
14. St John, p. 183.
15. Langallerie, p. 106.
16. Wolf, p. 509.
17. St John, Volume I, pp. 185–6.
18. Ibid.
19. St John, Volume I, pp. 262–3. The Princesse des Ursins was described by the Duc de St Simon as being ‘Tall, a brunette, with blue eyes of the most varied expression, in figure perfect, with a most exquisite bosom; her face, without being beautiful, was charming; she was extremely noble in air, very majestic in demeanour … She was eminently fitted for intrigue.’
20. Wolf, p. 524.
21. Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain, p. 248.
22. See Francis, p. 19 for interesting comments on this.
23. St John, Volume I, pp. 190–1.
24. Ibid, p. 192.
25. Wolf, p. 516.
26. St John, Volume I, p. 192.
27. Wolf., p. 526.
28. Shoberl, p. 65.
29. St John, Volume I, p. 193.
30. Wolf, p. 518.
31. St John, Volume I, p. 193.
32. Churchill, Book One, p. 481.
Chapter 2
1. Churchill, Book One, p. 450.
2. Langallerie, pp. 121–3. A rather more charitable explanation of the reasons for the Elector of Bavaria to ally himself to Louis XIV, contrary to his already declared allegiance to the emperor, is given by Colonel Jean-Martin De La Colonie, a French officer in the Bavarian service. ‘He was surrounded by powerful enemies, and his timorous friends abandoned him day by day … The choice only remained to him, either to be an ally of the Emperor, and make war against the Duke of Anjou, son of his dearly loved sister, or to join the King of France, and support his nephew on the Spanish throne, which had fallen legitimately to him.’ See Horsley, p. 77.
3. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 138.
4. William III’s instructions to Marlborough in negotiations with the Dutch States-General over the formation of the Grand Alliance were precise. The brief the earl held was so far-reaching that he was:
At liberty to enter into negotiations for the ends aforesaid in any other place that shall be thought proper for that purpose … You are to enter forthwith into such negotiations with the ministers of France and Spain and other potentates at The Hague, in concert with the ministers of the States-General to obtain the conditions following: That the Most Christian Majesty [Louis XIV] shall order all his troops, that now are, or shall be in garrison in any of the Spanish Towns in the Netherlands, actually to retire from thence, so as the same shall be entirely evacuated of French troops.
(See Churchill, Book One, pp. 1000–2 for further details on this correspondence.)
5. England was bound by treaty to go to the aid of Sweden if called on, but this did not occur, as Charles XII pursued his own wayward path.
6. Cronin, p. 315.
7. St John, Volume I, p. 231.
8. Chandler, Military Memoirs: Robert Parker and Comte de Merode-Westerloo, pp. 12–13.
9. Churchill, Book One, p. 481.
10. St John, Volume I, p. 237. Barbezieux was the son of François-Michel de Tellier, Marquis de Louvois, the formidable and talented French Minister for War who served Louis XIV so long and so well.
11. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 162.
12. St John, Volume I, p. 242.
13. Langallerie, p. 171.
14. St John, Volume I, p. 176.
15. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 146.
16. Ibid, p. 180. See also Hatton, George I, p. 103.
Chapter 3
1. Langallerie, pp. 198–9.
2. Spanish forces available to Philip V in 1702–3 comprised just 5,097 horse and 13,268 foot. Training and standards of equipment were quite feeble. See Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain, p. 60.
3. St John, Volume I, p. 245.
4. Ibid, pp. 196–7.
5. Marshal Villeroi was kept in comfortable detention in Austria after his capture at Cremona, as an honoured prisoner first at Innsbruck and then at Graz. He was released to return to France nine months later and punctiliously sent Prince Eugene 50,000 livres to cover the cost of his board and lodging, but this sum was promptly returned. The Duc de St Simon’s opinion of the episode, unusual in being the only time someone of Villeroi’s rank was taken prisoner, was that ‘in truth it was no fault of the Marshal, who had arrived at Cremona the day before the surprise, that he was taken prisoner directly he set foot in the street. How could he know of the aqueduct?’ See St John, Volume I, p. 198, for further details on this.
6. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 253.
7. Jenkins, p. 96.
8. Churchill, Book One, p. 572.
9. Ibid, p. 573.
10. Parnell, p. 23.
11. Francis, p. 49.
12. Ibid, p. 51.
13. Parnell, p. 29.
14. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 265.
15. Langallerie, pp. 198–9.
16. The French ships captured in Vigo Bay were the Prompte (76 guns), Ferme (74), Bourbon (68), Modére (54), Assuré (66) and Triton (42). The ships sunk or beached were the Jesus-Marie-Josephe (76), Esperance (70), Superbe (70), Sirene (62) and Voluntaire (46). The ships burned were the Forte (76), Oriflame (64) (whose commander Captain Fricambault blew the ship up, killing himself), Prudent (64), Solide (56), Dauphine (44), Entrepenant (24), Choquante (8) and Terror (fireship). See also Parnell, p. 37 for additional details on this epic action.
17. Philip V received nearly 600,000 silver pesos, as the royal share, from the cargo already landed at Vigo, while retaining a further 6.5 million (much of it from Dutch and English-owned cargoes) to help fund his military campaigns and partly to repay his grandfather for the expense of the French war effort. See Francis, p. 54.
18. Ibid, p. 45.
19. Schonenberg could be said to be a Spaniard, having been born in Antwerp in the Spanish Netherlands, although it is possible that he was also granted English nationality by King William III.
20. Cabrera publicly declared for the Habsburg cause in January 1703 after his property in Madrid was seized. See Francis, p. 65.
21. That Great Britain benefitted hugely from the treaty with Portugal and the enhanced opportunities for trade can be seen in the pamphleteer comment made in 1713 that ‘Tis the Portugal trade that has supported us in the war, and without it we should soon find the peace more burdensome than the war.’ See Trevelyan, Blenheim, pp. 299–300.
22. Either by accident or design the Dutch never did formally ratify the treaty with Portugal, and refused on that basis to press ahead with the terms in 1713.
Chapter 4
1. Wolf, p. 521.
2. Ibid.
3. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 89.
4. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 153.
5. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 94.
6. Wolf, p. 521.
7. Ibid, p. 522.
8. Murray, Volume I, pp. 48–9.
9. Wolf, p. 521.
10. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 154.
11. Ibid.
12. Wolf, p. 523.
13. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 119.
14. Ibid, p. 123.
15. Langallerie, p. 219.
16. Chandler, Military Memoirs; Captain Robert Parker and Comte de Merode-Westerloo, pp. 151–2.
17. Langallerie, p. 221.
18. Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 118.
19. Horsley, pp. 131–2.
20. Ibid, p. 134.
21. Wolf, p. 527.
22. Treve
lyan, Blenheim, p. 319.
23. Wolf, p. 529.
24. Horsley, pp. 144–5.
25. Langallerie, p. 212.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, p. 531.
28. Halevy, p. 629.
29. Wolf, p. 629.
30. Vendôme was never made a Marshal of France, although he is often referred to as such.
31. St John, Volume I, p. 268. Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy wrote to the States-General in The Hague on 8 October 1703:
The jealousies of France against us, upon our espousing the common cause, has induced her to treat us with an unheard of violence, contrary to all sorts of good faith, having disarmed and made prisoners of war all our officers and soldiers which were in the army of the Two Crowns in Italy. We inform your High Mightinesses therewith, being well pleased that a treatment of this nature, gives us an opportunity of showing you the desire that we have to join ourselves to the Allies; depending upon your friendship in assisting us with all necessary succours, vigorously to maintain so just a cause, for which we are ready to sacrifice all that belongs to us, and wishing you all sort of prosperity, we pray you to believe that we are in all sincerity.
See Langallerie, p. 231.
32. Churchill, Book One, p. 719.
Chapter 5
1. Churchill, Book I, p. 807.
2. Langallerie, p. 225.
3. Murray, Volume I, p. 258.
4. A witty doggerel rhyme sung by the troops who marched up the Rhine with Marlborough on the road that led them to Blenheim, is quoted in Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 220:
Here’s forty shillings on the drum
For them that volunteers to come
With shirts and clothes and present pay
When over the hills and far away
Come on the boys, and you shall see
We every one shall Captains be
To whore and rant as well as they
When over the hills and far away
5. T’Hopf, p. 105.
6. Chandler, Military Memoirs, Captain Robert Parker and Comte de Merode-Westerloo, p. 31.
7. Langallerie, p. 237.
8. Wolf, p. 534.
9. Murray, Volume I, p. 319.
10. Horsley, pp. 32–3.
11. Ibid, p. 162.
12. Langallerie, p. 239.
13. Churchill, Book One, p. 807.
14. Lediard, Volume I, p. 344.
15. Churchill, Book One, p. 807.
16. Wolf, p. 536.
17. Murray, Volume I, p. 345.
18. Langallerie, p. 244.
19. Murray, Volume I, pp. 378–9.
20. Trevelyan, Blenheim, pp. 368–9.
21. Churchill, Book One, p. 837.
22. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 401.
23. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 223.
24. St John, Volume I, pp. 284–5.
25. Ibid, p. 290.
26. Tindal, p. 77.
27. The construction of Blenheim Palace would take far longer than anticipated and cost much more than originally thought. When the duke’s influence failed, and memories of his great military triumph faded, this ongoing project became the cause of much dispute.
Chapter 6
1. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 190.
2. Ibid, p. 164.
3. St John, Volume I, p. 271. Orry had sent a message to Puységur that the stores of munitions and materiel for the coming campaign would be replenished, but this was read to mean that they had been replenished. When the empty storehouses were inspected, therefore, fraud and theft was suspected, and accusations began to fly, until the misunderstanding was corrected once Berwick had made enquiries.
4. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 168.
5. Francis, pp. 86–7.
6. Brown, pp. 143–4.
7. Ibid.
8. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 171.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, p. 173.
11. Ibid, pp. 171–2. The capitulation of the garrison of Castello de Vide was undoubtedly premature, and demonstrated very well the strains of having to work with allies who might not share values and opinions. The Duke of Berwick recalled the negotiations that preceded the giving up of the place: ‘At the end of four days siege, our cannon having begun to scratch the wall, the Portuguese governor desired to capitulate, and sent, as hostages an English and a Portuguese colonel. It was proposed to them to yield themselves as prisoners of war; upon which the Englishman began to swear and storm, saying he would never consent to it; but we found means to intimidate the governor, by assuring him, that if he defended himself, we would put all the men to the sword, while the women would necessarily be exposed to the brutality of the soldiers; but that if he surrendered at present, we would leave him and the officers all their equipages, and engage to prevent all plunder and disorder in the town. He then consented to surrender himself prisoner of war, in which the English not acquiescing the Portuguese introduced us into the town. The English troops were compelled to submit to the same fate as the rest of the garrison, which consisted of two battalions of Portuguese.’
12. Francis, p. 107.
13. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 410.
14. Ibid, p. 415.
15. Bradford, p. 43.
16. Langallerie, p. 267.
17. Brown, p. 152.
18. Pla, p. 30.
19. The French ships lost by Admiral Jean Pointis off Gibraltar were the Lys (88 guns), Magnanime (74), Marquis (56), Ardente (66) and Arrogante (56). See Francis, p. 145.
20. Brown, p. 147.
21. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 174.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid, p. 175.
24. While the fighting across the river Agueda was at its height, Berwick received a helpful letter from King Philip V giving him permission to engage his opponents there after all!
25. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 176.
26. Francis, p. 158.
27. Trevelyan, Ramillies and the Union with Scotland, p. 65.
28. Brown, pp. 157–8.
29. Ibid.
30. Peterborough claimed and was accorded the credit for the capture of Barcelona, but the decision to attack Fort Montjuich could only be taken in consultation with Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt. The naval commanders also had to be included, and Archduke Charles had, nominally at least, to give his consent. However, had the operation failed, all the blame and odium would have fallen on Peterborough, so the claim and apportioning of credit was not without some merit. To many common soldiers, however, the Prince was the hero of the hour. ‘In this action we lost the brave Prince of Hess, whom the Catalonians loved better than they did him whom we had brought to be their king.’ See Atkinson, ‘A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War,’ p. 14.
31. Ibid.
32. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, p. 176.
33. Francis, p. 189.
34. Carleton, pp. 103–4.
35. Ibid, p. 105.
36. Langallerie, p. 287.
37. Francis, pp. 204 and 218. Colonel St Pierre of the Royal Dragoons wrote of the Earl of Peterborough that ‘He is the first general that I know that can make war without men or money.’
38. Brown, p. 145.
39. Even when Archduke Charles received a large annuity from the estate of the deceased Emperor Leopold I in 1705, the sum received was hardly sufficient to cover his normal household expenses.
40. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 182.
41. Ibid, p. 187.
42. The Duke of Berwick’s uncle, John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, had been offered a commission in the French army when a young man. He had refused this, feeling (quite rightly as it turned out with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685), that as a Protestant he could not hope to rise far in the service of Louis XIV.
Chapter 7
1. St John, Volume I, pp. 329–30.
2. Taylor, Volume I, p. 274
.
3. St John, Volume I, pp. 329–30.
4. Ibid.
5. Murray, Volume II, p. 74.
6. Churchill, Book One, p. 937.
7. Taylor, Volume 1, p. 281.
8. Wolf, pp. 541–2.
9. Ibid.
10. Henderson, pp. 117–18.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, p. 119
13. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, pp. 356–7.
14. Ibid, pp. 363–4.
15. St John, Volume I, p. 336.
16. Henderson, p. 121.
17. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 402.
18. Brown, p. 184.
19. St John, Volume I, p. 338.
20. Ibid.
21. Burrell, p. 79.
22. Taylor, Volume I, p. 387.
23. Wolf, pp. 543–4.
24. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, pp. 177–8.
25. Langallerie, p. 308.
26. Churchill, Book Two, p. 135.
27. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, p. 18.
28. St John, Volume I, p. 340.
29. Taylor, Volume I, p. 338.
30. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, p. 2.
31. Ibid, p. 190.
32. Henderson, p. 125.
33. St John, Volume I, p. 344.
34. In a formal siege, the attacking army would protect itself by building lines of contravallation facing towards the fortress, and lines of circumvallation facing out, towards any enemy army that might approach to lift the siege operations.
35. Henderson, p. 131.
36. St John, Volume I, p. 344.
37. Shoberl, p. 99.
38. Marshal Marsin had a premonition of his own death, leaving a letter with his priest before the onset of the battle at Turin which read, in part: ‘Ever since I received the orders of the King to go to Italy I have not been able to clear from my mind the conviction that I shall be killed in the campaign; and Death, in the workings of God’s pity, thrust itself upon me at every moment and possesses me day and night.’ See Churchill, Book Two, p. 174 for more details on this intriguing prediction.
39. Shoberl, p. 101.
40. Langallerie, p. 315.
41. Shoberl, p. 101.
42. Ibid, p. 277.
43. Ibid, p. 102. Of almost as much importance to the Grand Alliance, the well-populated Italian states were opened to trade by the Maritime Powers, whose fleets already cruised at will and dominated the trading routes through the Mediterranean.
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) Page 30
