East of I Corps and the ROK 1st Division, the 25th Infantry Division on the left flank of IX Corps began its advance northward, following generally the course of the Kuryong River, a tributary of the Chongchon. The division headed for its first objectives of Unsan and Ipsok. The former was west of the Kuryong; the latter was east of it. The division expected to encounter a center of enemy troop concentration and hard fighting. The Kuryong River split the division's ten-mile front, which necessitated some special tactical dispositions. Because of expected heavy enemy opposition to its advance, the 25th Division's firepower was reinforced by three field artillery battalions, two of them, the 77th and 82nd, taken from the 1st Cavalry Division, which was now in Eighth Army reserve. The third artillery battalion, the 90th, was borrowed from the Turkish Brigade, which had just arrived at the front and was not expected to be committed to action immediately.
Col. Henry K. Fisher's 35th Infantry, minus B Company, advanced along the west side of the Kuryong about four miles toward Unsan without meeting enemy resistance.
Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, the division commander, formed a special task force to advance on the cast side of the Kuryong River, opposite Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry. This special task force was expected to meet enemy on its axis of advance, the road north from Yongbyon, one of the few remaining walled towns of medieval Korea. The road ran west from Yongbyon a few miles to the Kuryong River and then turned north along its east bank toward Ipsok. Beyond Ipsok, the road curved slightly eastward around the so-called Turtle's Head and Camel's Head bends of the Kuryong River. The special task force was known as Task Force Dolvin and took its name from its commander, Lt. Col. Weldon G. Dolvin, commanding officer of the 89th Tank Battalion.
To the right, or east, of Task Force Dolvin, the 24th Infantry Regiment, popularly known among its members as the Deuce-Four, commanded by Col. John T. Corley, completed the 25th Division deployment. This regiment was the only all-black infantry regiment in Eighth Army. Its officers, however, were white and were handpicked from among the top performers in the US Army. The 24th Infantry's line of advance on the right of Task Force Dolvin led it into hilly country with poor roads.'
The 25th Division's third regiment, Col. John "Mike" Michaelis's 27th (Wolfhound) Regiment, was held in division reserve.
General Kean had little worry about his left flank, with Colonel Fisher, an experienced, middle-aged officer, in command there. Fisher was a professional in the best sense of the term-wise and judicious in the use of weapons, calm and decisive under battle stress. He did not spend his time having energetic public-relations personnel meet incoming planes to snatch away to his CP feature writers for US national magazines and newspapers. Fisher was a quiet, thinking commander, not glamorous; he never sought headlines.
Task Force Dolvin left its line of departure just north of the walled city of Yongbyon. It was one of the few major units that met enemy fire on the 24thChinese small-arms fire in the afternoon. Its composition was a mixed one from three different battalions together with several special support units, all chosen for their combat capabilities:
Task Force Dolvin
B Company (less one platoon), 89th Medium Tank Battalion (8213th Ranger Company, attached)
E Company, 27th Infantry Regiment (Assault Gun Platoon, 89th Tank Battalion, attached)
B Company, 35th Infantry Regiment (1st Platoon, B Company, 89th Medium Tank Battalion, attached)
25th Reconnaissance Company
C Company, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion
Reconnaissance Platoon, 89th Medium Tank Battalion
The 105-mm howitzer artillery support units (two or three battalions, varying because of changing circumstances) are not given as constant units of the task force.' The Ranger Company in the task force was the first and only one of that type then in Eighth Army. B Company, 35th Infantry, and E Company, 27th Infantry, were two handpicked infantry units and formed the backbone of the task force.
Advance elements of Task Force Dolvin had barely crossed their line of departure at 10 A.M. when two American prisoners of the Chinese came into the task force south of Ipsok. They said Chinese had brought them to within three miles of the American lines and told them to go on down the road and they would meet American soldiers. They said there were 28 more American prisoners, unable to walk because of wounds, waiting up the road. The prisoners were members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment who had been captured near Unsan (now directly in the path of the 35th Regiment) a month earlier in the CCF 1st Phase Offensive. Colonel Dolvin refused to send ambulances for the waiting Americans. He said his force would attack toward them. His advance reached the group just north of Ipsok about 1:30 P.m. and found them to number 24 instead of the stated 28. The battalion aid station, with the help of ambulances from the 25th Division, evacuated all the former prisoners to the rear and turned them over to medical authorities.' Brig. Gen. George Barth, commanding the division artillery, brought back three of the prisoners in his jeep. These men reported they had been well treated but had suffered from wounds, intense cold, and meager rations.
It is not clear why the Chinese released these prisoners. An enemy document captured more than two months later but apparently issued in late November 1950 (since it covered information obtained by interrogating American prisoners of war between 13 and 23 November) said the Chinese commander of the prisoner-of-war stockade at Pyoktong on the Yalu River selected and investigated 27 American prisoners who were to be released. On the night of 19 November, interpreter Yuri Ki Bok started with them toward the front, and at a point four kilometers from the American lines, he released them. This document said those released were slightly wounded and of below-average intelligence." Information obtained from some of the released prisoners indicated they were told on 21 November that they would be released. On the night of 23 November they were placed in houses a few miles in front of the American positions and told to send two of their number the next morning through the Chinese positions to contact American soldiers. The next morning local Chinese screening forces apparently withdrew north of Ipsok."
Of interest was the statement of one of the released men that, as they traveled south from the Yalu, they encountered a roadblock about every 20 miles. As they neared the front, there were roadblocks about every quarter of a mile.
When Task Force Dolvin got under way on 24 November, B Company, 35th Infantry, was deployed on the left; B Company, 89th Tank Battalion, was in the center; and E Company, 27th Infantry, was on the right. In the early afternoon the force passed through and around Ipsok, a small village situated in a shallow east-west valley, south of a low range of hills. In the afternoon about 4 P.m., a group of Chinese in the hills east of the road rose up in groups of three or four and fired rifles at B Company, which returned their fire. This drove off the Chinese screening force. The tanks in the center of the road helped by firing a few rounds at the Chinese. The task force went into positions late in the afternoon three to four miles north of Ipsok.
Meanwhile, the 24th Infantry Regiment was supposed to be advancing on the right, or east, of Task Force Dolvin. A meeting of contact patrols between the two forces had been arranged for that evening. First Lt. Robert K. Sawyer, 3rd Platoon leader of the 25th Reconnaissance Company, took his platoon eastward up a shallow valley to the designated meeting point on the regimental boundary. He and his men waited several hours during the frigid night, while a full moon lighted the frosty landscape. Eventually the 24th Infantry patrol arrived, reported it had seen nothing, and continued on its way."
That morning, Col. John Corley's 24th Infantry had moved up on the right of Task Force Dolvin, relieved the 8th Cavalry Regiment, and with its 1st Battalion on the left and its 2nd Battalion on the right, started its main advance east of Yongbyon toward Unhang. It had no opposition during the day.
The other US division in IX Corps, the 2nd Infantry Division, put its 9th Infantry Regiment in the lead as it started from Kunu-ri north up the Chongchon River valley. Nothing eventful happ
ened to it during the day, except that its 3rd Battalion found seven self-propelled guns and three T-34 (Soviet-built) tanks on flatcars in a railroad tunnel south of Won-ni (Pugwon). All were in good condition. Ahead of the troops, the Air Force bombed and napalmed every village along the way. Elements of the 9th Infantry were nearly two miles north of Kujang-dong by evening."
On the right, or east, of the 9th Infantry, the 38th Infantry Regiment was on higher ground east of and away from the river. There, Col. George Peploe's regiment held the vital right flank of the IX Corps, inland from Kujang-dong and next to the left flank of the ROK II Corps, 15 miles northwest of Tokchon. On 24 November Peploc's men met Chinese patrols that quickly withdrew and disappeared. By evening the 38th Regiment was in the high His east of the Chongchon River but not in contact with the ROK II Corps. The 23rd Regiment of the division, at first in reserve, had left Sunchon on 23 November and the next day reached Kunu-ri, poised to follow the rest of the division northward up the Chongchon.
During the day, aerial observers studied high and massive Hill 1229, seven to eight air miles northward in the center of the 38th Infantry zone of advance. They discovered freshly dug positions on it and estimated that there were at least 500 enemy troops on the mountain. Air strikes were directed on these positions, killing an estimated 150 enemy."
The only place on the Eighth Army line where there was hard fighting on 24 November was on its right flank, in the area of the ROK II Corps, near Tokchon. Actually, the Eighth Army attack there on 24 November was only a continuation of fighting that had been in progress for many days. Chinese had opposed ROK troops there from the very first attempt of the South Koreans to occupy Tokchon. When the ROKs made a determined effort on 24 November to move ahead, the Chinese again fought them to a standstill. At the end of the day the South Koreans were no more than 1,000 yards from where they had started in the morning. The situation at Tokchon and eastward from it in the ROK Corps zone of operation requires some explanation, in view of what was to happen there in the next 48 hours.
The Special Situation at Tokchon
The Chinese 1st Phase Offensive in late October had caught the Eighth Army by surprise north of the Chongchon River in a series of major ambushes. The ROK II Corps, then also on the army right flank, suffered serious losses at that time. The 2nd and 19th regiments of the ROK 6th Division were hit hard, and its 7th Regiment had been cut off just below Chosan on the Yalu-only about 300 men from it ever escaped back to friendly lines. The ROK 6th Division at this time had been rendered combat ineffective. At the same time, the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division suffered heavy losses.
In the Eighth Army withdrawal after this first meeting with the CCF, the ROK II Corps moved south and east. It was still on the army line on the right, extending its line to the vicinity of Tokchon. Some of its elements took up blocking positions farther cast near Macngsan on the army's extreme right, or eastern, flank.
Tokchon is situated on the north bank of the Taedong River. A sharp, coneshaped hill, rising from the flat, although narrow, valley of the Taedong, about a mile west of Tokchon, dominated the town. This hill was studded with caves. In the fighting there in the first part of November, it became known as the Honey Comb. The 16th and 21st regiments of the ROK 8th Division had the mission of capturing Tokchon and Honey Comb Hill that dominated it. When the ROK troops arrived, they found that Chinese were in Tokchon and had occupied the area in force.
For eight consecutive days, the ROK regiments fought to capture their Tokchon objectives. They would blast their way to the crest of Honey Comb by day, and each night the Chinese would drive them off. After the eighth day of this sec-saw fighting, the Chinese in mid-November suddenly withdrew from Tokchon.
After 14 November, the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division held the extreme right flank blocking position at Macngsan, about 15 air miles southeast of Tokchon, but many more miles by a narrow, twisting mountain road. Its patrols into the gap eastward toward the US X Corps found North Korean guerrilla bands of recently conscripted personnel, but no Chinese units.
On 18 November the ROK II Corps boundary was shifted eastward again, and the US IX Corps took over the positions west of Tokchon then held by the ROK 6th and 7th divisions. The ROK 7th Division now moved to the ROK 8th Division positions north and east of Tokchon, and the ROK 8th Division was ordered to new positions north and east of Yongwon, about 15 air miles northeast of Tokchon. The ROK 6th Division, still far understrength and in the process of taking in replacements and reorganizing because of its earlier heavy losses, went into corps reserve. The ROK 7th and 8th divisions occupied their new positions without great difficulty. The Chinese in front of them gave only token resistance but maintained contact with the ROK troops. On 24 November the 2nd Regiment of the ROK 6th Division assembled at Tokchon as part of the ROK II Corps reserve.15
The ROK 7th Division, now next to the US IX Corps boundary, had had only limited operational experience since its reorganization. The ROK 8th Division was the only major unit of the ROK II Corps that was in relatively good condition. A ROK division at full strength had about 12,000 men. But it must be remembered that, at whatever strength, the ROK divisions in the ROK II Corps were supported by only one battalion of light artillery-105-mm howitzers-and they had no armor. The ROK II Corps headquarters itself had no additional artillery or support weapons. The ROK II Corps on 24 November occupied by far the most rugged terrain of the Eighth Army front.
In one respect the UN Command had by now given improved support to the ROK units. In the early months of the war there was only a haphazard attempt to supply a balanced and suitable food ration to the South Korean troops. The command was wholly preoccupied with other more pressing matters. But in the late summer and early autumn, a ROK Army ration was developed, known as the 12-in-1 ration. It was first issued to ROK troops in November 1950 and was airlifted from Kimpo airfield, near Seoul, to Pyongyang and then forwarded by truck to the ROK units.16
The ROK II Corps positions on 24 November had the 3rd and 8th regiments of the ROK 7th Division, in that order, extending the line eastward from the US 2nd Division boundary northwest of Tokchon, with the 5th Regiment in division reserve. The 10th and 21st regiments of the ROK 8th Division were on the extreme right in the direction of Maengsan and Yongwon. The 16th Regiment of the division was in a blocking position at Maengsan and patrolling daily eastward into the gap toward X Corps. The ROK 6th Division was in corps reserve, with its 2nd Regiment assembled at Tokchon. The 7th Regiment had a strength of only 119 officers and 1,443 enlisted men and was at Kunu-ri. The division's third regiment, the 19th, was far to the rear, just moving to Hwachang, Songchon, and Yangdok, 45 to 50 air miles south of Tokchon. It could be of no immediate use in any crisis at the front. The ROK II Corps headquarters on 24 November moved to Pukchang-ni, 15 air miles south of Tokchon."
There was a damaging incident in the ROK II Corps rear just before the 24 November attack that also adversely affected the corps's combat effectiveness. In a well-planned and equally well-timed move on 23 November, a large North Korean guerrilla force of about 1,500 men attacked the town of Songchon, about 50 miles south of Tokchon. Songchon was on the ROK II Corps MSR. The attack was unusually successful. It blocked the corps's supply road at a critical moment, and in addition it destroyed ammunition dumps and field hospitals the ROKs had established there. The ROK II Corps immediately started the 19th Regiment of its 6th Division to Songchon to reopen the road. This left only the 2nd and 7th regiments of the 6th Division in corps reserve. Only the 2nd Regiment was combat effective.
This was the situation when Chinese stopped in their tracks the three ROK regiments in the II Corps center and right, the 8th Regiment of the 7th Division and the 10th and 21st regiments of the 8th Division, on the morning of 24 November after they had climbed less than half a mile into the hills in their attacks. Heavy fire from Chinese positions, protected by sheer cliffs, formed a steel and rock wall that repeated ROK assaults failed to dent. The ROK II Corp
s advance stopped. It was the one place on the Eighth Army front where no appreciable gain was made that first day.'"
Aside from these actions at the front on 24 November, the 25th Infantry Division airlifted truck drivers from Pyongyang to Pusan to drive back 101 vehicles that were badly needed; the 1st Cavalry Division quartermaster was able to issue winter shoepacs and pile-lined jackets to division troops; two new UN units arrived at Pusan for duty in Korea (the Netherlands Battalion and the British 29th Brigade), and Eighth Army ordered the 5th Cavalry Regiment to assume responsibility for the Sunchon-Kunu-ri MSR to the US IX Corps."'
MacArthur Goes to Korea on 24 November
Gen. Douglas MacArthur planned to go to Korea on 24 November to see the attack start. In a sense, he meant to launch the Eighth Army attack by his presence on the Chongchon River front. Prior to 24 November, the last General Headquarters FEC communique MacArthur had issued was no. 11, on 6 November. This summed up the situation as he saw it at the end of the Chinese 1st Phase Offensive. In that communique he spoke of Eighth Army's escaping from "a possible trap ... surreptitiously laid [and] calculated to encompass the destruction of the United Nations Forces. ..." In the days that followed, MacArthur carried on an argument with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as already noted, that he should be allowed to renew his attack toward the border, despite the "trap" from which the Eighth Army had so recently escaped.='
On 24 November MacArthur issued his Communique No. 12. It reflected his views at the outset of the UN offensive on 24 November, or at least the view he wished to present to the world, and it is therefore of great interest and importance. It is quoted in full below:
The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea against the new Red Armies cooperating there is now approaching its decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our Air Forces of all types, have for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the North so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer [X Corps], with noteworthy and effective Naval support, has steadily advanced in a brilliant tactical movement and has now reached a commanding enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy's geographical potential. This morning the western sector of the pincer moves forward in general assault in an effort to complete the compression and close the vise. If successful this should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight.
Disaster in Korea Page 8
