by Daniel Wrinn
With the Pocket now in Allied control, the division’s logistical lifeline was assured. While the Japanese still had some observation capability on the airfield, they could only harass rather than threaten.
The Marine front lines were now close to the final Japanese defensive positions. While intelligence couldn’t verify it—the terrain and situation suggested that all assault requirements had been met, and it was time for siege tactics.
Enemy defenders learned that when aerial observers were overhead, they could no longer run their weapons out of caves and fire on the beach or the airfield. After one or two rounds, they were answered with a quick counter-battery fire or a dreaded aerial attack from carrier-based planes.
On September 24, Marines used attack planes operating from the airfield on Peleliu.
Peleliu’s Eastern Peninsula
On D +1, when the 1st Marines launched their bloody assault on the Pocket, the 5th Marines (on the right flank) found less opposition and easier terrain to navigate.
The 1/5 fought southwest to northeast across the airfield through a built-up area similar to what the 2/1 Marines faced. The battalion took fire from the Pocket and assorted small arms from hidden defenders in the rubble-filled built-up area.
The 1/5’s tank-infantry attack carried the day. Marines had control of the east to west cross-island road—the next step in securing Peleliu’s eastern peninsula.
The 2/5 Marines had a more difficult time. Their progress was opposed by infantry from the woods, and artillery directly from the Pocket, which targeted their tanks supporting the attack along the wood’s edge.
Whether the Japanese troops in those woods were posted to defend that position or just trying to survive was never established. The battle took all day, and Marine battalions suffered heavy casualties. By nightfall, the 2/5 Marines had fought past the north end of the airfield and halted to spend the night in the woods, concealing the approaches to the eastern peninsula.
The two-battalion Marine assault was deeply engaged on its front and right. Regimental headquarters near the beach was hit by an artillery barrage that, coupled with the 3/5 Marines’ CO and XO losses, prompted a considerable rearrangement of command assignments. The barrage at the regimental command post took out most of the staff and buried the regimental commander in the crumbling Japanese anti-tank trench.
Luckily, it was a temporary burial, and the regimental commander, Colonel Harris, crawled out with a twisted and battered leg but could still hobble. Two of his staff officers were casualties, and the sergeant major was killed. Harris didn’t evacuate but needed help in his CP. Harris ordered Colonel Walt back from the 3rd Battalion and had the XO of the 2/5, Major John Gustafson, take command of the 3/5.
Fortunately, the 3/5 Marines were having a quiet day, unlike their hair-raising regrouping on the night of D-Day. After daylight, the 2/5 attacked to the north, and the 3/5 stretched along the east edge of a mangrove lagoon, separating Peleliu from the eastern peninsula. From that position, the 3rd Battalion 5th Marines tied into the 3/7 Marines as they attacked south.
This maneuver protected each regiment’s flank against enemy movement across the lagoon and into the rear of the attacking Marines. While no such threat developed, a more pressing concern emerged for the 3/5 Marines. Major Gustafson was tasked with getting the 3/5 into position to bolster and relieve the 1/5 Marines as they closed in on their objective.
The next day, the 5th Marines tied in with the 1st on their left and secured the foot of the East Road. To the right, the 2/5 Marines hacked their way through the jungle north of the airfield and alongside a road leading to the eastern peninsula. A thick and almost impenetrable scrub reduced progress to a crawl. The scrub concealed most of the advancing Marines from enemy observation on the high ground to the northwest.
The 5th Marines’ position overlapped with the northeast sector. Securing that visual boundary meant frontline Marines were spared hostile, directed fire from Pocket. Like the 7th Marines, hidden mainly in the jungle to the South, this would lessen the need for a frontal assault.
Now Marines had the freedom to maneuver purposefully and coordinate supporting fire more carefully into enemy positions.
7th Marines in the South
In the south, starting on D +1, the 7th Marines’ spirited assault against enemy fortifications smashed into the elite 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment.
Even though the enemy was isolated and surrounded by Marines, this Japanese battalion showed skill and an understanding of Colonel Nakagawa’s orders and mission: to sell Peleliu at the highest price possible.
The 7th Marines attacked. The 3/7 were on the left and the 1/7 on the right. Marines had the advantage of assaulting the extensive and well-prepared defenses from the rear—with heavy fire support. Both sides fought bitterly, but by 1530 on September 8, the battle was over. Marines destroyed the fortified elite Japanese infantry battalion in their stronghold.
General Rupertus was informed that the 7th Marines’ objectives had been met, through the courage, bravery, skill, and many casualties of the 7th Marines infantry companies. Now the 7th advanced out of their successful battle area and into another bloody assault—better known as a siege.
The 5th Marines were still battling bitterly for the eastern “lobster claw” peninsula. By the end of D +2, the 5th Marines stood at the approach to the eastern peninsula off the East Road—near the 1st Marines’ vicious fight at the Pocket.
They’d planned an assault on the eastern peninsula across a narrow causeway the Japanese were sure to defend. But a recent reconnaissance revealed that the causeway was not defended. The 2nd Battalion advanced swiftly to seize the opportunity. They moved across in strength but were turned back by friendly fire. The battalion was strafed by Navy planes and then hit by an artillery airburst that killed eighteen Marines.
Still, a bridgehead across the causeway was established and on D +3 the 5th Marines moved in. By the afternoon, Marines advanced to capture and clear the eastern peninsula. Marines expected an attack against a strong defending force that never materialized, this provided an opportunity to secure Purple Beach quickly—a massive logistical prize.
Just before dark, two companies of the 3/5 Marines moved across the causeway to plan the next day’s advance. They hoped for little resistance but armed their point units with war dogs to guard against a nighttime ambush. Their lead companies moved out just after dawn, while nearly ambushed, the war dogs warned the Marines and thwarted the enemy’s attempted surprise attack.
By the end of D +4, the two battalions had secured the main body of the eastern peninsula and reached Purple Beach from the rear. While the Japanese defenses were extraordinary, many were unmanned. The enemy troops encountered were more interested in hiding than fighting. This added to the speculation that Colonel Nakagawa’s trained infantry had been moved west. By D +5, Purple Beach was secured along with the southwest and northeast of the long peninsula of Purple Beach.
From that position and others near the island of Ngardololok, Marines could direct fire against the cave-infested ridges of central and northern Peleliu.
Now that eastern and southern Peleliu was captured, the Allies planned to encircle the Japanese defenders in central Peleliu and assault nearby Ngesebus and Kongauru in the north. While this was the obvious next tactical phase for the fighting, securing it was unnecessary for strategic and tactical goals.
General Oliver Smith, the 1st Marine Division’s assistant commander, believed that the island’s mop-up operations should take priority. He wrote: “by the end of the first week, the division controlled everything on the island that was needed, or later even used.”
The airfield was secured and under improvement and repair—and in use. There was now no threat to MacArthur’s long-heralded return to the Philippines. Purple Beach, Peleliu’s best strategic axis, was secured and provided a protected logistic access to the major battle areas. While enemy defenders in their caves on northern Peleliu could still somewhat harass A
llied rear installations, Marine counterattacks would quickly silence them.
Only two significant Japanese capabilities remained: they could reinforce Peleliu from Babelthuap and bitterly resist from their cave positions.
The Allied encirclement of the Pocket suffered from a lack of reinforcements.
The III Amphibious Corps reserves were fully committed to the seizure of Angaur. The Angaur operation’s planning and timing were heavily affected by the Peleliu operation. Division planners proposed landing on Angaur before Peleliu, but General Julian Smith said that would cause the Japanese in northern Palau to reinforce Peleliu.
Division agreed that Angaur should only be assaulted after the landing on Peleliu was sure to succeed. But in the end, the assault on Angaur began before the Peleliu landing was resolved. The 81st Division’s commanding general wanted to land as soon as possible and was supported by Admiral Bill Valenti. General Julian Smith argued that committing the III Corps’ Reserve before the operations on Peleliu were more fully developed was premature and costly. Admiral Wilkinson ignored his advice.
On September 17, the III Corps’ final reserve was assigned to the Western Attack Force and ordered to use “all available forces.” Against General Smith’s advice, Wilkinson committed the entire 323rd RCT and the 81st Division’s other maneuver element. The 321st successfully occupied an undefended Ulithi, while reserves were desperately needed on Peleliu.
By September 20, the 81st Division had destroyed or cornered Angaur’s 1,400 enemy troops, and Anguar was declared secure. The 322nd RCT would complete mop-up operations, and the 321st RCT was now available for further operations.
General Rupertus believed his Marines could do it without help from the Army. The III Corps’ plan had the 81st Division reinforcing Marines on Peleliu and then relieving the 1st Marine Division for the mop-up. But General Rupertus refused to accept the help and continued to tell his commanders to “hurry up.”
Rupertus also shrugged off suggestions from 5th Marines “Bucky” Harris that he should take a look at the Pocket from the newly available light planes of the Marine Observation Squadron 3. Harris’ newest aerial reconnaissance on September 19 changed his view of the Pocket from sober to serious. He believed attacking the Pocket from the north would be less costly than the original plan, and Rupertus told Harris that he had his own map.
The Marines’ plan was built on the tactical concept that the 1st Marine Division would push in a northern line across the island’s width after capturing the airfield. Once close to the southern edge of the Pocket, Marines would advance in four west-to-east phase lines. It was expected that the advance along with flatter zones east and west of the Pocket would be roughly the same pace as along the high central ground of Peleliu. Maybe this thinking was consistent with Rupertus’ prediction of a three-day assault, but developments in Marine sectors to the west and east didn’t change division-level thinking. Until additional forces were available, this linear advance may have seemed the only possible advance.
There was no re-examining the planned south-to-north advance, and for days, the Pocket was sealed off at its northernmost extremity. Still, the division commander kept ordering attacks from south to north following the initial landing plan. As “Bucky” Harris reported from his aerial reconnaissance of the overall Pocket, these attacks would only bring severe casualties. Heavily supported Marines could advance into “the Horseshoe” and “Death Valley,” but their positions would soon prove untenable, and they’d need to withdraw by day’s end.
The failure in this thinking may have come from the mapping use. The 5th Marines in early October created a newer sketch map to locate and identify the details within the Umurbrogol Pocket.
Even after General Geiger had ordered General Rupertus to stand down Puller’s shattered 1st Marines on September 21, Rupertus made it known that his Marines alone would clear the entire island. After taking a closer look at the situation on the ground, General Geiger ordered the 321st RCT from Angaur and attached them to the 1st Marine Division—the encirclement of the Umurbrogol Pocket was possible.
Capturing Ngesebus and northern Peleliu became a priority. Allied forces discovered on September 23 that considerable enemy troop strength in the northern Palaus was being ferried by barge from Koror and Babelthuap. Even though the Navy patrol set up to protect against those reinforcements had discovered and destroyed some of the Japanese barges, many enemy troops had waded ashore on the early morning of September 23.
Colonel Nakagawa now had reinforcements on northern Peleliu.
Northern Peleliu Seizure
General Rupertus held a meeting with III Corps staff and General Geiger. They formed a plan to encircle the Pocket and deny reinforcements to the enemy on northern Peleliu. The Army’s 321st Infantry would advance up the West Road with the 5th Marines. After they reached the Pocket, Marines would pass through Army lines and continue north to assault Ngesebus and northern Peleliu.
The 321st Army Regimental Combat Team was now a battle-tested and hardened outfit. They would advance up the West Road along the edge of the elevated coral plateau. The plateau was 300 yards west to east and formed the western shoulder of the Pocket. It rose seventy feet, and its western cliff was a jumble of small ridges that dominated the road. This cliff would have to be cleared and secured to allow for an un-harassed use of the road.
After the 321st passed this cliff, they could probe east in search of any routes to the eastern edge of Peleliu. Any openings in that direction would be a chance to encircle the Pocket on the north. Following the 321st, the 5th Marines would press their attack into northern Peleliu. The 7th Marines (relieving the 1st) were stood down on the eastern peninsula and relieved the 5th Marines of their passive security role. This allowed the 5th to focus on the capture of northern Peleliu and Ngesebus.
The West Road would be used as a tactical route north and then as a communication line for continuing operations. The road was paralleled by the jagged cliff, which made up the western shoulder of the plateau. This was not a level plateau and had a moonscape of sinkholes, coral knobs, and karst.
With no defined ridges or patterns, the sinkholes varied from room size to house size, and some were over twenty feet deep and covered by jungle and vines. This plateau was ninety feet above the road. And another 300 yards to the east, it dropped off into a sheer cliff (known as the China wall). Marines who looked up at it from the eastern approaches to the Pocket claimed the western edge of the plateau was “virtually impassable.”
The plateau was also impenetrable to vehicles. Coral sinkholes forced all infantry to crawl, climb, and clamber into small compartments of jagged and rough terrain. Having to evacuate any casualties would involve rough handling of stretchers and the wounded men.
The enemy defended this area with scattered small units who bitterly resisted movement into their moonscape. Japanese troops ignored individuals and only fired on groups or what they considered rich targets.
The tactical decision along the West Road was to seize and hold the cliffs and coral spires. From here, they could command the road and defend these positions against any attacks. Once these heights were secured, troops and trucks could move along the West Road. But until secured, this cliff gave cover and concealment to the enemy. Until these cliff positions were taken and held, the Japanese could only be temporarily silenced from heavy firepower.
On September 23, this was the situation the 321st launched their assault into. Following an hour-long naval bombardment against the high ground of the West Road. Army patrols moved in and were screened from the Japanese still on the cliff. These small-unit tactics worked well until larger units of the 321st moved out alongside the West Road. From here, the enemy unleashed hell from above.
Two battalions of the 321st advanced along an east-west line across the road and up to the heights. Soldiers secured the west edge of the cliff and advanced northward, but some elements of the cliff were outpaced to the west. Instead of fighting to seize the ridge, so
me units responsible for securing the cliff abandoned it and side-stepped down to the road.
Colonel Hanneken ordered the 3/7 to capture the high ground that the 321st had abandoned. After that, the 3/7 Marines were committed along the ridge within the 321st zone of action. This stretched the Marines, who still needed to maintain contact to their right. Farther north, the 321st pressed on and regained some of the heights above their advance and held onto them.
On the northern end of the Pocket, the sinkhole terrain blended into regular ridgelines. The 321st assaulted Hill 100, along with a nearby hill east of East Road, and designated it Hill B. This position was the northern cap of the Pocket. The 321st would fight for Hill B and the northern cap of the Pocket for the next three days.
The 321st probed the eastern path across the north end of the Pocket. They sent patrols north up to the West Road. In an area of buildings designated “radio station,” they found the junction of East and West Roads. Colonel Bob Dark, commanding the 321st, sent a mobile task force (Task Force Neal), heavy with flamethrowers and armor, to circle southeast and join with the 321st at Hill 100. Below that battle, the 7th Marines continued to put pressure on the south and east fronts of the Pocket.
As this was underway, the 5th Marines were ordered to help in the battle for northern Peleliu. The 5th motored, marched, and waded to the West Road and sidestepped the 321st to join in the fight. The Marines found flat ground, some open, and some covered with palm trees. The familiar limestone ridges broke the ground. But the critical difference here was that most of the ridges stood alone.
Marines were not exposed to flanking fire from parallel ridges like they were in the Pocket. The Japanese fortified the northern ridges with extensive tunnels and concealed gun positions. But these positions could be attacked individually with flamethrowers, demolitions, and tank tactics. Many of the enemy defenders were from Naval construction units and not trained infantrymen.
