Where the initial reforms targeted the monarchy’s immediate survival, subsequent initiatives addressed nearly all aspects of Maria Theresia’s rule. In the name of efficiency and rationalization, Haugwitz undertook further centralization of governance via the creation of a new Directory of Administration and Finance and a joint Austrian-Bohemian Chancellery in 1749. Reorganization of the councils and other bureaucratic organs continued under Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, the eccentric yet ingenious minister who dominated the second half of Maria Theresia’s reign and served both Joseph II and Leopold II as well. Kaunitz was notorious during his lifetime for his sexual escapades and strange health preoccupations; he continually complained of fevers and headaches, feared cool breezes, and ate an inordinate amount of fruit. But Maria Theresia saw past his odd qualities to recognize his consummate competence, describing him as “honest, without ulterior motive or spirit of favoritism, without ambition or party; he supports the good because he recognizes it as such.”3 Kaunitz continued the judicial reforms that Haugwitz had begun, for example by overseeing the implementation of a new Supreme Court that would reduce the power of nobles’ and town courts. Measures were also adopted to improve the quality of judges. A unitary codification of law for the Hereditary Lands (embodied in the Codex Theresianus) was completed by 1766, and modernization of the penal code abolished torture in 1776.
Besides the reforms carried out at the upper levels of the government, under Haugwitz and Kaunitz there were many measures to improve the lives of the monarchy’s subjects. The initiatives in education, religious affairs, and the economy were never merely altruistic. Rather, they exemplify common eighteenth-century thinking whereby reforms for the mass population not only improved their lot but strengthened the state in the process. Through school ordinances decreeing compulsory primary education in Austria in 1774 and Hungary in 1777, the monarchy instituted a school system that was exemplary for its time. Access to education was massively expanded, and curricula were modernized, with greater emphasis on German (or other vernacular languages), math, and at higher levels, science and engineering. As the state became more responsible for education, the Church’s influence markedly decreased, which was part of Kaunitz’s project to subject Church institutions to greater state supervision. In this the more traditional Maria Theresia took some convincing, but she did authorize a number of major changes. In 1762, based on Kaunitz’s plans, a new government department was created to oversee Church affairs. It intervened in a number of ways: it ensured that state courts would try priests in nonecclesiastical matters, it vetted appointees for high Church offices, and it took control of some Church revenues. Kaunitz also imposed limits on the number of religious holidays and monks in monasteries, and ended the clergy’s tax exemption. The goal was to reduce the size of the unproductive religious establishment and make it serve the state more efficiently, for example by using priests as teachers to help train professionals for the monarchy’s burgeoning bureaucracy.
The economic reforms followed the general trend of cameralist thinking to promote economic and population growth. New governmental bodies were created to encourage trade; they advanced new tariff schemes, whittled away guild privileges, and encouraged shipping along the monarchy’s waterways. Modest attempts to support domestic industries focused on textiles or sugar refining, and on the introduction of new technologies. Very few of these reforms reached Hungary, which, like most of the monarchy’s economy, remained overwhelmingly agricultural. Improving agricultural productivity went hand-in-hand with bettering the conditions of the peasantry, and in this area Maria Theresia clearly demonstrated her intertwined concern for her subjects and for her state. She saw a boost in profitability from applying various forward-thinking reforms on her own estates. A series of edicts from the later 1750s onwards protected peasants from excessive robot labor requirements and other abuses of landlords. Agrarian reform required Maria Theresia to walk a fine line of asserting the state’s intermediary role in the relationship between noble landlord and peasant laborer while not antagonizing the aristocracy, nor upsetting the traditional social hierarchy unduly. Thus she supported peasants’ freedom to move, to change occupations, and even to marry without their lord’s consent, but she also suppressed several peasant revolts that threatened the established order.
Despite the concerted effort of all these reform initiatives, in many ways they remained limited. One way they were limited was in their application. The Italian and Flemish territories were barely touched by most of them. Hungary was affected more, but still remained administratively and financially distinct from the rest of the monarchy. When the Hungarian diet refused to countenance administrative competency for Hungary being subsumed into Kaunitz’s new united chancellery in 1764, Maria Theresia did not press her case. She respected the promise she had made to preserve Hungarian liberties in 1741, and most of the time left the Hungarian diet to its own devices, only summoning it 3 times in 40 years. The reforms were also limited in their scope. They were never exactly avant-garde. Many of the ideas that she or her ministers implemented were actually several decades old, and most were quite narrowly targeted. Finally, her reforms were limited in their actual success. While certainly many improvements were made, the fundamental goal of strengthening the monarchy’s power bases was only partially successful. Though revenues more than doubled over her reign, they were still not enough to cover military ventures such as that of 1778–9.
One thing for which Maria Theresia and her advisors cannot be faulted is the way their single-minded pursuit of key goals led them to reconsider long-standing policies. This applies to the domestic reforms as well as to the new international course impelled by the desire to recover Silesia. This desire led to the so-called diplomatic revolution by which the Habsburgs reconciled (at least temporarily) with their old enemy of France. Friedrich’s Prussia had instead become the Habsburgs’ chief adversary. As Kaunitz himself said, “Prussia must be overcome, if the House of Austria is to survive.”4 This reversal of alliances meant the dissolution of the strategic partnership with Britain, which the empress did not particularly regret since the British had insisted that she give up on Silesia and surrender Bavaria in the 1740s. Moreover, Britain and Prussia began warming up to each other, with the English king pledging not to support Austria’s intent to recover Silesia in return for Prussia’s protection of Hanover. Initially France was not attracted to Austria as an ally, but Kaunitz’s blandishments, and an impending conflict with Britain, brought the French around. Hence in May 1756 France and Austria made a defensive alliance, and this proved an immediate lead-in to what became the Seven Years’ War.
That war was another worldwide conflict involving all the major European powers. Friedrich initiated the hostilities when he invaded Saxony in the summer of 1756, which then brought a combined attack of Austria, Russia, the Empire, France, Poland, and even Sweden against him. Maria Theresia signed a new, tighter alliance with France, receiving large subsidies in return for giving up some land in Flanders and Italy. The Austrian and Prussian armies fought a series of inconclusive battles in which the Austrians failed to strike a knockout blow. At Kunersdorf in 1759 Friedrich was almost killed, but the over-cautious Austrian general Daun did not capitalize. Maria Theresia’s support of Daun despite his errors was a grave mistake, and a contrast to her normally incisive identification of talent, as she later acknowledged. Meanwhile, France lost repeatedly to Britain in North America and India, which meant its subsidies to Austria dried up. Maria Theresia’s other most important ally, Russia, also withdrew from the conflict after the Tsarina Elizaveta [Elizabeth] died, replaced by her pro-Prussian son Pyotr [Peter] III. Thus in 1763 Austria made peace with Prussia at Hubertusburg, shortly after France and Britain also ended their conflict. Maria Theresia had attained none of her war aims; indeed, Prussia was only confirmed as a great power. The main concession Friedrich granted was to vote for Joseph II as King of the Romans and hence heir to the imperial crown. Though the permanent loss of Sil
esia was a bitter pill, it is a testament to Maria Theresia’s realism that she knew when it was time to let it go and stop fighting.
In the last 15 years or so of her reign, Maria Theresia was less actively engaged in international matters. She tended to leave foreign policy to Kaunitz and Joseph, who became her co-regent. These two men pushed the major adventures of Maria Theresia’s late period, namely the first partition of Poland and the war over the Bavarian succession. As a way to keep Ekaterina [Catherine] the Great of Russia from preying on Habsburg territories, Joseph and Kaunitz agreed with Friedrich of Prussia that all three powers would prey on Poland instead. In 1772, out of this first of three partitions, the Habsburgs got the largest slice, Galicia, including most of southern Poland except for Kraków. They also maneuvered to get the region of Bukovina from the Turks in 1774 to tie Galicia to Transylvania. In reality, this was not much of a gain, since the new lands were very poor, and further complicated the monarchy’s ethnic makeup, adding many Poles, Ruthenians, and some 200,000 Jews. Maria Theresia protested that this carving up of the sovereign state of Poland was unjust, and that it cost her ten years of her life. But again, she was too pragmatic not to seize the opportunity.
Maria Theresia was just as skeptical of Joseph and Kaunitz’s enthusiasm for trying to acquire Bavaria. The reigning Wittelsbach duke of Bavaria died at the end of 1777 with no son, and the next in line, his cousin the Elector Palatine, did not want to take up the inheritance. He thus offered the Habsburgs a trade: they would get Bavaria in return for giving him the Austrian Netherlands. Joseph and Kaunitz readily agreed. Friedrich was wary of any such Austrian expansion, however, and demanded two modest duchies as his price for allowing the trade to happen. Kaunitz and Joseph rejected his demands, which led to war in 1778. This conflict dragged ineffectually through the winter before Maria Theresia gave up on the desultory fight in 1779. The Wittelsbachs retained Bavaria while the Habsburgs acquired some land in the valley of the river Inn, but they also had to acquiesce to Friedrich’s seizure of the two duchies he had coveted.
Maria Theresia was devastated by the death of her husband Franz Stephan in 1765. Several older advisors such as Haugwitz died around the same time. Though in these later years she ruled in conjunction with Joseph and Kaunitz, she retained most of the power. In effect, Joseph was the junior partner in the triumvirate, much to his dissatisfaction. Maria Theresia’s relationship with Joseph became strained. He often criticized what he saw as the conservatism and empty formalities of her court, complaining of “gossiping and squabbling between one old woman and another.”5 Joseph was impatient for more rapid change, and supported Kaunitz’s ambitious reforms after 1765. Maria Theresia did leave certain areas to Joseph’s oversight, such as German affairs (since he became the emperor), military matters (he participated in some campaigns of the Bavarian war), and financial management. She even agreed to some of his proposals such as simplifying the staid Spanish court ritual, and reducing the time and money spent on hunting and gambling at court.
However, on many other matters she rebuffed her son, and out of frustration with Viennese politics he often traveled around the monarchy’s lands. This was ultimately to his benefit, since he learned much and ranged far afield, going to France in 1777 and Russia in 1780. He got to know the conditions of the monarchy’s subjects up close; according to legend, he even helped peasants plow their fields on occasion. And staying out of Vienna helped reduce the frequent spats with his mother. The relationships in this co-regency were certainly productive in terms of the monarchy’s policies, but they were also volatile. Maria Theresia, Joseph, and Kaunitz all were known to use threats of resignation as part of the gamesmanship of their unusual joint rule. Still, the arrangement made sense as Maria Theresia aged and withdrew from the daily management of government. She never fully recovered from a bout with smallpox in 1767. She also complained that her many pregnancies had aged her prematurely, and by her last years her body was fragile. The great lady died in November 1780 at age 63, after catching a cold. The dynasty would never again be led by so astute a politician, able expertly to deploy so many tools to achieve her will, whether cold intelligence or occasional feminine guile. This skillful leadership invigorated the structures of the dynastic monarchy that would serve it until its end.
Joseph II (1741–90)
Where Maria Theresia is the most accomplished of Habsburg monarchs, Joseph II is the most controversial. He was unapologetically an autocrat, but one avowedly dedicated to ruling in the best interests of his subjects. He was enlightened, infused with many modern ideas, but not truly an intellectual; he embraced those ideas for political rather than philosophical ends. Many of his reforms—some lasting, some annulled—were smartly attuned to strengthen the dynasty’s government. But Joseph’s arrogance and lack of political skills counteracted much of what he wanted to achieve. Since his time historians have alternately praised him for being forward-looking and denounced him for his authoritarianism. There is no question that he tried to do too much; he issued some 6,000 edicts in just under ten years of rule. That number illustrates his ambition for reform, which could often be heedless in its trampling of obstacles such as traditional prerogatives. Joseph’s reformist inclinations were formed by his own native intelligence as well as by his education under some moderately enlightened scholars. Unfortunately for him, Joseph’s intelligence was not one aware of its own shortcomings. Maria Theresia explicitly criticized his biting wit and sarcasm, saying that they were not befitting a monarch, but Joseph took his lack of diplomacy almost as a badge of honor. There was, though, a softer side to his character. He grieved deeply after the loss of his first wife in 1763 (after only three years of marriage) and his only daughter seven years later. He kept some of his wife’s and daughter’s clothes as mementoes to console him in his chilly second marriage (Figure 9.2).
Joseph expressed his philosophy of rule quite clearly: he identified himself as the chief servant of the state. Because of his great responsibilities, he insisted that he therefore deserved preponderant authority. Joseph did believe in the equality of all people, regarding nobility as essentially meaningless. The true test of a person’s worth was in making himself or herself useful to the state—which in practice meant following Joseph’s orders. He was intensely self-righteous, convinced that he had unassailable insights as to what his monarchy needed. He expected everyone from his advisors on down to the lower classes to accept his insights without resistance. His ideal was to be able to issue orders which would then be obediently followed. He was not well-disposed toward the negotiating, compromise nature of actual politics and governance. His orders extended into the realm of micro-management, such as with testy directives forbidding military cadets from masturbating, or about the proper hours for illuminating Vienna’s streetlights. While such orders may seem despotically arbitrary, Joseph believed he acted for the common welfare. He did not hesitate to overturn the privileges of the traditional elites such as the landed nobility and the clergy when he thought they stood in the way of the public good. His own, sometimes idiosyncratic definition of the public good is what explains his seemingly contradictory path between liberalism and despotism. Ultimately, though he believed firmly in the public good and working for the benefit of his subjects, Joseph did not trust the public; thus he had to define the good for them. This arrogance toward those he purported to serve explains the nature of Joseph’s style of rule, and explains many of the mistakes he made.
Joseph’s reforms were motivated more by his vision of rational state efficiency than by Enlightenment notions of liberty and equality. He believed that the greatest good would come from increasing the power of good government, which could then order society in a way conducive not only to the general welfare, but also to the appropriate amount of liberty. Unsatisfied with progress under his mother’s reign, once he was sovereign Joseph leapt at administrative, economic, and social transformation of the dynastic state. The administrative reforms were designed to create more uni
tary, professionalized ruling institutions across the monarchy’s lands. He decreed that German would be the unified language of administration, partly for the purpose of standardizing bureaucratic governance. The state bureaucracy was essential to Joseph’s goal of increasing central control. He therefore promulgated new standards for the expanding bureaucracy and the judiciary, and filled many positions with commoners, in accordance with his belief that birth conferred no automatic distinction. More professional judges and lawyers were also introduced as the judicial system was modernized.
FIGURE 9.2 Joseph II and Leopold II, by Pompeo Batoni (1769). In the collection of the Kunsthistorisches Museum. Image courtesy of Bridgeman Art Library.
The other administrative reforms had similar objectives, such as his plan to institute a standardized land tax across the monarchy. Joseph particularly resented Hungary’s special status and tried to undermine it through the elimination of the old county structure and intervention in the noble landowners’ relationships with their peasants. However, that special status also meant that his reforms had less impact in the Hungarian kingdom. In other areas, such as in the Italian and Belgian possessions, political power was centralized upward, reducing the legislative competencies of local estates and municipalities. A new criminal legal code was promulgated in 1787, in which Joseph discarded some of the more archaic things that had survived his mother’s reforms, such as capital punishment and prosecution for sorcery. It also explicitly trumpeted the principle that all classes were equal before the law. This code exemplifies Joseph’s goals of unifying and rationalizing the instruments of rule, which he hoped would simultaneously help unify his realms. He also decreed some progressive improvements in public health, such as opening the General Hospital in Vienna in 1784, requiring every community to have a state-registered nurse and doctor, and sending surgeons abroad to learn the most modern medical practices.
The Habsburgs- The History of a Dynasty Page 28
