At 6 P.m. on 29 November, the Service Company and the 9th Regimental trains left Kunu-ri for Sunchon by way of the road west to Anju. News had come to the 2nd Division during the day that its MSR south to Sunchon had been cut by the enemy. An hour and a half later, at 8 P.M., Colonel Sloane received verbal orders from General Keiser that he was to attack the roadblock the next morning. For this task, Colonel Sloane organized the approximately 400 survivors of his 2nd and 3rd battalions fit for duty into a reinforced company."
Meanwhile, the 38th Infantry, on the morning of the twenty-ninth, moved out to take its assigned defensive position, the hills northeast of Kunu-ri. Colonel Peploc still had the ROK 3rd Regiment on his left, facing north and adjacent to the 23rd Infantry, which was still north of Kunu-ri on the valley road hills. The Turkish Brigade was on his right facing north, in the vicinity of Pongmyong-ni and Sinnim-ni, about two miles farther east, on the Wawon-Tokchon road. It was all-important to the 38th Regiment that the Turks hold their defensive position as the regiment moved into its new assigned positions. Otherwise, that east flank of the regiment would be completely exposed and open to encirclement, and it could be cut off from the 2nd Division escape road leading south to Sunchon.
When the 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, reached its assigned position, it found Chinese there ahead of it. The Chinese fired on the battalion. Word came to the 38th Infantry at this time that the Turks farthest east, at Sinnim-ni, were surrounded, and they were to make a three-mile withdrawal. That would put all the Turks still combat effective on line in the vicinity of Pyongmyong-ni, near Kunu-ri. The Turkish CP was reported still to be in Pyongmyong-ni (Kacchon in the records), only five to six miles southeast of Kunu-ri.
In this situation, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 38th Infantry took up a defensive position during the morning of 29 November more than a mile farther back than those the 2nd Division had assigned them. At noon, Colonel Peploe received an order from the 2nd Division to send a rifle company to the division for use to help clear an enemy roadblock below it on the Sunchon road. Peploe sent C Company. Just before noon, a Chinese force drove the Turks out of Sinnim-ni. They began falling back on Pongmyong-ni and Kunu-ri in utter disorder.30
At 2 P.M., Chinese forces attacked the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, from the north, cast, and south. They overran the battalion right flank. The rest of the battalion held. At the same time, the Chinese struck the Turks at Pongmyongni and drove them back on Kunu-ri. Then the Chinese hit the 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, and drove hard against it. By now, with the rout of the Turks, the 38th Infantry's right flank (southeast) was completely uncovered. The 2nd and 3rd battalions were cut off from friendly forces. The Turks continued to fall back under a screen of smoke from burning buildings. Peploe's men could not distinguish friend from foe. Peploe ordered his 1st Battalion to reinforce his right flank. On its way to carry out this mission, the battalion encountered great numbers of Turkish soldiers and their vehicles on the road in complete rout. The 1st Battalion, caught up in this chaos, was unable to accomplish its purpose. It then received orders to take a position astride the Wawon road 2,000 yards cast of Kunu-ri. The 2nd and 3rd battalions were ordered back to the regimental perimeter; they would have to fight their way out to get there."
At 3:30 P.m., Peploe had radioed to the 2nd Division CP, asking if he could get through on the Sunchon road, as he had a lot of wounded. The division told him he could not, that he would have to evacuate wounded west through Anju. Accordingly, Peploc, now encircled and threatened with destruction southeast of Kunu-ri, that evening sent his wounded, Service Company, and trains west on the Anju road. When these vehicles arrived at Anju that evening, there were about 250 Turks on them. Just where and when they got on the trucks is a mystery.
According to a IX Corps G-2 report, there were some Turks still fighting in the area east of Kunu-ri on the right flank of the 38th Regiment as late as 5:15 P.M. About that time, or soon thereafter, these troops withdrew, leaving the 38th Infantry, the IX Corps, and the Eighth Army east flank open and exposed. At 6:10 P.m., a Turkish colonel and two Turkish soldiers arrived at Eighth Army headquarters in Pyongyang and reported that, at 9 A.M. that morning, an enemy division had surrounded the Turkish Brigade east of Kunu-ri but that from 500 to 1,000 Turks had broken through the enemy force and were at an unknown location. The Turkish colonel said he thought the Turkish commander, Brig. Gen. Yazici, was with them.
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Colonel Peploe reported to the division that his right flank battalion (the 3rd) was under enemy attack and that he could not get the Turks on its right to move into a supporting position. Col. Gerald G. Epley, the 2nd Division chief of staff, called Colonel Grunby, American advisor with the Turkish Brigade, asking him to get the Turks out of the village (apparently Pongmyong-ni, just east of Kunu-ri) and into the action. Colonel Grunby replied that he did not expect to succeed in the effort. He did not."
At 4:30 P.M., General Keiser radioed to the IX Corps, telling General Coulter that the Chinese roadblock on the 2nd Division MSR south of the division CP was still holding. Keiser asked Coulter for urgent help from south of the roadblock, saying it was needed if the 2nd Division was to break it. Coulter responded by instructing the British 27th Brigade to send a relief force to help the 2nd Division. The brigade dispatched the Middlesex Battalion from Sunchon to move against the enemy roadblock below the 2nd Division. We have already noted that this battalion was repulsed by the Chinese as it approached the Pass from the south, and it gained only the low ground south of the Pass that evening.
General Keiser reported to General Coulter that night at 10:20 P.M. by voice radio on the situation at the 2nd Division. He told Coulter that his CP was then under enemy small-arms fire, that the remnants of the 9th Infantry (2nd and 3rd battalions) had reached his vicinity, that part of the 23rd Infantry Regiment was in the Kunu-ri area, that none of the 38th Infantry had reached his vicinity, and that Colonel Peploe had sent a radio message that two of his battalion headquarters had been destroyed."
For General Keiser the most obscure situation that evening involved what was happening to the 38th Infantry. At 5 P.M., Peploe had a report that all roads into Kunu-ri were blocked, but he set about trying to save his regiment. Half an hour later, an ammunition truck, the lead vehicle in the 3rd Battalion's withdrawing column was disabled in a narrow pass on the road between Hills 182 and 107, about four miles southeast of Kunu-ri. It seemed impossible to move the vehicle. The 2nd and 3rd battalions formed a perimeter around the disabled vehicle and for several hours fought off Chinese attacks. The enemy onslaught began in earnest about 8 P.m. when an estimated two Chinese regiments attacked the right flank of the 38th Regiment through the vacated former Turk position. Smoke from burning buildings obscured the scene.
In this furious and chaotic battle, Capt. Nicholas Gombos, commander of F Company, who had been a conspicuous leader in previous days, was lost to the 2nd Battalion. Enemy machine-gun fire hit him in both legs. Some of his men put him in a jeep, but he was hit again in the area, where the disabled ammunition truck disrupted the withdrawal movement."
While this critical fight was in progress, reconnaissance disclosed an alternate route of escape. The two battalions succeeded in getting some tanks and vehicles around the disabled truck. Colonel Peploe at his CP at this time had voice radio contact with the two battalion commanders, Lt. Cols. James H. Skeldon and Harold V. Maixner, who covered themselves with blankets so the Chinese could not hear them talking, so close were they. With tanks in the lead and the infantry on foot, part of the two battalions fought through to the 38th Regimental CP. But most of the infantry, guided by their officers, had to infiltrate through the enemy at different places to reach the 38th Infantry CP.35
West of the 2nd and 3rd battalions, the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, held Hills 133 and 110, about two miles southeast of Kunu-ri, blocking the road there into the town. The ROK 3rd Regiment survivors were on its left (west). When the 1st Battalion prepared to withdraw, Pe
ploe informed the ROK colonel, through the 1st Battalion commander, that he could withdraw his men at the same time. The ROK 3rd Regimental commander replied, "No, my soldiers will remain on fine until all American soldiers are out, and then I will come out." There was much praise from 38th Regimental officers and men for the ROK 3rd Regiment, which had fought with them from 26 to 30 November."
An hour after midnight on the morning of 30 November, Kunu-ri was reported to be partly in Chinese possession. Still, the 2nd Division had a line holding on the northeast and south sides of the town, with the 23rd Infantry on the north and northeast and the 38th Infantry on the south.31 By this time the 2nd Division G-3 had requested authority to move the division out on the road west to Anju. The IX Corps replied that it would have to clear the request with I Corps because this road was within I Corps's zone of responsibility.
During this furious fighting around the cast and south sides of Kunu-ri, and in some cases within it, on the afternoon and night of 29 November, quad-50s and dual-40s of the Antiaircraft Artillery played important roles in helping the infantry units. They were special targets of Chinese attack. It would be impossible to say how many Chinese these lethal weapons killed or wounded in closein fighting. But a few examples will indicate the nature of their effectiveness. One eyewitness told of finding one M16 (quad-50) with its entire crew dead beside it but about 500 enemy dead in heaps along the approaches to it (the number of enemy dead would appear to be an exaggerated estimate). In this case, the company clerk seems to have been the last man to fire the weapon after its crew had all been killed. In another instance, a Chinese soldier succeeded in carrying a bangalore torpedo to the platform of an M19 (dual-40) before he was killed. In this fight, Sergeant Denham directed the dual 40-mm guns on a nearby house and killed approximately 40 enemy who had been inside it. A few escaped. Later this gun battery's personnel went forward to pick up American wounded in the battle area. They found an American lieutenant alive but almost in shock behind a hump of earth near 40 dead Chinese .31
The 2nd Division had ordered the 38th Infantry in its withdrawal to clear the Kacchon River bridge southwest of Kunu-ri by 1 A.M. But the 38th Regimental Headquarters had to wait until 4 A.M. of 30 November for its 2nd and 3rd battalions to join it, the delay caused by the heavy night battles the two battalions had to fight in their withdrawal, before Peploe could move his regiment across the bridge to the south side of the Kaechon River and go into an assembly area. Peploe had some trouble reorganizing his regiment in the assembly area. The weather during the night had been biting cold, casualties in the 2nd and 3rd battalions had been heavy, units were mixed, and there were many stragglers.
In the withdrawal movement, which was to include the ROK 3rd Regiment, Peploe had ordered the latter, after it had crossed the bridge, to take a position southwest of the Kaechon River to tie in with the flank of the 23rd Infantry Regiment on its left and to extend from there eastward toward the river. This would put the ROK regiment north of the 38th Infantry assembly area, and provide protection for it and the nearby division artillery emplacements, as well as protect the right flank of the 23rd Infantry. For reasons unknown, the ROK commander, who had previously faithfully followed all instructions from the 38th Infantry to the best of his ability, failed to comply with this order. This failure left the 38th Regiment's assembly area uncovered and the right flank of the 23rd Infantry open to enemy infiltration. This situation was not discovered, however, until after daylight of 30 November. Peploe was preparing to send troops to close the gap for his and the division artillery's protection when he received division orders to withdraw to its CP two miles south. Peploe told the nearby artillery commander that his regiment was leaving and that there would be no protection for it from the north, after he left his position. The artillery commander said he would stay.39
The 23rd Infantry, Rear Guard for the 2nd Infantry Division at Kunu-ri
During the morning of 29 November, the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, stayed in its blocking position a mile south of Won-ni. All morning American stragglers passed through the battalion and were collected by it. There was no Chinese attack on the battalion in the morning. Although Chinese forces in great number were in the vicinity of Won-ni and on the hills to the east, they seemed intent on moving south and southeast around the 1st Battalion. At noon the 1st Battalion moved south, halting short of the regiment's 2nd and 3rd battalions. They were in blocking positions astride the road about two miles north of Kunu-ri on Hill 73, west of the road, and on a ridge of about the same height cast of the road. At dark, the 1st Battalion moved through their blocking position, continued on to and through Kunu-ri, turned west at its southern edge, and at midnight crossed the bridge over the Kaechon River.
Lieutenant Colonel Hutchins put his 1st Battalion on two hills, one on either side of the road. This was the road that led west from Kunu-ri to Anju. At Hutchins's position, therefore, the road passed between these two hills in what might be called a saddle or a small pass. The 1st Battalion in its new position seemingly would control this road west of the Kacchon River and Kunu-ri. Hill 201, on the south side of the saddle, was the higher of the two hills.
Less than a mile west of the 1st Battalion's position at the saddle, the road coming north from Sunchon met the Kunu-ri-Anju road. This was a crucial road junction in the military situation that was developing. This road running south from the river road at that junction was the MSR for the 2nd Division in its projected withdrawal to Sunchon, and it was also the road on which the division CP and the division artillery emplacements were located. The 2nd Division CP was located four miles south of this road junction. The division artillery units were located in general about two miles north of the division CP and therefore that much closer to the road junction.
From midnight on, all kinds of American and UN troops passed Hutchins's 1st Battalion position, heading either west past the junction toward Anju and Sinanju or south from the junction toward Sunchon. There were men from the 25th Division, Turks, South Koreans, and the 2nd Infantry Division in this constant stream of units or stragglers seeking an escape route from the Chinese behind them. At one time during the night, a column of 24th Infantry, 25th Division, withdrawing from the northwest and another of the 23rd Infantry, from the northeast, met at an intersection in Kunu-ri. The commander of the 23rd Infantry unit argued with the military police at the intersection that he should let his unit through first. The MP stood his ground and ruled against the officer. Everyone was in a hurry that night to get through Kunu-ri.`0
Meanwhile, the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 23rd Infantry, in their blocking positions two miles north of Kunu-ri on the valley road, did not have serious trouble until late in the afternoon. They had spent the day digging in on their position and keeping a close observation on all sides. By 5 P.M., the 2nd Battalion moved out under orders to follow the 1st Battalion to a position southwest of Kunu-ri. The 3rd Battalion remained in position as rear guard.
The 2nd Battalion had hardly disappeared southward on the road to Kunu ri, with dusk at hand, when Chinese attacked the 3rd Battalion. A dogtrotting column of the enemy hit I Company. The company did not fire on the Chinese until they were within 15 yards. It was now dark. This point-blank fire killed or scattered these Chinese soldiers. At 10 r.m., the 3rd Battalion still held its position, but word had now come that the 38th Infantry on its right (south) had been forced to withdraw along the Wawon road west of Pongmyong-ni. Colonel Freeman now ordered the 3rd Battalion to begin its withdrawal to Kunuri. L Company and the 72nd Tank Battalion platoon remained behind as a roadblock to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the battalion and to protect the left flank of the 38th Regiment, which was in a desperate situation southeast of Kunu-ri. This blocking force was to remain in its position north of Kunu-ri until ordered to retire. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry passed through Kunu-ri, crossed the Kaechon River, and went into position on the right flank (south) of the 1st Battalion at its position astride the Anju road at Hill 201.<
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Colonel Freeman, commander of the 23rd Infantry, arrived at Colonel Peploe's 38th Infantry CP in Kunu-ri during the evening and there received orders from General Keiser to withdraw his regiment to the southwest of Kunu-ri but to cover the movement of the 38th Infantry across the bridge to high ground south of the town, where it would tie in with the 23rd Infantry. L Company carried out this mission in its rear-guard position two miles north of Kunu-ri. At midnight an estimated Chinese battalion made four strong attacks against L Company and its platoon of tanks but was repulsed. About on 30 November, L Company received information that the 38th Infantry had completed its withdrawal and that it was returned to 3rd Battalion control and should join the battalion southwest of Kunu-ri. L Company and its tanks constituted the last American tactical unit through Kunu-ri. In moving through the town, it came under enemy small-arms fire but suffered no casualties. Chinese had begun to enter parts of Kunu-ri by midnight or soon thereafter. Lieutenant Colonel Maixncr's 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, closed in its position southwest of Kunuri, on the left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Hutchins's 1st Battalion. There the 3rd Battalion faced the rice-paddy land of the Chongchon valley to its northwest.
Disaster in Korea Page 33
