I think probably the most harrowing experience was the withdrawal from Sinanju when we had to fall back from the Chinese Communists in November of last year. There was a lot of equipment abandoned and a great deal of confusion resulting from the lack of communications and people trying to get through the roads. Vehicles jammed bumper to bumper and the aspect of what might happen was worse than what actually happened.... Everyone was anxious to get back and set up where they could protect themselves. There were no known front lines and everyone was trying to get back and get organized.19
When Eighth Army's massive retreat began from the Chongchon River front, there were few railroad locomotives and only a small number of cars of any kind that far north to evacuate materiel and supplies from Sinanju and other points north of Pyongyang. Most of the rail equipment was between Pusan, the southern port, and Seoul, bringing supplies northbound. Every effort had been made prior to 24 November to build up a stock of supplies at the Eighth Army front sufficient to support an advance. Ironically, this readiness had just been achieved when everything was put in reverse. Now everything that was to be saved had to be put on the single-track railroad at Sinanju and Sukchon and on the twolane highway, running south. ASP 17 at Sinanju had just been built up to 3,000 tons daily when the order came to evacuate it. Only 15 railcars were available to do it-not enough. I Corps had to destroy 1,600 tons of ammunition there because there was no transport available to move it."
The port of Chinnampo, 35 miles southwest of Pyongyang, the seaport for the North Korean capital, was just reaching its unloading capacity when Eighth Army turned back south. The US Navy had just completed what it said was the greatest mine-sweeping task in its history, clearing a 65-mile-long channel to the port so that supplies could be brought in for the army. From Chinnampo an improved highway and a rail line ran to Pyongyang, and from there to the front. This new avenue of military supplies was abandoned just after it reached operational state. The 24th Division, which expected to receive most of its supplies through Chinnampo in the drive north, reflects the story rather well in the movement of its Quartermaster Company in six hectic days. On 25 November the company moved north to Pakchon to support the advance. On 28 November it withdrew suddenly to Sinanju; the next day it went back farther to Sukchon, and on 30 November it fell back to Pyongyang. From there it went all the way back to the outskirts of Seoul. In the general movement south, Chinnampo was an destroyed. Some supplies accumulated there were evacuated, some destroyed, and some fell to the Chinese.22
In the rapid withdrawal of Eighth Army from north of Pyongyang, the necessity for most of the units to go through the city caused some slowdowns. Physical and geographic features that characterized and surrounded the city caused the problems. The Taedong River split the city in two parts on a line running from northeast to the southwest. This mandated two supply points for Eighth Army, one on the south side of the river for cargo and supplies arriving by rail and air from the south, and a second one on the north side of the river for supplies arriving from Chinnampo and those trucked across the river from the south. In the withdrawal movement, a large amount of supplies being evacuated from points north of Pyongyang could have been hauled by truck to rail stations south of the city and the Taedong River for further evacuation if more trucks had been available. Since adequate transport was not present, large amounts of supplies were lost north of the river."
The nearly nightly raids of a lone enemy light plane on Pyongyang and other supply centers on the MSR had certain disruptive effects. On a few occasions this nighttime harassing caused damage. As early as 19 November an enemy singleengine plane bombed Sunchon and strafed US troop positions along the Chongchon. The worst of these hit-and-run nighttime attacks occured at 3 A.M. on 28 November, when a single enemy light plane, a night heckler that American troops called Bed Check Charlie, dropped a string of fragmentation bombs across the 8th Fighter Bomber Group parking ramp at the Pyongyang airfield, killing an Air Force sergeant and damaging 11 Mustangs, three of them so badly they were left there when the field was abandoned a few days later in the evacuation of the city.2`
The 24th Division effort to move its large supply dumps from Sukchon to East Pyongyang illustrates some aspects of the problems that faced the entire army in its withdrawal. A little after noon on 30 November, verbal orders passed down from the 24th Division G-4 through Lieutenant Colonel Cocheu, the division quartermaster, to Maj. James W. Spellman, his executive officer, to evacuate the Sukchon Quartermaster Supply Point to East Pyongyang. About 2 P.M., the larger part of the 24th Quartermaster Company left Sukchon for Pyongyang. There were no trucks left for evacuation of supplies.
But 14 trucks belonging to the company were then on their way to Sukchon from the K-29 airstrip, 17 miles to the north at the edge of Sinanju. They were hauling gasoline, because the previous evening the officer in charge at K-29 had told Captain Overmeycr of the 24th Quartermaster Company that he intended to burn all the gasoline still left at the airstrip on the morning of 30 November. When these trucks arrived at Sukchon they could be used to load railcars with priority supplies for evacuation. But these trucks encountered great delay in arriving at Sukchon because of slow-moving, southbound military traffic from Sinanju. Lieutenants Zabilski and Osterhout, in charge of the trucks, finally walked several miles into Sukchon to report truck movement was at a crawl. It was 4:30 P.M. before the first trucks of the 24th Quartermaster Company were loaded at the Sukchon Supply Point. In their shuttle movement to and from the railhead, they had to move a short distance on the main highway, and this they found almost impossible to do. Southbound traffic was using both lanes. Northbound vehicles found it impossible to break into this bumper-tobumper mass of traffic. Just to get rations to the supply point, Major Spellman had to send a detachment of 25 Philippine scouts on foot to the rail head to carry back boxes of rations."
In the meantime, reports came from Sinanju that ammunition and supplies not already evacuated had been destroyed at 5 P.M. on 30 November. A captain of the 724th Ordnance Company reported to Major Spellman that he had abandoned about 60 unserviceable vehicles near Anju and was moving south. At Sukchon, Major Spellman continued to shuttle trucks from the supply point to the railhead, loaded with priority supplies, including winter clothing, as fast as he could get them through the traffic on the main road south. He had only six trucks for this purpose because eight of the 14 returning from the K-29 airstrip with gasoline had been ordered to continue on to the 24th Division rear with fuel to support its move to Pyongyang.
At 1 A.M. on 1 December, three trucks fully loaded returned from the railhead to the supply point. Lieutenant Zabilski, accompanying the trucks, reported that a lieutenant colonel in command at the 3rd Transportation Military Railway Service at the railhead told him no more cargo was to be loaded on the eight railcars standing there. Six of the cars were fully loaded, but the last two were only partially loaded. The commander at the railhead said the only available engine was going to depart immediately with the train. It was charged later that this officer had closed the rail service at Sukchon 24 hours early; otherwise, all supplies could have been evacuated from there.
When Major Spellman received the report from Lieutenant Zabilski that the Sukchon railhead was being closed, he put all possible supplies on the six trucks he had and ordered the rest of the supplies to be burned. This was done at 2:15 A.M. on 1 December. At this time a loud explosion indicated that nearby ammunition had been destroyed. Half an hour earlier the enemy's Bed Check Charlie had flown over Sukchon, strafing various targets. By the time Major Spellman had loaded his six trucks and burned warehouses and the supplies that remained, traffic from the north had practically ceased. One may say, therefore, that virtually all of Eighth Army using the coastal road had cleared Sukchon by 2:15 A.M. on 1 December. Spellman, his 24th Quartermaster detachment, his Philippine scouts, and six trucks reached Pyongyang by 7:30 A.M "The 24th Division's records of supplies lost in the withdrawal disappeared when the truck carrying the
m broke down on the road and was abandoned.
The suddenness of orders to various Army and Air Force units to evacuate their positions near the Chongchon River front and move south in withdrawal can be illustrated by an Air Force unit at Sinanju. The commanding officer of the 606th Squadron of B-26s received an order in the afternoon of 29 November to evacuate the field within three hours. He had no chance to destroy radar and camp equipment. He could only get the men out. Col. Gilbert Myers, deputy for operations, Fifth Air Force, said, "A million and a half dollars worth of equipment . . . was lost for the lack of a few trucks.""
When the 35th Regiment of the 25th Division was withdrawing south from the front, Col. Henry Fisher, its commander, said, "I saw a warehouse burning. It had trench coats in it-enough for a division of 15,000 men, I was told." The building and its contents were being burned to prevent capture by the enemy." The US I Corps had ordered such destruction on Eighth Army orders, that all stocks of food and supplies in warehouses, military or civilian, should be destroyed if they could not be evacuated. As a result of these orders much winter clothing for American troops, not yet issued, was burned in division dumps. In some cases the winter clothing reportedly was not issued earlier because of fear that the troops would throw it away before cold weather. Most of the winter clothing, however, was late in getting to the front because the quartermaster organization in the United States had not foreseen or been informed that it would have to provide Eighth Army for a winter campaign in North Korea. The winter clothing, in general, was being issued to the troops as rapidly as it arrived and arrangements could be made. With nearly all units moving daily in the course of constant battle, there sometimes was no opportunity to issue the winter clothing on the hour or day of its arrival in the division dumps."
Lt. Col. Clarence E. Stuart, commanding officer of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the 5th RCT, 24th Division, spoke of passing an ordnance dump south of Anju during the army withdrawal and observing guns and prime movers being left there. He reported the matter and was instrumental in having men and equipment sent back to get this expensive heavy equipment out. His battalion passed an Air Force dump during their withdrawal south, and his men were able to help themselves to what they called "fancy clothing," probably meaning excellent cold-weather leather jackets.
Concerning the attitude of the men in his artillery battalion in the withdrawal, Lieutenant Colonel Stuart said, "The attitude of the men astounded me. They were proud of having done a good job and they had not been hurt much. Many of them thought the army would fight north of Seoul." Stuart felt that the 24th and 25th divisions were not defeatist at this time and, with the exception of the 24th Regiment of the 25th Division, were ready to engage the enemy again whenever ordered to do so. He said the rapid, nonstop withdrawal confused the infantry and the artillerymen in these
The effect of the long retreat on soldier morale is seen in the remarks of a few weary soldiers who led the advance of the retreat into Seoul. Army PXs there had been rationing cigarettes but now suddenly were selling them in larger quantities. GIs were queued up at one of the PXs when the tired arrivals from the front passed by and shouted to them, "Wait a few days, Joes, and they'll be passing out that stuff free so the Commies don't get it."3'
It must be recorded that some units did not carelessly throw things away or think only of getting south as fast as possible. The Ordnance Company of the US 25th Division provides an example. During the first days of December, the 25th Division was one of the first to move south of the Chongchon on orders and to keep on moving south after it reached Pyongyang. The division's order of march is an example of good road organization for protection of all parts of the division in a withdrawal; first, the division trains, followed by service companies, two infantry regiments, ordnance armored maintenance platoon, tank battalion, the last infantry regiment, and lastly, demolition teams. The ordnance armored maintenance platoon was to repair or evacuate equipment that failed on the march and, on call, to return past the last infantry regiment and the tanks and repair or evacuate equipment. When the 25th Division reached Chunghwa, about 18 miles south of Pyongyang, it had about 20 trucks that could go no farther. They were grouped near a crossroads, and all units following were invited to cannibalize them. Eight tanks could go no farther without new engines. It was important not to leave them. In temperatures of ten degrees below zero that night, the Ordnance Company erected tents and built bonfires in an area adjacent to an intersection in Chunghwa and then started pulling out the worn-out engines and installing new ones. The work began about 6 P.M. By 6 A.M. the next morning, all eight tanks had new engines and lived to fight another day."
On 2 December it was apparent that Eighth Army was speeding up plans to evacuate Pyongyang and to hurry south. In that connection, Eighth Army adopted a "scorched-earth" policy in its withdrawal, ordering all its subordinate units to destroy everything that could not be evacuated. This included food such as rice, wheat, barley, and millet that was staple food items for the Chinese and North Koreans."
The 2nd Division was ordered to continue on to Munsan-ni, and the 24th Division received orders to continue guarding the army's east flank south of Kangdong. The division's 19th Infantry still held its blocking position northeast of that town. At midafternoon, the 2nd Division returned to army control. Another combat-ineffective force, the Turkish Brigade, by Eighth Army order, issued through the IX Corps, was to assemble in the vicinity of Kaesong, where it would become attached to the 2nd Infantry Division. The Turkish Brigade at the time of this order had about 3,000 men assembled at Pyongyang, another 300 were at Kaesong, and some others were as far south as Seoul. A flurry of excitement came to Pyongyang at 2 A.M. on 2 December when a fight enemy plane dropped from six to nine bombs on the Pyongyang airstrip."
The American Air Force continued air strikes in enemy-held territory south of the Chongchon River. The G-3 Air Report for the day stated that 91 sorties were flown in the IX Corps area on the army's cast flank. In these strikes aircraft hit two villages ten miles west of Songchon, where enemy had sought shelter, and destroyed an estimated 950 CCF soldiers. Air strikes hit three other enemy troop concentrations, with unknown results. And at Yangdok, air strikes hit two concentrations of 1,000 enemy each, but again with unknown results.35
The Far East Command intelligence summary for the day concluded that the CCF, with the NK guerrillas operating behind the Eighth Army lines, had the capability of seizing Kaesong, preventing the Eighth Army from retiring toward Seoul, and completing the destruction of US field forces in Korea.", This was indeed an alarming intelligence estimate and reflects the agitated state of mind that existed in at least some quarters of the Far Fast Command in Tokyo.
General Walker Orders Evacuation of Pyongyang on 3 December
A significant troop movement on 3 December for the protection of the Eighth Army retreat involved the 5th RCT of the 24th Division, which had reverted to 24th Division control on 2 December. The 5th RCT was ordered to Yul-ti, where it closed during the day. Yul-li lay 25 road miles south of Kangdong on the main road south from that place to Suan, Singye, and Sibyon-ni. At Yul-li the 5th RCT controlled a main road that ran from there, northwest to Pyongyang. The 5th RCT remained at Yul-li, blocking there for the army until 8 December.37
The most exposed American division on 3 December was the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been disposed on the cast and south ofSunchon, covering the army's right flank there and collecting stragglers from the US 2nd Infantry Division. On 3 December it received orders to withdraw to Singye, 75 miles southeast of Pyongyang. Before it could break contact with the enemy, its 8th Cavalry Regiment moved into an enemy ambush just before daylight on the third. Some of the Chinese involved in the ambush tied themselves to trees and stumps and, in the dark, looked as if they were dead. After the 8th Cavalry unit had passed them, most of these supposed corpses came to life and shot many Americans in the hack. In this encounter, northeast of Pyongyang, the 8th Cavalry had 24 casualtie
s. They seem to have been the last American and UN casualties to enemy fire in breaking contact with the Chinese south of the Chongchon River. The CCF 42nd Army constituted the enemy force engaged in the deepest movement around the right flank of Eighth Army, and some of its troops probably were involved in this incident. The 1st Cavalry Division now, on 4 December, began moving to its assigned assembly area three miles south of Singye, arriving there the next day. The ROK 6th Division remnants were detached from the division's control at this time.38
On 3 December, also, the 24th Division, attached to IX Corps, received orders to place one battalion on the north bank of the Taedong River to cover the withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry Division over the river bridges at Pyongyang. The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, took up the defense position. After the last of the 1st Cavalry Division had crossed the river, the 19th Infantry blew up the bridges at 6:45 A.M. on 5 December. The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, was certainly one of the last American infantry units at the Tacdong River."
In the withdrawal from Pyongyang, the ROK 6th Division, on being detached from the 1st Cavalry Division, was reassigned to control of the 24th Division, which made it responsible for the western half of its division sector. On 3 December, Eighth Army considered its defensive line to be south of the Taedong River. Korean civilians reported in the evening that CCF soldiers at 5 P.M. were in Sukchon, 25 miles north of Pyongyang.
The North Korean refugee problem was a huge one at Pyongyang for the withdrawing army, thousands of Korean civilians were fleeing in advance of the approaching Chinese. It was a human wave that threw itself onto the bridges across the Taedong from the north part of the city and the country to the north. They crowded the roads leading south, already jammed with army vehicles and personnel. Often enemy agents infiltrated the refugees, dressing like them and then gathering intelligence or creating chaos whenever an opportunity arose. In Pyongyang, refugees accumulated in ever-increasing numbers, despite efforts to keep them back.
Disaster in Korea Page 49
