Meanwhile, all day of 26 November, Chinese forces of the 66th Army had attacked the ROK 1st Division and had forced one of its regiments out of line. This threatening development on the division's right flank caused Lieutenant Colonel Throckmorton to move his 5th RCT forward and to take position on the right of the 21st Infantry near the boundary with the ROK 1st Division.
Beginning on the night of 25 November, the CCF attacked across the breadth of Eighth Army eastward from the 24th Division, which alone was spared. As a result of the nightlong battle elsewhere, General Walker ordered the 24th Division to hold the 21st Infantry at Chongju. If it continued its unopposed advance it would soon be far out in front of the rest of the army, with the CCF making inroads everywhere to the east of it. In such a situation, the division would be in danger of being surrounded.'
Throughout the Chinese 2nd Phase Offensive, the US 24th Division on the army left flank reacted to events elsewhere. By morning of 27 November these successful CCF attacks included important inroads in the zone of the ROK 1st Division on the immediate right flank of the 24th Infantry Division. The CCF 66th Army, concentrated around Taechon, on the night of 26-27 November struck the ROK 11th Regiment northeast of Taechon, and during the day attacked and forced back the ROK 12th Regiment.
At 8 A.M. on 27 November I Corps ordered General Church to send the US 19th Infantry to Pakchon as I Corps reserve and to withdraw the 21st Infantry from Chongju to Naechong-jong. There it was to establish contact on the main road with the 5th RCT on its right. During the day only the 5th RCT had important enemy contact.
Pursuant to division orders, Colonel Stephens's 21st Infantry at Chongju canceled at 8 A.M. all patrol orders and prepared to relieve the 19th Infantry at Naechong-jong. The 3rd Battalion started back at noon, and the 1st Battalion followed it an hour later. By 4:30 P.M., all 21st Regimental units had closed on Naechong-jong. When the 21st Infantry started back at noon on 27 November, it was 50 miles south of the Yalu River and the North Korean border. On 1 November, it had been located at Chonggo-dong on the coastal road, only 18 air miles south of the Yalu, the farthest north of an American unit in the Eighth Army. The 21st Infantry had no enemy contact during this latest movement northward. The CCF 50th Army was in assembly areas north of Chongju and deliberately withheld action against the 21st Infantry, awaiting resuits of CCF attacks against Eighth Army elsewhere to the cast.
The critical area for the 24th Division was now along its right flank, next to the ROK 1st Division. The 24th Reconnaissance Company and the 5th RCT covered this area. A 24th Reconnaissance Company patrol, with two tanks, encountered an enemy force, which local villagers estimated to number about 500 Chinese. The patrol caught most of this enemy force while its men were eating and, before they fled west, inflicted approximately 60 casualties.
Earlier, about 2:45 A.M. on 27 November, a Chinese force using heavy machine-gun fire forced a platoon of G Company, 5th RCT, to withdraw from its position. The company counterattacked after daylight and regained the lost ground at 9:30 A.M.
During 27 November, I Corps and the 24th Division were making plans to withdraw the division back to the Chongchon River line. I Corps at 10 P.M. issued its Operational Directive No. 25. It required the 24th Infantry Division to start withdrawing at 7 A.M. the next morning. The 19th Infantry, positioned cast of the Taeryong River, was to be prepared to counterattack at any time in the ROK 1st Division zone during the withdrawal, but only on corps orders. Meanwhile, division troops and the 21st Infantry and 5th RCT were scheduled to withdraw without delay to a new defense line, called the Chongchon River bridgehead line. This was the same line the Eighth Army had held when it started its attack on 24 November. Heavy equipment and service trains not needed to support the immediate action were to go on south across the Chongchon River.'
The CCF 66th Army, from the vicinity of Taechon, carried out unrelenting attacks against the ROK 1st Division from 25 November on and, after the twentysixth, against the 5th RCT of the 24th Division. Two enemy divisions, the 196th and the 197th, of the 66th Army operated against the ROK 1st Division, and the 198th Division against the 5th RCT. Thus, the CCF 66th Army, with its main force against the ROK 1st Division, straddled the boundary between the ROK 1st Division and the 24th Division, with at least elements of one division driving south along the right flank of the 24th Division zone. The 5th RCT guarded this flank for the 24th Infantry Division. The CCF 50th Army, to the north of the 24th Division in the coastal area, apparently never entered the battle, or at most made only a few reconnaissance contacts.
The CCF 66th Army was on line with the 198th Division on its right (west) flank and apparently west of the main road that ran south from Taechon through Unsok-tong to Kasan. The road from Taechon south was the general boundary between the 24th Infantry Division and the ROK 1st Division. This meant that the road also was the boundary between the 5th RCT and the ROK 1st Division. The latter held the zone east of it to the divide between the Taeryong and the Kuryong rivers. East of the Tacchon road, the CCF 197th and 196th divisions, on line from west to east, drove against the ROK 1st Division, pushing it back toward Pakchon. In effect, the CCF 66th Army was carrying out the Chinese right (west) flank attack of the 2nd Phase Offensive against the 5th RCT of the US 24th Division and the ROK 1st Division, with the ROK 1st Division bearing the brunt of the attack.
About 3 A.M. on 28 November, an estimated two Chinese battalions attacked the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 5th RCT along the ROK 1st Division boundary. The enemy assault teams split K Company at three places and L Company at two places. Both companies had to withdraw. They reassembled on I Company, which was then in 3rd Battalion reserve. By 3:30 A.M., the 5th RCT repulsed this Chinese attack. It then disengaged and, on orders, withdrew to an assembly area southeast of Pakchon, where it closed by 3 P.M. that afternoon. At 4:20 P.M., the 24th Reconnaissance Company and E Company, 5th RCT, received the mission of securing the peninsula of land southwest of Pakchon between the Taeryong and Chongchon rivers. The 5th RCT now went into I Corps reserve, with one battalion taking a blocking position at the Chongchon River crossing site east of Anju.•
Meanwhile, the 21st Infantry Regiment received orders at 3:45 A.M. on 28 November to fall back to the old Chongchon River bridgehead line, west of Pakchon. Most of it arrived at its new position before noon. The 3rd Battalion brought up the rear, closing there at 3:30 in the afternoon. The 21st Regiment had no enemy contact during the move. The 19th Infantry remained behind to defend Pakchon.s
At 10:55 A.M. on 28 November Eighth Army sent an order by radio to I Corps and IX Corps, and to all divisions in the two corps, to execute a withdrawal to the Chongchon River bridgehead line. This line began on the west at the north bank of the river near the village of Kwanhae-dong, approximately 15 miles southwest of Pakchon, extending from there to Pakchon, where it turned slightly north of east for a distance of nearly 20 miles to Won-ni on the Chongchon River. There the line turned sharply southeast to Pukchang-ni, a distance of 25 miles, and from there continued on the same axis about 28 miles to the village of Taeul-1i on the boundary between X Corps and Eighth Army. This defense line crossed the Chongchon River from the north to the south side at Won-m. Eighth Army units were to organize, occupy, and defend along this line, utilizing the most favorable terrain, and be "prepared for resumption of offensive at an early date."' The most interesting part of this order was that calling for readiness to resume the offensive at an early date. It seems incredible that on 28 November General Walker and his Eighth Army staff could have seriously contemplated a resumption of the offensive in the near future.
At noon on 28 November I Corps issued its own Operational Directive No. 26, ordering its units to carry out the Eighth Army order, and gave some specific missions to the 24th Infantry and ROK 1st Divisions. The 24th Infantry Division was to establish defensive positions in the ROK 1st Division sector of the bridgehead line and secure the left flank of the I Corps; the ROK 1st Division was to defend while the 24th Division did thi
s, then it was to withdraw through the 24th Division positions, reorganize, and take over the lines established by the 24th Division. Once the ROK 1st Division had taken over this defensive line, the 24th Division was to move south in army reserve and assemble in the vicinity of Sunchon-except for one regiment, the 5th RCI', which would assemble in the vicinity of Anju to protect the Chongchon River crossings until all I Corps troops had crossed to the south side of the river. These movements were to be executed at once-at the earliest possible time. At 5 P.M. that afternoon, I Corps ordered the 24th Division to Sunchon, except for the 5th RCT Eighth Army by this order transferred the 24th Division from I Corps to the IX Corps, but at the same time the 25th Division from IX Corps was attached to I Corps.'
On 29 November the 24th Infantry Division continued its withdrawal of all units to a point below (or south of) the Chongchon River and was out of contact with the enemy. Its destination, as fast as it could reach it, was Sunchon, 20 air miles south of the Chongchon River and in the IX Corps zone of operation. The 555th Field Artillery remained behind in support of the 5th RCT at the river bridges.
Chinese units were now boldly concentrating and moving in daylight in pursuit of Eighth Army units, everywhere in retreat. This was an unusual practice for the Chinese because it exposed them to crippling air attack. But with the entire Eighth Army suffering defeat and in retreat, the Chinese command apparently thought the results of hot pursuit in daytime worth the risk. At the same time, their trucks and pack convoys moved south in daylight from the Manchurian border to bring supplies to the front, and at night their trucks hurried south with headlights on.
On 29 November the 21st Infantry CP closed north of the Chongchon River at 2 P.M. and opened south of the river at Anju three hours later. The 24th Division G-3 telephoned the regiment to move all units across the river and those with transportation to continue on south to Sunchon. The 1st and 3rd battalions remained near Anju for the night but proceeded to Sunchon the next morning."
On the 29th, the 5th RCT received an alert to move to its blocking positions at the bridgehead on the Chongchon River to cover the withdrawal of corps troops to the south side. The bridgehead blocking position was approximately five miles northeast of Anju on the Chongchon River road and across the stream from the village of Yongchon-dong. The 5th RCT closed into its blocking position. at 5:30 P.M. 29 November. The 1st Battalion took its position at the river near the crossing sites; the 3rd Battalion blocked on the river road on the south side against attack from the north; and the 2nd Battalion remained in regimental reserve.'
The ROK 1st Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, was on the right of the I Corps advance in the Eighth Army attack that began on 24 November. Its axis of advance was almost due north from Pakchon toward Tacchon. It straddled the Taeryong River, which emptied into the Chongchon near its mouth.
The Tacryong between Taechon and Pakchon ran a meandering course through low hills, none more than 1,000 feet high. Just northeast of Taechon, however, a high rugged mountain mass between 2,000 and 2,500 feet high formed a barrier between the Taeryong River on the west and the Kuryong River on the east; the two rivers were separated on average by about 14 air miles. The two highest peaks of this high ground were named Hyangjok-san, 782 meters high, and Mulsil-san, three miles westward, 750 meters high. The highest point in the eastern extremity of this mountain mass, near the Kuryong River and the boundary between the ROK 1st Division and the 25th Division, was Obongsan, 598 meters high. The ROK 1st Division advance on 25 November ran straight into this mountain cast of Taechon. There the Chinese awaited them.
One of the main north-south roads in western Korea ran along the Taeryong valley toward the border, and it was certain to be a center of enemy concentration. It was a foregone conclusion that the ROK 1st Infantry Division would have tough going if the Chinese intended to attack Eighth Army or to defend against it in strength.
In studying the Korean War it is generally very hard to find reliable, detailed information about the actions of the South Korean Army. This is true even of those divisions attached to an American army corps. At this time, General Paik's ROK 1st Division was the only ROK division attached to an American army corps (I Corps) in Eighth Army. The Americans considered it a good division; it was well led, had more artillery support attached to it than any other ROK division, and had given an excellent account of itself in the war thus far. It was thus not far below, if not equal to, the standard of American divisions in its infantry action. But the American military records relating to the Korean War do not contain any South Korean unit reports of battalions, regiments, divisions, and corps. There are no South Korean staff S or G-1, -2, -3, -4 journals. The attached Korean units were not subject to the US Army's reporting system, and they made few if any written reports to their own government during the first year of the war.
The information one does find in American records comes from American Military Advisor messages to the Chief of KMAG, a member of the Eighth Army Staff. American advisors were attached to South Korean units down to battalion level. American units fighting adjacent to ROK units usually reported some incidents or the condition of the ROK troops at various stages of combat, because the ROK units on their flanks often affected them. The Eighth Army combined G-2/G-3 situation maps accompanying the daily G-2 Intelligence Summary often gave location data on ROK units.
Only these sources, as well as aerial observer reports, had the information that is needed to piece together a general account of ROK military action. A similar dearth of information exists in the case of the ROK 1st Division in the CCF 2nd Phase Offensive; some reference to it is found in the Eighth Army KMAG reports, I Corps reports, and reports of the 5th RCT, which fought on its western flank, and from reports of the 35th Infantry, which fought on its eastern flank. Aerial reports occasionally refer to the ROK 1st Division situation. But there is not available the amount of specific detail that is sometimes found in American records for US units. Personal accounts of ROK participants are almost never encountered.
For these reasons the ROK story is of necessity more generalized than the American, and it may also be not as reliable. However, the ROK action must be described to the full extent that the available facts will allow. The ROK 1st Division played an important part in the war, as did other ROK units at different times and places. Considering what happened in other sectors of the Eighth Army front in the last week of November 1950, the hard fighting of the ROK 1st Division stands comparison with the American divisions.
For the drive north, General Paik had established his division headquarters at Maengjung-dong, about five miles north of Sinanju on the main road from there to Pakchon. It happened to be about midway between the Chongchon River and the Taeryong River, where the road came to the east bank of the latter, seven miles south of Pakchon. At Maengjung-long, the west coast main Korean rail line turned west to cross the Taeryong River and follow the westward bulge of the Korean peninsula to the Manchurian border. The town was an important rail and road center for control of military actions between the Chongchon River and the western part of Korea northward.
General Palk had an unusually large concentration of artillery attached to his division for the attack toward Taechon, in addition to the 17th Field Artillery Battalion, which was the division's usual support. Col. W. H. Hennig's 10th AAA Group had overall command of the artillery supporting the ROK 1st Division in this attack. It included the 78th AAA Gun Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas W. Ackert; the 9th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm howitzers), commanded by Maj. Thomas A. Arnold; and a rocket battery. Maj. John B. Coontz was the 10th AAA group liaison officer with the ROK 1st Division. In the initial approach to Taechon, the 78th AAA Gun Battalion supported the ROK 12th Regiment. Before the ROK 1st Division withdrew to the Chongchon River on the night of 29-30 November and while it was defending an extensive perimeter at the vital road center of Pakchon, two more artillery battalions, the 555th (105-mm howitzer) Artillery Battalion and the 68th AAA
Gun Battalion, were added to its support.'°
General Palk deployed his I1th Regiment on the division right and the 12th Regiment on his left as he advanced on Taechon. The 15th Regiment was in reserve. On the night of 24-25 November the 12th Regiment just south of Taechon had a quiet night, but the 11th Regiment about two and a half to six miles northeast of Taechon received a strong CCF attack. The ROK 11th Regiment was the most advanced unit of the ROK division. A Chinese force estimated to be a battalion struck it shortly after 3 A.M. on 25 November. In a battle that lasted until after dawn, the CCF forced the 1st Battalion back one and a half miles. With the coming of daylight, the enemy force withdrew from contact. During 25 November, the 1st Battalion reoccupied its lost position along the Taeryong River. It reported finding about 700 Chinese dead in the ground it reoccupied."
Chinese prisoners taken during the night battle indicated that the 196th, 197th, and 198th divisions of the 66th Army were on the high ground and north and northeast of Taechon. Two of these divisions, the 196th and 197th, were in front of the ROK 1st Division to the north and northeast of Taechon. The third division, the 198th, it was learned later, initially held the west side of the CCF 66th Army front and was engaged mostly with the US 5th RCT of the US 24th Division west of the ROK boundary, although that division also was involved in fighting with the ROK 1st Division at times.
Disaster in Korea Page 23
