at a mad-man's speed when they met a ROK three-quarter ton weapons carrier headed south. Belton did not reduce speed. The jeep side-swiped the 3/4 ton, the jeep turned over clock-wise as seen by the men in the second jeep. They all saw it and it was Belton's fault. General Walker was under the jeep and the hand rail came down on his head. The entire jeep was upside down on the ground on the general. Sgt. Belton was also partly under the jeep and suffered a broken back. Major [Lt. Col.] Tyner also suffered a broken back. Both men (Belton and Tyner) were conveyed away from the scene in ambulances, neither walked around while awaiting the ambulances, and none of us in 502 Recon ever saw either of them again... .
The ROK truck stopped and three South Korean soldiers on it helped our men in the second jeep lift the jeep off the general. Then the three South Korean soldiers got back on their weapons carrier and drove away. . . . The weapons carrier was not damaged, and all this information I got straight from Donald Waters, Donlin, Sullivan, and Long.
Corporal Long gave us all the lurid details of the general's injuries. He "looked" dead when they got the jeep off him. Long said his head was visibly deformed and "his eye ball was in his mouth." Two generals came from Uijongbu along with other rescuers and one of the generals made Long hold the general's head in his lap as they drove to a field hospital. When Long and the rest of the party returned to Seoul later in the day, I saw the blood on Long's pants. I think the generals who came to the scene of the accident were from the corps headquarters. I do not now recall the names of the generals.`
To President Syngman Rhee and the ROK high command, it was a tremendous shock and disgrace when they learned that the commander of the UN forces in Korea had been killed in an accident involving some of their soldiers. They immediately ordered a thorough investigation of the accident. It was carried out under the supervision of Gen. Chang Chang Kuk, provost marshal of the ROK Army. His findings confirmed General Coulter's account.' Thus ended the life of the defender of the Pusan perimeter, the famed commander of the "Ghost Corps" (the XX Corps) of General Patton's Third Army. This corps was the driving force that led the Allied armies from Normandy across France and Germany into Austria.
Cpl. Randle Hurst was one of the detail that guarded General Walker's body during the dead general's last night in Korea. General Walker's body was placed in a heavy casket and brought to the University of Seoul's auditorium. (The university served as Eighth Army's CP and headquarters.) The guard detail, drawn from the 502nd Reconnaissance Platoon, stood that night of 23-24 December in silent post beside their dead general. Hurst wrote a letter to his parents in Oklahoma City on 25 December, only one day after the general's body was flown to Japan on its way to the United States, describing those hours. It follows:
We guarded our general all night long in the cold and drafty auditorium. Six candles illuminated the area immediately around the coffin. The flag was draped appropriately over the top. A guard stood at rigid parade rest at each corner of the coffin. Three guards stood at the door, parade rest also. No lights were shown except for the six candles in the entire building. We stood at our guard posts in immaculate uniforms. We pulled four hours on and four hours off all night long. We shivered in the cold, but we never moved or spoke a word throughout our tours of duty. Everyone was permitted to pay their respects. Division commanders and high ranking officers came and went all night long. It was so quiet you could hear a pin drop.
-At 0500 hours in the morning, the 24th, all our vehicles were rolled out, guns uncovered, and a convoy was formed. We moved the casket into a 21h ton truck. Our convoy was reinforced by the 503rd Reconnaissance Platoon vehicles. Also, the vehicles containing the high ranking commanders of all the forces in Korea brought up the rear. Our platoon led the convoy. We drove slowly through the frigid early morning darkness toward Kimpo Air Field. When we arrived an Army band [ROK] played a mournful dirge while we loaded our general for his last homeward voyage. We stood at present arms until the great transport plane had roared away into the dawn of the east."
The plane that carried General Walker's body to Japan was a Constellation, undoubtedly General MacArthur's Constellation No. 1. General Partridge, commander of the Fifth Air Force, was at the controls as it took off from Kimpo airfield. Mrs. Walker arranged for brief observances at Yokohama, the home base in Japan of Eighth Army. Then the body was flown to Washington, D.C. Funeral services for General Walker were held there on 2 January 1951, and he was buried the next day in Arlington National Cemetery.'
Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, I Corps commander, had assumed temporary command of Eighth Army at 3 P.M., 23 December. At the same time, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, commanding the 25th Infantry Division, temporarily took command of I Corps. Both Milburn and Kean returned to their regular posts on 26 December when General Ridgway assumed command of Eighth Army.
During General Milburn's three-day command of Eighth Army, the army became increasingly tense as the CCF built up strength in front of the western end of the army line. And in the central part of Korea, a large buildup of North Korea's revitalized divisions threatened the understrength and largely raw-recruit ROK divisions that had hastily taken positions there. It was evident that a new enemy offensive was being prepared, this time with the CCF concentrated on the western half of the line and with the North Koreans, for the first time in more than two months, taking an active and important role in the action, concentrating their strength in the central and eastern part of the peninsula along and just below the 38th Parallel. There is no evidence that the enemy knew immediately of General Walker's death and a change in Eighth Army command. This event had no part in the enemy's plan for a renewed offensive.
On the day that General Walker died, North Korean forces in the central area hit the ROK 8th Division again, forcing back the ROK 10th Regiment two miles, leaving gaps between its battalions. The ROK 3rd Division moved westward into the ROK III Corps area. The unstable ROK eastern part of the Eighth Army line now was organized so that the ROK III Corps was east of the US IX Corps, the ROK II Corps was east of the ROK III Corps, and the ROK I Corps was at the eastern end of the line in the mountains and along the coast near Yangyang. At the same time, elements of the ROK 1st Division in the US I Corps area along the Imjin River regained the important river-crossing village of Korangpo on the north bank of the river after Chinese forces had driven the ROK 1st Division Reconnaissance Company and the I&R Platoon out of the village the day before. In some places American units had an early Christmas Day dinner, including most units of the 25th Infantry Division, as they prepared for an enemy Christmas Day offensive, widely anticipated in Eighth Army.'
The ROK 1st Division did not hold Korangpo very long after retaking it on 23 December. During the twenty-fourth, elements of the ROK 11th Regiment captured ten Chinese near Korangpo. But that night two companies of CCF captured the town for good and drove remaining soldiers of the ROK 1st Division across the Imjin River to the south bank. This was the ROK division's main battle line.
The Chinese prisoners taken near Korangpo were from the CCF 116th Division, 39th Army. They said their mission was to determine the depth of the Imjin River, locate fords, learn the condition of any bridges, and find out the disposition of UN troops along the river. They said the CCF 39th Army's CP was at Uichon, six miles southwest of Sibyon-ni, that the CCF 50th Army was assembling near Kaesong, and that the NK V Corps was in position to the left (east) of the CCF 38th Army, which was to envelop Yonchon and Pakchon. This would put the CCF 50th Army on the American left flank in the west, the 39th Army next to it eastward, and the 38th Army east of the 39th in the area of the Iron Triangle, the Yonchon-Chorwon area, astride the main route south toward Seoul. The Chinese-North Korean boundary seemed to be at the eastern edge of the Iron Triangle, with the North Korean concentration in the vicinity of Chunchon. Elements of the ROK 6th Division captured two Chinese prisoners during the day from the 38th Army, southeast of Yonchon, seeming to confirm this report. Later events showed that the CCF 66th Army wa
s east of the 39th Army, and the CCF 42nd Army was behind the westernmost North Korean divisions and northeast of the CCF 66th Division.9
Aerial observers reported during the day seeing about 500 haystacks with no snow on them between Kumhwa and Hwachon, and 50 haystacks close to the road at one place with vehicle tracks to them. Several hundred stacks of odd shape were observed near Ichon. The next day, a haystack exploded when it was strafed.
Just about all of Eighth Army expected an attack on Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. Army intelligence expected the main CCF attack to be down the Uijongbu-Seoul corridor from the Yonchon-Iron Triangle area held by the CCF 38th Army, with a secondary attack by North Korean divisions in the Chunchon area toward Wonju to outflank the UN forces north of Seoul. But Christmas Day came and went without an enemy general attack.'°
On the cast central front in the ROK Army positions, there was bad news. Strong North Korean forces there shifted their attack somewhat eastward from the ROK 8th Division to strike the ROK 9th Division in a very mountainous and almost roadless area. The ROK 9th Division was composed of inexperienced troops, and the North Koreans made a deep penetration in the ROK 9th Division. It was never closed off, and large numbers of North Koreans got not only into the rear of that division but also into the rear of the ROK 3rd, 8th, and 2nd divisions farther west.
On 25 December there was little activity anywhere at the front, except in the remote mountains of the ROK I Corps near the east coast. Communications with the ROKs there were poor, and the confusion that prevailed in the ROK 9th Division resulted in very little firm information. In the US IX Corps sector, B-29s bombed the important enemy buildup centers of Kumhwa, Sariwon, and Pyongyang. Far East Command intelligence issued a statement that 11 reconstituted North Korean divisions had appeared on the central and eastern Korean front in the past ten days and that it had reports that 130,000 North Korean troops were in training in Manchuria."
Christmas Day in Korea saw the continuation of American troop movements toward the central front as a result of the US 2nd Division Operational Order of 23 December. On 25 December, the 2nd Reconnaissance Company established a patrol base at Hoengsong, 12 air miles north of Wonju, in rear of the crumbling ROK II and III Corps divisions. The 2nd Division units that had just moved from the Seoul area to Chungju in the central mountains reported an unceasing flow of South Korean civilians drafted for the South Korean Army, estimated at 75,000, going south to training camps. The 72nd Tank Battalion, part of the 2nd Infantry Division, was still near Sangju, south of the main mountain barrier that cuts across this part of cast-central Korea. It was under orders to be prepared to move north or east against a possible enemy penetration of the ROK troops to the north of and in front of it. To help the US 2nd Division in moving into battle positions or critical areas, markers with the names of villages and towns in English were to be placed on their outskirts in this zone of action."
In different areas of the Eighth Army front, Christmas dinner was served over a period of four days, from 23 to 26 December, as circumstances dictated. The twenty-sixth was much like the days that preceded it, except that Eighth Army's new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, arrived from the United States and assumed command. In the eastern central front, North Korean attacks against the ROK 8th and 9th divisions continued with enemy success, and the situation there became worse by the hour. Patrols from both US I and IX corps on the western half of the front encountered enemy groups. At this time the IX Corps CP was three miles east of Seoul.
In its Daily Intelligence Summary for 26 December, the Far East Headquarters intelligence section wondered "Why CCF delay?" It surmised that the enemy had been surprised at their initial success in late November and that they were now acting cautiously. It also surmised that the CCF in the west were delaying further attack until CCF troops of the IX Army Group that had fought against the X Corps in northeast Korea could move into position in the WonsanHungnam area to help the North Koreans there. Intelligence projections by Eighth Army gave the same reason for the CCF delay in renewing attack." Both were wrong. And they continued to be wrong in this matter for the next three months. This is an unusually good indication of the condition of UN intelligence of enemy troop disposition and potential in Korea at this time. The fact is, the CCF IX Army Group lay crippled in the Hungnam area and was incapable of taking combat position anywhere. Those CCF divisions had to rebuild with recruits and rearm and reprovision before they could reappear in the front lines. They first reappeared in the central front in March 1951.
In its intelligence summary covering 26 December, the Far East Command intelligence section thought the enemy attack was at hand. It noted that, during the previous 48 hours, enemy troops, supplies, and artillery had been amving in forward areas on all roads and trails, coming south from Sibyon-ni, Chorwon, and Kumhwa. The largest buildup seemed to be on the Yonchon-Seoul axis and the Kumhwa-Uijongbu axis. Air reports said there was displacement of artillery and 5,000 troops to the vicinity of Yonchon. Enemy patrols tried to penetrate the 24th Infantry Division to determine its extent, and an enemy patrol was encountered seven miles southeast of Yonchon."
The death of General Walker on 23 December when his Eighth Army was taking defensive positions just north of Seoul and new South Korean divisions were hurriedly being placed in defense positions in an extension of the army line to the central mountains and beyond to the eastern coast, to meet an imminent Chinese-North Korean offensive, marks the logical place to bring this volume to a close. A new phase of the Korean War was about to open with a new commander for the UN forces as the new year, 1951, awaited only a few dawns away.
Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the American leader of airborne troops in World War II in Europe, came to his Asian assignment on very short notice, direct from the Pentagon in Washington. He inherited a dispirited army. The disastrous chain of events that unfolded following General MacArthur's orders on 24 November 1950 to resume the attack to the northern border of Korea had ended in the loss to Chinese Communists of all North Korea. The question now was, Would South Korea-all of Korea-follow?
Abbreviations used in these notes include the following: Act. Rpt. = Action Report; Comd. Rpt. = Command Report (designation for monthly reports to Eighth Army after November 1950); DIS - Daily Intelligence Summary; GO - General Order; HQ - Headquarters; Jnl. file - Journal file (especially important for G-2 and G-3 sections); Msg. = Message; Narr. - Narrative; PIR (Periodic Intelligence Report) - G-2 Daily Intelligence Report; POR (Periodic Operations Report) - G-3 Daily Operations Report; PLR (Periodic Logistics Report) = G-4 Daily Logistics Report; (The PIR, POR, and PLR were daily reports from the major staff divisions of Eighth Army.); Sec. - Section; Summ. - Summary; WD - War Diary (designation for monthly reports by elements of Eighth Army up to November 1950).
Chapter 1
1. A detailed history of the Korean War from its onset in June 1950 to 24 Nov 50, including the Chinese 1st Phase Offensive, appears in Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktmrg, North to the Yalu (official US Army history of the Korean War, 25 June-24 Nov 1950; Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961).
2. Ibid., pp. 758-60.
3. Edgar Snow, Red China Today: The Other Side of the River (1962; reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 116-17.
4. Peng Dchuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: A Cultural Revolution "Confession" by Marshal Peng Dchuai (1898-1974) Coxing His Carer Service in China's Warlord Armies to Command of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Kona, 1st English edition (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 472-73.
5. Ibid., p. 477 The Party Central Comm. voted on 6 Oct to enter the war.
6. The information on Han Xianchu is based on the article "A Biography of Comrade Han Xianchu" (trans. Ellis L. Melvin), People's Daily (Beijing), 12 Oct 86, p. 4. I am indebted to Ellis L. Melvin of Tamaroa, III., for all the foregoing information about the establishment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army of Volunteers and its commander, Marshal Peng Dehuai. Melvin translated several chapte
rs of Wei Wei's "Marshal Peng" from Kunlun magazine and supplied machine copies of relevant material from his copy of Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal. Melvin served as a senior translator in Asia and the United States until 1964, after having studied Chinese Mandarin in 1953-54. He served in Korea in 1954-55 and has been reading Chinese for more than 30 years. Mel vin, a retired member of the United States armed forces, has tried to keep abreast of publications in China relating to the Korean War.
7. This account is based on Khrushchen Remembers, with introduction, commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and cd. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 367-73. It was reported during the war that Mao Tse-tung's son, a general, was killed in an American air raid on a Communist force CP in Korea.
8. Appleman, South to the Nakmng, North to the Yalu, p. 766n.57
9. Estimates of the number of boats of all kinds being assembled on the Chinese coast opposite Formosa reached 100,000-an incredible number. Necessarily they included vessels that could carry only a few persons. Such craft could make a crossing of the 90-mile wide Taiwan (Formosa) Strait only if favored by good weather and if they encountered no significant air or naval opposition.
10. Appleman, South to -the Nakmng, North to the Yalu, p. 751.
11. This estimate of Chinese troop strength is based on experience and intelligence gained in the course of battle and from prisoner interrogation and captured enemy documents. While there was some variation in the strength of Chinese divisions, they averaged about 8,000 men. Full strength of a Chinese division was supposed to be 10,000 men, but this strength was rarely attained in the Korean War.
Disaster in Korea Page 63
