and to cooperate with other countries to maintain global peace.
For many older Japa nese who had been in China before 1945, the opening
to China stirred memories of the war in China, and they experienced an
outpouring of guilt for the damage that they or their relatives and friends
had caused. Some hoped that Chinese would forgive Japan for the atroci-
ties that had occurred. Others wanted to forget what Japan had done and
reframe the events of World War II so that the Japa nese would be regarded
as good people who had been forced to go to war to defend themselves from
Western imperialists.
In China, the decision to normalize relations with Japan was made by
a small group of leaders. For the wider Chinese public, the media did not
provide a comprehensive explanation of Japa nese politics and society.
Without an understanding of the complexities of Japa nese politics and the
sentiments of the Japa nese people, it was difficult for the Chinese to empa-
thize with the Japa nese and understand their perspective. In meetings be-
. 332 .
Working Together, 1972–1992
tween sister cities, religious groups, and youth groups following normaliza-
tion, representatives on both sides would offer polite expressions of
goodwill, but they rarely examined the troubled history between the two
countries, which would again rise to the fore when relations between the
two countries began to deteriorate.
The Limited Opening
From 1972, when relations were normalized, until 1978, when the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship was signed, the number of Japa nese visitors to China
and the number of meetings between Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and
Japa nese visitors increased rapidly, but business relations between China
and Japan developed slowly. The two sides had rushed through normaliza-
tion in 1972, but China did not reach a consensus to boldly promote reform
and opening until 1978. In 1972 Mao had welcomed a number of foreign
guests to Beijing, but he was not yet prepared to allow them to travel freely
within the country. A Japa nese diplomat, Sugimoto Nobuyuki, who had the
rare opportunity at the time to attend a Chinese- language school and share
a room with a Chinese student, reported that his roommate told him his
surname but never revealed his given name. He would say ni hao (hello),
but they never engaged in any further conversation.
Once China and Japan normalized relations in 1972, Japa nese individ-
uals in many diff er ent circles— business, local government, the media, reli-
gious groups, and former residents of China— sought to visit China. They
hoped that China and Japan could enter a new era of friendship, and they
wanted to make friends with their Chinese counter parts to help usher in
the new age. Businessmen had visions of trade opportunities and were pre-
pared to be patient and to postpone making profits. The number of visi-
tors between the two countries increased from fewer than 3,000 in 1969 to
10,000 in 1973, although this was still less than 1 percent of the number of
visitors who would travel between the two countries three de cades later.
Overwhelmingly, the visitors were Japa nese travelers going to China.
In his last years before his death in 1976, Mao did not give a clear green
light for moving ahead rapidly to improve relations with Japan. Mao con-
tinued to allow his wife, Jiang Qing, and the other members of the Gang of
Four, to criticize those who wanted to promote reform and opening, but
. 333 .
china and japan
he also allowed Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping to greet many foreign visi-
tors, including those from Japan. After 1973, Zhou began to slow down his
activities because he had been diagnosed with cancer, but he continued to
meet with visiting Japa nese dignitaries for two more years, and he supported
Deng Xiaoping in meetings with foreign visitors. Deng personally met with
more than forty Japa nese del e ga tions between 1972 and 1976, far more del-
e ga tions than from any other country, for in the years immediately following
normalization many Japa nese wanted to visit China.
Through the discussions among Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and their
Japa nese counter parts, Chinese leaders began to develop a more positive
view of both Japa nese and U.S. policies. Zhou Enlai acknowledged, as
Henry Kissinger had told him, that Japan required a security treaty with
the United States to provide for its defense. In a talk with Miyazawa
Kiichi, who was later to become Japan’s prime minister, Zhou even acknowl-
edged that he understood the need for Japan to have a self- defense force.
Chinese officials continued to worry, however, that as the Japa nese economy
grew, Japan might use its formidable economic power to develop a strong
military.
Many Japa nese were prepared to be generous to China, not because they
feared Chinese power but because they felt guilty about Japan’s aggression
and the suffering that it had brought upon the Chinese people, and they
believed they owed the Chinese extra favors before they would be able to
make profits in the Chinese market. At the time, most Japa nese people could
never have imagined the speed with which China’s economic power would
take off over the next several de cades, and they were not then seriously wor-
ried about competition. Japa nese businesses entering the China market
sought to develop long- term relationships. They were prepared to be gen-
erous in helping their Chinese counter parts even if they lost money for sev-
eral years, because their goal was to establish lasting relationships.
Trade developed at a fairly fast pace, increasing from $1.1 billion per year
in 1972 to almost $4 billion per year in 1975, by which time China had more
trade and other contacts with Japan than it had with any other country. In
1974, 24 percent of Chinese trade was with Japan, although only 3 percent
of Japa nese trade was with China. China bought chemical fertilizer from
Japan to help increase its crop yields, and Japan helped China build chem-
ical fiber factories for producing cloth, so the acreage devoted to growing
. 334 .
Working Together, 1972–1992
cotton could be reduced to make way for increased grain production. Japan
also sent machine tools to China to help set up other factories. At the time,
China did not yet have any manufactured goods to sell abroad but it did
have petroleum, and with virtually no automobiles, China had little demand
for petroleum at home. In 1973 China exported some 1 million tons of pe-
troleum to Japan; by 1975, that figure had increased to 8 million tons, and
both Chinese and Japa nese specialists were optimistic that petroleum ex-
ports would increase rapidly, providing Japan with energy security, reducing
its oil de pen dency on the Soviet Union, and allowing China to increase im-
ports of machinery from Japan. It was entirely unexpected that, two de-
cades later, China would have a growing need for petroleum and would be
working with other countries to establish a stable supply of petroleum
imports.
Chinese leaders continued to pressure Japan to cut ties with Taiwan in
hopes of making pro gress in their goal of reuniting Taiwan with the main-
land. But the Japa nese and Taiwanese resisted giving up the deep ties they
had established between 1895 and 1945. In 1973, when 10,000 Japa nese visi-
tors traveled to China, some 400,000 Japa nese visitors traveled to Taiwan.
In the mid-1970s, the amount of Japan’s trade with Taiwan continued to rival
the amount of its trade with mainland China. By using “dummy companies,”
Japa nese companies managed to keep trading with the mainland and Taiwan,
but by the late 1970s large Japa nese companies were conducting more busi-
ness with China and allowing smaller dummy companies to trade with
Taiwan. Japa nese businessmen and politicians who had close relations
with Taiwan still found it much easier to deal with Taiwanese business-
people, many of whom had learned Japa nese during colonial days and were
more comfortable with the Japa nese than they were with the mainlander
Chinese— few of whom, with the exception of some in the Northeast, could
speak Japa nese. Japa nese companies preparing to expand their role in China
hired Japa nese employees who understood China from their days living
there before 1945, as well as younger Japa nese employees who had studied
Chinese language in Japan or in Taiwan.
One of the most difficult issues between China and Japan was how to
handle airline flights between the two countries. To keep pressure on Taiwan
and ensure that the growing air travel market focused on flights from Japan
to the mainland rather than from Japan to Taiwan, Beijing de cided not to
. 335 .
china and japan
let Japa nese airlines land in China if the com pany flew planes to Taiwan. In
1974 China and Japan fi nally reached an agreement that Japan Airlines
(JAL) would end its cooperation with Taiwan’s China Airlines. Flights from
Taiwan to Japan would be allowed, but they would have to be on private
carriers, not JAL, and the planes could not fly the Taiwan flag. Planes from
China could land at Narita International Airport in Japan, but flights from
Taiwan could land only at Haneda Airport, a smaller airport used primarily
for domestic flights. Taiwan’s officials were so angry about this arrangement
that initially they cancelled all flights to and from Japan. It was more than
a year before Taiwan backed down and “private airlines,” not national car-
riers, could fi nally fly between Taiwan and Japan’s Haneda Airport. Japan’s
largest private airline, Zennikku, All Nippon Airways (ANA), did not re-
ceive permission from the Japa nese government to schedule flights abroad
until 1986. But because flights to China were so central to ANA’s expan-
sion plans, ANA leaders began cultivating friendships with mainland of-
ficials in preparation for playing a key role in what they expected to be a
growing number of flights between Japan and China in the future.
Negotiations over fishing rights, which began in 1974, also posed serious
prob lems because China placed many restrictions on fishing near its coast-
lines. Japan eventually accepted many of China’s restrictions. The United
States had passed the administration of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands to
Japan when Okinawa was transferred back to Japan in 1971. China claimed
the islands for the first time in December 1971, but Japa nese specialists be-
lieved that China did not have a strong legal basis for owner ship. However,
in 1978, when the two countries signed their Treaty of Peace and Friend-
ship, Deng Xiaoping told the Japa nese that the question of owner ship could
be put aside, to be de cided by future generations. Thereafter, while Deng
was in power, owner ship of the islands was not an issue of serious dispute,
but by the time of Hu Jintao it became a highly contested issue.
Relations between Japan and China did not blossom immediately after
1972 because they still needed to deal with a host of practical prob lems in
managing their relations. A new treaty, to be known as the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship, would provide a framework for making trade agreements,
issuing visas, collecting customs fees, setting up consulates, and establishing
airline rights. During the treaty discussions, China, in an attempt to
strengthen the anti- Soviet stance of the Japa nese government, insisted that
. 336 .
Working Together, 1972–1992
the treaty should include an “antihegemony clause” directed at the Soviet
Union. The Japa nese were anti- Soviet, but they refused to agree to such a
clause for they feared it would unduly provoke the Soviets. They feared, after
the oil shock of 1973 had threatened them with a cutoff of oil from the
Middle East, that the Soviets might send military ships and planes to ha-
rass Hokkaido and also cut off oil exports to Japan. It was difficult for rela-
tions between the two countries to move forward until they reached agree-
ment on the new treaty.
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Deng Xiaoping’s
Visit to Japan
In the summer of 1977 Deng Xiaoping was allowed to return to work, after
having been attacked and rusticated in Jiangxi during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, and he was given responsibility for guiding foreign policy. He realized
that for China to grow, more than anything else it would need the coop-
eration and assistance of two countries that could provide funds and guid-
ance to help it build a modern industrial economy— Japan and the United
States. To begin the pro cess of cooperating with Japan, Deng first had to
resolve those issues that were blocking the signing of the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship. Japa nese diplomats suggested that they might accept an an-
tihegemony clause if the treaty also stated that the clause was not aimed at
a third country. The Japa nese calculated that with this additional statement,
the Soviet Union would not be so upset as to refuse to sell oil to Japan or
to take aggressive military action. On July 21, 1978, China and Japan began
their negotiations on the treaty. On August 10, after fifteen rounds of ne-
gotiations, the Chinese accepted the Japa nese proposal to include the state-
ment that the antihegemony clause was not aimed at a third party. At the
negotiating table, one Japa nese diplomat, the deputy head of the Treaties
Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Togo Kazuhiko, was so happy
at hearing that the Chinese had fi nally agreed that he shook hands with his
superior under the table. Japa nese diplomats understood that the Chinese
decision had come directly from Deng Xiaoping.
Although Prime Minister Tanaka had gone to Beijing in 1972 to sign
the normalization agreement, until 1978 no high- level Chinese leader had
made a reciprocal visit to Tokyo. After the signing of the Treaty of Peace
. 337 .
china and japan
and Friendship, it was understood that a top Chinese leader should make
a return visit to Japan. Yet never before in history had a top Chinese leader
in office visited Japan, and never before in the 2,200 years of their history
<
br /> had a leader of China met the Japa nese emperor. At Deng’s side on his trip
to Japan in October 1978 was Liao Chengzhi, ready to advise, translate, and
greet his old friends.
On arriving in Japan, Deng announced that he had come for three rea-
sons: to exchange the formal Treaty of Peace and Friendship documents,
to thank Japa nese friends who had worked to improve relations between
the two countries, and to find the “magic drug” that Xu Fu had been looking
for. The Xu Fu legend, still well known in China and Japan, tells of a Chi-
nese man who went to Japan some 2,200 years ago in search of a drug that
would bring eternal life. Deng explained that the magic drug he was looking
for was the secret for how to modernize.
Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Japan, October 19–29, 1978, was extraordinary
not only because it was unique historically but also because it ushered in
the closest relationship between China and Japan in their history. At Deng’s
press conference at the Foreign Press Center in Tokyo, there were more than
400 reporters in attendance— more than had been pre sent when Queen
Elizabeth visited Japan (and the Japa nese take a great interest in royalty).
In explaining China’s situation, Deng said that China would not be like an
ugly person trying to appear beautiful by putting on nice clothes. “We are
a backward country and we need to learn from Japan.” He said that although
his visit would be brief, he wanted good relations between Japan and China
to continue forever. When asked about China’s view on the dispute over
the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, he said that China and Japan had not reached
any agreement on the islands and pointed out that each country even called
the islands by diff er ent names. But he said that China and Japan should put
aside their differences about the islands and work together to find ways to
cooperate. After his press conference, Japa nese reporters stood and clapped
for several minutes.
The Japa nese public viewed the Deng visit on tele vi sion, and though few
Chinese then had access to tele vi sion, they could view the filmed visit in
Chinese movie theaters. On his visit to Japan, he greeted as “old friends”
many members of the forty del e ga tions he had met with in Beijing. Never
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