Many ROK leaders of groups numbering as many as 100 to 200 men fought their way back to friendly lines. To do this they had to work their way through mountainous terrain and fight CCF forces dug in across the most likely routes of escape southward. The ROK leaders had difficulty keeping their men moving, exhausted as they were after the climbing, marching, and fighting of the preceding days and nights. One ruse they employed was to have a small detail bring up the rear of their groups and fire close to the retreating men, thus creating the impression that Chinese pursuers were close on their heels. This stimulated them to further exertion toward escape.
On the morning of 27 November there could be no doubt that the CCF 112th Division and other enemy forces from the CCF 38th Army held Tokchon, although some remnants of the ROK 7th Division were in the vicinity, mostly south of the town in the direction of Pukchang-ni, the ROK II Corps headquarters. Maengsan was entirely surrounded by the CCF 42nd Army, if not actually in its hands. Large numbers of the 42nd Army had bypassed Maengsan and were south and west of it in the ROK II Corps rear. The road south from Tokchon to Pukchang-ni had been blocked repeatedly since the morning of 26 November, reopened several times briefly, and then blocked again. At noon on 27 November the CCF closed it for good. This caught the CP staff of the ROK 7th Division north of the block and closed this escape route. The ROK II Corps headquarters had to leave Pukchang-ni, and it took the road south. Some miles south of Pukchang-ni the ROK II Corps set up a defense position with elements of the ROK 6th Division and gathered up stragglers and groups from the ROK 7th and 8th divisions that had escaped the Chinese dragnet. The corps commander tried to reorganize these troops into usable units.
The ROK Sth Regiment had captured some prisoners in the vicinity of Tokchon. Korean interpreters interviewed them and learned that the CCF 112th Division had made the frontal assault on Tokchon, while the 113th and 114th divisions enveloped the town. By noon on 27 November, the ROK II Corps area of the Eighth Army front was almost entirely in enemy hands, and the corps routed." The location of most units of the ROK II Corps was unknown.
From the ROK Corps left flank five companies of the ROK 3rd Regiment had escaped westward to the 38th Infantry positions, and they took up frontline duties with it. About 250 more ROK soldiers from the 2nd Regiment of the ROK 6th Division had come into the 38th Infantry lines as stragglers and were being reorganized there. Elsewhere, three companies of the ROK 7th and 19th regiments of the 6th Division had been left behind at Pukchang-ni, when the ROK II Corps evacuated the town, to delay enemy advance south of there. But theirs was only a temporary holding action at best. South of Pukchang-ni, units of the ROK 6th Division still intact took up a defensive position, behind which stragglers from the ROK 7th and 8th divisions assembled and regrouped, according to a message from a KMAG advisor with the ROK II Corps at to IX Corps."
Aerial reports during the day advised of numerous enemy formations converging on Tokchon and Yongwon from the north and the Huichon area, apparently to join and reinforce the drive southwest into the Eighth Army rear areas.
General Walker took several steps during the twenty-seventh to meet the growing crisis confronting Eighth Army. He ordered General Coulter, IX Corps commander, to assume control of the ROK II Corps sector. To help accommodate the larger IX Corps zone of responsibility, he changed the boundary between the US I Corps and the US IX Corps, moving it eastward, and as a part of this change the US 25th Infantry Division henceforth was in the I Corps zone. The boundary between the two US corps now ran south of the Chongchon River from Kunu-ri to Sunchon, with responsibility for the Kunu-riSunchon road in IX Corps. Walker also released the 1st Cavalry Division from Eighth Army reserve and attached it to IX Corps, with orders that it should advance toward Pukchang-ni, the former ROK II Corps headquarters, secure it, and protect the Eighth Army east flank. The Turkish Brigade already had been attached to IX Corps and sent east from Kunu-ri toward Tokchon. As a further gathering of strength on the eastern flank, the British 27th Brigade had been ordered to an assembly area south of Kunu-ri.
During the day, the 7th and 8th regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division reached Sunchon, and the 5th Cavalry Regiment was on its way there. The 1st Cavalry Division was to advance on Pukchang-ni from Sunchon as early as possible on the morning of 28 November. The latest reliable information on the chaotic ROK II Corps situation on the southeast flank of Eighth Army came from Brigadier General Farrell, chief of KMAG, who was at the ROK II Corps headquarters in the afternoon. He reported there were about four battalions of ROK troops from mixed units assembled in the 11th Regiment, 6th Division, some artillery with them, and about 500 more ROKs from the 8th Division with some artillery pieces. They were in position about one mile south of Pukchang-ni. He said the road from Sunchon to Pukchang-ni was under fire at some points, indicating that some CCF units were already south of Pukchang-ni."
Just after noon on 27 November, Eighth Army Deputy Chief of Staff Eugene M. Landrum telephoned Maj. Gen. Doyle Hickey, chief of staff, General Headquarters, Far East Command in Tokyo with a message from General Walker, which summarized the situation as he knew it. General Walker's message follows:
Indications are that cn is no longer on def but is taking off action in str. Main effort at the moment is against IX Corps (center) and II ROK Corps on our right. No important activity on our extreme west flank, but captured PWs indicate possibility of some str in that area. We are consolidating positions of I Corps until situation clarifies. IX Corps is resisting strong attacks but is under orders to resume the offensive. II ROK Corps on right has fallen back to general line cast and west through TOKCHON. Situation in that corps still fluid. IX Corps is employing Turks to attack TOKCHON from the west to assist in stabilizing situation in II ROK Corps. 1st Cav Div being assembled east of Sunchon in rear of ROK as a precautionary measure.
To Walker's message, Landrum then added in conversation with Hickey, ". . . the general feeling up there is not pessimistic. But it's a tight situation brought about primarily by the lack of firmness on the part of our little friends."" It is surprising to note in this message that Walker at midday, 27 November, apparently thought the IX Corps could still resume the Eighth Army offensive and that Landrum would say the American feeling at the front was not pessimistic.
CCF Exploit Breakthrough of ROK II Corps
During 28 November the Chinese were everywhere in motion during daylight, exploiting their breakthrough of the ROK II Corps. This daylight movement was in contrast to their usual practice of remaining quiet and hidden during daytime to minimize losses to air attack. Aerial observers at 8:55 A.M. reported two enemy regiments were approaching Pukchang-ni from the north. Another observer reported an enemy regiment moving west from Maengsan. A Joint Operations Center air report stated that a continuous stream of enemy soldiers was moving south from the Huichon area toward Tokchon, using all roads, trails, ridgelines, and gullies that afforded a route for foot movement. This activity continued all day. One report indicated that the troops were variously dressed, stating that an estimated 2,000 seen were dressed in white, another 400 to 500 in dark blue uniforms. Some of the troops had 40 to 50 pack animals with them. During the night or early morning of 28 November, the CCF occupied Pukchang-ni. Approximately four enemy regiments were there or in its vicinity after daylight of 28 November. Apparently the closest ROK defensive position was about three miles southwest of the town, where the ROK II Corps had organized parts of the ROK 7th and 19th regiments of the ROK 6th Division on high ground in an effort to stop further enemy penetration southward from Pukchang-ni.
At 9:30 A.M., an estimated regiment of Chinese with 20 mortars was reported to be in Pukchang-ni, another regiment a mile west of Taepyong-ni, two miles southwest of Pukchang-ni. The deepest penetration by enemy troops observed from the air was at Sochang-ni, where an estimated 2,000 enemy cavalry were seen. Sochang-ni was located on a trail or track about 12 air miles southeast of Pukchang-ni and almost directly cast of Sunchon. At Sochang-ni, this forc
e was many miles south of the ROK defensive position just established three miles below Pukchang-ni and moving around and behind it, apparently headed for Sinchang-ni and Sunchon.'s Another 2,000 men in civilian clothes were seen ten miles southeast of Wawon, moving west. The chief of staff of the ROK 7th Division arrived at the 1st Cavalry Division CP at noon on 28 November and reported his division had an estimated strength of 2,000 men. Eighth Army received a report during the day that the headquarters of the routed and fragmented ROK II Corps was at Sunchon.16
The Far East Command in its Daily Intelligence Summary for the 24-hour period beginning at 2:00 A.M. on 28 November admitted that the enemy in the last 48 hours had changed to "sharply aggressive counteroffensive with an apparent massing of his strength against 2nd ROK Corps which was swept aside to a depth of 5 to 25 miles...." It then went on to say that the "probing attacks by the Eighth Army actually turned out to be a reconnaissance in force in which the enemy disclosed his real strength along the entire front." Here for the first time we see reference to the Eighth Army's attack that began on 24 November as "a reconnaissance in force," a term General MacArthur was later to use in describing what the Eighth Army had been doing, claiming that its action in disclosing the enemy's massed strength saved that army from anni This is not what the Far East Command had planned. It is a rationalization after the fact. Also, some misconceptions of the Far East Command intelligence section at this time are reflected in the previous day's intelligence summary, which implies that enemy action against the ROK II Corps came through the area of the gap between the Eighth Army and the X Corps. This, too, demonstrably, is not what happened.
At the end of 28 November, the leading CCF forces that had penetrated south and southwest of the ROK II Corps areas were swinging into the rear of the IX Corps front and threatening to move behind all of Eighth Army. General Walker counted on the 1st Cavalry Division to block that move. The collision of the 1st Cavalry Division with the CCF, primarily elements of the 125th and 126th divisions of the 42nd Army, will be described in a later section. First it will be necessary to go back a day or two and relate the story of the Turkish Brigade that had already met a strong force of the CCF 38th Army that drove west from Tokchon toward Kunu-ri, directly threatening to get in the rear of Eighth Army at the boundary of IX Corps and I Corps.
The 'Kirks Meet Disaster
The Turkish Brigade was thrust into the battle for Tokchon on 26 November, their first appearance in combat in the Korean War. This United Nations contingent was the largest, except for the British, that participated in the Korean War alongside American and ROK troops.
Essentially, the Turkish Brigade, or Turkish Armed Forces Command, was a regimental combat team consisting of three infantry battalions and supporting engineers and artillery, with a brigade staff superimposed on it.
The advance party of the Turkish Brigade arrived at Pusan on 12 October 1950. The main body, numbering 5,190 troops, arrived there five days later, on 17 October. They unloaded the next day. The Turks were fully equipped, except for certain weapons. On 23 November, the Eighth Army G-4 Section carried the brigade as numbering 5,055 men for logistical support. Brig. Gen. Tahzin Yazici commanded the brigade. His principal staffoffrcers were Col. Celal Dora as assistant commander, Maj. Faik Turun as G-3, and Maj. Recai Baturalp as G-4. The brigade went into bivouac just outside Taegu in South Korea for training exercises and to receive supplies and certain equipment. It was then attached to the 25th Infantry Division. One of the problems at first was to supply the brigade with enough bread to meet its requirements, as it was the major element of the Turks' diet. Bakers had to be trained to meet their needs, and US Army field ranges were provided for all Turkish kitchens. On 19 November the 25th Infantry Division left Kaesong at 6 A.M. and closed at Kunu-ri at 10 P.m. that night, after traveling 187 miles. The next day, 20 November, Eighth Army ordered the Turkish Brigade detached from the 25th Division and reassigned to IX Corps reserve. It stayed in that status five days.1s
The Turks had the reputation of being rough, hard fighters. Most of those in the brigade were young and wore big, black mustaches that gave them a particularly fierce appearance. They wore a sidearm sword, as they called it, but to most Americans it looked like a long knife. No other troops in the UN forces were armed with a weapon of that kind. The Turks were proficient in its use for close combat. `°
When the Turks arrived at Kunu-ri, "a little mud-and-stick village," as an English correspondent called it, they chanced to camp beside the Australian Battalion. A strange bond of affection and admiration between the two groups of young men sprang up, whose fathers had fought against each other at Gallipoli in World War I. This meeting between the two groups took place on a bitterly cold night, when they pulled up railroad tics, hacked down telegraph poles, and gathered rice sheaves to burn for warmth. This common tie seemed to cheer the Turks, who were indeed strangers in a strange land, with no understanding of either the English or the Korean languages, and whose customs were different from those all around them. The language barrier was to be a major difficulty in their military operations for some months. For one thing, the Turkish private would take orders from no one except his own officers.20
On 26 November the Chinese penetration of the ROK II Corps in the Tokchon area had assumed alarming proportions. General Coulter decided to send the Turkish Brigade from his corps reserve eastward on the road from Kunu-ri to Tokchon to defend that place. At 3:15 in the afternoon the corps attached a platoon of American tanks to the brigade and ordered the Turks to start moving toward Tokchon at once. The Turks' mission was to protect the right flank of the US 2nd Infantry Division, which, in effect, was at that time the Eighth Army's right flank. Trucks were to transport a battalion of Turks to Wawon, about 15 miles cast of Kunu-ri, not quite halfway to Tokchon, unload them there, turn around, and return to transport another battalion to Wawon. The third Turkish battalion would for the present remain at Kunu-ri. From Wawon the Turks were to attack toward Tokchon on foot. The route from Kunu-ri that ran eastward behind the front lines was upstream along the Tongjukkyo River into the high mountain divide that separated the Chongchon from the Taedong drainage. Wawon was a small village on the road high in the mountains just west of the divide, where the headwaters of the Tongjukkyo River fanned out into numerous small streams that poured down from the divide to form the
The first battalion of Turks to reach Wawon unloaded there in the afternoon of 26 November without tank support. It is not entirely clear just what happened at Wawon thereafter. The first word back to IX Corps at Unhang-ni, a few miles west of Kunu-ri, was that the Turks had met a force of Chinese, had won the ensuing fight in a wild knife and bayonet melee, and had captured some hundreds of Chinese. The IX Corps accepted this report as factual and, knowing now that the CCF held Tokchon, ordered the Turks to turn north from Wawon, advance into the mountains toward the right flank of the 2nd Infantry Division, and make contact with the 38th Regiment at Tomgi. The IX Corps headquarters immediately informed press representatives of the spectacular Turkish victory in their first encounter with the Chinese. Press releases recounting the story were sent at once to the United States and widely printed there and in Europe. But the story was entirely erroneous. It was never subsequently corrected in the press.
Word of the Turks' "victory" quickly reached the 2nd Division. It wanted to confirm it and to establish communications with the Turks, and at once sent a Nisei (Japanese-American) interpreter to Wawon. He reported back that the Turks actually had met about 200 ROK troops retreating from Tokchon, had thought they were Chinese, and had attacked them, killing many and capturing about 125. These ROKs were members of the ROK 6th and 7th divisions. There were no Chinese involved in this first fight the Turks had in Korea. This unfortunate incident was quickly covered over and not publicized-the public did not know what had really happened. The South Koreans bitterly resented being attacked and suffering many casualties by a force under Eighth Army command and in an area they thought was safe f
or their withdrawal from Tokchon."
The Turks, however, can hardly be blamed for what happened. They had little reliable intelligence to guide them. They did not know a ROK force was retreating from Tokchon toward them. They did expect to meet Chinese somewhere on the road. They had none of their UN allies with them, who might have prevented the accident. They did not know either the Korean or the Chinese language. In their ignorance of the true situation and believing they were meeting enemies, their attack showed valor. The Turks stayed during the night at Wawon, astride the road they had traveled. They and the Chinese were almost certain to meet each other on the morrow.
Before the Turks could get started north for Tomgi after daylight on 27 November, they did indeed see Chinese soldiers. But the precise circumstances of the meeting are unclear. A message in the G-3 Journal, 2nd Infantry Division, says that the Turkish column was ambushed about three miles east of Wawon at 8 A.M. that morning. Eighth Army, aware on the morning of 27 November that Tokchon was in enemy hands, sent a message to halt the Turks at Sochang, for they reportedly had started toward Tokchon at 5 A.M. from Wawon and Wolbong-san. The latter is the high mountain at the divide east of Wawon. Just after noon on 27 November, at 1:10 P.M., IX Corps changed the Turks' mission to one of establishing a blocking position six miles cast of Wawon, on Wolbongsan mountain pass. What happened to the earlier Eighth Army order is not known. From its blocking position ordered by IX Corps, the Turks were to patrol to the cast, southeast, and north and to establish contact with the UN unit on their left. Presumably this would be the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division, or possibly with ROKs of the 3rd Regiment who were still straggling into the 38th Infantry's zone. This message went to Lieutenant Colonel Weaver, who was the IX Corps liaison officer with the Turkish command."
Disaster in Korea Page 13
