mands, which would have given Japan the right to establish schools and re-
ligious institutions anywhere in China.
Yuan had no intention of keeping the negotiations confidential and
he began using a weapon of the weak— global public opinion. He enlisted an
able young gradu ate of Columbia University, Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun),
to communicate with the foreign diplomats and the press corps in Beijing to
generate sympathy for China. Koo, very effective in this assignment, met
frequently with the Westerners, and as the weeks passed, the image spread
of a cunning and aggressive Japan taking advantage of a weak China. Once
the news had gotten out, Yuan started sending groups of Chinese spokesmen
to New York, Chicago, Washington, London, and elsewhere to speak at
foreign- affairs gatherings, chambers of commerce, and po liti cal gatherings.
This model of public diplomacy was followed by Yuan’s successors and
evolved into what became known as the “China lobby.”
The U.S. ambassador to Beijing at the time, Paul Reinsch, an academic
and a devout Christian appointed by Woodrow Wilson, took up the cause
for China with a passion and became an equally impassioned critic of Japan.
But the United States was not prepared to do anything except make mor-
alistic pronouncements. The best efforts by Reinsch resulted in nothing
more than an official statement: “The United States cannot recognize any
agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be
entered into between the government of Japan and China impairing the
rights of the United States and its citizens in China.” From this time through
the 1930s, the world came to understand that American criticism would
not be backed up by action.
The Chinese publicity campaign was effective, even in Japan, where it
gave ammunition to Kato’s numerous adversaries, including Hara Takashi.
Kato’s critics, many of whom learned about the negotiations from the em-
barrassing articles in the foreign press, tended to focus on the bungled tactics
rather than the substance of the demands. Many shared the view that Japan
should solidify its interests in areas such as Liaodong, particularly since Yuan
seemed so unpredictable. Even some foreign observers noted that the de-
mands were conventional within the context of the diplomacy of the time.
However, all factions, including the genro and po liti cal leaders like Hara,
recognized that Kato had unnecessarily provoked the Chinese and, in
turn, the United States, thereby isolating Japan in international affairs.
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china and japan
Versailles, 1919
Many in the Chinese government pinned their hopes on the Versailles peace
conference to block Japan’s expansion into China. Woodrow Wilson’s
speeches about national self- determination and his opposition to colo-
nialism had raised the hopes of China’s leaders.
The first issue for China was determining who would go to Paris, and
the second issue was how to fund the trip. In all, China sent fifty delegates,
including several non- Chinese advisers. Some of the key Chinese delegates
would become familiar faces as they represented vari ous Chinese govern-
ments and factions over the years. They included Wellington Koo, who was
then ambassador to Washington from the Beijing government of warlord
Duan Qirui; Alfred Sze, who had been educated at Cornell and was serving
as minister to London; and C. T. Wang, a gradu ate of Yale, originally from
Shanghai, who was in Washington representing a rival faction from Guang-
zhou. The funding came from a loan taken out by Duan Qirui. Although
the group was highly fragmented, the Chinese were united in their goal to
recover the German territories from the Japa nese.
In the end, the Chinese failed. No Asia issue was a high priority at the
peace conference, particularly for the Americans. The Japa nese del e ga tion
was defeated in its efforts to incorporate a clause into the Covenant of the
League of Nations prohibiting racial discrimination, although the Chinese
delegate Wellington Koo supported Japan on this issue. Then, when some
members of Japan’s del e ga tion threatened to bolt from the conference if they
were not allowed to take over German rights in Shandong, the American
del e ga tion supported the Japa nese for fear their most impor tant achieve-
ment, the League of Nations, would come unraveled without Japan. Because
China lost its rights in Shandong, it was the only country that did not sign
the Treaty of Versailles that concluded World War I. After China’s efforts
failed, Ambassador Reinsch, Wilson’s appointee in China, resigned from
his position, declaring, “The Chinese trusted Amer i ca, they trusted the fre-
quent declarations of princi ple uttered by President Wilson, whose words
had reached China in its remotest parts. . . . It sickened and disheartened
me to think how the Chinese people would receive this blow which meant
the blasting of their hopes and the destruction of their confidence in the
equity of nations.”
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Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
When word reached Beijing and Shanghai that China had lost its rights
in Shandong, Chinese youths demonstrated in protest, sparking a move-
ment of young intellectuals that many saw as the birth of a new China. The
demonstrations in Beijing continued for weeks and spread to other cities.
The eruption of public gatherings and the writings that followed after May 4
flourished in an environment of new institutional developments, especially
the establishment of new universities, that had taken place in China in the
years before 1919. The modern universities that were opened in China as
the old examination system was eliminated had attracted large numbers of
students, who lived together, interacted, and, as in other countries with large
universities, developed a sense of camaraderie and a youth culture. Assem-
bled together and studying new ideas, it was easy for students to or ga nize
and take to the streets. China’s defeat at Versailles led to a breakthrough,
as young Chinese intellectuals began expanding their public involvement
in national issues.
The Washington Conference, Hara Takashi,
and Shidehara Kijuro
After the Versailles Treaty brought an end to World War I but failed to
address China’s issues or Asia generally, the United States or ga nized the
Washington Conference, the brainchild of Charles Evans Hughes, U.S. sec-
retary of state under the Harding administration. The goals of the confer-
ence were to rein in the expensive race among the world’s naval powers to
build new ships and “to address misunderstandings which could lead to
military conflict, particularly in China.”
Washington Conference, 1921–1922
It was a huge conference, with 100 to 150 delegates taking part from each of
the participating countries: Belgium, Britain (with representatives from
Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand), China, France, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States. The conference lasted
from November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922. Germany and Rus sia were not
participants, and some criticized the conference as an Anglo- Saxon– led
venture.
. 215 .
china and japan
The Chinese participants welcomed the conference as an opportunity
to right the wrongs of the Versailles Treaty. As at Versailles, the decision
about who should represent China was complex. In May 1921 a rump par-
liament in Guangzhou had elected Sun Yat- sen as president of China, and
when Secretary of State Hughes suggested that Beijing and Sun Yat- sen’s
government should both send representatives, Sun refused, claiming that
his government was the only true government of China. More than 100 Chi-
nese representatives from the Beijing government attended the conference,
including, once again, Wellington Koo and Alfred Sze. But it was not clear
how much of China the Beijing government controlled, nor was it clear who
was in charge in Beijing. When the del e ga tion departed China, the govern-
ment was headed by the warlord Duan Qirui, but midway through the con-
ference Duan was deposed by the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin.
Although the Chinese delegates were accorded the re spect and dignity of
diplomats, it was known that they could not lay claim to representing a uni-
fied China.
Many in the Japa nese government initially viewed the Washington Con-
ference with suspicion. Some had criticized President Woodrow Wilson’s
style as “moralistic aggressiveness,” and they had not yet figured out the new
Republican administration under Warren Harding. But Prime Minister
Hara endorsed the goals of the conference and saw it as an opportunity to
soften the blow of the Twenty- One Demands by returning the German ter-
ritories to China and also to improve Japan’s standing with the United
States. Hara welcomed the chance to cut military expenditures as well. He
appointed Admiral Kato Tomosaburo to serve as head of Japan’s del e ga-
tion. Kato was a hero of the Russo- Japanese War and a person with enough
clout to get military support for arms limitations. A key participant was
Shidehara Kijuro, who was serving at the time as ambassador to the United
States.
According to agreed- upon conference procedures, any agreement by
the conference required the consent of all; for the China portion of the con-
ference, nine nations had to agree. Elihu Root, a former U.S. secretary of
state and senator, drafted a resolution regarding China that was sufficiently
abstract that all nine nations agreed. The nations resolved that they would:
re spect the sovereignty, territorial, and administrative integrity of China;
provide the fullest opportunity for China to develop and maintain itself as
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Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
an effective stable government; aim to maintain equal opportunity for com-
merce and industry for all nations throughout the territory of China; and
refrain from taking advantage of the pre sent conditions in China to seek
special rights or privileges that would abridge the rights of the subjects or
citizens of friendly states, or countenance actions inimical to the security
of the states.
At the conference, Wellington Koo and Alfred Sze established good
working relationships with Shidehara Kijuro and his assistant, Saburi
Sadao. They had originally become acquainted at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence, and the intense four months they spent together in Washington helped
solidify their relationship. Saburi observed that in contrast to Paris, where
participants were looking out for their respective national interests, in Wash-
ington they were more of a cross- national team trying to resolve mutual
prob lems. Like Shidehara, Saburi was a well- trained young diplomat who
had held several postings in China. He was married to the daughter of dip-
lomat Komura Jutaro, a former classmate of Theodore Roo se velt at Har-
vard who had negotiated the Portsmouth Treaty to end the Russo- Japanese
War. During the conference, Shidehara became ill, so Saburi covered for
him in many of the meetings with Koo and Sze.
Prior to the Washington Conference, under Prime Minister Hara’s guid-
ance Shidehara made plans to negotiate the return of the Shandong Pen-
insula and Qingdao to China. Together with the Chinese team, the two
sides agreed on a six- month timetable, with compensation to come from
the Chinese for Japan’s infrastructure improvements. The British announced
that if Japan gave up its rights in Qingdao, Britain would give up its rights
in nearby Weihaiwei. The conference participants did not succeed in com-
pletely dismantling the complex system of unequal treaties but they made
pro gress, and the discussions at the conference served to set the agenda for
the remainder of the 1920s on issues such as tariff autonomy. Shidehara put
together a team, including Saburi and also Yada Shichitaro, that continued
to work on China- related issues after the conference. Yada, who had served
in several positions in China, is quoted as saying that the prob lems of Japan
and China could not be solved until the unequal treaties, an affront to Chi-
nese sovereignty, were removed. The one issue that the Japa nese were not
willing to put on the agenda was Manchuria, including Japan’s rights in the
Liaodong Peninsula.
. 217 .
china and japan
The Washington Conference was a success, with some qualifications.
The large naval powers agreed to stop their race to build huge, expensive
battleships, but they continued to build lighter destroyers, frigates, and sub-
marines. Aircraft carriers were also still being developed. The powers with
interests in China came to some agreement on basic issues, such as tariff
structures, postal ser vices, and contested areas like the Shandong Penin-
sula. Issues that were impor tant for Chinese sovereignty, such as legal ju-
risdiction and the presence of foreign military and foreign police, were doc-
umented but not solved. The common caveat used by Japan and the
Western powers was that the unequal treaties could not be fully rescinded
until China regained unity and control of its territory and could guarantee
the safety of foreigners living within its borders. The assertion that China
was not unified was both the cause and the excuse for treating China as less
than a fully sovereign nation.
Hara’s Uncompleted Agenda
Tragically, Prime Minister Hara was shot and killed by an assassin in
November 1921, just when the del e ga tion was departing Japan to attend the
Washington Conference. Japan, a country that does not produce many
strong charismatic politicians, was robbed of one of its best at a crucial
moment. Prior to becoming prime minister in 1918 at the age of sixty- two,
Hara had been a diplomat, had served in several cabinet- level posts, and had
chaired Japan’s first major po liti cal party. After years of “transcendental cabi-
nets” in which the prime minister was chosen by the emperor and the genro,
not by the Diet, Hara’s was the first “
normal cabinet,” meaning a cabinet in
which the prime minister and most of the cabinet members were members
of the majority party, in this case the Seiyukai Party. Hara had said he could
have done much more to improve the governance system established by the
Meiji Constitution if he had become prime minister ten years earlier.
Hara had several objectives during his administration that were reflected
in the way he managed preparations for the Washington Conference. First,
immediately prior to becoming prime minister Hara took a private study
tour to the United States and China. He was surprised by the dynamism
of the United States and shocked by the strong anti- Japanese sentiment in
China. He de cided that Japan should try to develop good relations with the
. 218 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
United States and ameliorate its bad relations with China. Second, he
wanted to establish civilian control of the military and break the ability of
the army or the navy to topple a cabinet by withdrawing its minister. For
this reason, when he appointed Admiral Kato as chief delegate to the Wash-
ington Conference, Hara appointed himself as interim minister of the
navy. It was a significant move in the context of the Meiji Constitution, and
Hara made sure that he had Yamagata Aritomo’s full support for the deci-
sion. As another step toward civilian control, Hara changed the governor-
generalship in Taiwan from a military to a civilian position.
In 1922, the year after Hara was assassinated, Yamagata Aritomo, the
father of Japan’s modern military, died. These two deaths left a hole in Japan’s
governing structure nearly as large as that left by the death of the Meiji em-
peror. Even though the two men were very diff er ent in personality and ide-
ology, they had developed a solid working relationship, and Hara was skil ed
at convincing Yamagata, the stubborn field marshal, to cooperate in ad-
dressing some of the weaknesses of the Meiji system, such as the need to
strengthen civilian control and the military chain of command. Unfortu-
nately, their reforms were still incomplete when they died, and the weaknesses
that they left behind became prob lems, particularly for Japan’s China policy.
From Shidehara Diplomacy to Preparations for War
After Hara’s assassination, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo was ap-
China and Japan Page 34
