The second enemy roadblock was about five miles farther south, near the village of Yongbong-ni, where an estimated 150 enemy were observed going into position on the high ground west of the village and road. An attack force composed of the 19th Regimental I&R Platoon and C Company, supported by B Company, 6th Tank Battalion, moved south to clear this enemy force from the road. Tanks and machine guns directed their fire on the hill, and an air strike hit the enemy position. But there were also Chinese close in-15 of them were killed within 150 feet of the road. The enemy in this second fireblock were driven off by 5 P.M. The road was cleared about dusk. The 19th Infantry closed on Sunchon at 11 P.M. that night.' This is the only instance known of Chinese troops getting in the rear of I Corps and Eighth Army in the Chongchon area west of the 2nd Infantry Division massive fireblock and roadblock.
An interesting fact emerges when one considers that, on 29 November, the Chinese established fireblocks on three different north-south roads behind Eighth Army about eight or nine miles below the Chongchon River, all on nearly an east-west line. These were (1) on the east at Samso-ri on the Taedong River at a highway-crossing site of the then main Kunu-ri-Sunchon road, where the Chinese turned back the 5th Cavalry Regiment, which tried to break the fireblock; (2) the CCF fireblocks on the secondary road five air miles westward of the Samso-ri road, which the 2nd Infantry Division had to use in its withdrawal attempt; and (3) and the weaker fireblocks on the diagonal Anju-Sunchon road just described, which the 19th Infantry did eliminate, about six air miles west of the 2nd Division withdrawal route. These enemy fireblocks covered all the usable roads over an air-mile distance of 12 miles behind the 2nd Infantry Division and parts of I Corps. Only the most western of the series of fireblocks, on the Anju-Sunchon road, was reopened after the fireblocks were put in place. It appears likely that the enemy who were driven from the Anju-Sunchon road fireblocks retreated eastward to join the forces at the 2nd Division fireblocks.
A captured enemy sketch map later showed that two regiments of the CCF 113th Division, 38th Army, made the cross-country movement from Tokchon to establish these fireblocks. One must say that the Chinese maneuver behind the 2nd Infantry Division was brilliantly conceived and well executed to force the withdrawal of Eighth Army from the Chongchon River front or to entrap large parts of its forces.
There is nothing in the Eighth Army and subordinate unit records, however, to indicate that the army so understood it at the time. As stated earlier, it appears that the 2nd Division did not know of the Chinese fireblocks on the Anju Sunchon road on 29-30 November, and nothing has yet been found to indicate that IX Corps or Eighth Army placed a correct interpretation on it. They did not understand the precarious position of the 2nd Division at dark on 29 November, or take necessary measures to help extricate it the next day. With sufficient units in reserve, the IX Corps and Eighth Army could have seized the Pass area on the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road and could have threatened the southern flanks of the Chinese on the cast and west ridges along that road where the Chinese had positioned their fireblock forces. IX Corps and Eighth Army combat intelligence, or its interpretation, as well as that of the 2nd Infantry Division, in the Kunu-ri-Sunchon area was faulty at this critical moment.
During the day of 29 November the 2nd Division Headquarters staff and General Keiser were preoccupied with getting their 9th, 38th, and 23rd regiments settled in positions south and southwest of Kunu-ri to defend the division CP and to concentrate them for a general movement to Sunchon. Also, the 23rd RCT, with division artillery support, was to prevent any CCF from moving west from Kunu-ri toward Anju and Sinanju. The regimental actions of 29 November have been described. For the most part they were intense and dangerous for the 38th Infantry, and almost equally so for the 23rd Infantry. In the midst of this preoccupation, the 2nd Division may have given about all the attention it could to the CCF roadblock below it. The CCF formations were putting utmost pressure on the 2nd Division combat units blocking their way along the Chongchon River road and on the Tokchon road southeast of Kunuri. The division at this time had only two fragmented battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment near its CP that could be used against the enemy fireblock.
On 29 November, the 2nd Division Headquarters could not locate the CP of the Turkish Brigade, which was supposed to be northeast of it. And later in the day it could not locate the headquarters of the ROK 3rd Regiment's troops. Neither did IX Corps Headquarters know their location. The 2nd Division wanted to move the Turkish troops that were still combat effective to the hills cast and south of its CP to block there against the advancing Chinese. The division tried to get orders to the Turks through the 38th Infantry Regiment. Peploe confirms that the American advisor to the Turkish Brigade was at his headquarters at Kunu-n' at the time, along with a Turkish liaison officer. He thinks that, if an order came through for the Turkish Brigade, it would have been delivered to these officers. It would have been their duty to transmit it to the Turkish Brigade. But he does not know what happened to such an order.9
During the twenty-ninth, many 2nd Division supply vehicles were parked near the division CP. They had been directed to move to Sunchon, but the enemy fireblock to the south prevented their going farther south on the division road. Also, other vehicles began to pile up in the vicinity of the division CP. By 5 P.m., it became evident that the road to Sunchon would not be opened that day. Lieutenant Colonel Holden, the operations officer, went to see Lt. Col. Henry Becker, the provost marshal, who was in charge of all the vehicles assembled in the division area. Holden told Becker that, with so many vehicles in the area, their movement south on the Sunchon road would impede movement of tactical units. Holden proposed to Becker that they turn the column around and send it out west by the Anju road. Becker agreed. They sent vehicles north to the road junction and then west to Anju. When these vehicles started moving north, Lt. Col. Howard N. Tanner, Jr., the Division G-1, who was in charge of the division advance party, after a discussion with Holden, moved the advance party out the same way. Tanner left with his party about dusk. Both these division columns reached Anju without incident.t0
During the afternoon, the G-3 Section of IX Corps informed the 2nd Division that it would move on the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road and that a battalion of British troops would attack north to help open the fireblock. The corps informed the 2nd Division that I Corps to the west of it had the 25th Division and many other units moving south on the Anju-Sinanju roads and that they were clogged with troops and vehicles withdrawing south. Lieutenant Colonel Holden remembers that, at some point in the afternoon or evening of 29 November, Lieutenant General Milburn, the I Corps commander, called General Keiser on the telephone and asked him about his situation and that General Keiser told him that General Milburn offered the use of the Anju road for the 2nd Division if it became necessary. Milburn and Keiser were close friends. In that conversation, Keiser asked Milburn if it would be all right to send his division advance party out that road. Milburn replied, "Yes."
As night came on, General Keiser became increasingly concerned about the CCF roadblock below the division. He decided that the 9th Infantry Regiment should attack the roadblock at daylight, and he set the hour for 7:30 A.M. Colonel Sloane and his S-3, Major Woodward, came to the Division Headquarters for a briefing on the situation they would face the next morning. Lieutenant Colonel Holden and Colonel Epley briefed them on their knowledge of the fireblock situation. Holden told Sloane the 2nd Division troops at the fireblock had broken contact with the CCF there at dark. Epley said the enemy fireblock forces amounted to about two companies. Colonel Sloane told Epley and Holden that all his riflemen would not total more than 400 to 500 men. It was a regiment in name only-actually little more than two rifle companies. After listening to Holden and Epley's briefing, Sloane appeared to think that his composite battalion, with supporting artillery and tank fire plus air strikes, could break the enemy fireblock. Sloane returned to his 2nd and 3rd battalions and spent the next several hours organizing them for their mission.
He found that his effectives numbered little more than 400 men. The commander of C Company, 72nd Tank Battalion, was to join him the next morning with a platoon of tanks when he reached the 2nd Division CP."
About 1 A.M. on 30 November, General Keiser called the assistant division commander, Brigadier General Bradley; Colonel Epley, chief of staff; and Lieutenant Colonel Holden, G-3; to his dugout. Keiser told them he had just talked with General Coulter, the IX Corps commander, who had ordered him to attack south with the 2nd Division at daylight and to withdraw the combat units along the Kunu-n'-Sunchon road. General Keiser further told the group that General Coulter said that he had flown over the road that afternoon (the twcnryninth) in a liaison plane when he moved his headquarters from west of Kunu-ri to Chasan, south of Sunchon, and that he did not think the roadblock was very strong and that the division should he able to break through it. Coulter's remarks on the telephone to Keiser gave no hint that a large Chinese force might be in the area south toward Sunchon. Coulter confirmed to Keiser in this con versation that a British unit would start attacking north at daybreak to assist the 2nd Division. General Keiser, after discussing this telephone call with his principal staff officers, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Holden to prepare a plan for the division withdrawal, starting at daylight, and to use increased strength against the enemy fireblock. Holden started at once on the plan and worked most of the night on it. At times, Holden conferred with General Bradley for his opinions and help.
One problem that caused trouble was the need to work out an artillery fire plan with the G-3 of IX Corps that would prevent the 2nd Division from firing into the British troops that were to attack north. After a no-fire line was decided on and other matters such as a march order had been determined, the plan was sent to General Keiser, who approved it. Keiser at this time felt he had no choice but to go down the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road, since that is what the IX Corps commander had ordered.'2
The 2nd Division Headquarters' fears that it was open to attack were realized during the night. About 10:30 P.m., enemy mortar, automatic weapons, and small-arms fire hit the CP area. Three tanks from the 2nd Reconnaissance Company and three dual-40s and quad-50s from the 82nd AAA Battalion, together with the Defense Platoon, returned the enemy fire. After about an hour the enemy fire ceased, and the rest of the night was quiet. The enemy fire killed a few men and wounded several in the miscellaneous units near the CP but otherwise did little damage."
The 2nd Infantry Division Withdrawal Order
The 2nd Division withdrawal order, prepared and approved as related on the night of 29-30 November, listed the following units in march order, with the 9th Infantry leading after it had cleared the fireblock:
9th Infantry
ROK 3rd Regiment
2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry
2nd Reconnaissance Company
2nd Division Headquarters
Division Artillery
38th Infantry, minus 2nd Battalion (in march order earlier)
2nd Engineer Combat Battalion
23rd Infantry Regiment
15th Field Artillery Battalion, 72nd Tank Battalion (minus C Co.), B Battery, 82nd AAA Battalion (these units supported the 23rd Infantry and were part of the RCT)
(other miscellaneous units such as the Military Police and the Signal Company were placed generally in the march order after the Division Headquarters)
The next day there were several variations in this march order caused by delays of some of the major organizations in taking their places."
When the withdrawal order was delivered to the Division Artillery com mander, Brig. Gen. Loyal M. Haynes, he inquired as to the priority of the artillery battalions within the Division Artillery. General Bradley felt that the 17th Field Artillery Battalion of 8-inch howitzers, the only one in Korea at the time and thus considered the most valuable and hardest to replace, should lead the artillery units, followed by the 155-mm howitzer battalion, and then two of the three 105-mm howitzer battalions. Colonel Goodrich, the Division Artillery S-3, said the withdrawal order was received by telephone about daylight of 30 November."
According to Colonel Epley, "The order of movement was designed for a fighting withdrawal if need be. Combat units were disposed front and rear. The Artillery and spare parts units were in the center."'°
The withdrawal order as actually carried out in the afternoon and night of 30 November, in contrast to the march order given in the division order, was as follows for the major units:
2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, with 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, riding on the 38th Infantry vehicles
2nd Division Headquarters
3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry
ROK 3rd Regiment, but parts mixed with other units
17th Field Artillery Battalion, 8-inch howitzers, and Division Artillery Headquarters
1st Battalion, 38th Infantry
2nd Military Police Company
37th Field Artillery Battalion, 105-mm howitzers
503rd Field Artillery Battalion, 155-mm howitzers
38th Field Artillery Battalion, 105-mm howitzers
82nd AAA AW Battalion (M19s and M16s), interspersed with artillery units
9th Infantry Headquarters Company
2nd Engineer Combat Battalion
The 23rd Infantry Regiment, together with the personnel of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion (the howitzers were left behind) and a company of 72nd Tank Battalion, went out west on the Anju road from its Kunu-ri defense position. This change of route was not contemplated in the withdrawal order."
The command structure of the division artillery follows:
2nd Division Artillery-Brig. Gen. Loyal M. Haynes, commanding general; Col. Joseph H. Buys, exec. off.; Col. Walker R. Goodrich, S-3
17th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzers)-Lt. Col. Elmer H. Harrelson
503rd Artillery Battalion (155-mm howitzers)-Maj. Geoffrey Lavell
37th Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzers), regular support for 9th Infantry-Lt. Col. John R. Hector
38th Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzers), regular support for 38th Infantry-Lt. Col. Robert J. O'Donnell
15th Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzers), regular support for 23rd Infantry-Lt. Col. John W. Keith
82nd AAA AW Battalion (M19s and M16s), organic to 2nd Infantry Division-Lt. Col. Walter Killilae
Brig. Gen. Loyal M. Haynes, commander of the 2nd Division Artillery, was one of the most senior brigadier generals in the US Army. Even so, he had had no combat experience prior to coming to Korea with the division in the summer of 1950. Some years before he had been in an airplane accident in Austria and had broken an ankle, which did not heal properly and left him with a gimpy walk. As a result, in Korea he seldom left his CP. When the division withdrawal started on 30 November, General Haynes got into his jeep and left with the command group. Colonel Goodrich, the S-3 operations officer, remained behind in the Division Artillery Fire Control Center.1°
In the 2nd Infantry Division's withdrawal south from Kunu-ri to Sunchon, a distance of approximately 21 miles, it is important to know the disposition of the division artillery below Kunu-ri at the beginning. No arm of the 2nd Division suffered as heavy casualties as did the artillery. The artillery was in the rear part of the division position. In the withdrawal plan it was protected, however, by the infantry rear guard, the 23rd RCT But when that unit, late in the afternoon of 30 November, suddenly left its place in the withdrawal column and instead went west on the Anju road, the artillery and the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion were left without protection against the onslaught of a force of enemy infantry that continued to gain strength as night fill. The 2nd Infantry Division had had the largest concentration of artillery supporting it of any division in Eighth Army at this time.
The artillery units on the night of 29-30 November and on the thirtieth were concentrated in firing positions north of the 2nd Division CP and between it and the Kunu-ri-Anju and the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road junction, which the 23rd RCT defended. The 17th Art
illery Battalion was farthest north of the artillery units, and east of the Sunchon road; the 15th Artillery Battalion was south of the 17th and also cast of the road. The other three artillery battalions-the 503rd, the 37th, and the 38th-were west of the road and south of the two on the east side of the road. These three battalions on the west side of the road were just south of the 2nd Division Artillery CP but northwest of the 2nd Infantry Division CP.19
Lt. Col. Walter Killilae, commander of the 82nd AAA AW Battalion, had his antiaircraft weapons vehicles scattered among the 2nd Division units on 30 November. He broke down the 2nd Division Withdrawal Order into eight serials, which is helpful in understanding the sequence of unit withdrawals during the day and night.
1st Serial: Attack Force-two battalions of infantry from the 9th Infantry and two tank companies of the 72nd Tank Battalion
2nd Serial: One regiment of infantry-thc 38th Infantry
3rd Serial: Division Command Group, Artillery Headquarters, Military Police Company, Reconnaissance Company, and part of Signal Company
4th Serial: 17th Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzers)
5th Serial: Remaining parts of Infantry Attack Force (9th Inf.); one 105-mm howitzer battalion (37th); and Headquarters Battery, AAA AW Battalion
6th Serial: 503rd Artillery Battalion (155-mm howitzers), and 38th Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzers)
7th Serial: 2nd Engineer Battalion (less heavy equipment, which had already left area)
8th Serial: Rear Guard-23rd RGT with all normal attachments
Killilae said the combat elements of the 82nd AAA AW Battalion were integrated into the column. The 2nd and 8th serials each had the AAA Battery normally attached to the 38th and 23rd regiments; the 3rd serial had a platoon normally attached to the Division Headquarters; and the 5th serial had the remaining three AAA platoons. Serials 1, 4, 6, and 7 did not have any AAA AW vehicles, because they were considered to have adequate ground-support weapons of their own.20
Only serials 1, 2, and 3 got through the enemy roadblock on the Sunchon road before dark. Serial 4 was going through the roadblock and fireblock at dusk and as darkness fell. Serial 8 never entered the fireblock-it traveled west on the Anju road. The roadblock and fireblock area was about six miles in depththree miles longer if one includes the ford area at the blown bridge after dark. It helps to put the entire withdrawal in perspective to remember these facts.
Disaster in Korea Page 37
