EO 12333 proved to be such an imminently workable definition and policy standard that in 1991 the U.S. Congress enshrined most of the language and intent into the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, one of the most important pieces of intelligence legislation ever. As now defined in federal statute:
Covert Action is an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include: (1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities; (2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities; (3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or (4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities [other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)] of other United States Government agencies abroad.6
Significantly, the law also requires that the president notify Congress whenever any “third party” (e.g., foreign country, private organization, corporation, or individual) is to finance any covert action program or operation, or even participate “in any significant way”—an acknowledgment of Iran-Contra misdeeds.
While the EO and the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act are generally straightforward in intent, they are nonetheless written in legal language utilizing terminology that may be confusing to some outside of the intelligence or legal professions. As the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act was intended to embed into federal law the primary provisions of EO 12333, these documents are complementary in content so that reading both together provides the fullest understanding of covert action’s limits and missions. Yet despite a joint reading of the two texts, there is still ample room for misunderstanding.
First, the rules apply to something broader than pure covert action programs and operations. “Special activities,” first defined in EO 12333 as “covert action,” now—by dint of the 1991 statute—encompasses any intelligence activity, in addition to covert action, that does not fit the rubric of traditional FI or CI. This can be sufficiently confusing to cause even learned individuals to see covert action and special activities as synonymous.7 But they are not. Included in special activities are programs such as, inter alia, the training of foreign military, security, and intelligence services; the provision of intelligence materials or special support to foreign governments; field support to operational counternarcotics and counterterrorism forces of a foreign nation; exfiltration by sea or air of a sensitive defector; or rendering inert a cache of terrorist explosives. The “security-assistance and intelligence-training” special activities programs have been especially important to presidents not because the programs seek change in a hostile regime, but because they work to preserve a friendly regime.8
Also under the special activities umbrella is the much more restrictive role of “special operations,” which, to the CIA, means paramilitary operations—military-type actions utilizing non-military personnel—including commando-style raids, long-range reconnaissance, and sabotage operations. For the CIA, all of its “special operations” are also “special activities,” but not all (indeed, only a few) special activities are special operations. Stated differently, special activities constitute one subset of covert action, and special operations are a subset of special activities. Another distinction between covert action and special activities is that the latter are not intended to produce any overt event to influence an audience, but instead are operations that are meant to remain clandestine in all aspects.
Covert action is distasteful to many Americans who see it as a violation of the “norms of democratic accountability,” which run “counter to the country’s moral conscience.”9 They view covert action as antithetical to our constitutional belief in government openness and accountability, to the rule of law, and to American ethical values. These earnest citizens argue that U.S. government activities should be open to public scrutiny, certainly a noble ideal. Yet in practice such openness for intelligence programs and covert action would be manifestly unwise. Covert action programs remain justifiably covert whenever knowledge of U.S. participation or sponsorship would make the program unfeasible or impossible. Examples of such situations include instances when knowledge of a program would invite retaliation or escalate hostilities or when other countries’ governments participating in the program specifically request that the U.S. government keep the program covert, deeming the American connection deleterious to their own interests.10
One definitive example is found in President Harry S Truman’s policies to influence European politics in the late 1940s to prevent or counter Soviet programs intended to undermine European democracies. A senior CIA officer who was deeply involved in the management and policies of these programs has noted that “European political and cultural leaders who solicited our aid in their unequal struggle with the Soviet-subsidized apparatus made it a condition that there be no publicity, since the Communist propaganda machine could exploit any overt evidence of official American support as proof that they were puppets of American imperialists.”11 Another informative example, albeit one not involving the American government, was the relationship between the Jewish state of Israel and the Muslim nation of Iran during the time of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Not only did the two countries maintain normal diplomatic and trade relations, but the shah allowed Israel to use Iran for the clandestine infiltration of agents into neighboring Arab nations while assisting with the exfiltration of Jews from these states. The shah, for obvious reasons, demanded that this aspect of the relationship remain secret, and Israel naturally complied. The overall relationship was covert, rather than clandestine, because there was some awareness of them among segments of the government and, perhaps, in public circles, but “it sufficed that [any] affront to [Iranian] Muslims not be blatant.”12
COVERT ACTION: A DISCIPLINE OVERVIEW
In meeting agents recruited for covert action programs (often referred to as “assets”) and as support resources, the intelligence service’s operations officer will use many of the same clandestine techniques that he/she would in meeting an FI-producing agent, so there is this tradecraft factor in common. But unlike the FI operation, where all elements are intended to remain secret, it is vital that the results of the covert action operation be visible to the intended target. One outstanding text on intelligence and espionage gives the reader a classic case:
If, for example, it is decided to strengthen a political party in a neutralist country which is wavering in the face of Communist subversion, the reinforced efforts [i.e., results] of the party are not and cannot be hidden or disguised, nor is it even desirable to do so. What is covert is foreign government involvement in the process, whether it is in the form of subsidies or advice—and the two are rarely separated in practice. Since cover is limited to but one essential point—the relationship to government—it is obvious that the choice of cover, the choice of agent, the forms of communication, and the nature of the case officer-agent relationship are all affected . . . the cover possibilities in political operations are more flexible than in secret intelligence, the choice of agent is more difficult, the forms of communication are equally restricted, and the case officer-agent relationship less prone to duplicity.13
As noted, the target audience is often—but not always—another government, usually hostile, but occasionally neutral or even friendly. One transparent example of the last are the little-known programs by the British government in 1916–1917 and again in 1940–1941 to influence the U.S. government and American people to support the British war effort in both World Wars, to undermine the isolationist sentiment in the country, and ultimately to entice the United States to enter each war on the side of the British.
The British lesson serves to underscore that successful covert action is “intelligence-intensive work” in that it “requires precise knowledge of whom in the target government [or other audience] would be receptive to what threat or blandishment; it requires cover; and it requires protection against hostile CI.”14
There are other important factors that separate covert action, in kind and in degree, from collection/analysis and counterintelligence/counterespionage. Arguably most important, the CIA’s employment of covert action operations is predominantly a peacetime function for use against enemies. But in highly selective and carefully considered instances in which the gain clearly outweighs the risk and consequences of exposure, covert action is also an appropriate tool for employment against neutrals and even against allies. For this reason, a range of potential political dangers exists for the government engaging in covert action that does not inhere in the more traditional intelligence disciplines. For while target governments will accept being spied upon as a natural adjunct of a nation’s foreign or national security policy (and likewise will accept the defensive requirements of counterintelligence as a routine responsibility of governing), covert action involves the deliberate, planned intervention in the sovereign rights of a nation by an outside government to influence or coerce a change of state policy. As such, covert action is not only in contravention of the laws of the government being targeted, but also contrary to international law and the United Nations Charter, both of which prohibit the “interference in the internal affairs” of other nations. Moreover, paramilitary operations used in covert action programs, especially those involving destruction and assassination, are apt to be considered by the adversary leadership as an act of war—which is rather ironic, in as much as covert action is as likely to permit the two sides to avoid war as to cause it.
Still, covert action has its place in American foreign policy and presidential statecraft, empirically proven by the fact that all post–World War II presidents have relied on it. Thus, it is of value not only for American citizens but also (it should go without saying) American government officials to understand its uses and limits without the hindrance of misleading concepts and erroneous information. By nature, covert action often involves America’s secret intervention into the policies of sovereign nations, and so it is often labeled as “undemocratic” by critics. Yet a study group led by the exceptional presidential scholar Richard G. Neustadt found that while “covert action inherently conflicts with democratic aspirations,” there are circumstances in which, with proper controls and oversight, it can be used to further national objectives when overt policies would be marginal or ineffectual.15
In point of fact, covert action can be, and often is, effective when it is employed within the limits of its capabilities and in support of established overt policies. In the words of one national security expert: “Covert action is only one of the tools of foreign policy, but it is not a negligible one: in certain conditions it may be decisive. It is not an option to be chosen lightly, but in the absence of such an option a global power may be doomed to impotence.”16
The value of covert action to a president is that it offers a “third way” or “quiet option,” a middle ground between overt measures on the one hand (diplomacy, trade incentives or sanctions, foreign aid, etc.) and the use of military force on the other. Covert action gives the president an alternative that may be more effective than diplomacy and a bit “less noisy and obtrusive than the overt use of force.” Writes one intelligence scholar, “If a covert action capability exists, all kinds of possibilities are open.” During the cold war, covert action was often the option of presidential choice, a “prudent alternative,” for it allowed the United States to resist Soviet expansionism in Europe and the Third World without the threat of war that a direct confrontation would carry. From the onset of the cold war, covert action had almost equal seating with diplomacy and military force at the policy table, for Presidents Truman and Eisenhower “preferred covert action to a possibility of a general war in Europe.” Looking backward from 1976, David D. Newsom, deputy secretary of state at that time, analyzed that critical period and noted, “In a world where the movements of U.S. troops in any sizeable numbers risked superpower confrontation . . . and where traditional diplomacy seemed cumbersome at best and counterproductive at worst, covert action seemed a godsend.”17
The origins of the CIA’s covert action operations in Europe following World War II began, as former deputy director of central intelligence (DDCI) Dr. Ray Cline has noted, as a way to curb Soviet expansion:
In 1947 and 1948, many thoughtful and patriotic people urgently searched for ways to forestall Soviet use of either local Communist parties or nearby military forces to intimidate and dominate the governments of Germany, France, and Italy. . . . This was a conflict short of war, the zone in which the United States would use covert political and psychological efforts to counter Soviet influence. The United States was able to supplement its diplomatic efforts with assistance to moderate, non-Communist groups.18
One illustrative example of the use of covert action as a “third option” was President Kennedy’s introduction of CIA paramilitary forces in Laos in 1962: JFK, “for national policy reasons, did not want to use the uniformed forces of the United States . . . but also did not want to be limited to a mere diplomatic protest against the continued presence of five thousand North Vietnamese troops in Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords, and their expansion of control over communities who wished to resist them.” In this manner, the United States was able, with the full knowledge and approval of the Laotian government, to help those Laotian villagers without “confronting North Vietnam and its allies with a direct and overt challenge.”19
Covert action can be subtle or confrontational; it can be long-term, short-term, or something in-between. It may rely on the power of the pen, the power of public demonstrations, or the power of the sword. It offers the president the ability to deal with a foreign policy problem unilaterally or with the secret assistance of foreign governments. In all but the largest programs, covert action permits the president to subtly push foreign governments or leaders in directions that benefit American national interests, while hiding the origins of that force. In this respect, one ancillary attraction of a limited covert action program being integrated into a larger overt policy effort is that the likelihood of the covert action program’s coming to public attention is significantly reduced.
Further, covert action can be surprisingly inexpensive compared to the costs of overt military action or foreign aid programs. U.S. covert action programs in Chile began under John Kennedy in 1963 and continued almost until the end of the Nixon administration; the costs were less than $2 million a year for extensive propaganda and political action programs in election campaigns. Numerous programs involving the infiltration into the USSR of materials keeping alive minority cultures and history, or providing accurate accounts of world events—to counter the false stories put out by the Soviet government—ran for decades at costs of no more than a few hundred thousand dollars a year, per program, and often less.20
Thus, covert action is a foreign policy tool that is more flexible and responsive, and often much less costly to the U.S. treasury, than many other options at the chief executive’s disposal. It’s no wonder then that so many presidents—even those who come into office predisposed against it—find covert action to be such a useful lever to move foreign governments.
TWO
The “Romances” of Covert Action
Romances: Fictitiously embellished accounts or explanations; constantly reiterated misstatements, myths, and misconceptions.1
American Heritage Dictionary
It is perhaps ironic that the instrument of statecraft known as covert action has come to be seen by many in modern times as an odious practice unworthy of the world’s leading democratic government. Somehow the knowledge that covert action was employed to further the interests of the American colonies before they became t
he United States—notably by George Washington as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army and by patriots Ben Franklin and James Monroe serving as diplomats to France and Spain—has evaporated from our national memory. Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe relied on covert action programs as an adjunct of American national security and foreign policy to win military victories, expand the boundaries of America, and help sustain the security of its borders while avoiding open warfare. The last point is critical, for the avoidance of full-scale wars allowed the energies of the new nation to be directed to strengthening and growing its economy—a sine qua non for the establishment of an enduring democracy. Yet in the latter half of the twentieth century, this significant aspect of American history is mostly ignored, especially by covert action’s detractors.2
Before dissecting this secrecy-shrouded, controversial policy option, a review of the more frequently voiced criticisms of covert action will be helpful. These are the “romances” of covert action: the myths, misunderstandings, misrepresentations, and just plain wrong information about this intelligence discipline that exist in the public domain as “conventional wisdom,” and which no doubt contribute much to the opprobrium that surrounds covert action. This is not to claim, of course, that all the negative or unflattering information the public sees about covert action programs is wrong—far from it. There have been programs that should not have been ordered by presidents, or that should not have been conducted as they were by government officials in or out of the CIA. Yet a good deal of information also exists that shows the alleged failures were not such in reality or that, in the least, places the failures in an enlightening context. Much of the material will be further discussed in later chapters, but to set the stage it is useful now to look at the more egregious “romances” that repeatedly draw closed-minded critics as the flame draws the moth.
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