TEN A MILLION AND A TRILLION
1 “could dramatically adjust …”: Gallucci (2001), p. 14.
2 “The air war … leveled North Korea …”: Cumings (2004), p. 27.
3 “Destroying the last major …”: Crane (2000), p. 160.
4 “skeptical of the feasibility …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 162.
5 “North Korea decried …”: Crane (2000), p. 162.
6 “in accordance with Far East …”: Ibid.
7 “were dominated by discussion …”: Ibid., p. 163.
8 “eighteen of twenty-two …”: Ibid., p. 168.
9 “They are prepared for war …”: Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 Feb. 1976, “History of North Korean Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons and Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Capability,” Cold War International History Project e-dossier, 17 May 2005 (hereafter “North Korean e-dossier”).
10 “Our specialists reported …”: Document 7, “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Soviet specialists in North Korea,” 27 Sept. 1963, North Korean e-dossier.
11 Kim Il Sung, visited the U.S.S.R.: Document 11, Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 13 Mar. 1967, North Korean e-dossier.
12 “The Soviet side asked …”: Document 17, Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 12 Nov. 1969, North Korean e-dossier.
13 “conspiracy concocted by the USSR …”: Quoted on Nuclear Threat Initiative website, China Profiles, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
14 “The DPRK side … made a request …”: Document 22, Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 15 April 1976, North Korean e-dossier.
15 “Until the 1960s …”: Savada (1993), Chapter 1, subsection on economic development (online).
16 “that the DPRK was in …”: Document 26, Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 Dec. 1976, North Korean e-dossier.
17 “If we compare the output …”: Document 29, Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 23 Feb. 1979, North Korean e-dossier.
18 “Kim Il Sung is believed …”: Mansourov (1995), p. 26.
19 “a mill for concentrating …”: Ibid.
20 “in the 1980s and with the coming …”: Reed and Stillman (2009), p. 261.
21 “affirmed that the DPRK …”: Document 35, Report on the Visit by Erich Honecker to the DPRK, 18–21 Oct. 1986, North Korean e-dossier.
22 “The long-term goal …”: John Lewis, Center for International Security and Cooperation seminar at Stanford University, 17 Nov. 2006.
23 The Soviet Union … demise: Wit et al. (2004), p. 54.
24 “What’s the use of a few …”: Quoted in Sigal (1998), p. 34.
25 “It became increasingly clear …”: Harrison (2002), p. 32.
26 “So I was there and it …”: Hans Blix interview, 2005.
27 “senior Defense Department official …”: David E. Sanger, “North Korea Plan on Fueling A-Bomb May Be Confirmed,” New York Times, 15 June 1992.
28 “So I began to press …”: Hans Blix interview, 2005.
29 One scenario … implosion bomb: Albright (1994a), p. 67.
30 Lee Butler … James Woolsey: Cited in Cumings (2004), p. 65.
31 Able Archer: See my Arsenals of Folly, p. 163ff.
32 “I’m running out of demons …”: Quoted in Nichols (2004), p. 108.
33 “the first North Korean nuclear crisis”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 26.
34 “The recent example of Iraq …”: Ibid., p. 35.
35 “it was clear to all …”: Ibid., p. xv.
36 9.5 kilograms of plutonium: Albright and O’Neill (2000), p. 116.
37 “In a telex to Pyongyang …”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 43.
38 “a short, stocky man …”: Ibid., p. 52.
39 “I knew that the North …”: Robert Gallucci interview, 2002.
40 “Not surprisingly …”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 53.
41 “Now, according to the chief.…”: Ibid.
42 the two sides issued a joint statement: Ibid., Appendix B, p. 419ff.
43 “bold new instructions”: Quoted in ibid., p. 71.
44 “remove the fuel rods …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 74.
45 “Model One, the happy model …”: Unless otherwise specified, this and following Gallucci statements come from my Robert Gallucci interview, 2002.
46 “in making the proposal …”: Wit et al. (2004), pp. 75–76.
47 “suggested that the United States …”: Ibid., p. 77.
48 “was a full hour-long …”: Graham (2002), p. 232.
49 “Clearly, … the consequences …”: Wit et al. (2004), p 83.
50 “North Korea cannot be …”: Quoted in Reiss (1995), p. 260.
51 “more likely than not”: Quoted in ibid., p. 287.
52 “If we pull an Osirak …”: Quoted in Wit et al. (2004), p. 104.
53 a recent war game: Cited in ibid., p. 102.
54 “We can’t find nuclear …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 104.
55 “bellicosity … more of a negotiating …”: John Lancaster and Ann Devroy, “U.S. Weighs Deployment of Patriots to S. Korea,” Washington Post, 27 Jan. 1994.
56 By one careful contemporary estimate: Hayes (1994), p. 5.
57 Clinton was said to be “likely” to approve: Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Said to Plan Patriot Missiles for South Korea,” New York Times, 26 Jan. 1994, p. A1.
58 “all the activities in the DPRK’s …”: Statement by a spokesman for the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 18 Mar. 1994, Pyongyang. IAEA publications, INFCIRC/437, Attachment 1, www.iaea.org (online).
59 “Thanked us for our …”: Ibid.
60 “that the Agency …”: Quoted in D.P.R.K. General Department of Atomic Energy Statement of 18 March 1994.
61 “We are ready to respond … Seoul is not far …”: quoted in Sigal (1998), p. 107, and (a variant version) Oberdorfer (2001), p. 304.
62 “We don’t know anything …”: Mark Thompson, “Well, Maybe a Nuke or Two,” Time, 11 Apr. 1994 (online).
63 “out of place …”: Josette Shiner and Michael Breen, “Another Sharp ‘No’ from Kim Ilsung,” Washington Times, 19 Apr. 1994, p. A1.
64 “The only way that …”: Steve Komarov, “N. Korea Sounds a Conciliatory Note,” USA Today, 19 Apr. 1994, p. 4A.
65 “Except for … one senior-level …”: Creekmore (2006), p. 19.
66 “a bombshell”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 169.
67 “four or five nuclear bombs”: “US Security Policy in Korea.” Address by Secretary of Defense William Perry to the Asia Society, Washington, 3 May 1994 (online).
68 “If North Korea were to break …”: Ibid.
69 The North’s pointed … reactor: Albright and O’Neill (2000), p. 126, n. 10, gives this date, citing “an IAEA official,” which I take to be the most credible source. Oberdorfer (2001), p. 309, gives 8 May without attribution. Wit et al. (2004), p. 172, presumably drawing on Gallucci’s notes, write, “Kang told Gallucci that unloading would begin on May 4.” An outside limit is the North’s communication with the IAEA on 12 May that it had already started unloading, cited in Sigal (1998), p. 115.
70 He sent off his inspectors … 15 May: Wit et al. (2004), p. 175.
71 with Dimitri Perricos in charge: Oberdorfer (2001), p. 309.
72 fourteen hundred fuel rods … more inspectors: Wit et al. (2004), p. 184.
73 “They just dumped the fuel …”: Sig Hecker interview, 2004.
74 “a big mess …”: Quoted in Oberdorfer (2001), p. 309.
75 “You think of the United Nations …”: Robert Gallucci interview, 2002.
76 “the United States could not fight …”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 176.
77 “the possibility of North Korean …”: Ibid., p. 178.
78 “When asked by t
he president …”: Ibid., p. 181.
79 “at that time they still …”: Sig Hecker interview, 2004.
80 “must not be allowed …”: William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, “The Crisis Last Time” (op-ed), New York Times, 19 Jan. 2003.
81 “sanctions mean war …”: Peter Grier, “China May Be Wild Card in N. Korea Drama,” Christian Science Monitor, 7 June 1994.
ELEVEN GREAT LEADERS
1 North Korea had been trying … invitation: Creekmore (2006), p. 61.
2 “I spent over three hours …”: Robert Gallucci interview, 2002. Unless otherwise specified, all further Gallucci statements in this chapter derive from this source.
3 “that North Korea wanted …”: Creekmore (2006), p. 62.
4 “that the United States …”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 63.
5 “We are not going to let you …” Quoted in Oberdorfer (2001), p. 326.
6 “with access to all …”: Oberdorfer (2001), p. 325.
7 “Carter emphasized his strong view …”: Creekmore (2006), pp. 65–66.
8 Carter flew … similarly rebuffed: Sigal (1998), p. 152.
9 “too close an identification …”: Creekmore (2006), pp. 339–40, n. 38.
10 “With rumors of shortages …”: Ibid., p. 108.
11 Other foreign embassies in Seoul: Wit et al. (2004), p. 217.
12 “The crossing at Panmunjom …”: Jimmy Carter, “Report on Our Trip to Korea, June 1994,” Appendix F in Creekmore (2006), p. 320. (Hereafter “Carter Report.”)
13 “over an almost-empty …”: Ibid.
14 “that spelled out …”: Creekmore (2006), p. 135.
15 “We strongly affirm …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 140.
16 confidential message from Carter to Clinton: For Carter’s summary, see Carter Report, p. 321.
17 “We are heading toward …”: Quoted in Creekmore (2006), p. 151.
18 “over which President Clinton …”: Creekmore (2006), pp. 151–52.
19 “We must have a way …”: Quoted in Wit et al. (2004), p. 224.
20 “The central problem is …”: Quoted in Creekmore (2006), p. 160.
21 “If the U.S. had helped us …”: Quoted in ibid., pp. 160–161.
22 “He accepted all my proposals …”: Carter Report, p. 322.
23 “asked him each time …”: Carter Report, p. 322.
24 Gallucci … making himself inconspicuous: see photo at Wit et al. (2004), between p. 204 and p. 205.
25 Creekmore said the former president … commitments: Creekmore (2006), p. 180.
26 “That killed the … sanctions …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 179.
27 “a very important …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 331.
28 “occasioned the largest municipal-bond …”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 266.
29 “They hated the idea …”: Stossel (2005), p. 14.
30 “From the standpoint …”: Wit et al. (2004), p. 332 (original italics).
31 “The missiles cannot reach …”: New York Times Magazine, 19 Oct. 2003, p. 41.
TWELVE THE CORNERSTONE OF PEACE AND STABILITY
1 “Look around you …”: Thomas Graham, Jr., interview, 2004.
2 There was nothing there …”: Ibid.
3 “the centerpiece of international …”: Graham (2002), p. 257.
4 “Although few agreed …”: Ibid., p. 260.
5 “I traveled all over …”: Thomas Graham, Jr., interview, 2004.
6 “an impossibility …”: Graham (2002), p. 262.
7 “the cornerstone of international …”: Ibid.
8 “many countries stressed …”: Ibid., pp. 262–63.
9 “and the Russians …”: Ibid., p. 137.
10 “the greatest disarmament …”: Jentleson (2000), p. 111.
11 “laid out very clearly …”: Chollet and Goldgeier (2008), p. 44.
12 “wanted the United States to remain …”: Ibid., p. 51.
13 “That was just nutty …”: Ibid., p. 45.
14 “The September decision was …”: Lambright (2002), pp. 75–76.
15 “It was a whole different world …”: Sig Hecker interview, 2004. All the following Hecker statements in this chapter derive from this source unless otherwise specified.
16 “Reliability testing is not …”: Graham (2002), pp. 240–41.
17 “I had not been able …”: Ibid., pp. 241–42.
18 “Who will speak for the moratorium …”: Ibid., p. 242.
19 “Hazel, however …”: Ibid.
20 “It was an inspirational …”: Ibid., pp. 242–43.
21 “Hazel brought with her …”: Ibid., p. 243.
22 “Stockpile Stewardship … consists of two …”: Statement of Dr. Victor H. Reis, 1999 Congressional Hearings Supporting the National Security Strategy, House Armed Services Committee, 2 Feb. 1999 (online).
23 “For three years running …”: Ibid.
24 “A very large part …”: Odom (1998), p. 215.
25 “Israeli officials … said”: Graham (2002), p. 270.
26 “None of that material …”: Ibid., p. 286.
27 “could not live forever …”: Ibid., p. 269.
28 “Mexico was determined …”: Ibid., p. 275.
29 “had kept open the nuclear option …”: Ibid., p. 276.
30 “Countries began to join …”: Ibid., p. 279.
31 “Several important NAM ambassadors …”: Ibid., p. 291.
32 “The treaty did not create …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 287.
33 “the principal elements …”: Butler (2001), p. 53.
34 “The treaty had served …”: Ibid., pp. 45–47.
35 “a series of documents …”: Ibid., p. 47.
36 “to seek its cooperation …”: Ibid., p. 48.
37 “It was during the long flight …”: Ibid.
38 “the possible final form …”: Ibid.
39 “At the request of others …”: Ibid., p. 49.
40 “a CTBT by 1996 …”: Graham and LaVera (2003), p. 106.
41 “Though [political commitments] do not …”: Bedjaoui (1991), p. 268.
42 “the nuclear issue …”: Untitled UNSCOM document, “UNSCOM/IAEA SENSITIVE, NOTE FOR THE FILE,” undated, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/un/unscom-iaea_kamal-brief.htm, p. 1.
43 “12 ton, then 9 ton …”: Ibid., p. 4.
44 “All chemical weapons …”: Ibid., p. 13 (emphasis added).
45 “In retrospect, the French tests …”: Graham (2002), p. 248.
46 “Several of them …”: Thomas Graham, Jr., interview, 2004.
47 “that they would break …”: Graham and LaVera (2003), p. 1379.
48 “countries favoring the treaty …”: Hansen (2006), p. 44.
49 “I stood just feet away …”: Butler (2001), p. 65.
THIRTEEN THE DOG ATE MY HOMEWORK
1 “nuclear apartheid”: Quoted in Perkovich (1999), p. 373.
2 “reevaluate the country’s …”: Quoted in ibid.
3 At least one test device: Perkovich (1999), p. 374.
4 “The situation was more urgent …”: Ibid., p. 375.
5 “profoundly shocked the Iraqi …”: Rolf Ekéus (rapporteur’s summary), From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC: The Future of Weapons Inspections in Iraq. Washington Institute Special Policy Forum, 18 July 2000 (PolicyWatch #477), p. 1 (online).
6 “had been responsible …”: Quoted in Cockburn and Cockburn (1999), p. 199.
7 “In a locked chicken shed …”: Ibid., p. 200.
8 “Do you think I could harm …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 207.
9 “He would return to Baghdad …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 197.
10 “UNSCOM would be spying …”: Duelfer (2009), p. 117.
11 “Since the U-2 could loiter …”: Ibid., p. 32.
12 “no indication of Iraq …”: IAEA 4th Consolidated Report (S/197/779), 6 Oct. 1997, p. 4.
13 “There were no documents …”: Duelfer (2009), p. 112.
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14 “The Iraqis had provided …”: Ibid., pp. 154–55.
15 “verify the unverifiable …”: Ibid., p. 154.
16 “Head of UNSCOM …”: Butler (2000), p. 61.
17 “I’ve spent a lifetime …”: Butler (2000), p. 63. Italics in original.
18 “Butler came in at an extremely …”: Duelfer (2009), p. 137.
19 “would quickly take advantage …”: Ibid., p. 138.
20 “to flood Iraq …”: Ibid.
21 “Iraqi propaganda began …”: Butler (2000), p. 110.
22 “Saddam had every reason …”: Ibid., p. 124.
23 “stood transfixed, watching …”: Ibid., p. 126.
24 “Many Republicans were … demoralized …”: Alfonsi (2006), p. 363.
25 “Saddam Hussein is a convicted …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 359.
26 “the only sure way …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 364.
27 “The Kristol/Kagan analysis …”: Brent Scowcroft, “Taking Exception: The Power of Containment,” Washington Post, 1 Mar. 1998, Op-ed Section, p. C7.
28 “We would have been forced …”: George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, “Why We Didn’t Remove Saddam,” Time, 2 Mar. 1998, p. 31.
29 “We may soon face a threat …”: Elliott Abrams, et al., letter to William J. Clinton, 26 January 1998, online at http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm.
30 “efforts to remove …”: Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Section 3 (online).
31 “The government believed …”: Perkovich (1999), p. 384.
32 a cost … $2.5 billion: Ibid., p. 437.
33 Vajpayee made the final decision to test: According to a reliable intelligence source who prefers anonymity.
34 “George, there aren’t going to be …”: Quoted in Talbott (2004), p. 47.
35 “We needed to make sure …”: Transcript, 17 May 1998 Indian Department of Atomic Energy press conference, online at www.fas.org.
36 The AEC announced: Quoted in Zhimin and Feizhi (1998) (online).
37 “I can now believe stories …”: Quoted in Talbott (2004), p. 49.
38 “Dr. Khan reminded …”: Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, “When Mountains Move—the Story of Chagai,” online at www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm.
39 “About equal …”: Jeremiah News Conference, 2 June 1998, p. 4., at www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/jeremiah.html.
The Twilight of the Bombs Page 43
