We must definitely keep in mind that imperialism is a world system, the final stage of capitalism, and that it must be beaten in a great worldwide confrontation. The strategic objective of that struggle must be the destruction of imperialism.
The contribution that falls to us, the exploited and backward of the world, is to eliminate the foundations sustaining imperialism: our oppressed nations, from which capital, raw materials and cheap labor (both workers and technicians) are extracted, and to which new capital (tools of domination), arms and all kinds of goods are exported, sinking us into absolute dependence. The fundamental element of this strategic objective, then, will be the real liberation of the peoples, a liberation that will be the result of armed struggle in the majority of cases, and that, in Latin America, will almost unfailingly turn into a socialist revolution.
In focusing on the destruction of imperialism, it is necessary to identify its head, which is none other than the United States of North America. We must carry out a task of a general kind, the tactical aim of which is to draw the enemy out of their environment, compelling them to fight in places where their living habits clash with existing conditions. The adversary must not be underestimated; the US soldiers have technical ability and are backed by means of such magnitude as to make them formidable. What they lack essentially is the ideological motivation, which their most hated rivals of today—the Vietnamese soldiers—have to the highest degree. We will be able to triumph over this army only to the extent that we succeed in undermining its morale. And this is done by inflicting defeats on it and causing it repeated suffering.
This brief outline for victories, however, entails immense sacrifices by the peoples—sacrifices that must be demanded starting right now, in the light of day, and that perhaps will be less painful than those they would have to endure if we constantly avoided battle in an effort to get others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us.
Clearly, the last country to free itself very probably will do so without an armed struggle, and its people will be spared the suffering of a long war as cruel as imperialist wars are. But it may be impossible to avoid this struggle or its effects in a conflict of worldwide character, and that country might still suffer the same or even more. We cannot predict the future, but we must never give way to the cowardly temptation to be the standard-bearers of a people who yearn for freedom but renounce the struggle that goes with it, and who wait as if expecting it to come as a crumb of victory.
It is absolutely correct to avoid any needless sacrifice. That is why it is so important to be clear on the real possibilities that dependent Latin America has to free itself in a peaceful way. For us the answer to this question is clear: now may or may not be the right moment to start the struggle, but we can have no illusions, nor do we have a right to believe, that freedom can be won without a fight.
Moreover, the battles will not be mere street fights with stones against tear gas, or peaceful general strikes. Nor will it be the struggle of an infuriated people that destroys the repressive apparatus of the ruling oligarchies in two or three days. It will be a long, bloody struggle in which the battlefronts will be in guerrilla refuges in the cities, in the homes of the combatants (where the repression will go seeking easy victims among their families), among the massacred peasant population, in the towns or cities destroyed by the enemy’s bombs. We are being pushed into this struggle. It cannot be remedied other than by preparing for it and deciding to undertake it. […]
How close and bright would the future appear if two, three, many Vietnams flowered on the face of the globe, with their quota of death and their immense tragedies, with their daily heroism, with their repeated blows against imperialism, forcing it to disperse its forces under the lash of the growing hatred of the peoples of the world.
And if we were all capable of uniting in order to give our blows greater strength and certainty, so that the aid of all kinds to the peoples in struggle was even more effective—how great the future would be, and how near!
If we, on a small point on the map of the world, fulfill our duty and place at the disposal of the struggle whatever little we are able to give—our lives, our sacrifice—it can happen that one of these days we will draw our last breath on a bit of earth not our own, yet already ours, watered with our blood. Let it be known that we have measured the scope of our actions and that we consider ourselves no more than a part of the great army of the proletariat. But we feel proud at having learned from the Cuban revolution and from its central leader the great lesson to be drawn from its position in this part of the world: “Of what difference are the dangers to a human being or a people, or the sacrifices they make, when what is at stake is the destiny of humanity?”
Our every action is a battle cry against imperialism and a call for the unity of the peoples against the great enemy of the human race: the United States of North America.
Wherever death may surprise us, let it be welcome if our battle cry has reached even one receptive ear, if another hand reaches out to take up our arms, and others come forward to join in our funeral dirge with the rattling of machine guns and with new cries of battle and victory.
1. “Message to the Tricontinental” is published in full in Ernesto Che Guevara, Che Guevara Reader, pp. 350-62.
2. In April 1965 tens of thousands of US troops invated the Dominican Republic to crush a popular uprising.
Bolivian Diary
These excerpts are taken from Che Guevara’s final diary, his diary of the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia.1 The notebooks found in his backpack were seized when Che was wounded in battle and captured by the Bolivian army on October 8, 1967. Che was assassinated the following day on the instructions of the CIA.
The first entry of the diary is November 7, 1966, three days after Che arrived in Bolivia and the day he arrived at the first guerrilla base camp at a farm on the Ñacahuazú River. His last entry is October 7, 1967, the day before his capture. Although generally written in Che’s characteristic concise style, the diary—especially the monthly summaries—is invaluable for anyone seeking to understand the recent history of Latin America.
This selection includes Che’s comments on events as they unfolded and some of the problems, such as the conflicts with the leaders of the Bolivian Communist Party (especially Mario Monje, its general secretary), whom Che called traitors; he is also critical of public statements made by Régis Debray (referred to as “the Frenchman” in the diary) and Ciro Bustos (“Pelao, the Argentine”); and he makes references to the disrespectful statements made by Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, who described Che as a “Bakunin” and “irresponsible,” reflecting the dispute between the pro-Moscow communist parties and those advocating armed struggle.
November 28 [1966]
[…] In the afternoon, I met with the Bolivian group to discuss the Peruvian offer to send 20 men; everyone agreed they should be sent, but after the action had begun.
Analysis of the month [November]
Everything has gone quite well; my arrival [in Bolivia] was without incident; half the troops have arrived, also without incident, although they were somewhat delayed; Ricardo’s main collaborators are joining the struggle, come what may. The general outlook seems good in this remote region and everything indicates that we could be here for practically as long as necessary. The plans are: to wait for the rest of the troops, increase the number of Bolivian [combatants] to at least 20, and then commence operations. We still need to see how Monje2 reacts and how Guevara’s3 people conduct themselves.
December 2
Chino4 arrived early, quite effusive. We spent the day chatting. The substance is: he will go to Cuba to inform them in person of the situation, and that five Peruvians can join us in two months, after we see some action. Two will come now to stay for a while: a radio technician5 and a doctor.6 Chino asked for weapons and I agreed to give him a BZ, some Mausers, and grenades; and I will purchase an M-1 for them. I also decided to assist them in sending five Peruvians, who would establish
the necessary connections for sending arms to a region near Puno, on the other side of [Lake] Titicaca. He told me about his troubles in Peru, including a daring plan to free Calixto,7 which seems unrealistic to me. He thinks that some survivors of the guerrilla movement are active in that area, but he is not certain because no one has been able to make it there to see.
The rest of the conversation was anecdotes. He said goodbye with the same enthusiasm he had when he arrived; he took some of our photos with him to La Paz. Coco8 has been instructed to organize the contacts with Sánchez9 (whom I will see later) and to contact the head of the president’s information office, who is Inti’s10 brother-in-law and who has offered to help. The network is still in its infancy.
December 4
Uneventful. Everyone is quiet since it is Sunday. I give a little talk about our approach to the Bolivians who will be coming and about the war.
December 7
Today, in fact, completes our first month here, but for the sake of convenience I will give the summaries at the end of each month.
December 12
I spoke to the whole group, taking them to task about the reality of war. I emphasized the importance of a united command and discipline, and I warned the Bolivians of the responsibility they would bear in violating the discipline of the party’s line by adopting another one. I made the following assignments: Joaquín11 as military second in command; Rolando12 and Inti as political commissars; Alejandro13 as head of operations; Pombo,14 services; Inti, finances; Ñato,15 provisions and armaments; and Moro,16 medical services, for the moment. […]
December 20
[…] A telegram came from Manila [Cuba] indicating that Monje will be coming from the south.
They set up a contact system, but I was not satisfied because it shows how truly suspicious of Monje his compañeros are.
[…] Iván17 has the opportunity to do some business but his poorly forged passport is preventing him; the next step is to improve the document and write to our friends in Manila to expedite it.
Tania18 will come soon to receive instructions; I will probably send her to Buenos Aires. […]
December 31
[…] The conversation with Monje began with generalities but came down to his fundamental position, summarized by three basic conditions:
1)He will resign from the leadership of the party, but he will at least ensure it remains neutral and he will recruit cadres for the struggle.
2)He will head the political-military struggle for as long as the revolution is taking place in Bolivian territory.
3)He will handle relations with other South American parties, and try to convince them to support liberation movements. (He used Douglas Bravo as an example.)
I responded, saying that the first point was up to him, as secretary of the party, although I considered his position to be a grave error.
It was vacillating and compromising and protected those who should be condemned by history for abandoning their principles. Time will prove me right.
Concerning the third point, I had no objections to his attempting this, but it was doomed to fail. To ask Codovila19 to support Douglas Bravo was like asking him to condone an uprising in his own party. Time will be the judge here too.
On the second point, there was no way I could accept his proposal. I had to be military chief and would not accept any ambiguity on this. Here the discussion got stuck and went around and around in a vicious circle.
We left it that Monje would think it over and talk to his Bolivian compañeros. We moved on to the new camp and there he spoke with everyone, presenting the ultimatum that they could either stay or support the party; everyone opted to stay, which he seemed to take quite hard.
At 12:00, we made a toast, pointing out the historical importance of this date. I replied, taking advantage of his words and marking this moment as the new Cry of Murillo20 of the revolution on this continent, saying that our lives meant nothing when faced with the fact of the revolution.
Analysis of the month [December 1966]
The team of Cubans has been successfully completed; morale is good and there are only minor problems. The Bolivians are doing well, although few in number. Monje’s attitude can delay the development on the one hand, but on the other, can free me from political constraints. Apart from waiting for more Bolivians, the next steps are to speak with [Moisés] Guevara and with the Argentines Mauricio21 and Jozami22 (Masetti23 and the dissident party).
January 1 [1967]
In the morning, with no further discussion, Monje informed me that he was leaving and would present his resignation to the party leadership on January 8. According to him, his mission was over. He left looking like he was being led away to the gallows. My impression was that when Coco told him that I would not budge on strategic matters, he held onto this point to force the break, because his arguments are inconsistent.
In the afternoon, I brought everyone together to explain Monje’s position and to announce that we would unite with all those who want to make the revolution happen. I predicted difficult times ahead and days of moral anguish for the Bolivians, and that we would try to solve problems through collective discussions or through the commissars.
I worked out the details of Tania’s trip to Argentina to speak with Mauricio and Jozami and to bring them back. […]
January 2
[…] The others (Sánchez, Coco, and Tania) left in the afternoon when Fidel’s speech was over. He talked about us in a way that makes us feel even more committed, if that is possible. […]
January 6
[…] After the class, I launched into a little tirade about the qualities required of a guerrilla force and the need for greater discipline; I explained that our mission, above all else, was to become a model nucleus, one of steel. I explained the importance of study as indispensable for the future. […]
January 15
I stayed at the camp, drawing up some instructions for the cadres in the city. […]
January 21
[…] Mario Monje spoke to three others coming from Cuba, dissuading them from joining the guerrillas. Not only did he not resign from the party leadership, but he also sent a document to Fidel, attachment D. IV. I received a note from Tania about her departure and Iván’s illness, and another note from Iván, which is attachment D. V. […]
January 22
[…] I wrote instructions for the urban cadres (Document III). […]24
January 25
[…] Manila [Cuba] sent a message reporting that everything had been received and that Kolle25 will go to where Simón Reyes26 is already waiting. Fidel said he would hear them out, but will be hard on them.
Analysis of the month [January 1967]
As I expected, Monje’s position was at first evasive and then treacherous.
The party has taken up arms against us and I do not know where this will lead, but it will not stop us and maybe, in the end, it will be to our advantage (I am almost certain of this). The most honest and militant people will be with us, although they are going through a more or less severe crisis of conscience.
Up to now, Guevara has responded well; we will see how he and his people act in the future.
Tania departed, but the Argentines27 have shown no sign of life and neither has she. Now the real guerrilla phase begins and we will test the troops; time will tell what they can do and what the prospects for the Bolivian revolution are.
Of everything that was envisioned, the slowest has been the incorporation of Bolivian combatants.
February 14
[…] We decoded a long message from Havana, the main news being about the meeting with Kolle, who claimed he had not been informed our undertaking was on a continental scale and, if this was the case, they were ready to collaborate in a plan and wanted to discuss details with me; Kolle himself, Simón Rodríguez,28 and Ramírez29 will come here. The message also stated that Simón had declared his decision to help us independently of what the party decides.
Besides this, there is news that the Frenchman,30 traveling with his own passport, will arrive in La Paz on the 23rd, and will stay with either Pareja31 or Rhea.32 Part of the message has yet to be decoded. We will see how to deal with this new conciliatory offensive. Other news is that Merci33 turned up with no money, claiming it was stolen; misappropriation is suspected, although something more serious cannot be ruled out. Lechín34 is going to ask for money and training.
Analysis of the month [February 1967]
[…] From the outside, there is no news of the two men who should have arrived to complete the group; the Frenchman should be in La Paz by now and should come to the camp any day. I have no news of the Argentines or Chino. Messages are being communicated well in both directions. The party’s position remains vacillating and two-faced, to say the very least, although when I speak with the new delegation and hear the latest explanation, this will be clearer.
The march has been going well enough, although it has been seriously affected by the accident that cost Benjamín35 his life. The men are still weak and not all of the Bolivians are able to hold up; the last few days of hunger have dampened their enthusiasm, which was already obvious after the group was divided.
The Awakening of Latin America Page 49
