15. Johnson, “Accountability,” 100–101.
16. During the 1980s counterterrorism training programs were conducted for intelligence, military, and security services in “dozens” of countries around the world, including Sudan, Egypt, Bolivia, Venezuela, South Korea, Lebanon, Greece, and Peru. When the CIA conducted the training, it was under the authority of a Presidential Finding. See Wright and Broder, “Secretly Aids.”
17. PL 102-88; Twentieth Century, Need to Know, 57; Cohen, “Oversight,” 157.
18. See Daugherty, Ayatollah, 184–91, for a succinct explanation of this mission. For further reading, see Beckwith and Knox, Delta; Haney, Inside; Earl, “Principle”; Kyle and Eidson, Guts; and Ryan, Rescue.
19. Brzezinski, Power, 59–63; Johnson, “Accountability,” 97–98. This process was incorporated in NSDD-159 (see chapter 11).
20. NSDD-286 of October 15, 1987, is reprinted in full in Twentieth Century, Need to Know, 87–93. See also Reisman and Baker, Regulating, at 213; and Richelson, Community, at 431. NSDD-159 required that all senior members of Reagan’s National Security Planning Group review and approve draft Findings prior to their being sent forward to the president for signature.
21. National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National Security System, signed by President George W. Bush on February 13, 2001, retained the system set up under Clinton, including the Principals and Deputies Committees. The Interagency Working Groups were abolished, and in their place a network of Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) was created. See inter alia: Johnson, Agencies, 133, and “Accountability,” 94-95; Gates, Shadows, 379; and Twentieth Century, Need to Know, 53–59.
22. See inter alia Chomeau, “Role,” 412; Strong, “Covert,” 71; Meyer, Reality, 382. Johnson, in “Accountability” at 94, cites a “senior DDO” officer as telling him in 1980 that “roughly 85 percent” of covert action proposals originate in the CIA field stations. This number is manifestly wrong for the period after 1980 and very questionable, for several reasons, for the era prior to 1980. First, as discussed earlier, CIA officers, whether in the field or at headquarters, are not enamored of covert action programs, preferring for multiple reasons to run collection operations instead. Second, there were few programs running after the Nixon administration and early in the Carter years, and most of those were low-key propaganda/political action programs for the USSR and Eastern Europe that had been in existence for years. Third, there were but few covert action specialists at the CIA to run such programs after Carter’s DCI, Stansfield Turner, cut 880 positions from the DO, most of them in the covert action area. Fourth, when Carter did start to ramp up covert action programs, it was much more at the insistence of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski than anyone else. DCI Turner has written (Secrecy, at 88) that at times he would relate to covert action specialists the “problems the policymakers were facing” and these officers would generate ideas that the DCI would then take back to Brzezinski and the NSC. But Turner goes on to say that others, including the secretaries of state and defense, would offer suggestions for covert action programs.
23. Twentieth Century, Need To Know, 53. It is possible that the Twentieth Century Panel was in fact referring to specific operational methodology, which of course is the responsibility of Agency officers, and not the overall policy, but that’s not the sense one acquires from a first reading. See also Nutter, Black, at 293, stating that “sometimes the impetus” flows down from the president, as though this is an aberration in normal procedures. It is not: it is the way things are done. While Bill Casey may well have pushed (vice merely suggested) covert action programs to the president while he was DCI, in seeming contravention of my point, it must also be remembered that Casey held cabinet rank and, as such, was “dual-hatted” as a presidential policy advisor. Nutter also states that the DCI possesses the authority to order “minor” covert action programs on his own authority (270n5). While this was the case prior to the Nixon years, it has not been so since the advent of the Presidential Finding. All covert action programs must, as a matter of federal law, be approved by the president and reported to Congress. Nutter, while presenting a fairly wide range of legitimate issues about covert action, loses credibility for several reasons. First, he tends to draw broad, very general conclusions from single, isolated events (which he may or may not have described accurately); second, he often does not provide any further sources of support or evidence for his conclusions; and finally, he simply repeats or elaborates on (without providing additional information) many ancient allegations of Agency behavior.
24. Aspin, “Covert,” 10.
25. Richelson, Community, 431.
26. Richelson identifies the CARG only as “the top echelon of CIA management.” See Community at 431.
27. Laqueur, “Future,” 309.
28. The forty-eight-hour requirement was added to the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988 in response to the Iran-Contra scandal.
29. Richelson, Community, 431.
SEVEN: HARRY S TRUMAN
1. Opening epigraph is found in Twentieth Century, Need To Know, 36.
2. Anderson, “Security,” 407. The fate of the postwar intelligence community and the creation of the CIA are beyond the scope of this work. Among the copious volumes on this subject are: Darling, Central Intelligence Agency, chapters 1 and 2; Ranelagh, The Agency, chapters 3 through 7; Andrew, Eyes Only, chapter 5; O’Toole, Treachery, chapter 33. For personal accounts, see: Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, chapters 2 and 3; Thomas, Best Men, chapters 1 through 5; Ralph E. Weber, ed., Spymasters, introduction, chapters 1 and 2.
3. Godson, Tricks, 24–25.
4. OPC/CIA, 2.
5. Rossitzke, Operations, 14–15.
6. Thomas, Best Men, 29; Ranelagh, The Agency, 133; O’Toole, Treachery, 434–35; Cline, CIA, 120.
7. CIG, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, 26 September 1946. Cited in Karabell, Architects, at 39n6.
8. O’Toole, Treachery, 435.
9. NSC-1/1, The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy, 14 November 1947. My copy of the original document was provided courtesy of the Harry S Truman presidential library, as were copies of NSC-1/2 and NSC-1/3. One may also find NSC-1/1 in FRUS/BC, 724–26.
10. Karabell, Architects, 46.
11. NSC-1/2, The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy, 12 March 1948, FRUS/WE, 1948, 756–69, although the CIA censors must have struck before clearing the document for publication as the statement in paragraph 9(e) about allowing the use of unvouchered funds has been deleted from the FRUS version. The same applies for NSC-1/1.
12. NSC-1/3 may be perused in FRUS/WE, 1948, Kennan’s acknowledgment, which was made to the Church Committee, may be found in Twentieth Century, Need to Know, at 111n1.
13. NSC-1/2, The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy, 12 March 1948, in FRUS/WE, 1948; NSC-1/3, Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means, 12 March 1948, in FRUS/WE, 1948. Also see Cline, CIA, 122; Godson, Tricks, 30–32.
14. NSC-4 may be found in FRUS/EIE, “Psychological and Political Warfare,” document 251.
15. Karabell, Architects, 47.
16. Andrew, Eyes Only, 172; Karabell, Architects, 40; Anderson, “Security,” 411; Prados, Presidents’, 83; FRUS/EIE; Ranelagh, The Agency, 115, 118n; Powers, Man, 30; Peake, “Truman,” 35. NSC-4A was signed on December 17, 1947. The text of NSC-4/A may be found in FRUS/EIE, 1945–1950, document 257.
17. Cline, CIA, 124; Ranelagh, The Agency, 115; Colby and Forbath, Honorable, 108–40; Richelson, Community, 343.
18. Washington Post, December 22, 1963; Andrew, Eyes Only, 171. While there has been some argument that Truman speech writer David Noyes wrote the article without the former president’s knowledge, CIA official and intelligence historian Hayden B. Peake has established that Truman almost certainly had prior knowled
ge of the contents of the article and so must have approved it. See Peake, “Truman,” 31.
19. Thomas, Best Men, 28–29; Ranelagh, The Agency, 115n; Peake, “Truman,” 35. Colby and Forbath, in Honorable at 108–39, provides a detailed account from his perspective as one of the principal officers involved in the operations.
20. O’Toole, Treachery, 437. Concurrently, there was a similar program in France intended to reduce the influence of the French Communist Party and its supporters, while swaying public opinion against European Communists. See Richelson, Community, 343; Aldrich, Hidden, 137–38; Pisani, CIA, 81–105.
21. Karabell, Architects, 42.
22. See FRUS/WE, documents 92, 113, 116, 125, 133.
23. Bukovsky, “Secrets,” 5. See Aldrich, Hidden, 342–70; Meyer, Reality, 60–67; and Pisani, CIA, passim for more details of the European covert action programs.
24. Prados, Presidents’, 79, 472; Powers, Man, 31; OPC/CIA, 30.
25. FRUS/EIE, “Psychological and Political Warfare,” documents 277 and 280.
26. Pforzheimer, “Remarks,” 147.
27. OPC/CIA, 7.
28. FRUS/MSA, “Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Administration.”
29. FRUS/EIE, “Psychological and Political Warfare,” document 292. See also Ranelagh, The Agency, 118n; Andrew, Eyes Only, 172–73; Richelson, Community, 394; Peake, “Truman,” 35; Cline, CIA, 126. The Office of Policy Coordination was officially established on September 1, 1948. OPC was not to operate completely independently, however; as with the Agency’s covert action component in the 1980s, it was to receive thematic guidance from the Department of State in time of peace.
30. Cline, “Prerogative,” 363.
31. Prados, Presidents’, 79, 81, 109.
32. Official CIA history of OPC, found at www.foia.ucia.gov, accessed on June 22, 2001.
33. The CIA’s formerly secret official history of OPC may be found at the Agency’s Web site, www.foia.ucia.gov. See also OPC/CIA, at 11, and Sayle, “Déjà Vu,” 399–400, for a succinct account of this merger.
34. Prados, Presidents’, 83–84.
35. Weber, Spymasters, 44.
36. Godson, Tricks, 36–37.
37. Warner, “Origins,” 1 (page number is consistent with Web-based version). The history of the Congress is explored in Saunders, Cultural Cold War.
38. Sullivan, “Review,” 1 (page number corresponds to the Web version).
39. O’Brien, “Interfering,” 437.
40. Andrew, Eyes Only, 172–73; Bowie and Immerman, Waging, 12–13.
41. NSC-20/4, U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, November 24, 1948.
42. Godson, Tricks, 46–50; Nutter, Black, 51.
43. Bowie and Immerman, Waging, 27–28; Prados, Presidents’, 45–60; Dorril, MI-6, 360–403; Richelson, Community, 343; Codevilla, Statecraft, 246.
44. O’Toole, Treachery, 460; Ranelagh, The Agency, 265n; Pincus, “CIA,” A4; Risen, “Documents,” A11. O’Toole claims lower-level State Department officers were the driving force behind the cancellation.
45. Andrew, Eyes Only, 203. See also Gavin, “Politics,” passim.
46. Rositzke, Operations, 173.
47. The full story may be enjoyed in Knaus, Orphans.
48. O’Toole, Treachery, 455–56. Lansdale would later apply the same tactics and strategies that worked so well in the Philippines in Vietnam, where they met with abject failure; the lessons of the Philippines were not transferable to Indochina.
EIGHT: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
1. Opening epigraph is from Cline, “Prerogative,” 365.
2. Knaus, Orphans, 137. This is no doubt the most complete recounting of the Tibetan program in the public domain.
3. Ambrose, Eisenhower, 110–11.
4. Richelson, Community, 347. The two instances are Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba and Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro.
5. Bowie and Immerman, Waging, 149–62; Cullather, Guatemala, 36. NSC-162/2 was further revised on January 7, 1955, making it clear that the administration’s “Cold War strategy” was based on Kennan’s doctrine of containment. Bowie and Immerman, 177.
6. Andrew, Eyes Only, 20; Prados, Presidents’, 105, 472; FRUS/MSA, “NSC-5412 Special Group; 5412 Special Group; 303 Committee.”
7. National Security Council Directive 5412, National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations,” 15 March 1954; FRUS/MEA, “5412”
8. NSC-5412, National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations, 15 March 1954; NSC-5412/1, Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Covert Actions, 15 March 1954. See Peake, “Truman,” 38–39; Karabell, Architects, 128; Prados, Presidents’, 109; Ranelagh, The Agency, 279; Richelson, Community, 394; FRUS/MEA, “5412”
9. National Security Council Directive (NSC) 5412/1, National Security Council Directive On Covert Operations, March 12, 1955, in FRUS/MEA; Treverton, Covert Action, 75.
10. Treverton, Covert Action, 75; Prados, Presidents’, 112.
11. Prados, Presidents’, 148.
12. NSCD-5412/2, “Directive On Covert Operations,” 28 December 1955; Prados, Presidents’, 147; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 506–7; Cook, Declassified, 182; Treverton, Covert Action, 75; Ranelagh, The Agency, 279, 341, 346; Weber, Spymasters, 80; Karabell, Architects, 128; Peake, “Truman,” 38; FRUS/MEA, “5412”; Andrew, Eyes Only, 212.
13. Recommended readings, among a host of materials, on this event include Gasiorowski, Shah; Gasiorowski, “Coup D’Etat”; Cottam, Iran; Bill, Eagle; Daugherty, Ayatollah; Roosevelt, Countercoup. The CIA’s own history of the coup was obtained by New York Times reporter James Risen and published in the Times as “Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran,” 16 April 2000, A1.
14. Karabell, Architects, 83.
15. Roosevelt, Countercoup, 210.
16. Draft NSC Policy Paper, August 19, 1953, cited in Cullather, Guatemala, 38.
17. Powers, Man, 85.
18. Ranelagh, The Agency, 266n; Karabell, Architects, 128; Prados, Presidents’, 105.
The whole story is recounted in Immerman, Intervention; Cullather, Guatemala; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, keeping in mind that the last is clearly prejudiced against the CIA and the intervention.
19. O’Toole, Treachery, 462.
20. Gaddis, We Now Know, 177–78.
21. Ibid., 178; Rabe, Eisenhower, 61.
22. Gaddis, We Now Know, 179–81.
23. Weiner, “Millions.”
24. Bukovsky, “Secrets,” 2 (page citations for this article relate to those of the Web version printout).
25. Collins and Tovar, “Sukarno,” 338–39; Andrew, Eyes Only, 250.
26. Collins and Tovar, “Sukarno,” 340–42.
27. Powers, Man, 88–89. See also Smith, Portrait, 205–48 for the personal account of one officer involved with Indonesian operations.
28. Collins and Tovar, “Sukarno,” 340–42. Conboy and Morrison, Feet, at 12 and 176n22.
29. Conboy and Morrison, Feet, at 12.
30. Conboy and Morrison, Feet, at 12–13; Cline, CIA, 206.
31. Nutter, Black, 54, 56.
32. Samuel Halpern, cited in Weber, Spymasters, at 122.
33. Knaus, Orphans, 138, 139, 187.
34. Richard Bissell believed, based on meetings he attended in the Eisenhower White House, that Eisenhower’s desire to see Lumumba’s assassination is “one perfectly clear case.” Bissell claimed that Ike regarded the African as a “thorough scoundrel and a very dangerous one,” and he wanted Lumumba “got rid of” by whatever means worked. See Weber, Spymasters, 104–6. See also Ranelagh, The Agency, 338; Trento, Secret History, 194; Nutter, Black, 58, citing US Senate, Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book 6: “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,” 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, S. Rept. 94–465; Tuttle, “Secrecy,” 528n38.
35. Andrew, Eyes On
ly, 253; Ranelagh, The Agency, 339–41. See De Witte, Assassination.
36. Prados, Presidents’, 176; Andrew, Eyes Only, 252; Nutter, Black, 15; Rabe, Eisenhower, 162.
37. Prados, Presidents’, 180.
38. Andrew, Eyes Only, 252. Andrew asserts that Eisenhower’s words “strongly imply assassination” (252), and in light of Gray’s comments, it is hard to think otherwise. Andrew believes any claim that the president was unaware of planning to assassinate Castro or that the planning was undertaken against Eisenhower’s wishes is “barely conceivable” (253).
39: Rabe, Eisenhower, 152. See also Rabe, Dangerous, 35–40, for additional perspective on Trujillo, Eisenhower, and Kennedy.
40. Rabe, Eisenhower, 153–62; Weber, Spymasters, 83–90.
41. Nutter, Black, 71n37.
42. Weber, Spymasters, 73–74; Rabe, Eisenhower, 167.
43. Andrew, Eyes Only, 225, 233; Aldrich, Hidden, 482.
NINE: JOHN F. KENNEDY
AND LYNDON B. JOHNSON
1. Opening epigraph is from McNamara, Retrospect, 129–30.
2. Ranelagh, The Agency, 411; Prados, Presidents’, 197, 472. Some in the White House continued informally to refer to “5412,” probably more out of habit than anything else. In an interview years afterward, Richard Bissell persistently used “5412” vice any of the other titles (Weber, Spymasters).
3. Weber, Spymasters, 71.
4. Prados, Presidents’, 211; Ranelagh, The Agency, 411; Andrew, Eyes Only, 272.
5. Ranelagh, The Agency, at 411; FRUS/MEA, “5412”
6. Andrew, Eyes Only, 272, 370; Ranelagh, The Agency, 411–12; FRUS/MEA, “5412.” Treverton, in Covert Action, states that “some thousands of covert action projects between 1949 and 1968” were run by the CIA with only “some six hundred” reviewed or approved by the extant NSC body, and that by 1970 only about “a fourth” of covert action programs were considered by the White House (at 230 and 234). However, it must be noted that those run by the DCI were under his appropriate delegated authority and constituted only very small, inexpensive, low-key (“routine,” if any covert action programs can be considered such) operations with little or no ability to embarrass the president or the nation.
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