for a cause. After his suicide, support for Japa nese military action in Korea
increased.
At the time, most Japa nese leaders, including Emperor Meiji and Ito Hi-
robumi, hoped to avoid conflict and to resolve the prob lems with China
and Korea through diplomacy. Li Hongzhang, who was aware that a Japa-
nese invasion of Korea might provoke a Rus sian response, also wanted to
resolve the Korean issue through diplomacy. Officially, China still had su-
zerainty over Korea, with the right to approve Korea’s foreign- policy deci-
sions but not to interfere with its domestic affairs. However, for centuries
China had not actively exercised its rights of suzerainty. In November 1875,
when Japan dispatched Mori Arinori as its first minister (the equivalent of
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china and japan
a present- day ambassador) to Beijing, Mori sought Chinese support for
Japa nese trade with Korea. When Mori Arinori met with Zongli Yamen
officials for a series of discussions, the Chinese officials pointed out that
Korea was a Chinese de pen dency, but they said they could not interfere in
Korea’s domestic affairs and therefore could not ask Korea to open up trade
with Japan. In January 1876, when Mori Arinori and Li Hongzhang were
negotiating over Korea, they both sought to reach a peaceful agreement.
Mori, who saw Japan’s interest as opening ports and carry ing on trade, not
in sending troops, advocated that Korea be treated under international law
as a sovereign state.
The Kanghwa Treaty and the Opening of Wonsan and Inchon
Ito Hirobumi, who doubted that pro gress could be made in opening Korea
by working with China, urged that Japan should work with Korea directly.
Korea should make such decisions, he said, not China. In their discussions
with Japan about Korea, the Chinese maintained that Korea made its de-
cisions in de pen dently, but after 1872, in discussions with Japan over Korea,
China took an increasingly proactive role. In 1873, when King Kojong
reached the age of twenty- one and replaced his father, the Taewongun, as
ruler of Korea, he proved to be more willing than his father to consider
opening up and cooperating with Japan. In February 1876, just months after
the Japa nese ship the Unyo had entered Korean waters, Japan sent an emis-
sary to Korea to conclude an agreement on opening up. King Kojong signed
the Kanghwa Treaty, which allowed Japan to trade in three Korean ports.
Pusan, the port at the southern tip of Korea that had long been open, was
soon reopened, but the Koreans dragged their feet in opening the other two
ports, Wonsan and Inchon. Some Koreans had begun to advocate following
the example of Japan: opening and modernizing to resist the Western
powers, but they lost out to conservatives. However, Japan continued to
exert pressure. Wonsan, in northeast Korea, was opened by Japa nese naval
forces in 1880. At the time, the Koreans still refused to open Inchon, but
with additional Japa nese pressure they fi nally yielded and opened Inchon
in 1883.
As China and Japan began to discuss the Korean issue, the Chinese
started to suspect that Japan’s desires for a presence on the peninsula did
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
not accord with their own interests. Even Saigo Takamori, who in 1873 was
ready to fight to open trade with Korea, had not expressed territorial am-
bitions, but by the mid-1870s some in Japan were considering the possibility
that their country might someday be strong enough to occupy Korea. Li
Hongzhang openly expressed the fear that Japan was developing territorial
ambitions. The Chinese and Japa nese continued to talk about cooperating
against threats from the Western Eu ro pe ans and the Rus sians, but by the
mid-1870s they had become more wary of each other, and an uprising in
Korea in 1882 precipitated a clash.
Japan’s Military Ambitions: Coordinated Plan
or Unpredictable Pro cess?
After Japan moved ahead of China in the 1870s and the 1880s, with its de-
veloping industrial state, educated and patriotic citizenry, and growing mil-
itary strength, did it already have a plan to conquer China?
Some Chinese scholars see a continuity in Japan’s determination to con-
quer China, beginning with Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea in the late six-
teenth century. In their view, Hideyoshi’s aims were revived in the 1850s
when Japan and China resumed contact and Japan expanded into the
Ryukyus and Korea, and later by the attack on China that set off the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–1895— events that led to the occupation of Taiwan,
the expansion into Manchuria after the end of the Russo- Japanese War in
1905, the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the invasion and occupation
of much of the rest of China from 1937–1945. In the view of these scholars,
the so- called friendship offered by the Japa nese was a tactical strategy they
employed as they gathered strength to carry out more invasions. Japan would
temporarily accept a nearby buffer state, then move to take it over and make
the next area beyond it a buffer state, and then move to take that state over
as well. They believed that the Japa nese, realizing that China was too big to
absorb at once, aimed to divide China and then conquer it one part at a time.
In their view, Japa nese claims of friendship were not trustworthy; rather,
they were deceitful expressions calculated to lull the Chinese into compla-
cency as Japan gradually expanded its control.
These Chinese scholars also acknowledge that Chinese leaders prior to
the Sino- Japanese War of 1894–1895 were too proud to take Japan seriously
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china and japan
and lacked responsibility to their country to study, understand, and respond
to the actions taken by the Japa nese.
There is evidence that at each of these stages, from Hideyoshi to Ishi-
wara Kanji, who set off the Japa nese takeover of Manchuria (see Biogra-
phies of Key Figures), there were those in Japan who did indeed intend to
conquer China. When Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea in 1592, he
clearly had the aim of advancing into China and conquering it. In 1597,
Hideyoshi’s troops were again on the march with the intention of invading
China. In the eigh teenth century, scholars like Hayashi Shihei advocated
that Japan should plan to conquer China. When Yamagata Aritomo intro-
duced universal military conscription in 1873, he announced that troops
might be required to respond to China. In 1878, after Katsura Taro returned
from spending six years studying the Germany military, Yamagata sought
his help in building a modern military for Japan. After the Meiji Restora-
tion, the Japa nese government inherited a small number of ships and per-
sonnel who had served the Satsuma domain and formed a national navy,
and in the mid-1880s the Japa nese Navy undertook a large- scale expansion.
Eto Shimpei, originally from the Hizen domain (present- day Saga prefec-
ture), who became minister of justice in 1872, proposed at the time that
Japan should
secretly send monks to China to gather information in case
a conflict with China were to break out.
However, other Chinese historians, along with Japa nese and Western
scholars who study Sino- Japanese relations, find no evidence that the early
Meiji leaders constructed an integrated long- term plan for conquering the
surrounding areas and moving on to conquer China. Japa nese po liti cal
leaders in the 1860s and the 1870s were primarily concerned with managing
domestic po liti cal developments and defending Japan against threats from
Rus sia and the Western powers, not with planning military ventures against
China. At each stage of Japa nese aggression there were many Japa nese
leaders who advocated maintaining peaceful relations with neighboring
countries and avoiding military conflict. But at each stage there were also
Japa nese radicals who wanted to take more aggressive actions and over the
years several po liti cal leaders, including prime ministers, were assassinated
because they insisted on pursuing a more moderate course.
Mainstream scholars see the Japa nese invasions as resulting from rad-
ical groups within Japan taking aggressive actions that some Japa nese po-
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
liti cal leaders tried to stop and others passively accepted for fear of further
assassinations or other radical actions. The decisions to carry out such ag-
gressions, in this view, derived not from an integrated, clear, long- term plan
but from a complex pro cess involving Japa nese politics, military leadership,
intimidation, and radical activists.
Mainstream historians also believe that the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1894 could not have been predicted two de cades earlier.
Until several months before the outbreak of the war, many Chinese and
Japa nese diplomats and statesmen thought there was little chance that their
rivalries would lead to open conflict. There is no clear evidence that Japan
was planning a military conflict before 1894. And even in 1894, many leaders
in both countries still hoped their people, who belonged to the same “race
and culture” and shared the same anx i eties about Western penetration into
Asia, would cooperate against threats from the West. However, in the 1870s
both the Chinese and the Japa nese began to prepare for contingencies in
case a conflict between them were to break out, and the clash in 1882 led
Japan to expand its investment in the military.
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chapter four
Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese
War, 1882–1895
The Soldiers’ Riot (Imo Uprising) in Korea in 1882 led both China
and Japan to send troops into Korea. The two forces clashed and the Chi-
nese won. As a result of China’s victory, Japan increased the resources it was
putting into its military. Tensions between China and Japan in Korea con-
tinued to rise until 1894, when Japan attacked China and set off the Sino-
Japanese War.
In the 1880s China, Japan, and Korea were anxious about Western ad-
vances and the danger of colonization, and there were leaders in all three
countries who wished to cooperate with one another to resist Western co-
lonialism. At the time, however, Rus sia loomed as the biggest outside threat
in the region. Rus sia did not start building its Trans- Siberian Railway until
1891, but the railway was already under discussion by 1880. Additional plans
were in place in 1882 for Rus sia to start a steamship line from Ukraine to
Priamur, on the coast of Siberia, within the next year to be followed by in-
creased Rus sian efforts to upgrade the government of Priamur. The prospect
of large numbers of Rus sians moving into East Asia worried the Koreans,
Chinese, and Japa nese who were concerned about long- term developments.
But after their clash in Korea in 1882, tensions between Japan and China
over Korea became stronger than their desire to cooperate against Rus sia.
Korea had the misfortune of being the “shrimp among the whales,” lo-
cated between China, Japan, and Rus sia. Chinese and Japa nese troops had
fought on the Korean Peninsula from 661 to 663, when Japan sent in troops
to help the Paekche kingdom. Yuan dynasty troops had passed through
Korea on the way to Japan in the 1190s, and Chinese and Japa nese troops
had clashed in Korea from 1592 to 1597, when Hideyoshi invaded Korea.
Later, Korea would also be the locus of the Russo- Japanese War of 1904–
1905 and the Korean War of 1950–1953.
. 100 .
Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
In 1882 China still had official suzerainty over Korea, giving it the power
to make decisions about Korea’s foreign policy but not to interfere with do-
mestic affairs. However, for centuries China had not exercised its suzerainty.
When Japan began discussing pos si ble moves into Korea in the 1870s, China
began to consider taking a more active role. China had been alerted to Japa-
nese ambitions in Korea in 1873, when Saigo Takamori declared that Japan
should “pacify Korea” ( seikan), and again in 1876 when Japan forced Korea to
sign the Kanghwa Treaty that established diplomatic relations between Japan
and Korea and opened two new Korean ports, Wonsan and Inchon. China,
separated from Korea only by the Yalu River, had long had access to trade
with Korea through the tribute system and markets along the border, so the
opening of two new ports made little difference, but they al owed Japan to
obtain more grain from Korea and to sell more industrial products.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century Korea’s Choson dynasty,
founded in 1392, was in a state of disor ga ni za tion and decay. Unlike Japan,
which had used its port in Nagasaki to remain informed about world af-
fairs, Korea, the “hermit kingdom,” had tried to defend itself from the sur-
rounding powers by remaining closed off. Although individual Koreans
learned about the outside world through China, the Korean government
did not have Japan’s eagerness to learn about the outside world. As the sur-
rounding powers began to encroach on Korea in the nineteenth century, it
was increasingly difficult for Korea to remain sealed, and members of the
Korean royal family were divided as to how to respond to these challenges.
King Kojong, who was born in 1852 and assumed office when he turned
twenty- one in December 1873, was not a strong leader, but he was more
willing to consider opening than his father, the Taewongun ( Grand Pre-
mier). The Taewongun ruled from 1864 until Kojong reached maturity, but
he never abandoned his po liti cal ambitions. King Kojong’s wife, Queen Min,
and her relatives were allied against the Taewongun. Both China and Japan
were able to find allies within Korea’s divided royal family.
The Soldiers’ Riot and the Entry of Chinese and Japa nese Troops
King Kojong and those more willing to open Korea had begun working with
Japan to begin a Meiji- style modernization program in Korea. In 1880 a
promising young Korean official, Kim Hong- jip, was sent to Japan to learn
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china and japan
about Japa nese modernization. When he returned to Korea, Kim Hong-
jip called the king’s attention to two essays that he said should guide Ko-
rean policy. One, an essay that King Kojong especially liked, was “A Strategy
for Korea,” written by Huang Zunxian, the official at the Chinese embassy
in Tokyo who had been following Japa nese developments. Huang argued
that the Rus sian threat posed the greatest danger to Korea, and to deal
with the Rus sian threat Korea should not only remain close to China but
also strengthen its treaty ties with Japan, build new institutions to support
modernization, and strengthen its alliance with the United States. The other
essay, by Zheng Guanying, a Chinese merchant who had grown up in
Guangdong but was very familiar with Japa nese developments, advised that
for Korea to acquire the necessary technology to produce modern industrial
products, it had to create modern po liti cal institutions, and the place to learn
how to do this was Japan. Within months of Kim Hong- jip’s return to
Korea, Korea expanded its discussions with Japan. It also sought to maintain
good relations with China and, in line with Zheng Guanying’s suggestions,
to upgrade the management of foreign affairs. It established an Office for the
Management of State Affairs, modeled after China’s Zongli Yamen. Fifteen
years later, Kim Hong- jip would become Korea’s prime minister.
To follow up on Kim Hong- jip’s suggestion about learning from Japan,
in the next year, 1881, Korea sent what it called a Gentlemen’s Sightseeing
Group of twelve young Koreans to Japan to report in more detail on
Japan’s modernization efforts. The Gentlemen’s Group was modeled after
Japan’s Iwakura Mission, but because the Korean government was short of
funds, it visited only Japan and remained for only seventy days. Like
members of the Iwakura Mission, the Koreans inspected administrative
agencies, military facilities, schools, and industrial sites. Several members
of the group remained in Japan after the mission and became the first
Korean students to study in Japan. Although many Koreans at home still
identified Japan with the Hideyoshi invasion and feared that Japan was
planning to invade again, the members who toured Japan were impressed
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