newspapers had a circulation of some 650,000, but several months after the
incident readership had increased to more than one million. Most Japa nese
families by then owned radios, and radio broadcasts and newspaper reports
helped fan the flames of excitement over Japa nese advances in Manchuria.
Even many liberal- minded Japa nese in both Manchuria and Japan who felt
kindly toward China and the Chinese people did not oppose the Japanese-
led Manchurian government, for they thought that Japan would not only
protect the Japa nese living there but also provide enlightened leadership that
would in turn create stability, develop the Manchurian economy, and en-
hance the welfare of the Chinese people. Seiji Ozawa, for example, who was
born in Shenyang in 1935, lived in Manchuria until 1944, and later became
the longest- serving director of the Boston Symphony Orchestra (from 1973
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to 2002), was named Seiji by his father, a dental school professor, in honor
of Itagaki Sei shiro and Ishiwara Kan ji, who four years before Seiji was born
were the main conspirators behind the Manchurian Incident.
Through the 1930s Japan tightened its control over those who questioned
Japa nese aggression. In 1931 Ishibashi Tanzan wrote in the journal he ed-
ited that Japan should abandon its special rights in Manchuria, as it was
not worth turning China and the Western nations into enemies. But by the
late 1930s, as the Japa nese right wing was killing po liti cal leaders who op-
posed them and the Japa nese military was establishing firm control over the
national government, the vast majority of Japa nese intellectuals chose not
to publicly criticize the Japa nese government.
There was a huge gap between public opinion in Japan and public
opinion about Japan in China and the Western countries. Most of the
Western media by this time had become critical of the Japa nese government.
In October 1932 when the Japa nese government recognized Manchuria as
an in de pen dent country, only Japan’s future World War II allies Germany
and Italy joined in recognizing it. Western officials criticized the military oc-
cupation of Manchuria and worried that Japan had further territorial ambi-
tions. From the 1880s until 1905, the interested public in England, Germany,
France, and the United States generally held favorable impressions of Japan,
which they regarded as the most modern civilized country in Asia, and they
appreciated Japan’s contribution in putting down the Boxer Rebellion in
1900. However, after Japan’s victory over the Rus sians in 1905, its issuance of
the Twenty- One Demands in 1915, the continued presence of Japa nese
troops in Manchuria after troops from other countries left in 1918, and the
growth of the Japa nese Navy, the Western powers grew watchful and more
worried. Japan’s activities in Manchuria further heightened their concern.
Within months after the Manchurian Incident, members of the League
of Nations or ga nized a commission, headed by Lord Bulwer- Lytton of
England, to investigate Japa nese activities in Manchuria. The Lytton Com-
mission, after spending six weeks in China, Japan, and Manchuria, wrote a
report clearly stating that the Japa nese had invaded Manchuria and that
there was no international legal basis for Japan’s territorial claims. The re-
port was released in late 1932 and the League of Nations named Japan an
aggressor nation. In early 1933 Japan withdrew from the League of Na-
tions, maintaining its control over Manchuria.
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The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
Manchuria and Chinese Nationalism
As Thomas Gottschang and Diana Lary conclude from their research,
there was no large- scale anti- Japanese re sis tance in Manchuria, even
among mi grant laborers.1 Compared with areas the Japa nese Army invaded
during World War II, there was almost no fighting in Manchuria during
its Japa nese occupation. Even during the Manchurian Incident of 1931, only
a small number of people were directly involved. In many parts of China,
university students played a major role in leading demonstrations against
Japa nese aggression, but there were few university students in Manchuria
and there were no labor unions. On December 9, 1935, when students in
Beiping took to the streets advocating that China’s Communists and
Nationalists should unite to oppose Japan, and students in many other
cities took part in similar demonstrations, there were no demonstrations
in Manchuria.
There was some re sis tance to the Japa nese in Manchuria from Ma Zhan-
shan, a local warlord in Heilongjiang, and from other local warlords, but as
Rana Mitter concludes, despite the great publicity given to Ma’s heroism
in resisting the Japa nese, his re sis tance was not carried out on a large scale
and it did not last long. Ma Zhanshan behaved more like a local warlord
defending his own turf than an anti- Japanese patriot promoting a national
revolution, and in early 1932 he even cooperated with the Japa nese. A small
group of Manchurian residents moved south, out of Manchuria, and formed
the Northeast National Salvation Society in an effort to link Manchurian
re sis tance to national goals, but they had little influence in either Manchuria
or the nationalist movement.
However, the Manchurian Incident became well known in other parts
of China, especially among young intellectuals, in whom it stirred up anti-
Japanese sentiment. As Parks Coble concludes, the negative sentiment gen-
erated by Japa nese aggression was also turned into criticism of those offi-
cials’ failure to resist the Japa nese. The failure of Zhang Xueliang to stand
up to Japan after his father’s assassination gave his opponents an opportu-
nity to criticize him for being weak in the face of the Japa nese. Chiang Kai-
shek, long cautious about speaking out against the Japa nese because of
their military strength, was constantly criticized by the Communists for his
failure to stand up to Japan.
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china and japan
The Legacy of Colonization in Taiwan and Manchuria
The Chinese in Taiwan and Manchuria who lived under Japa nese rule had
learned how to live in what was then a modern society. They had become
familiar with electric lighting, the radio, and the telephone, and they knew
how to use banks. They had become familiar with trains and motor vehi-
cles. Many had become literate under Japa nese teachers.
People in Taiwan were introduced to a modern lifestyle through Japa-
nese culture. A generation of people in Taiwan knew how to operate in Japa-
nese culture, and a group of Japa nese people had become comfortable
working in Taiwan. These connections would prove useful in carry ing out
rapid economic development in Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War and in
establishing po liti cal, economic, and personal relationships between Taiwan
and Japan that would continue long after China’s Civil War between the
Communists and Nationalists ended in 1949. These ties would also create
difficulties in the relations
hip between Beijing and Tokyo.
In Manchuria, many of the buildings erected by the Japa nese, such as
those in the new capital of Xinjing (Changchun) and in the city of Dalian,
remain today. The Kwantung Army headquarters is now the headquarters
of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Because
many youths in Manchuria were educated in Japa nese schools between 1931
and 1945, many of China’s Japan specialists after 1949—in business, gov-
ernment, and academic life— came from China’s Northeast. They had ex-
perienced Japa nese colonial rule, but unlike people in many other parts of
China, they had not directly fought against the Japa nese. Because there were
so many Japa nese people in Manchuria at the time, many of the Chinese
living there under Japa nese rule had become familiar with the Japa nese
through local businesses, schools, and workplaces, and therefore they had
a more nuanced view of the Japa nese than those who had known them only
as enemy soldiers. After the reform and opening of China in 1978, people
in Manchuria were therefore more welcoming to the Japa nese than people
in other parts of China, and many Japa nese also felt more comfortable in
China’s Northeast than elsewhere.
. 202 .
chapter seven
Po liti cal Disorder and the
Road to War, 1911–1937
. with Richard Dyck .
Japan invaded China in 1937 not because of a well- organized long-
term plan but because of a failure of military and po liti cal leadership. Japa-
nese leaders made serious miscalculations, the greatest of which was the
failure to recognize Chinese determination and per sis tence.
The systems that had held each country together started changing fun-
damentally at the same time, around 1911–1912, with the downfall of the
Qing dynasty in China and the death of Emperor Meiji in Japan. Disorder
followed and continued in both countries because the new systems inau-
gurated in 1912, the Chinese Republic and the reign of Emperor Taisho, both
failed to reestablish effective and stable systems of po liti cal rule. In the
quarter of a century from 1912 to 1937, the growth of Japa nese investment
and settlement in China, in addition to the increase in communication,
travel, and trade, enabled relations between China and Japan to grow closer
and more intertwined than ever before. Unfortunately, the disorder in both
countries created forces that also made their relations more tense and ad-
versarial, ultimately exceeding the capacity of their leaders to manage
them peacefully.
Disorder in China and the 1911 Revolution
In 1911 the Qing dynasty fell because of its inability to cope with challenges
at home and abroad and because of the growing opposition to the Man-
chus as an outside group of rulers. However, the immediate events that led
to the Qing’s downfall happened by accident. On October 9, 1911, in the Rus-
sian concession of Hankou, now part of the city of Wuhan, a group of rebels
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china and japan
accidentally exploded a bomb. When the Russian police came to arrest
them, the rebels resisted. The rebels took the local Manchu authorities by
surprise and prevailed, sparking the 1911 Revolution. October 10 thus be-
came the official date of the beginning of the Republic of China. Although
some revolutionaries had been planning to overthrow the Qing dynasty,
the 1911 Revolution was not a coordinated effort by a strong rebel organ-
ization able to establish a new order; rather, it was a spark that set off the
collapse of an old system that had already lost its base of support.
Sun Yat- sen, who at the time of the revolution was in Denver raising
money, promptly headed back to China. On the way, he stopped in Japan
to consult with supporters he hoped would help finance his efforts to form
a new government. Thus the “ father of the revolution” arrived in Shanghai
in December, two months after the so- called revolution occurred. Yuan
Shikai, who would eventually lead the new republic, was summoned from
retirement not by the rebel side but by the Qing officials to prepare the Bei-
yang Army in hopes of putting down the rebellion. There was no unified
group ready to take leadership of the revolt and transform an accidental skir-
mish into a movement, much less to create a new republic to replace the
Qing. The main goal uniting the rebels was a desire to oust the Manchus,
and once they succeeded they had neither po liti cal order nor a well- developed
vision for the future.
Britain and Japan were the two countries with the most commercial in-
terests in China, and the events of October 1911 were communicated in-
stantly to Tokyo and London by way of undersea telegraph lines. Wuhan
was an impor tant inland treaty port on the Yangtze River. It had a large
British population, and it was one of the ports through which coal and iron
ore were transported to the Yawata Steel Works in Japan. The British and
Japa nese, through the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, had pledged to cooperate in
protecting their interests in China, so diplomats urgently launched a series
of meetings in London, Tokyo, and Beijing to ensure that traffic on the
Yangtze would not be interrupted by the Wuhan disturbance.
As the drama unfolded, the two top contenders for China’s leadership
were Yuan Shikai, the recently retired Qing general, and Sun Yat- sen, the
publicist who had spent years overseas drumming up support to topple the
Qing dynasty. Initially it was not clear if Yuan would align with the rebels
or align with his former Manchu masters and try to craft a constitutional
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Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
monarchy similar to that in Meiji Japan. Yuan had an advantage over Sun
because he had commanded the Imperial Beiyang Army, and he also knew
how to manipulate the British and the Japa nese by telling them what they
wanted to hear. Yuan tried to win over the British with his plan to restore
order along the Yangtze and maintain peace in Wuhan, Shanghai, and the
other treaty ports. To the Japa nese ambassador in Beijing, he spoke of his
loyalty to the emperor. And yet at the same time that Yuan was extolling
the virtues of the monarchy to the Japa nese ambassador, he was negotiating
with the Qing house hold for the child emperor’s abdication. Yuan was clever,
and in his lust for power he covered all his bases.
The loosely or ga nized Revolutionary Alliance met in Shanghai and
named Sun as provisional president of the new republic, but Sun quickly
realized that Yuan Shikai had the military’s support and in February 1912,
after the Qing dynasty abdicated, he yielded the presidency to Yuan. Later,
in 1913, Sun became dissatisfied and obtained the support of some troops
to challenge Yuan, but his force was defeated and Sun sought asylum in
Japan.
Disorder in Japan Fol owing the Death of Emperor Meiji
Emperor Meiji died in July 1912, at age sixty, ending an incredibly conse-
quential forty- four year reign. In the last six months of his life, Meiji had
; received daily briefings on the revolution in China. In November 1911, in
his last address to open the Diet, he expressed his deep concern about the
disturbances in China and his hope that order would be restored and peace
would prevail. When the Qing emperor abdicated in February 1912, ending
2,000 years of imperial rule, it could not but have had an impact on a Japa-
nese emperor whose ancestors for centuries had sent embassies to the em-
perors of China. Knowing that he was nearing the end of his own life and
having witnessed the passing of several of his advisers, it must have been
disturbing to him in his final days as he was briefed on what was transpiring
after the end of the imperial line in China.
The changes that occurred with the death of Meiji were less dramatic
than the fall of the Qing dynasty, and they came when Japan was already
much further along in its modernization pro cess than China. Despite the
po liti cal chaos at the top during the Taisho era (1912–1926), the changes
. 205 .
china and japan
introduced under Emperor Meiji— Western- style bureaucracy, a cap i tal ist
economy, Western- style factories, and a professional military— all sur-
vived him. By the beginning of the Taisho period, not only were universi-
ties and technical schools functioning but nearly 100 percent of Japa nese
elementary- school- age children were in school.
While the Meiji system had the appearance of a British- style constitu-
tional monarchy, with a cabinet, prime minister, and parliament, strategic
decisions during the Meiji period had actually been made by an oligarchy
consisting of Meiji himself and the founding fathers, the genro. After much
debate, the model that the genro had favored for the 1889 Constitution was
not Britain’s constitution but the Prus sian constitution, which limited par-
ticipation in decision making and placed the emperor at the center. Under
the Meiji Constitution, the emperor had the authority to appoint and dis-
miss ministers, determine the structure of the administration, convene and
dismiss the Diet, appoint officers in the army and navy, declare war, make
peace, and conclude treaties. In practice, the emperor was careful never to
publicly display his powers, but always to work through the genro. Thus,
the genro shielded the emperor from blame when policies failed, and the in-
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