Japa nese supply column, with some 170 soldiers, approached the east end
of the pass with its seventy horse- drawn wagons and eighty trucks carry ing
rations and ammunition, it was completely unprepared for the surprise at-
tack by Lin Biao and his Chinese troops. Lin Biao’s force virtually wiped
out the Japa nese supply column and seized some of the supplies. Although
it was a small- scale battle, the victory provided great publicity for the
Chinese Communist forces as they strug gled against Japan’s power ful mil-
itary. Farther south in Shanxi province, at Xinkou, there was a much larger
battle. Although nearly 5,000 Japa nese troops were killed, the Japa nese
prevailed and took over the northern half of Shanxi and Chahar. They
then began selecting local officials to maintain order and to serve in their
puppet regime.
Chiang Kai- shek quickly shifted the main battlefront from north China
to Shanghai, where he could make use of the able, well- trained Guomin-
dang military officers and their troops, who were near Shanghai. Other
troops were dispatched from Xi’an and Nanjing before the fighting in
Shanghai began. To overcome Chiang’s forces in the Shanghai area, the Japa-
nese were forced to dispatch some of their troops south to the Shanghai
area, thus relieving pressure on the Guomin dang forces in the north. Chiang,
aware that there were more foreigners in Shanghai than anywhere else in
China, hoped that fighting in the area would encourage the foreigners to
back the Chinese against Japan. Over the years, Japa nese businesspeople in
Shanghai had found ways to work with the Chinese, but tensions between
Japa nese citizens living in the Japa nese Settlement in Shanghai and the local
Chinese had been high ever since the Twenty- One Demands of 1915. As
soon as fighting broke out after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Shanghai
residents began to fear that clashes would again break out in their city, as
they had in both 1925 and 1932.
. 253 .
china and japan
On August 1, 1937, as Japa nese Navy troops started arriving in Shanghai,
clashes broke out when the Chinese tried to prevent 1,200 Japa nese naval
infantrymen from landing to join the small number of Japa nese troops in
the Shanghai area. On August 2, Chinese planes attacked the Japa nese
troops that were already in Shanghai to protect Japa nese people and prop-
erty. On the next day, Japa nese warplanes began bombing Shanghai as well
as Nanjing and Nanchang, a day away by train, to wipe out China’s small
air force.
Both sides called for reinforcements. Chiang appealed to the warlords
to send in troops, and he quickly had 190,000 soldiers at his disposal. The
Japa nese naval infantrymen who had arrived in Shanghai could not fend off
the larger numbers of Chinese, so on August 18 and 19 three more Japa nese
battalions of naval infantrymen arrived.
By August 23, troops from three Japa nese Army infantry divisions also
began coming ashore, but they met more re sis tance than they had antici-
pated. On September 11 the Japa nese mobilized three more divisions, and
on the following day, the army received imperial approval to mobilize four
more divisions. The Japa nese still hoped for a quick, decisive victory, but
that goal was beginning to seem elusive.
The Japa nese believed that with a quick and decisive war they could
avoid the participation of the Western nations. To avoid further alienating
the Western powers and thus increase the risk that they might join the Chi-
nese in a war against Japan, Japa nese troops did not enter the foreign con-
cessions in Shanghai. The fighting took place in the Chinese sections of the
city and in the surrounding areas. Many Chinese civilians, trying to find a
safe haven, flooded into the foreign concessions.
The Japa nese made use of their superior firepower and much larger air
force, but the Chinese brought in more troops. Chiang’s forces fought well
and troop morale was high. The two sides engaged in hand- to- hand fighting
in Shanghai. With superior firepower from its naval air support and newly
arrived artillery, Japan, after more than two months of heavy fighting, fi nally
began to overwhelm Chinese defenses and to prevent the Chinese from
bringing in reinforcements. On October 25 Chiang Kai- shek, unable to stop
the Japa nese assaults, began pulling his troops out of Shanghai, although
his men made a last stand at a large ware house, the Sihang Ware house,
where they held off the Japa nese until November 1.
. 254 .
The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
The three months of fighting over Shanghai constituted one of the
largest confrontations of the Second Sino- Japanese War. Except for the for-
eign concessions, which the Japa nese did not invade, the city of Shanghai
lay in ruins. An estimated 330,000 Chinese were killed or injured in the
fighting, including more than 10,000 of Chiang’s officers, many of whom
were his best officers. More than 11,000 Japa nese were killed and in excess
of 31,000 were injured.
The Japa nese won the battle at Shanghai, but they failed to achieve their
goal of ending the war with a quick attack. Chiang Kai- shek knew that the
Japa nese were too strong for him to be able win a fight to defend his capital
city of Nanjing, the next likely target, some 160 miles west of Shanghai. He
therefore began to move his military headquarters to Wuhan, where his
troops would offer a forceful re sis tance. He also began to move his govern-
ment officials from Nanjing to Chongqing, beyond the mountains. Chiang
thus began to follow the strategy that Jiang Baili, many years earlier, had
conceived to achieve ultimate victory against a Japa nese invasion: the Chi-
nese forces, moved beyond the mountains, would pursue a long war of at-
trition until the Japa nese were exhausted and ultimately defeated. A small
number of Chiang’s officials remained behind, but most of his officers and
troops began the pro cess of moving toward Chongqing.
As the Japa nese troops marched toward Nanjing, there were a few days
when some believed it was pos si ble to reach an agreement to end the war.
The Japa nese entrusted the German ambassador to China, Oskar Traut-
mann, to represent them in a meeting with Chiang Kai- shek. In the dis-
cussions with Trautmann, Chiang at first seemed willing to consider Japan’s
proposals for ending the war, but by December 7 Chiang had de cided that
he had no choice but to continue the war. In contrast, Wang Jing wei, who
was then working under Chiang but remained his rival, felt that it would
save lives if the Chinese and Japa nese could reach an agreement to stop the
fighting. After Chiang rejected Trautmann’s efforts, Wang Jing wei continued
to explore the possibility of working with the Japa nese to end the war on
terms the Japa nese might accept.
Before the Shanghai campaign, the Japa nese had still been confident that
their quick attacks in North China and Shanghai would cause the Chinese
to accept Japa nese domination, but after Shanghai, they started making
&nb
sp; preparations for a longer war. They called into ser vice a higher proportion
. 255 .
china and japan
of young men and began to activate more reserve forces. They also expanded
the production of planes, ships, tanks, artillery, and other weapons.
The Massacre at Nanjing, December 1937
At the end of the three months of heavy fighting in Shanghai, the troops
on both sides, deprived of sleep and food, were exhausted. Both sides had
suffered heavy losses, including some of their best young officers. To the
Chinese, the Japa nese were the hated enemy. After seeing their comrades
killed in action, the Japa nese marching to Nanjing were already battle-
hardened. The Chinese in the Nanjing area were terrified.
Because the Japa nese had not anticipated that heavy fighting would
move from northern China to Shanghai so quickly, when they met with for-
midable re sis tance in Shanghai, Japan’s military planners rushed to get
more men and armaments into position to fight. They did not have time to
make adequate logistical preparations. As a result, their troops had to find
their own food, which inevitably meant taking it from local store houses,
shops, and families, thus further alienating the local people.
Nanjing was not a great economic or military center, but since it was
the capital, Japa nese leaders hoped that by capturing it they could control
the country and end the war quickly. Nanjing had symbolic value, not only
as the capital that Chiang Kai- shek had been building up since 1927 but as
the historic site where Chinese kingdoms had been located in antiquity and
where there were remains from the Ming dynasty when the capital was lo-
cated there between 1368 and 1421.
With little pause after the Shanghai battles, Japa nese troops quickly
began marching toward Nanjing. As they marched through small cities
along the way— Kunshan, Suzhou, Wuxi— they had to remain alert for
Chinese soldiers who could be hiding and be prepared to shoot them. To
reduce such a risk, they carried out a massive campaign of burning trees,
and even entire villages, along their path to prepare for the troops that were
to follow. By December it was already getting colder, and Japa nese troops
lacked enough warm clothing for the winter. Reports that reached Nanjing
of the approaching Japa nese troops described them as a terrifying enemy,
with unruly soldiers who stole food and goods and shot people along their
. 256 .
The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
route. Even before they arrived in Nanjing, there were reports of Japa nese
soldiers raping women and stealing their jewelry. Many Japa nese com-
manders, aware of the suffering of their troops, the unexpected death of so
many comrades, the risks they were taking, and their deep disappointment
that the anticipated short war was turning into a war with no end in sight,
were lenient when they heard the reports of stealing, raping, and killing.
As the Japa nese approached Nanjing, the Chinese established three de-
fensive rings of soldiers around the city, but the Japa nese easily broke
through them. Rather than have his government officials under siege,
Chiang had de cided that the officials should move, with all their rec ords
and documents, to Chongqing before the arrival of the Japa nese. On
November 20, Nanjing newspapers reported that government officials had
already packed up and set out for Chongqing. Local people panicked when
they heard this news, and they hurried out of the city and tried to hide in
the nearby countryside. Radio reports, however, stated that the army would
remain and that Nanjing would be defended to the last drop of blood.
Chiang Kai- shek had already de cided that he and his crack troops would
move on to Wuhan, where his forces would reassemble and prepare to fight.
Chiang appointed General Tang Shengzhi and his troops, not part of
Chiang’s top force, to stay and defend Nanjing.
On November 22, a group of foreigners from Germany, Denmark, Great
Britain, and the United States who had de cided to remain in Nanjing de-
spite the Japa nese attack, met to form the International Committee for Es-
tablishing a Neutral Zone for Noncombatants in Nanjing. They hoped
that the zone, like the foreign settlements in Shanghai, would be a safe haven
from the fighting. The committee included a small group of medical doc-
tors, missionaries, professors, and businessmen. At the time, Germany and
Japan were on good terms following their signing of the Anti- Comintern
Pact in November 1936, and the group selected a respected German, John
Rabe, a Siemens com pany representative, to be their chairman. Rabe had a
large swastika placed in his yard in hopes that it would escape Japa nese
bombing. With the support of ambassadors from several countries who
were still in their embassies in the city, the committee sent a tele gram to
the Japa nese ambassador to China, asking the Japa nese, for humanitarian
reasons, to allow the formation of a neutral zone to protect noncombatants.
. 257 .
china and japan
The zone would be located in the western part of the city, in an area that
included Nanjing University, several hospitals, several of the embassies, and
some government buildings and elementary schools, as well as the homes
of John Rabe and other foreigners.
For days the committee received no response from the Japa nese. Deeply
worried about whether their zone would be recognized by the Japa nese,
committee members tried contacting the Japa nese through intermediaries.
Fi nally, on December 1, a tele gram arrived reporting the Japa nese response:
“The Japa nese authorities responsible for Nanjing cannot grant a safety zone
for fear that the Chinese forces might use it for military purposes.” How-
ever, they also stated that they would “endeavor to re spect the district as con-
sistent with military necessity.” The committee understood this as it was
intended, that the Japa nese authorities would try to cooperate with the es-
tablishment of a safety zone if it were not used to harbor Chinese troops
and it did not cause prob lems for the Japa nese military. Rabe approached
General Tang to request that no soldiers be allowed in the proposed zone,
to reassure Japa nese officials and protect civilians. General Tang responded
that that would be impossible.
Before Chiang Kai- shek and Mayor Ma Chaochun left Nanjing on
December 7, 1937, they passed administrative leadership of the city over to
John Rabe, who in effect became the acting mayor as well as the chairman
of the neutral zone. At the time, Chinese troops were burning many of the
buildings in Nanjing so that they could not be used by the Japa nese. By the
beginning of December, most government officials and other residents of
Nanjing had already moved out, headed toward Chongqing or the coun-
tryside. Before the exodus began, Nanjing is estimated to have had a popu-
lation of about one million people, but by December 7 only about 200,000
remained, and nearly all of them, except for soldiers and an estimated 10,000
civilians, were
in the safety zone.
By December 9, the Japa nese were at the city gates. Japa nese represen-
tatives demanded that the Chinese surrender to avoid a fight. They an-
nounced that if the city did not surrender within twenty- four hours, at-
tacks would begin. John Rabe and his Safety Committee, hoping that
Chinese officials would want to avoid further damage to the city, had al-
ready asked General Tang to agree to surrender, and after the ultimatum
. 258 .
The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
they urgently pleaded with the general to agree. General Tang, who until
that point had been refusing, said that if Chiang Kai- shek would agree, then
he would also agree. But Chiang felt that if they did not try to defend
Nanjing, it would send the wrong signal to the Chinese public. He refused to
surrender. On December 10, 11, and 12 Japa nese artillery subjected the city
to a massive bombardment, leaving it in flames. In the bombing attacks on
December 12, they sank an American ship, the Panay, which was docked
on the Yangtze, just west of the safety zone. The Japa nese, still hoping to
avoid war with the Americans, two weeks later apologized to the United
States and agreed to pay compensation for the ship’s bombing. On the eve-
ning of December 12, General Tang left the city with most of his troops.
The departure of the forces under Chiang and Tang preserved large num-
bers of troops for later battles. But Chiang’s officer corps was badly depleted.
In the battles in Shanghai and Nanjing, Chiang lost about 70 percent of
the officers directly under his command.
On December 13 Japa nese troops marched into the city, and it is esti-
mated that, by the end of the day, some 70,000 Japa nese troops had arrived.
By the eve ning of December 13, when the bombardment stopped, Japa nese
soldiers had broken the glass on many shopfronts and begun looting, some-
times carry ing away their booty in crates, sometimes in rickshaws. Foreign
reporters wrote that uncontrolled Japa nese troops outside the zone were
wildly slaughtering local people and raping women.
Over the next several weeks, the Japa nese rounded up thousands of Chi-
nese soldiers who had remained in the city and machine- gunned them to
death. Many Chinese soldiers disguised themselves by putting on civilian
clothes, sometimes obtained by raiding clothing shops. Some of these former
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