In the run through the enemy fireblock on the afternoon of 30 November, and during that night, nearly all the dead were left on the sides of the road. Many wounded were also left there and in the roadside ditches. When the column was held up at the Pass for about an hour because of the enemy mortar and small-arms fire there, General Keiser came to Lieutenant Colonel Holden, took him to the side of the road away from others, and asked if he thought he should order the men to abandon vehicles and continue on foot. Holden said he did not think that time had come. Keiser agreed, saying that he just wanted his opinion. At this point a shout from up ahead said the Pass was clear. The column moved on, and there was no more stopping until they reached Sunchon.
Innumerable gripping of personal drama and tragedy occurred every mile of the way to the Pass. At one time, Holden and Maj. Bill Harrington, assistant G-2, were kneeling behind a jeep firing at an enemy position. A burst of enemy small-arms fire knocked Holden's M-1 rifle out of his hands, and Major Harrington fell over on him dead-shot through the heart. At another place, Jack Thorpe, General Keiser's bodyguard, was killed while manning the machine gun on the general's jeep. The three vans of Generals Keiser and Bradley and Colonel Epley, carrying wounded, all had several bullet holes in them- Bradley's about 18, the driver said. Keiser's jeep had seven bullet holes. Much of the time during the numerous stops, Keiser was out on the road firing his favorite rifle (a Springfield) at the enemy and shouting encouragement to his men. Sgt. John H. Cook, the general's driver, said, "Believe me, the old man can get in and out of a jeep pretty fast. He'd holler, `Dismount,' and wed hit the ditch and fire away at the Reds. Then he'd yell `Mount up,' and off we'd go." Sometimes Cook would fire the jeep machine gun, and then the general would bellow, "You're a simple minded S.O.B., but give them hell!" One bullet smashed through Keiser's windshield and hit the steering gear.s°
Colonel Stebbins, Eighth Army G-4 and a close friend of General Walker, told the author that the pilot of a liaison plane that flew General Walker over the 2nd Division withdrawal road on the afternoon of 30 November told him that General Walker was furious at the chaotic scene he saw below him and yelled, "Get back there and fight, you yellow S.O.B.s," referring to the 2nd Divisions' This comment, if actually made, was unfair. Many in the 2nd Division fought their battle without getting the help they expected and needed from higher authority. His reaction to what was happening as he saw it from the liaison plane does not answer the question, Where were the IX Corps and Eighth Army reserves on this day when they were needed to help the 2nd Division below Kunu-ri? And where was the Middlesex Battalion?
Although Colonel Epley had the Signal Company radio vehicle with him at the division CP after the command group left, he found that, once the command group began running the roadblock, he could not maintain communication with it. He wrote later:
It was difficult to 1) locate the commander you wished to talk to, and 2), to get him to the radio so that you could communicate. When the units were in movement, we lost contact. This was especially true of the forward units. I tried without success to contact Gen. Keiser & the G-3 several times.
I was in contact with Gen. Haynes, the Div Arty Commander twice. He was trying to get in touch with Gen. Keiser. He had been informed that the 23rd Inff, were preparing to use the Anju road and wanted to know if there had been a change in the Division order. I replied in the negative. The second time was somewhat later and he informed me that the 23rd was pulling out and again asked if there had been a change in the order. Upon being told No, he informed me that he was complying with the div plan and that the Div Arty, less those attached to the 23rd Inf would follow the Div special units.
Gen. Bradley came back to the CP area once to my knowledge and used the Signal Company radio. I don't remember much of our conversation. He informed me that the situation up front was confused and he was vague about the whereabouts of Gen. Keiser. I believe he urged me to authorize the 23rd Inf to use the Anju Road, which I would not do in the absence of Gen. Keiser's blessing.52
In the meantime, Colonel Freeman began to feel that his 23rd RCT was becoming increasingly vulnerable to mounting Chinese attack in his positions north of the division, defending the road junction to Anju and Sunchon, southwest of Kunu-ri. He thought that his regiment should withdraw west on the Anju road, which was open, rather than act as division rear guard and follow the other units down the Sunchon road. It appears that he asked Chief of Staff Epley about noon, after the division command groups had started south, for authority to go west to Anju if he should think that was necessary to save his regiment. Epley told Freeman he could not give that authority. Freeman wanted to speak with General Keiser on the subject, but Epley could not establish radio communication with Keiser, who was then in the fireblock. About 2:30 P.m., Freeman was able to talk with General Bradley via Colonel Sloane's radio at the north end of the enemy fireblock. Bradley on that occasion did not give Freeman the authority to go west on the Anju road but said he would think about it. Colonel Freeman left his own CP and started south on the road to find someone who would authorize the move.
On his way south Freeman stopped at the Division Artillery CP, where he found Colonel Goodrich, the Artillery S-3 at the Fire Direction Center. Freeman arrived there about 3 P.M. Lieutenant Colonel Keith, commander of the 15th Artillery Battalion, accompanied Freeman. Freeman told Goodrich that he wanted him to place all the artillerymen still in position under Freeman's command to serve as infantry. Goodrich reports this incident:
About 1500-1530 Col. Freeman and Lt Col Keith came to the FIX; [Fire Direction Center]. Col. Freeman stated that he would be unable to hold his position unless all artillerymen were placed under his command and employed as infantrymen. Another unsuccessful radio attempt was made to reach the Div Arty Commander [Haynes] for his decision. I (S-3) did not have this decision authority.
Freeman was told that I would drive S to contact the CG for a decision but until informed otherwise the Arty units would follow the Div order.
The Opns Sgt was told to close the FDC and to move forward on the road to the rear of the column. When driving south the Bns Cos were told of Freeman's assessment and request, and my response.
About a mile S of the artillery area I started to become aware of the seriousness of the situation. Troops prone in ditches on both sides of the road, dead and wounded both military and civilian. It was clear that they were or had been under fire although I was not conscious of any as I drove around vehicles for 3-4 days (estimate) until meeting the Div Arty CG in the road about 1 mile from the start up the Pass. His radio had gone dead.
He stated that he would not agree to Freeman's request, and to my query whether I should return to the Bn COS with his decision he replied to the negative; that there was no need to confirm their orders. (My recollection is that this conversation took place about 1600.)
As to the situation at the Pass he [Haynes] stated another tank-infantry attack up the Pass was being organized and when underway the column was to "smash" its way through ...s'
A little earlier in the afternoon, and preceding Goodrich's trip south on the Sunchon road, Colonel Epley left the old division CP to go south to Sloane's position to see what the situation was there. Epley found Sloane and his men spent and exhausted and some enemy fire falling on the road. He spent a short period placing some mortars and infantrymen on a ridge just north of a draw where the enemy fire came from and then, with his driver, continued on south down the road. About halfway to the Pass he came upon part of the division command group, including the Military Police Company, held up by fire from two enemy machine guns. There he met Lieutenant Colonel Becker, the division provost marshal, and 1st Lt. Leon D. Secton, assistant provost marshal. They walked ahead to determine the location of the two enemy guns and succeeded in spotting them. Lieutenant Secton went back to bring up an M19, dual-40 gun carriage, to fire on the enemy guns. Epley and his driver at this point started on up the road on foot, taking a defilade position in going around the en
emy fireblock. They reached the top of the Pass without trouble."` Epley commented on his walk up to the Pass and back down:
My purpose was to determine what obstacles, if any, lay ahead especially in the pass area. I expected to see elements of the 9th and 38th Regis and to touch base with the forward CP if I could find it. There were no friendly troops anywhere to be seen and none were defending the shoulders of the pass. We also encountered no enemy fire and no enemy. There were several ROK and Turk wounded along the road and I made signs that they would be picked up. I observed also some friendly and enemy dead. The pass area itself was clear of enemy and as far as I could tell so was the road and the downhill slopes beyond. No friendly troops were in sight. On the way back to the fireblock area several salvos of 155s from our artillery came in on the shoulders of the pass. One shell landed so close that the concussion picked me up and sat me down on the ground. My driver and I were unhurt as we were defiladed by the cut in the hillside.
I returned to the area where our column had halted on the other side of the fireblock and passed the word that the pass was clear of enemy and that we should get going at once. At this time we were receiving no more enemy fire from the roadblock. Becker and I got the column moving again and after observing it for a time I remounted and rejoined the column. We continued through the pass, down into the valley and across the stream into Sunchon without further delays. We did receive some sporadic small arms fire on the way but as far as I could tell it was ineffective.ss
While Epley and his driver walked up to the top of the Pass and back down, Lieutenant Sccton had brought up an M19, dual-40 gun carriage. He put it into position to fire on the two enemy machine guns. At the same time, fighter planes overhead were watching the impact area of the dual-40's fire. They delivered strikes on the same area. Between them and the dual-40, they silenced the two enemy guns. When Epley and his driver returned to the fireblock scene, Lieutenant Colonel Becker had already had the Military Police Company and other vehicles present organized to continue south. Capt. Richard S. Johnston's report for the Military Police Company confirmed Epley's statement that the company and the convoy of trucks behind it moved on south without further trouble and reached Sunchon."
As this episode shows, Epley was able to drive around the feeble fireblock at the north end of the enemy fireblock, where Sloane and some of his 9th Infantry were still in place, while the road ditches were filled with exhausted soldiers seeking cover. The determined action of Becker and Lieutenant Secton resulted in the quick removal of the two enemy machine guns that had held up the last part of the 3rd serial in the division withdrawal. If there had been similar determined action in all units of the withdrawal and officers with antiaircraft vehicles stationed at the north end of the fireblock to go to the aid of stalled units, the division withdrawal as a whole might have progressed better. The M19s and M16s were the best weapons in the division to reduce enemy fire.
In response to questions, Colonel Epley commented on the enemy fireblock at the time he was involved with it:
I went through the fireblock twice. Once on foot on a reconnaissance to the top of the pass. . . . The second time through the fireblock I was in my jeep. We received no enemy fire that I can remember while I was observing the movement of the column prior to rejoining it. There were no single vehicles in my memory. There was a solid column of vehicles with men jammed in and on them wherever they could find a place. For example, there were five or more in and on my jeep. I do not know when the enemy again closed the road and the pass. It must have been quite a while later because Div Special troops & Div Arty got through [only some of it], with some casualties."
Epley estimated that he was in the fireblock area altogether about two hours. His account of little or no enemy fire during that time and no visible presence of enemy during several miles of the road and at the Pass (except the two machine guns mentioned earlier) agrees with Goodrich's comments when he went forward to find General Haynes. Epley must have arrived at the Pass after Haynes's party had passed through it and on south. Captain Johnston's report for the 2nd Military Police Company is consistent with Epley's account. This then raised the question, Where were the enemy during this lengthy period of midafternoon? Possibly the enemy force in the fireblock had run out of ammunition and was waiting for a resupply. Possibly they were regrouping or moving to what they considered would be more effective positions. Whatever the reasons, valuable time was lost for some of the later serials-those following serial 3. Had senior officers of the division command staff remained at the north end of the fireblock to act as regulators or traffic directors, they might have been able to keep the serials moving through the fireblock more rapidly as opportunity offered. But there were none there to perform that vital function. They had all left the scene in the 3rd serial.
At 7:30 P.M. on 30 November, Lieutenant Colonel Holden sent a message to Colonel Kunzig, IX Corps G-3, saying that 2nd Division Headquarters had arrived at Sunchon. He said the 38th Infantry got through with 400 effectives, but that the 9th Infantry, also through the fireblock, was in worse shape. He reported that the 23rd Infantry was still in place southwest of Kunu-ri but said that he had had no information from them since afternoon. (From this message one may assume that the 2nd Division Headquarters at 7:30 P.m. did not know that the 23rd Infantry had left its defense positions more than two hours earlier and was then safely out to the west by the Anju road.) Holden reported that the Division Headquarters had come out of the fireblock at 4:45 P.M., that enemy small-arms fire had been heavy, and that there had been some mortar fire. He said there had been ample air support. Holden told the IX Corps they had got through by the heavy fire they delivered from the ditches, with everyone joining in-clerks, cooks, and men of all ranks-in the intervals when they had to stop, and then barreling down the road again. Very likely the M16s and the M19s of the 82nd AAA Battalion, interspersed in the column with certain units, were the division's most effective weapons.5
Holden's report was good news for IX Corps, because at 5 P.M. it had received a report from a pilot that he could not drop an operational order to the 2nd Division command section, that there was much confusion on the Kunuri-Sunchon road, that there were gaps in the road column, and that at places men alongside stopped vehicles were in firefights with the Chinese. Fifteen minutes later, just before dark, another pilot reported to IX Corps that the fireblock had not been cleared and that the column was not moving.59
The 17th Field Artillery Battalion and Other Units Enter the Fireblock
Brig. Gen. Loyal M. Haynes, the Division Artillery commander, and his headquarters personnel, together with Lt. Col. Elmer H. Harrelson's 17th Field Artillery Battalion of 8-inch howitzers, were the first artillery units to enter the fireblock. But no artillery had completed the passage by dark.
The 17th Artillery had been as far north as Kujang-dong, but since 28 November it had been in firing position about two miles north of the 2nd Division at the side of the Sunchon road. On 29 November Lieutenant Colonel Harrelson and his staff reconnoitered the road south and found that an enemy fireblock did exist. That night, enemy began closing on the artillery, and the 17th Battalion began firing interdiction at a range of 18,000 yards with charge 7. By morning, that had shortened to a range of 1,300 yards, and it could see some of its shells explode on targets. Its direction of fire had changed during the night from north to east, where increasing numbers of enemy were in evidence and pressing on the division. The Division Headquarters had come under small-arms fire from the east just before midnight.60
During the night of 29-30 November, Harrelson received orders from General Haynes that on the morrow the 17th Battalion would go south on the Sunchon road. Until then, Harrelson had hoped the artillery could go out on the Anju road. At 8 A.M. on 30 November, Harrelson called his battery commanders together and informed them they would have to go south on the Sunchon road. An hour and a half later he told them the 17th Battalion would go out as a fighting column. The march order would be B
Battery, A Battery, Headquarters and Service Company, and C Battery last. The tractors and howitzers would go first; the vehicles would follow. He said all tops and windshields would be down, machine guns mounted on vehicles, and the men would fight as infantry, with their individual weapons if necessary.
In moving south, the 17th Field Artillery Battalion passed the other division artillery battalions in their firing positions, the howitzers firing in different directions almost around the compass. Farther south on the road, the battalion came to an abandoned 25th Infantry Division quartermaster dump, where about 100 soldiers from miscellaneous units, including ROKs and Turks, lay on the ground resting, a captain apparently in charge. Everyone helped himself to anything in the dump that he might need. Overcoats were in demand. The 17th Artillery arrived at the dump about noon and stayed there about two hours, waiting word the road was clear. At 2:15 P.m., the battalion started moving again. The soldiers who had been resting at the dump climbed on board A Battery's vehicles. They were bumper to bumper on the dirt road. This road to Sunchon had been improved by US Engineer troops earlier when Eighth Army was planning to drive to the border, so that it was two-way in most places. Low hills lined the half-mile-wide valley here on both sides.61
The artillery group advanced slowly, with stops when enemy fire caused any part of the column ahead of it to halt and the men there to seek shelter in the ditches. About 4 P.M., the 17th Artillery again halted. This time it stopped in the vicinity of the villages of Sinchangcham and Sahyoncham. Machine-gun fire from a ridge south of Sahyoncham, on the west side of the road, at a range of about 400 yards, hit the artillery battalion on the road. Dusk was at hand, and all who looked could see tracer fire from the enemy guns. Brigadier General Haynes ordered a dual-40 up to the front, and it promptly began shelling the enemy hill with its two rapid-fire 40-mm guns. Some 105-mm howitzers, apparently from the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, had deployed on the east side of the road, and they too shelled the western ridges.
Disaster in Korea Page 41
