The element of surprise which has ever been an important tactic in warfare has become the more dangerous because of the amazing speed with which modern equipment can reach and attack the enemy's country.2
By emphasizing the revolutionary nature of blitzkrieg warfare, President Roosevelt sought to alert Americans to the threat emerging in Europe, but he unwittingly cooperated with German propagandists in distorting the actual nature of the fighting in 1940. In fact, the blitzkrieg and its success in 1940 rested upon techniques and procedures as old as warfare.
A key component of the myth surrounding the blitzkrieg pertains to the role and dominance of the tank, for most military observers saw the campaign of 1940 in terms of its having decisively demonstrated the importance of the tank. This assessment came partially from the feeble attempts by some of the French participants to explain the swift collapse of France, but it also came from the conscious efforts of the Germans after June 1940 to portray their army as invincible and thus as an army to avoid. The polished propaganda machine of Nazi Germany energetically publicized the rapid sweep of the tanks across France and the terrible offensive power possessed by them. Although one must acknowledge the important role played by the tanks, their contributions would have been significantly less without the remarkable performance of the German infantry. In fact, the fighting around Sedan was more a victory for the German infantryman than for the tanker.
To add to the misunderstanding of the campaign, French veterans of the 1940 campaign frequently complained of the supposed superiority of German weapons and equipment. Though deficiencies in weapons and equipment did affect France's performance, her army possessed materiel that was roughly equivalent to Germany's in quantity and in quality. The Allies and Germany had about the same number of tanks, and France probably had the best tank with her SOMUA S-35. Similarly, France had excellent antitank weapons. Her 25mm gun, which was her main antitank weapon, could penetrate the main armor plating on all German tanks except for a few Mark IVs that had additional armor plating added to their front slope. The only area of the army in which France had a distinct deficiency was in her woefully small number of antitank mines. The main area in which Germany had a clear advantage was in the superiority of the Luftwaffe, but she also had advantages in her more extensive use of radios, in her longer-range 105mm howitzers, and in her excellent 88mm antiaircraft weapon, which could double as an antitank gun. Nevertheless, Germany's small advantages in materiel did not provide the margin that assured her victory.3 The key difference between the two countries was not the weapons themselves, but how the weapons were employed.
Another myth to emerge from the battle was the importance of the dive bomber for providing close support to ground forces. For those British and American leaders who recognized the superiority of the German Luftwaffe, the specter of diving airplanes with screaming, howling noises exercised a remarkable influence over their development of aircraft in the period immediately following the battle. For reasons that are more psychological and emotional than scientific, the Allies were captivated by the specter of aircraft unleashing bombs on point targets and providing support to mobile forces that artillery could not provide. In fact, the dive bombers did have a powerful effect on poorly armed and inadequately prepared troops who were vulnerable to their psychological effects, but they rarely destroyed an armored vehicle or a bunker. More importantly, the overwhelming German advantage in the air failed to isolate the Sedan battlefield and prevent the French from reinforcing the threatened sector.
Then too, the collapse of the French defensive effort at Sedan convinced many military observers that the French soldiers of 1940 were not worthy sons of their fathers who had died willingly and by the thousands in the infernos of World War I. The panic of the 55th Division and the subsequent collapse of its defensive efforts seemed to come from a rotten core of French will and morale that somehow was linked to the contradictions and cracks in French society, decaying aspects that later became so apparent under the Vichy Regime. In fact, the failure of the 55th Division came from its poor training, its poor preparation for battle, and its poor leadership. The problems of units who suffered from a lack of cohesion were magnified by an inadequate doctrine that encouraged the sort of leadership habits that contributed to the collapse in 1940. By emphasizing numbers and combat-power ratios and paying insufficient attention to cohesion and small-unit leadership, French military leaders in the Sedan region weakened their units rather than strengthening them. Burdened by the task of digging trenches and building bunkers, they neglected to train their soldiers adequately and to inculcate in them a will to fight.
Despite the pervasiveness of the myths surrounding the defeat of France, the reasons for her failure are to be found elsewhere. As can be seen in the 10–16 May campaign that culminated in the breakout of the XIXth Panzer Corps southwest of Sedan, France's failures stem partially from her own inadequacies and partially from the ability of the Germans to concentrate overwhelming combat power at the decisive point. As I have previously written, the Germans “outfought the French tactically and outsmarted them strategically.”4 French Army doctrine was unsuited and inadequate for the war Germany was prepared to fight in 1940, and the strategy of rushing forward into Belgium was particularly vulnerable to the German attack through the Ardennes. Adding to France's difficulties, her army and its leaders lacked the proper flexibility and responsiveness to reply to the unexpected. Whatever the advantages for the Germans, however, the campaign was not “a walk through the sun” for them. General Guderian acknowledged this when he described the German success as “almost a miracle.”
By focusing on the battles fought by the German XIXth Panzer Corps between 10 and 16 May, this book seeks to investigate the inadequacy of the French military response and the superiority of the German response. Also, the book seeks to investigate the battle of 10–16 May 1940 as a complete campaign, from beginning to end with all its turns and twists. For modern mechanized warfare, a study of the deep attack of the German XIXth Panzer Corps and the attempts by the French to defend against it offers one of the finest opportunities available to study the operational level of war and to analyze a deep attack by a corps, as well as a prepared defense by a corps. Because the terrain remains relatively undeveloped and remarkably unchanged, the battlefield also provides a marvelous opportunity for detailed analysis on the ground, or for what the U.S. Army now calls a “staff ride.”
Thus, by focusing on the XIXth Panzer Corps and its opponents, this book examines the experience of a finite number of French and German units and analyzes a single campaign in detail. Such an analysis should provide insights into the different approaches of the two countries toward leadership, tactics, operations, and strategy. The reader, however, should not forget that the XIXth Panzer Corps was only one of three Panzer corps that crossed the Meuse in the Dinant, Monthermé, and Sedan areas.
To enable the reader to follow the intricacies of the campaign, I have chosen to separate the German actions from the French reactions. While I present both sides, to include aspects of the Belgian experience, I devote greater attention to the French than to the Germans. The reasons for this reside partially in my greater interest in the French, but it is also influenced by the nature of the campaign. Since the Germans have the initiative, the French must react to their actions. Therefore, the “French” chapters delve deeper into issues relating to the operational and strategic levels of war.
CHAPTER 1
Strategy and Doctrine
The fighting that occurred near Sedan between 10–16 May 1940 was shaped by the competing strategies of France and Germany. To halt the Germans, France relied on a defensive strategy. While holding along the fortifications of the Maginot Line on the northeastern frontier, and while placing a minimum number of forces along the Ardennes, she planned on rushing forward into northern and central Belgium and occupying strong defensive positions. By fighting from prepared, entrenched positions, she thought she could halt the main German atta
ck, which—she believed—would come through the broad avenue of approach extending from Maastricht, to Gembloux, to Mons. After weakening the enemy and building up her own and her allies’ forces, she intended to resume the offensive and achieve victory.
To concentrate her forces against France's weakest point, Germany relied on a daring offensive strategy. By attacking northern Belgium and the Netherlands with a minimum number of forces, she sought to deceive the French and convince them that the main attack was coming à la Schlieffen in 1914 through northern and central Belgium. When France moved into northern and central Belgium, Germany intended to deliver the decisive blow with a heavy Panzer force through the center of the French forces along the Ardennes. The distinguished British historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, has aptly described the operations against northern Belgium and the Netherlands as serving, like a “matador's cloak,” to distract the attention of the French from the deadly thrust that was coming through the Ardennes.1
Tragically for France and her allies, her strategy played directly into the hands of the Germans. After pushing some of her most modern and mobile forces forward into northern and central Belgium, she could not respond adequately to the gaping hole ripped in her lines between Dinant and Sedan by three German corps. The result was a disaster for France and her allies.
FRENCH STRATEGY
The goal of France's strategy was the avoidance of defeat, rather than the immediate gaining of victory. She believed victory could be hers only if she first managed to defend herself successfully against a German attack. When France developed her military strategy after World War I, almost all her senior military leaders agreed on the necessity to defend the national territory by placing fortifications along the northeastern frontier and by establishing a forward defense in Belgium. While the experiences of World War I and the terrible damages to France's countryside had a significant effect on her decisions, the realities of geography and the possibility of an attaque brusquée (surprise attack) from Germany dominated her thinking.
France's approach to protecting her frontiers was greatly influenced by her misfortune of having a major portion of her natural resources and industrial capacity near her frontiers and thus within easy striking distance of the Germans. This vulnerability contributed to her adoption of a strategy emphasizing defense of this crucial war-making capability. To defeat the more heavily industrialized and populated German state, she accepted the requirement for a total war and the complete mobilization of all the nation's resources. If the area along her frontiers, which contained a large portion of her industry, natural resources, and population, were lost to an invading enemy, her mobilization would be seriously disrupted and her ability to wage a total war would be eliminated. French military strategy had to be functional within this important constraint.
Clearly, misfortune had placed a significant portion of French economic wealth and potential dangerously close to the German threat. Within a triangle formed by Dunkirk, Strasbourg, and Paris, France had about 75 percent of her coal and 95 percent of her iron-ore production. And most of her heavy industry lay within that same triangle. Drawing another triangle between Paris, Lille, and Rouen would encompass nine-tenths of the factories producing French cloth in the 1930s and four-fifths of the factories producing woolen goods. In that same area France manufactured most of her chemical products, all her automobiles, and all her aircraft. France recognized that coal, iron, and factories are the basis for the materiel side of total warfare. She also knew that her war-making capability would be seriously weakened even if she managed to hold the enemy along the same lines where the Germans had been halted in 1914. If the Germans launched an unexpected attack and seized a significant portion of the territory containing the bulk of her natural resources, the war could be lost in a matter of days.2
At the same time a major portion of France's population resided near the natural resource and industrial centers. The problem of manpower for the French armed forces had long been a source of gloom. From the time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, the ratio of Frenchmen to Germans progressively declined. In the late 1860s the Germans slightly outnumbered the French in numbers of men aged twenty to thirty-four who were in the prime period of their lives for military service. By 1910 the Germans had increased their advantage to a ratio of 1.6 to 1. By 1939 the Germans had more than twice as many men of military age.3 For manpower reasons as well as patriotic ones the Frenchmen living along the frontiers could not be relinquished to the enemy.
The most important discussions over the strategy for defending France's frontiers occurred in the 1920s in the Superior Council of War, which was composed primarily of the senior generals in the army. The council exercised a remarkable influence over the construction of the Maginot Line and the decision to establish a forward defense in northern and central Belgium. As did much of the political leadership, members of the council also believed that France had to be on the defensive initially and that fortifications would strengthen her defenses and enable her to overcome the manpower advantages of Germany. Fortifications would enable the comparatively smaller number of France's soldiers to fight more effectively. France and her allies would go on the offensive as soon as they had amassed sufficient forces and resources to defeat Germany. Such a military strategy, in the council's view, enabled France to overcome the significant disadvantages she had relative to Germany.
In its May 1920 meeting, the first deliberations after the war on the problem of the frontiers, the Superior Council of War concluded that northern and central Belgium remained the major route of invasion.4 The French assumed that construction of fortifications in the northeast would encourage the Germans to divert their attack toward Belgium, and thus to attempt another version of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan. The likelihood of that occurring was heightened by the previous German violation of Belgian neutrality, the absence of geographic obstacles, and the location of a large network of roads and railways running directly toward Paris. Throughout the interwar period, the High Command did not deviate from this perception and demonstrated an unswerving preference to fight on Belgian soil in the north, rather than on French. The French leaders vividly remembered the disastrous destruction of precious agricultural, industrial, and mining resources in the World War I fighting. None wished for that to occur again.
When the Superior Council of War met in May 1920, it also addressed the question of fortifications on the frontiers. While the session demonstrated a lack of consensus among the army's leaders about the function, form, and location of fortifications for defending the frontier, almost all agreed that some type of fortifications was needed. By mid-1922, the council was split between those who wanted a continuous line of defensive works along the frontier, reminiscent of the trench and barbed wire system of World War I, and those who wanted fortified regions that could act as centers of resistance to facilitate offensive actions or defensive maneuvers. Following five years of debate and discussions, the council adopted on 12 October 1927 the concept of deep underground fortresses in key parts of the terrain with smaller blockhouses and other obstacles along other parts of the frontier.5 Shortly thereafter, the French began building the massive fortifications on the northeastern frontier that became known as the Maginot Line.
As they constructed the massive fortifications, the French decided not to extend them west across the face of the Ardennes. Throughout the interwar period, the French perception of the Ardennes remained unchanged. With its heavy forests and steep hills, particularly in Luxembourg and along the Semois River in Belgium, the Ardennes was a significant obstacle to the rapid movement of large forces, particularly motorized and mechanized ones. When Marshal Philippe Pétain appeared before the Senate Army commission in March 1934, he reflected the views of the military when he emphasized that this sector was “not dangerous.”6 In comparison to the vulnerable resources on the northeastern frontiers and the absence of easily defensible terrain on the northern frontier, the Ardennes seemed to require less defensive preparatio
n. From beginning to end, the French High Command treated the Ardennes sector as simply the connecting sector between the northeastern and northern frontiers.
By September 1939 the broad outlines of France's military strategy had been drawn and had been decisively influenced by geographic, resource, and manpower considerations. While holding on the right, she would move into Belgium and establish a forward defense. How far she would push forward, however, depended upon luck and circumstances beyond her control. Those circumstances became particularly problematic in 1936 following Belgium's renouncing of her alliance with France. When Belgium assumed her neutral status, she was reluctant to enter into open agreements or arrangements with France, but she nevertheless permitted an extremely limited amount of cooperation to occur. Unfortunately, this limited cooperation pertained primarily to providing France information about her fortifications. By May 1940 France and Belgium had secretly exchanged information about the basic outlines of their war plans, but they had done very little to coordinate the details of these plans, particularly if Germany moved west through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium.7
Despite her grave concerns about her neutral neighbor, France planned on rushing forward and establishing a defensive position in northern and central Belgium. She assumed that Germany would violate Belgium's neutrality first and thus provide a basis for her entry into Belgium, or that the neutral nation would appeal for aid shortly before a German invasion. Therefore, she concentrated her most mobile forces along the border of western Belgium and prepared them to move forward rapidly. After these forces entered Belgium, France wanted them to avoid an encounter battle. That is, she wanted them to occupy a defensive position that could halt the German advance, and she wanted them to occupy this position before the Germans arrived.
The Breaking Point Page 2
