Fortunately, during my fifteen months immersed in covert action policy, every single case in which the above deficiencies were present resulted in a final decision by the White House to forego a covert action program, although that did not prevent the same proposals from being raised repeatedly by NSC staff.
These repetitive results should have signaled to the White House that other foreign policy mechanisms (e.g., diplomacy or trade sanctions) in lieu of intelligence programs were much more appropriate, and occasionally the point was made. But not always. In one instance, a mid-level NSC staff member succeeded in having three separate reviews over a period of months for the same issue, despite the fact that no one at the Department of State (either in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research [INR] or in the geographic area bureaus), the CIA, or Pentagon (whether from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs), nor the U.S. ambassador in the country involved, was able to identify one single objective any possible covert action operation could accomplish. This NSC staff member was yet another Rhodes Scholar and, like her previously mentioned colleague (the “counselor” to the senior official), also later became an assistant secretary of state. The fact that this NCS staffer’s “expertise” in the region in question was obtained mostly through her academic experience did not, however, deter her from denigrating the knowledge and advice of career officials who had actually lived and worked for two or more decades in the countries, knew the cultures and languages involved, and understood that there was little if anything the United States could do. This arrogance was highly reminiscent of that displayed in the mid-1960s by Lyndon Johnson’s “Euro-centric” advisors when confronted with experts on Southeast Asia.
A senior CIA analyst has placed this shortcoming in perspective: “The abuse of the intelligence service by political leaders who weakly grasp at spy-novel tactics for pulling political chestnuts out of the fire shows a misunderstanding not only of covert action but also of the essence of international politics. Cases such as these serve to illustrate deceitful or incompetent politics rather than another intelligence failure.”9
In fairness, however, it must be noted that the Clinton administration continued to manage covert action programs begun in earlier administrations, which were producing positive results, with relatively little problem.
In contrast to the Clinton administration, Ronald Reagan’s national security team was usually on top of covert action initiatives. However, there was one program that escaped the detached, objective, professional management that characterized so many of their others: the Nicaraguan program. Regarding the controversial initiative, one longtime White House insider has observed: “[T]here was a covert action in Central America because the political support was lacking for an open U.S. confrontation with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The truest believers tended to be the handful of people that [DCI William J.] Casey brought in from the outside, and those directly involved in running the program.” This program disturbed many Americans—among whom there was no consensus about the initiative’s necessity or productivity—and polarized Congress to the point that it would eventually lead to the Iran-Contra scandal.10
When covert action is expected to play an effective supporting role in a foreign policy, it should be included early in the interagency policy development process and implemented in concert with the components of the policy. If a covert action element is shoehorned into the overall policy program near or at the end of the planning phase, the result will be much like trying to insert a single domino into the middle of a long chain: one clumsy move can disrupt the entire scheme. None was better at integrating covert action into policy schema than Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and their foreign policy teams. Again, Clinton stands out as the least effective. In one case during the Clinton administration, the confusion caused when a CIA covert action program was added at literally the last moment to a large-scale military operation brought about structural and personnel changes in the CIA and gave impetus to a greater Department of Defense (DoD) influence in the Agency.
Covert action programs are at times a source of conflict between the president and Congress, and a compromised or poorly managed program will inevitably exacerbate that relationship. As an example, one need only review the animosity that was publicly generated by Congress over the mining of several Nicaraguan ports in the 1980s. Although Congress was informed of this operation in advance, there was a measure of miscommunication that apparently left key senators in the dark.11 A firestorm resulted on the Hill, which came very close to ending prematurely the tenure of DCI William J. Casey. It should also be noted, however, that some of the public discord was political showmanship: in a closed, secret briefing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), liberal Democrats applauded the Agency and the operation, only to castigate the CIA later in the media.12
But the Reagan administration’s covert programs for Nicaragua in particular, and Central America more generally, were sufficiently problematic, even without the spectacle of Soviet ships being blown up in Nicaraguan ports, to generate consternation within Congress. First, the covert action programs, one for Nicaragua and a second covering the rest of Central America, were exceptionally expensive, with the Nicaraguan program funded at about $100 million a year by the late 1980s and the Central American program at a bit less. Second, the administration insisted that the goals of the Nicaraguan program were to interdict the movement of arms through Nicaragua and to support the Contras as a way to force the Sandinistas to moderate and/or reform their dictatorial policies. The overthrow of the Sandinistas was ostensibly not a program objective, although the White House of course hoped for that exact outcome. Congress reinforced the administration’s stated goals through legislation in late 1982 that specifically prohibited covert action operations from ousting the Sandinistas. But soon after, and to the great unhappiness of a number of officials, the Contras themselves, in a case of exquisitely poor timing, openly declared that their goal was to bring down the Nicaraguan regime, thus further eroding program support in Congress.13
A third element, complicating issues even more, was that Congress altered legislation regulating or limiting U.S. goals and operations in Central America five times in less than four years, with each piece of legislation more confusing than, and at times contradictory to, the last. This served only to create uncertainly among those who were executing the programs as to what their missions were and what they were permitted, or not permitted, to do. For example, in 1985 Congress voted to sustain the prohibition on any aid to the Contras, but then fourteen months later reversed course by voting to permit military assistance to the rebels. And what can one make of a situation where the president of the United States, in an Oval Office meeting, congratulated a Central American chief of station for doing a great job, only to see him indicted for violating federal law months later?14 The end result was that the Nicaraguan/Central American programs created and sustained one of the most acrimonious periods in the history of the congressional-executive intelligence relationship. Moreover, not only were some Agency officers unfairly tarnished by the madness that accompanied efforts to interpret the ever-changing legislation, but the quality of the Nicaraguan/Central American programs themselves no doubt suffered because excellent officers who had much to contribute in the way of expertise literally ran the other way when offered the chance to work on them.
ANCILLARY DIFFICULTIES INHERENT
IN COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS
The Nicaraguan program delineates a collateral difficulty with the development and management of covert action programs. While covert action programs are, by executive order, required to be “conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives,” it is often unclear what precisely those objectives consist of or are intended to accomplish. And even when these objectives are clearly enunciated by the president, there may be those in Congress and within the body politic who disagree with the direction or substance of the policy. Inevitably, “when policy i
s debated, those who question the legitimacy, efficacy, or wisdom of covert undertakings will almost certainly be present.”15 Often, then, the only way essential compromise or consensus can be attained is through a deliberate obscuration of the issues by all parties concerned, leaving the field operatives and headquarters officers alike confused.
Another inherent difficulty or problem with covert action is that if compromised, it can be publicly embarrassing to the president, especially if it is a failure or even perceived to be such. An exposed program can affect not only the president’s relations with Congress, but also U.S. policies toward allied, neutral, and hostile nations, and their leaders. King Hussein of Jordan, the United States’s closest Arab ally and longtime friend, was livid in 1985 upon learning that the Reagan administration had transferred arms to Iran, a country against which the United States had successfully led the fight in the United Nations for a total arms embargo due to its terrorist activities. The ultimate source of the king’s ire was that the United States had previously denied his own military the I-Hawk antiaircraft missile, only to send that same weapon to a country that was decidedly hostile to the United States. Similarly, European allies who sought and were denied permission to view satellite photography were incensed in 1984 to find that the United States was routinely providing this overhead imagery to assist Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the prosecution of a war that he had initiated without provocation against Iran.
Compromised covert action programs may also affect the president’s standing with the American people, and they may become a significant issue in an election year. While it is generally accepted that public discord will be minimal if there is widespread approval with the program’s cause or objective (e.g., Poland and Afghanistan), on issues where the public and Congress are divided, covert action and presidential policy are much more likely to be criticized.16 And not least of the consequences of a failed or exposed program is that it will always involve, and thus affect, the CIA’s relations with other U.S. government agencies, such as the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice.
FOUR
The Military and Peacetime Covert Action
The three worst Directors of Central Intelligence ever were John Deutch, John Deutch, and John Deutch.1
John Millis, Staff Director, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence
Following the creation of the CIA and the Department of Defense, there were suggestions within the Truman administration that Defense assume responsibility for covert action operations. After all, during World War II the armed forces undertook operations that are now recognized as classic covert action, such as propaganda and deception (called “psyops” in military argot, for psychological warfare), political action, and behind-the-lines paramilitary action, including with indigenous native groups, sabotage, raids, and assassinations. Assigning covert action to Defense seemed logical. But that department wanted no part of this nontraditional military role. Hence, through default, covert action landed in the lap of the CIA, and there it has remained.2
By dint of federal statute, presidential executive order, and operational methodology, the U.S. military has since been limited to playing only supporting roles in peacetime covert action programs. DoD components have provided training, airlift, and divers materials required by the CIA for various programs, but they have neither assumed nor exercised full operational responsibility for any program. This does not mean that the military establishment is excluded from the covert action arena, however. Whether or not military support is required for a covert action program, DoD representatives from both the Office of the Secretary of Defense (the civilian side, known as the “suits”) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the military side, the “uniforms”) sit in on the coordination and approval process at the various interagency levels in addition to participating as needed at CIA headquarters in the operational planning aspects of the program.
The CIA’s covert action missions are in marked contrast to the military’s use of identical or similar methodology principally because the CIA utilizes these techniques in peacetime against nations that may or may not be hostile to the United States. Further, these operations are conducted as ordered in writing by the president and with full knowledge of Congress. Military operations, in contrast, are undertaken in anticipation of hostilities and targeted against an enemy’s military forces and infrastructure; they are not reported to Congress. The most important distinction, however, is that the CIA’s peacetime role incurs a heavy political burden not faced by the military in wartime or in preparation for hostilities. Mark Lowenthal, who has three decades of experience as an intelligence professional, raises the collateral consideration that often covert action “is an alternative to military operations” and questions whether Defense “might find it difficult to keep the two options separate.”3
As the Agency was assigned more and more covert action programs during the cold war, and as it developed and refined its covert action capabilities and infrastructure, the need to consider the military as an alternative covert action manager diminished. As a result, the passing years have seen the imposition of legal and policy restrictions that, today, essentially prevent a president from assigning exclusive control of a peacetime covert action mission to the military, although at times DoD officials have advocated that.
But there are sound reasons why the president has not given the Defense Department full responsibility for covert action. First, DoD does not possess nor has it ever possessed any statutory authority to conduct classic covert action, with these critical exceptions: during a war formally declared by Congress; during any period covered by a report to Congress by the president under the 1973 War Powers Act; and during times that the president specifically tasks DoD with the mission on the basis that the military would be more likely to achieve a particular objective (as permitted by EO 12333).4 Additionally, although the special operations military units gathered under the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) may well have the capability of performing many of the same peacetime covert action operations undertaken by the CIA, the statute establishing USSOCOM specifically states that its component military forces do not possess the “authority to conduct any activity which, if carried out as an intelligence activity by the Department of Defense,” would require an explicit presidential directive (i.e., a Finding) and the subsequent notification to Congress.5
Second, the CIA is used in covert action because it allows the sponsorship of the United States to be much more easily concealed—the most crucial element in all covert action operations. The CIA has at its disposal civilian-registered aircraft and maritime vessels that can easily and without drawing notice transit the sovereign airspace or waters of foreign nations as legitimate civilian craft. Under international laws, before entering sovereign space, military aircraft and vessels must first obtain permission from the governments of the nations being transited. Obtaining such permission, it should go without saying, would make it obvious that the United States was involved.
Third, the CIA uses third-country nationals to carry out the required operational activity in overseas lands. These recruited agents are trained and supported by CIA staff officers and are then sent out to do the actual in-the-trenches work. Thus, the hand of the U.S. government remains hidden. Were U.S. military troops to conduct the operations, they would be required under international law to be in uniform and carry appropriate identification. If these troops were captured while, say, blowing up a bridge or sabotaging an electrical station, the target government would have legitimate grounds to consider the deed an act of war.6
Fourth, the CIA has a presence in many of the 190 sovereign nations in the world, while the U.S. military does not. As such, the CIA is likely to have case officers on the ground who speak the local languages, understand the national and regional political scene, and are learned in the local customs. These officers will often have access to an existing network of human intelligence and support assets that may be used
to establish and serve a separate operational network for a covert action program. Moreover, the CIA’s overseas facilities have nearly instantaneous communications with the impressive analytical and operational support capabilities found at CIA headquarters outside of Washington. This is an essential, singular capability, which would be difficult for the military to replicate.
Because of its relatively small size, flexibility, and can-do attitude, the CIA’s directorate of operations is able to manage programs at less cost, with far fewer personnel, and with much less visibility than the military. For one thing, CIA officers in the field do not need all of the supporting personnel that accompany the military. Two examples will suffice. Decades ago in Laos three CIA officers living with, and in the lifestyle of, a local mountain tribe were conducting sabotage operations against the Communist Pathet Lao; the CIA costs for the operation were minimal, measured in hundreds of dollars a month. The Defense Department thought that the operations would be better conducted by a U.S. military detachment. But an Army evaluation of the living and battlefield conditions produced a requirement for air-conditioned huts, cooks, clerks, guards, individual experts in various subspecialties, and on and on. Ultimately the costs of a military-run program were placed at more than a quarter of a million dollars per month with a contingent of several dozen personnel.7
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