sity law programs, prominent in public life as the very creators of the legal
profession in Republican China but always po liti cally vulnerable, in part
because of their Japa nese connections. Cao Rulin, attacked as a Japa nese
sympathizer for his failure to press China’s case at Versailles, is a prime
example. Other Chinese gradu ates of Japa nese universities rose quickly in
China’s academic hierarchy, notably Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Products
of Waseda University’s law and politics program, Chen became dean at
Peking University, Li head librarian, and both became celebrated co- founders
of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.
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china and japan
The list goes on. It is well known that Zhou Enlai, Chiang Kai- shek,
and Wang Jing wei, three of the main protagonists in China’s war time drama,
studied in Japan. It is less known that Zhang Zongxiang, a Tokyo Univer-
sity law gradu ate, later China’s minister to Japan, assisted a Japa nese legal
adviser in writing a new criminal code for China, or that Hattori Unokichi’s
Japan- trained teaching assistant, Fan Yuanlian, became president of Bei-
jing Normal University and minister of education, or that Shen Junru, ap-
pointed president of the Supreme People’s Court of China in 1949, studied
at Hosei University from 1905 to 1908. As indicated in these few cases and
the hundreds more that have been documented, “learn from Japan” poli-
cies produced a variety of outcomes; much more research needs to be done
to arrive at a full and balanced assessment. But it is safe to say at this stage
that the young Chinese students who were sent or de cided to go to Japan
were primed to absorb what was modern and useful for their own future
and China’s, that their subsequent careers had a kind of ripple effect in
changing Chinese social and po liti cal structures in significant ways, and
that over the long term they established professional networks with Japa-
nese counter parts that endured remarkably, even in the period of post–
World War II reconstruction. Their attitudes toward Japan, their host
country, were on balance ambivalent and ever shifting, not an unusual af-
tereffect of study- abroad programs in any part of the world.
For all the plans and proj ects launched by China’s newly trained elite,
many of whom were Japan-educated, the story of China after 1915 was one
of unceasing disorder, a sad narrative of fractured politics, military conflict
among contending warlords, and ultimately all- out war with Japan. Even
after 1949 when po liti cal unity was achieved, the sheer size, complexity, and
poverty of Chinese society made it difficult to catch up economically without
foreign help. It was not until 1978, after the failures of the Great Leap For-
ward and the Cultural Revolution, that Chinese leaders turned once again to
“reform and opening to the outside world,” including Japan, the policy that
Zhang Zhidong had endorsed with mixed success after 1895. In a conversa-
tion with Japa n’s Prime Minister Fukuda in 1978, China’s Deng Xiaoping,
reflecting on the wide scope of Japa nese learning from China during the
Tang dynasty, commented that “now the roles of teacher and student are re-
versed.” This had been the unspoken assumption and the hope of the Zhangs
and Konoes of the world in the early twentieth century.
. 174 .
chapter six
The Colonization of Taiwan and
Manchuria, 1895–1945
When Japan acquired Taiwan in 1895 after the Sino- Japanese War,
the Japa nese believed that just as the Western powers had used their colo-
nies to strengthen their own economies, so Taiwan could help strengthen
the Japa nese economy. Taiwan had fewer than three million residents com-
pared with Japan’s nearly forty million, but nonetheless Taiwan represented
a significant increase in the potential market for Japa nese manufactured
goods. Japan could also import from Taiwan tropical agricultural products,
such as sugar, that it could not produce on its own four islands. But for the
Japa nese, acquiring a colony had more than economic benefits. It was an-
other impor tant sign that their nation had joined the ranks of the advanced
Western countries. Japan wanted to show the Western powers that it could
be a model colonial power. It also expected in the future to acquire other
colonies, such as Korea, and it wanted to demonstrate that there were ad-
vantages to becoming a Japa nese colony.
In 1905, after the Russo- Japanese War, Japan also acquired the South
Manchurian Railway and rights to the Liaodong Peninsula. In Manchuria
it faced a much larger and more complex situation than in Taiwan. Man-
churia had a population of fifteen million people in 1905 and covered
380,000 square miles, more than twice the area of the Japa nese islands. Fur-
thermore, the population of Manchuria was still growing rapidly—it
would reach fifty million by 1945. In Manchuria the Japa nese also faced a
security threat from Rus sia, growing popu lar protests from Chinese nation-
alists, and, after 1931, criticism from Western countries for their occupa-
tion of Chinese territory. From 1905 to 1931, Japa nese leaders tried to op-
erate the South Manchurian Railway as a successful business while using
it as a quasi- government institution through which it gathered information
about Manchuria and North China, fostered relations with the po liti cal
. 175 .
china and japan
leaders in those areas, and developed businesses on both sides of the railway.
The Japa nese brought in troops to provide defense against Rus sian secu-
rity threats and to protect the region’s Japa nese residents. In 1931, after they
had set off the Manchurian Incident, they installed a puppet government
and took over formal control of all of Manchuria. Unlike the countries
colonized by the West, Manchuria was industrialized and it attracted hun-
dreds of thousands of settlers from the Japa nese homeland.
The Japa nese brought colonial modernity to Taiwan and Manchuria.
The two colonies grew eco nom ically with the introduction of modern
technology and infrastructure, and the average standard of living im-
proved. However, local people in both colonies were acutely aware that the
Japa nese held the impor tant positions in government and business, enjoyed
higher incomes and better living conditions, and did not treat them as
equals. In local schools, Japa nese history was taught in ways that reflected
positively on Japan. Classical Chinese culture was also taught, but on is-
sues where China and Japan disagreed, the Japa nese perspective prevailed.
Taiwan under Japa nese Rule, 1895–1945
Qing dynasty officials in Beijing had taken little interest in Taiwan until the
late nineteenth century, when some key officials became worried about
threats from both Japan and France. The Japa nese attacks on aborigines in
Taiwan in 1874 to punish them for killing the shipwrecked Ryukyu fish-
ermen, and the dangers of French attacks during the Sino- French War of
1883–1885, worried Li Hongzhang, Zuo Zongtang, and o
ther officials. Li
encountered re sis tance to his efforts to strengthen the defense of Taiwan,
but in 1885 he received approval to raise Taiwan from prefectural- level to
provincial- level status, which warranted sending a higher official to serve
as its first governor and increasing its bud get. In 1885 Li assigned as the
first governor-general Liu Mingchuan, an able official from Li’s Huai Army
in Anhui who had helped put down the Taiping Rebellion. After he ar-
rived in Taiwan, Liu Mingchuan brought in naval forces to build up coastal
defenses. He laid a telegraph line from Taiwan to Fujian in the mainland
and built a seventeen- mile railway from Keelung (Jilong) to Taipei. He un-
dertook a cadastral survey to establish the basis for agricultural taxes that
would pay for these developments. However, local landlords rioted, angry
. 176 .
The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
over the higher taxes, and in 1890 Liu was recalled and work ended on the
proj ects he had initiated. It thus fell to the Japa nese, when they gained
control of the island in 1895, to build on Liu’s development plans.
When they took over Taiwan, the Japa nese encountered less re sis tance
than they would face in Korea in 1910. In Korea the local people had a much
stronger sense of national identity, a more distinct culture, and a long his-
tory of in de pen dent rule. As a prefectural- level island Taiwan had never,
even under Liu Mingchuan, developed a sense of identity like that of the
Koreans, who had their own language and culture, and earlier had an in de-
pen dent government that resisted outside invaders. When the Japa nese took
control of Taiwan in 1895, the population was about two- thirds Fujianese,
descended from Qing- period mi grants, including those who had come with
Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), and one- third Hakka, whose ancestors had
escaped from the advancing Qing troops in the seventeenth century. By the
time the Japa nese arrived, an estimated 14,000 aborigines were left on the
island, but they did not pose a serious prob lem for the Japa nese. The Fu-
jianese living on Taiwan also offered little re sis tance to the Japa nese, but
the Hakka, a significant minority who mostly lived in the hilly areas in
central Taiwan, did put up armed re sis tance.
In 1895, Japan’s priority was to pacify the island. General Nogi Mare-
suke, a Japa nese hero in the Sino- Japanese War, was sent in to establish
order. He and his troops were considered very tough. Over several weeks,
Nogi’s troops marched the entire length of the island, from Hualien in the
northeast to Kaohsiung in the southwest. They encountered great re sis-
tance in mountainous Hakka areas in northern Taiwan. In January 1896,
when some Japa nese soldiers staying in a temple were killed during the night,
Japa nese officers ordered that all people found within a five- mile radius
of the temple should be killed. General Nogi Maresuke, who served as
the third governor- general from 1896 to 1898, was greatly feared by the local
population.
After their march from northeastern to southwestern Taiwan, the Japa-
nese signed amnesty agreements with local leaders and set about to estab-
lish a baojia system, wherein neighbors were held responsible for one
another’s be hav ior. By 1898 when General Nogi returned to Japan, the is-
land was pacified. Nogi was replaced by General Kodama Gentaro, who
had a reputation for being less savage and repressive.
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china and japan
Several times during Japa nese colonial rule, local people revolted against
the heavy repression imposed by the administration. In October 1907, in
the coal- mining town of Beipu, in Hsinchu county, local Hakkas, upset by
the be hav ior of the Japa nese rulers, took part in an uprising that killed an
estimated 57 Japa nese people. In retaliation, the Japa nese killed more than
100 locals. In 1915, members of a religious group in the city of Tainan, pro-
testing against tight Japa nese controls, attacked Japa nese police stations and
killed a number of officers in what came to be known as the Tapani Inci-
dent. Again Japa nese officials clamped down, killing the leaders of the reli-
gious group. In 1930, in the Wushe Incident (Musha, in Japa nese), led largely
by indigenous people in Nantou county who were upset about forced- labor
requirements and police brutality, some 130 Japa nese residents were killed.
Again the Japa nese retaliated.
From 1898 to 1912 the colonial government spent twice as much on po-
licing as it spent on civil servants. In 1912 there was roughly one Japa nese
police officer for every 580 locals in Taiwan, almost twice the number of
police per capita as then employed in Japan. Despite the early violent inci-
dents, once Taiwan was pacified in 1898 there were relatively few clashes,
and relations between Japa nese officials and local people were not as tense
as those in Korea after it was colonized.
Until 1919 the top Japa nese official in Taiwan was a military leader, but
in 1898 the Japa nese brought in a civilian, Goto Shimpei, previously the chief
of Japan’s National Bureau of Hygiene, to serve as head of the Civil Ad-
ministration Bureau, with responsibility for governing Taiwan. Goto, a med-
ical doctor who had been sent to Germany to study Bismarck’s modern
public health program, had already proved to be an able and highly respected
public health administrator in Japan. At the time, the field of epidemiology
was just developing, and in tropical climates pro gress was being made in
managing yellow fever and malaria. In selecting Goto, the Japa nese expected
that they would make pro gress in gaining control over those diseases in
Taiwan and this would help win popu lar support and re spect. Goto led the
construction of water proj ects to ensure the quality of the water supply, built
regional hospitals and antimalaria centers, and carried out rodent- control
proj ects, thereby making great pro gress in Taiwan’s fight against malaria.
Goto was prepared to cooperate with the Japa nese police to maintain order,
. 178 .
The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
but he also won the cooperation and appreciation of the local people, as well
as the re spect of Western leaders, for his enlightened leadership.
Goto replaced the military police with civilian police, and prohibited the
military from wearing uniforms or carry ing swords. He believed that gov-
ernment policies should be adapted to local customs, and he established a
center to carry out research on local customs. In Korea, serious tensions be-
tween the Koreans and Japa nese continued throughout the occupation
there. But in Taiwan, because order was established during the early years
of rule, relations between the Taiwanese and their Japa nese colonizers was
relatively relaxed and comfortable.
To lead economic development work in Taiwan, Goto Shimpei brought
in Nitobe Inazo, an agricultural economist who had studied at the Univer-
sity of Hokkaido. After Hokkaido, Nitobe spent a year at Tokyo Imperial
Universi
ty, three years studying economics at Johns Hopkins University in
the United States, and three years in Germany, where he received a Ph.D.
in agricultural economics. He arrived in Taiwan in 1901, and during his three
years on the island he established Taiwan’s economic priorities and worked to
develop an economy that was complementary to Japan’s. Generally, while
Japan concentrated on industry, Taiwan was to concentrate on agriculture.
Because tea production in Japan was ample, tea production in Taiwan was
reduced and instead sugar production was expanded because Taiwan’s
warmer climate was more suitable for it than the climate in Japan. Taiwan was
divided into fifty districts, each with a sugar mill. Chemical fertilizer was ap-
plied and irrigation networks were built. By the 1930s the Japa nese sugar fac-
tories in Taiwan were the most modern sugar factories in the world. Sugar
consumption in Japan rose throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and by the 1930s
90 percent of Taiwan’s sugar was exported to Japan. After the riots in Japan in
1918 because of the shortage of rice, Nitobe also concentrated on improving
rice yields in Taiwan, which enabled Taiwan to increase rice exports to Japan.
By the time Goto left Taiwan to take up new responsibilities with the
Manchurian Railway in 1906, Taiwan had established telegraph and tele-
phone lines and could generate electric power. The colony no longer required
subsidies from Japan and operated within its own bud get.
The Japa nese sent far more midlevel administrators and settlers to
Taiwan than the Eu ro pean countries sent to their colonies. The Japa nese
. 179 .
china and japan
administration was more like the British administration of nearby Ireland
than like the Eu ro pean administration of distant colonies in Africa or Asia.
By 1924 there were 183,000 Japa nese living in Taiwan, and by 1945, at the
time of the Japa nese surrender in World War II, there were roughly 200,000
Japa nese citizens living there, amid a local population of six million. Since
there were so many Japa nese settlers working in diff er ent capacities, many
Taiwanese people knew Japa nese individuals personally, as their teachers,
storekeepers, neighbors, and even friends.
If a British administrator in India was influenced by the lifestyle of an
China and Japan Page 28
