by Noam Chomsky
In short, reference to “generalization” does not eliminate the necessity to provide a precise account of the basis on which acquisition of beliefs and knowledge proceeds. We may, if we like, refer to the processes involved in language acquisition as processes of generalization or abstraction. But we will then apparently be forced to conclude that “generalization” or “abstraction,” in this new sense, has no recognizable relation to what is called “generalization” or “abstraction” in any technical or well-defined usage of philosophy, psychology, or linguistics.
115 Cf. Steinthal, Gedächtnissrede, p. 17. He holds that Humboldt’s fundamental insight was to see “how nothing external could ever find its way into the human being if it were not originally in them already and how all external influence is only a stimulus for the bursting forth of the inwardness. In the depth of this inwardness lies the unitary source of all genuine poetry and genuine philosophy, the source of all ideas and all great human creations, and from this source, language too flows.”
Humboldt’s views on education, incidentally, illustrate the same concern for the creative role of the individual. In his early essay against state absolutism (see pp. 66f. above), he argues that “sound instruction undoubtedly consists of spreading out before the person to be instructed various solutions, and then preparing him to choose the most appropriate, or even better, to invent his own solution by simply arranging before him all the difficulties to be conquered.” This method of instruction is, he maintains, not available to the state, which is limited to coercive and authoritarian means. (Cf. Cowan, Humanist, p. 43.) Elsewhere he holds that “all educational development has its sole origin in the inner psychological constitution of human beings, and can only be stimulated, never produced by external institutions” (Cowan, p. 126). “Man’s understanding, like all his other energies, is cultivated only by each human being’s own activity, his own inventiveness, or his own utilization of the inventions of others” (Cowan, pp. 42–43). Cf. also Cowan, pp. 132ff.
It is interesting to compare Harris’s observation in his Hermes that there is “nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of knowledge . . . [rather resembles] . . . the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree cooperate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue of the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity” (Works, p. 209). Here the ideal is apparently Socratic method; as Cudworth describes it (Treatise, p. 427; Cudworth 1996: 78), the belief that “knowledge was not to be poured into the soul like liquor, but rather to be invited and gently drawn forth from it; nor the mind so much to be filled therewith from without, like a vessel, as to be kindled and awaked.”
116 On the relation between Cudworth and Descartes, see Passmore, op. cit.; Gysi, op. cit.; and, for more general background, S. P. Lamprecht, “The Role of Descartes in Seventeenth-century England,” Studies in the History of Ideas, vol. III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), pp. 181–242. Passmore concludes (Ralph Cudworth, p. 8) that, despite some divergence, “it is still not misleading to call Cudworth a Cartesian, so great was their agreement on so many vital issues.”
117 Cf. Descartes, Meditation II, CSM, 21: we know what it is that we see not “from what the eye sees” but “from the scrutiny of the mind alone.”
But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square . . . I normally say that I see the men themselves . . . Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind.
118 However, “the cogitations that we have of corporeal things [are] usually both noematical and phantasmatical together.” This accounts for the fact that geometricians will rely on diagrams and that “in speech, metaphors and allegories do so exceedingly please” (pp. 430, 468; Cudworth 1996: 81 (for quotations), 121 (for geometrician reference)).
119 In a similar way, Cudworth arrives at the typical rationalist conclusion that our knowledge is organized as a kind of “deductive system” by which we arrive at “a descending comprehension of a thing from the universal ideas of the mind, and not an ascending perception of them from individuals by sense” (p. 467; Cudworth 1996:120, cf. 113–114).
120 See Abrams, Mirror, for discussion of the importance of this theory of cognitive processes in romantic aesthetics, and of its origins in earlier thought, particularly, that of Plotinus, who “explicitly rejected the concept of sensations as ‘imprints’ or ‘seal-impressions’ made on a passive mind, and substituted the view of the mind as an act and a power which ‘gives a radiance out of its own store’ to the objects of sense” (p. 59). Parallels between Kant and seventeenth-century English philosophy are discussed by Lovejoy, Kant and the English Platonists.
121 Quoted in A. D. Snyder, Coleridge on Logic and Learning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 133–134.
122 Quoted in Snyder, Coleridge, p. 116.
123 See, for example, D. M. MacKay, “Mindlike Behavior in Artefacts,” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1951), pp. 105–121. J. S. Bruner, “On Perceptual Readiness,” Psychological Review 64 (1957), pp. 123–152, “Neural Mechanisms in Perception,” Psychological Review 64 (1957), pp. 340–358. For a review of many of the findings relating to central processes in perception, see H. L. Teuber, “Perception,” in the Handbook of Physiology, Neurophysiology, ed. J. Field, H. W. Magoun, V. E. Hall (Washington: American Physiological Society, 1960), vol. III, chap. LXV. [Scientific research on perception since 1966 continues this theme; the literature is now massive. Chomsky sometimes refers to Marr 1981.]
124 For discussion and references in the areas of phonology and syntax respectively, see M. Halle and K. N. Stevens, “Speech Recognition: A Model and a Program for Research,” in Fodor and Katz (eds.), Structure of Language; and G. A. Miller and N. Chomsky, “Finitary Models of Language Users,” pt. II, in Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, ed. R. D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter (New York: John Wiley, 1963), vol. II.
Bibliography
Aarslef, H. “Leibniz on Locke on Language,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, 1964, pp. 1–24.
Abrams, M. H. The Mirror and the Lamp. Oxford University Press, Fair Lawn, N. J., 1953.
Aristotle. De Interpretatione.
Aristotle. De Anima.
Arnauld, A., and C. Lancelot. General and Rational Grammar: The Port-Royal Grammar, trans. J. Rieux and B. E. Rollin. Mouton, The Hague, 1975. (PRG)
Arnauld, A., and P. Nicole. La logique, ou l’art de penser, 1662.
Arnauld, A., and P. Nicole. The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans. J. Dickoff and P. James. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1964.
Arnauld, A., and P. Nicole. Logic or The Art of Thinking, trans. J. V. Buroker. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. (PRL)
Bacon, R. Grammatica Graeca.
Baker, Mark C. The Atoms of Language. Basic Books, New York, 2001.
Bayle, F. The General System of the Cartesian Philosophy, 1669.
Bayle, P. Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1697. Trans. R. H. Popkin, Historical and Critical Dictionary. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1965.
Beauzée, N. Grammaire générale, ou exposition raisonnée des éléments nécessaires du langage, 1767; rev. edn., 1819.
Bentham, J. Works, ed. J. Bowring. Russell and Russell, New York, 1962.
Berthelot, R. Science et philosophie chez Goethe. F. Alcan, Paris, 1932.
Bloomfield, L. Language. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1933.
Bougeant, G. H. Amusement philosophique sur le langage des bestes, 1739.
Brekle, H. E. “Semiotik und linguistische Semantik in Port-Royal,” Indogermanische Forschungen, vol. 69, 1964, pp. 103–121.
Brown, R. L. “Some Sources and Aspects of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Conception of
Linguistic Relativity,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, 1964.
Bruner, J. S. “On Perceptual Readiness,” Psychological Review, vol. 64, 1957.
Brunot, F. Histoire de la langue française. Armand Colin, Paris, 1924.
Buffer, C. Grammaire françoise sur un plan nouveau, 1709.
Carmichael, L. “The Early Growth of Language Capacity in the Individual,” in E. H. Lenneberg (ed.), New Directions in the Study of Language. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964.
Cassirer, E. Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 1923. Trans. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1953.
Chomsky, N. Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew. 1949 University of Pennsylvania undergraduate thesis, revised as 1951 MA thesis. Garland Publishing, New York, 1951/1979.
Chomsky, N. Syntactic Structures. Mouton and Co., The Hague, 1957.
Chomsky, N. “Review of B. F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior,” Language, vol. 35, 1959, pp. 26–58. Repr. with added preface in L. Jakobovits and M. Miron (eds.), Readings in the Psychology of Language. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967.
Chomsky, N. “Explanatory Models in Linguistics,” in E. Nagel et al. (eds.), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1962.
Chomsky, N. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory. Mouton and Co., The Hague, 1964. Repr. in part in Fodor and Katz, The Structure of Language.
Chomsky, N. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
Chomsky, N. The Sound Pattern of English (with Morris Halle). Harper and Row, New York, 1968.
Chomsky, N. Language and Mind (1968), enlarged edition. Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1972.
Chomsky, N. Reflections on Language. Pantheon, New York, 1975a.
Chomsky, N. The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (written in 1955). Plenum, New York, 1975b.
Chomsky, N. Language and Responsibility (Interviews with Mitsou Ronat). Pantheon, New York, 1979.
Chomsky, N. Rules and Representations. Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
Chomsky, N. Lectures on Government and Binding. Foris, Dordrecht, 1981.
Chomsky, N. Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current World Crisis and How We Got There. Pantheon, New York, 1982.
Chomsky, N. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use. Praeger, New York, 1986.
Chomsky, N. The Chomsky Reader (ed. James Peck). Pantheon, New York, 1987.
Chomsky, N. Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988a.
Chomsky, N. Necessary Illusions. South End Press, Boston, 1988b.
Chomsky, N. “A Minimalist Program for Linguistic Theory.” MIT Working Papers in Linguistics. 1992.
Chomsky, N. “Language and Nature.” Mind, 104, 1995a, pp. 1–61.
Chomsky, N. The Minimalist Program. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995b.
Chomsky, N. Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social Order. South End, Boston, 1996. Also published as Perspectives on Power. Black Rose, Montreal.
Chomsky, N. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, ed. Neil Smith. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000.
Chomsky, N. “Beyond Explanation.” MS, M.I.T., 2001.
Chomsky, N. “Three Factors in Language Design,” Linguistic Inquiry, 36, no. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 1–22.
Chomsky, N. “Approaching UG from Below,” in Interfaces + Recursion = Language?: Chomsky’s Minimalism and the View from Syntax-Semantics, Uli Sauerland and Hans-Martin Gartner (eds.). Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 2007.
Chomsky, N. forthcoming. Of Minds and Language: A Dialogue with Noam Chomsky in the Basque Country, ed. Piattelli-Palmarini, M., J. Uriagereka, and P. Salaburu. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
Chomsky, N., and M. Halle. The Sound Pattern of English. Harper and Row, New York, 1968.
Chomsky, N., M. Halle, and F. Lukoff. “On Accent and Juncture in English,” in For Roman Jakobson. Mouton, The Hague, 1956.
Chomsky, N., and E. Herman. The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. I: The Washington Connection and Third Word Fascism. South End Press, Boston, 1978.
Chomsky, N. and E. Herman. The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. II: After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology. South End Press, Boston, 1979.
Chomsky, N. and E. Herman. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Pantheon, New York, 1988.
Coleridge, S. T. “Lectures and Notes of 1818,” in T. Ashe (ed.), Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare and Other English Poets. G. Bell & Sons, London, 1893.
Cordemoy, Géraud de. Discours physique de la parole, 1666. 2nd edn., 1677; English trans., 1668.
Couturat, L., and L. Leau. Histoire de la langue universelle. Paris, 1903.
Cowan, M. Humanist without Portfolio. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1963.
Cowie, F. What’s Within? Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.
Cudworth, R. Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. American edn. of Works, ed. T. Birch, 1838.
Cudworth, R. A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. S. Hutton. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
Curtiss, S. Genie: A Psycholinguistic Study of a Modern Day “Wild Child”. Academic Press, London, 1976.
D’Alembert, J. Éloge de du Marsais.
Descartes, R. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (2 vols.), trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984–1985. (CSM)
Descartes, R. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. III: The Correspondence, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. (CSMK)
Descartes, R. The Philosophy of Descartes. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1892.
Descartes, R. “Correspondence,” trans. L. C. Rosenfield (L. Cohen), Annals of Science, vol. 1, no. 1, 1936.
Diderot, D. Lettre sur les sourds et muets. 1751.
Du Marsais, César Chesneau. Véritables principes de la grammaire, 1729.
Du Marsais, César Chesneau. Logique et principes de grammaire. Paris, 1769.
Elders, Fons (ed.) Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind. Souvenir Press, London, 1974.
Fiesel, E. Die Sprachphilosophie der deutschen Romantik. Mohr, Tübingen, 1927.
Flew, A. “Introduction” to Logic and Language, First Series. Blackwell, Oxford, 1951.
Fodor, J. A. “Could Meaning Be an ‘rm’?” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, vol. 4, 1965, pp. 73–81.
Fodor, J. A. Psychological Explanation. Random House, New York, 1968.
Fodor, J. A. “The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy,” in Fodor, Representations. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.
Fodor, J. A. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press, New York, 1998.
Fodor, J. A., and J. J. Katz. The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964.
Frege, Gottlob. “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 1892, pp. 25–50.
Galileo. G. Dialogo dei due massimi sistemi del mondo, 1630. Trans. Dialogue on the Great World Systems. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953.
Gallistel, C. R. The Organization of Learning. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990.
Gallistel, C. R. (with John Gibbon). Symbolic Foundations of Conditioned Behavior. L. Erlbaum Mahwah, N.J., 2002.
Gould, S. J., and R. Lewontin. “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,” in Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 205 (1161), 1979, pp. 581–598.
Grammont, M. “Review of A. Gregoire, ‘Petit traité de linguistique,’” Revue des langues romanes, vol. 60, 1920.
Grammont, M. Traité de phonétiqu
e. Delagrave, Paris, 1933.
Gunderson, K. “Descartes, La Mettrie, Language and Machines,” Philosophy, vol. 39, 1964.
Gysi, L. Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth. Herbert Lang, Bern, 1962.
Halle, M., and K. N. Stevens. “Speech Recognition: A Model and a Program for Research,” in Fodor and Katz, Structure of Language.
Harnois, G. “Les théories du langage en France de 1660 à 1821,” Études Françaises, vol. 17, 1929.
Harris, J. Works, ed. Earl of Malmesbury. F. Wingrove, London, 1801.
Harris, Z. S. “Co-occurrence and Transformation in Linguistic Structure,” Language, vol. 33, 1957, pp. 283–340. Repr. in Fodor and Katz, Structure of Language.
Hauser, M., N. Chomsky, and W. T. Fitch. “The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?” Science, 298, 2002, pp. 1569–1579.
Herbert of Cherbury. De Veritate, 1624. Trans. M. H. Carré, On Truth, University of Bristol Studies No. 6, 1937.
Herder, J. G. Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, 1772. Repr. in part in E. Heintel (ed.), Herder’s Sprachphilosophie. Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1960.
Herder, J. G. Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. 1784–1785.
