Around noon on the 12th, the defenders along the Meuse began to sight German motorcyclists and vehicles. As French artillery began to fire, the threat of a major German attack became more and more apparent. After the last Frenchmen crossed over the Meuse, all the bridges in the Second Army sector were destroyed. Contrary to some later reports that the Germans crossed the Meuse using bridges that had not been destroyed, the demolition of the bridges occurred smoothly and professionally. If every other aspect of the campaign had gone as well for the French, the Germans would have been in trouble.
During the night of 12–13 May, elements on the right of the 55th Division in the Angecourt sector were relieved by elements from the 71st Division. Despite this relief, only one battalion from the 295th Infantry Regiment (less one company) and part of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion moved out of the Angecourt sector into the Frénois subsector. After being relieved by battalions from the 71st Division, those elements of the 55th Division were moved by General Lafontaine, the 55th Division's commander, into the region south of Chaumont (two kilometers north of Bulson). He planned on placing them in the principal line of resistance during the night of 13–14 May.3 The unleashing of the German attack, however, prevented him from integrating them into the forward defenses of the division.
In his report written shortly after the battle, General Lafontaine provided a summary of the first phase of the fighting on the afternoon of the 13th:
Enemy aviation bombed in an intensive fashion the principal position along Croix Piot, Torcy, Wadelincourt, the area of Noyers-Pont Maugis, and the Bois de la Vache. Reports indicated the blockhouses [were] completely destroyed or covered with dirt. The Command Posts, including that of the division, were also bombarded….
At the beginning of the afternoon, the enemy crossed the Meuse protected by aerial bombardments of an extreme violence (particularly in the area of Donchery and in that of Wadelincourt) and by the fire (machine guns and 105[mm] cannons) from numerous tanks along the right bank of the Meuse.
The [enemy's] forward movement in the interior of the defensive position was particularly strong in the region of La Marfée and toward La Boulette where it used cover to infiltrate rapidly, bypassing and taking from the rear our strong points…. At this moment, the commanding general of the division had no reserves….
Telephone communications were cut in the forward zone and between the command posts of the division (the [radio] antenna of the division was destroyed very early by a bomb).
Because of alarmist information coming from the front and rear, because of orders given verbally or by telephone from unqualified cadres or coming from an unknown source, some infantry units withdrew in disorder [on the evening of the 13th], some [artillery] batteries put their cannons out of service, [and] some artillery resupply units and columns—in convoys—withdrew far to the rear, creating bottlenecks on the roads and a feeling of panic in the rear.4
WITH THE 2/331ST INFANTRY AT FRÉNOIS
Occupying the left of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's regiment, the 2/331st had responsibility for the defensive area between Glaire and the heights of La Boulette. When the German assault began, none of the French suspected that the key enemy penetration would occur in this battalion's sector. In fact, the deep push by the German 1st Infantry Regiment through the 2/331st opened the door for the rest of the XIXth Panzer Corps.
The battalion commander of the 2/331st, Captain Foucault, had three centers of resistance: one extending along the Meuse River and the Canal de l'Est from Glaire to Bellevue; another along the line of bunkers at Frénois that formed the second line; and a third called “Col de la Boulette” that extended along the stopping line. He thus had three companies arranged in depth with one of these companies (7th Company, 2/147th) occupying the western half of the mushroom of Glaire. The 5th Company, 2/331st, occupied the second line, and the 7th Company, 2/331st, occupied the stopping line. On the 7th Company's right along the battalion's stopping line was the 6th Company, 331st, which was attached to the 2/147th. In the approaching fight, both the 6th Company and 7th Company performed disgracefully by doing very little to hold the stopping line for the two battalions under whose control they operated.
As part of the relief of the 213th Regiment by the 331st, the 2/331st had occupied the area around Frénois on Monday, 6 May, after conducting a thorough reconnaissance on 4 and 5 May. Hence it was new to the area, and its men were not completely familiar with their positions. Only the 7th Company, 2/147th, along the Meuse River had been in the area for any appreciable time. Thus many of the advantages the French could have had by having occupied the position since October were dissipated by an unfortunate shifting of units on the eve of the German attack.
Early in the morning on the 13th, the French witnessed a great deal of activity occurring on the German side of the Meuse. After 0800 hours enemy movements increased, especially at St. Menges, Fleigneux, and Floing. Several subordinate elements reported this activity to the headquarters of the 147th.5 The commander of the 2/331st noted that little action occurred in the buckle of the Meuse, the area forward of the Canal de l'Est and toward which most of his elements along the principal line of resistance had been oriented. The company along the Meuse and canal from Glaire to Bellevue had organized most of its men and equipment to oppose a crossing coming from the direction of the buckle.6
Around 1200 hours the German aerial bombardment intensified, with some of the heaviest bombing occurring on Glaire. A machine gun position near the canal was destroyed by a bomb. Tanks firing from Gaulier destroyed a small bunker near the bridge leading from Glaire toward Iges. They also destroyed the two small bunkers located where the Ruisseau de Glaire flows into the Meuse; the two bunkers were armed with submachine guns and covered the central sector of the river between Torcy and Glaire. Artillery fires destroyed another nearby machine gun position. The destruction of these positions prevented the French at Glaire from interlocking their fire with the strong points in Torcy, and this opened up a small but important hole for the Germans.7
At 1500 hours elements of the German 1st Infantry Regiment crossed the Meuse at Glaire, and elements from the Gross Deutschland Regiment attempted to cross east of Gaulier. The boundary between the two crossings was the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire, which was also the boundary between the 7th Company, 2/147th, and the company to its right (the 6th Company, 2/295th). The first crossing occurred near the right boundary of the 7th Company, 2/147th, across from the Gaulier factory. The sergeant in charge of the strong point in Glaire watched “large numbers” of Germans cross over the river and move forward. He fired at them with his machine gun, which jammed, and he grabbed another weapon. He also requested an artillery barrage on the crossing point, but he received no response. The Germans who crossed the Meuse at Gaulier soon moved toward the strong point in Glaire. Forced to pull back, the French sergeant and the men in the strong point fled toward the bunkers at Bellevue, where they again opened fire.8
Advancing rapidly, the attackers rushed past Glaire, destroying some bunkers as they moved but leaving others behind. Their purpose was to destroy the strong points to their front that provided covering fire for the defensive positions near the river. As they moved south from Gaulier, they moved perpendicular to the direction the French in Gaulier had expected them to come, and by doing so, they swept through the flank of the defending company. The French had expected the attack against the positions along the Canal de l'Est to come from the direction of the buckle.
Being one of the few positions that could face the attacking Germans directly, the strong point at Les Forges, which was to their direct front, continued to place effective small-arms fire on them. The strong point continued fighting until some time after 1630 hours when elements from the German 2/1st Infantry moved around its left flank. Apparently, the defenders at Les Forges held up the Germans along the railroad track in front of Les Forges and then withdrew toward Frénois. But their withdrawal enabled the Germans to destroy the remaining bunker
s along the river one by one.
The strong point at Les Forges was commanded by Lieutenant Lamay, who withdrew to Bellevue. As he withdrew, he discovered that bunker number 42 near Bellevue was silent.9 With its occupants having departed without fighting, this bunker was about 600 meters to his rear in a southwesterly direction. Thus as early as an hour and a half after the Germans crossed the river, an ominous indicator suggested what would happen to other key bunkers.
As the German infantry pushed forward, they bypassed the defenders in the strong point across the canal from Gillette. The commander of the 7th Company, 2/147th, sent a runner to tell them to withdraw, but the runner could not reach them to deliver the message. The Germans had already reached the railway to their rear and cut them off.10
Despite the gravity of the situation, the battalion commander of the 2/331st encountered severe difficulties in his efforts to ascertain what was happening. Captain Foucault explained:
All the telephone lines were strung in the open and were placed hastily. Contact with the company from the 147th F[ortress] I[nfantry] R[egiment] was cut on 13 May around 0900 hours, with the subsector [battalion commander] around 1100 hours, with the unit to the right around 1200 hours, with the 5th and 6th companies [of the 2/331st] around 1500 hours until 1630. [Contact]…with the artillery [observer] functioned normally until 2100 hours. As for the artillery, telephonic contact was cut around 1030 hours.11
The stringing of wire across the open probably occurred because the battalion had been in the position for less than a week and was more concerned with fortifications, entrenchments, barbed wire entanglements, and so on. Nevertheless, the failure to bury the wire and thereby protect it was inexcusable. Though the Germans were expanding their breach rapidly after 1500 hours, the French chain of command had little information about exactly what was taking place.
After turning the flank of the defenders at Les Forges, the Germans entered the woods of Bellevue, continuing to hit the defenders in their flank.12 The fleeing of much of the infantry from the intervals between bunkers made the fortifications much more vulnerable and enabled the Germans to move forward rapidly. After bypassing the bunkers at Les Forges and Glaire, the Germans quickly moved past bunker 42, which was evidently unoccupied, and then encountered bunker 103 near the Chateau of Bellevue. Elements from the 7th Company, 2/147th, in the Bellevue area occupied bunker number 103 and were under the command of Second Lieutenant Verron.
Defenders in the two bunkers near Bellevue, which were under the command of Verron, could see in their assigned direction, which was toward Donchery in the west, but trees and an orchard limited the vision of the largest bunker (number 103) in other directions. The two bunkers had no communications between them, other than a runner on foot, and were several kilometers from their headquarters in Frénois. The occupants of the bunkers knew little about what was happening in the fighting, for since the Germans had crossed the Luxembourg border on 10 May, their only contact with the outside had been someone bringing them soup.13
The safety of the bunkers greatly depended on infantry, which provided local security. Many areas could not be covered by fire from the bunkers, particularly if the enemy moved west of the road from Glaire to Bellevue. An enemy moving from the north to the south through the flank of the defending company could use the slope of the river bank and the orchard for cover, particularly from fire coming from the heights to their front. Infantry in the interval between Glaire and Bellevue thus had to prevent an enemy from using the river bank for cover and attacking the blind sides of the bunkers.
During a lull in the aerial bombardment on the morning of the 13th, Lieutenant Verron saw a mass of French soldiers fleeing to the rear without their weapons. One of the fleeing soldiers stopped long enough to explain to him that the German aircraft had destroyed everything and that there was no one left to defend the bunkers. Verron recognized the great danger to which his men were exposed.14 Without infantry to prevent the enemy from using the riverbank, the bunkers were an easy target for the Germans.
Before the German infantry from the 1st Regiment reached the two bunkers near Bellevue, they had disrupted attempts by the Germans to cross at Donchery. The Germans tried to move troops between 1330 and 1400 hours to a position behind the railway tracks in Donchery, but the French soldiers in Bellevue and Villette placed deadly fire into their flanks. Each time the Germans tried to move forward and make a reconnaissance of the area around Donchery or occupy a position, the bunkers on their flanks forced them to flee.15 Soon the Germans brought tanks forward to soften the French defenses. The tanks arrived, according to German reports, about an hour later than the French reported.
The French commander at Donchery later described the action in his area:
Our artillery and mortars fired…very effectively. But the enemy did not stop bringing tanks—about 60 came from Montimont between 1300 and 1430 hours—and placed his armored vehicles under the protection of the railway [embankment] so well that at 1500 hours, he…was able to fire simultaneously at our blockhouses with four tanks at a time. Having thus “treated” each blockhouse, he continued his fire on the other machine gun and submachine gun emplacements….16
The systematic firing at protected positions weakened the French defenders and enabled the Germans to place troops along the railway, but it did not stop French fire from coming into their flank from Villette, Glaire, and Bellevue.
When the Germans tried to launch their assault from Donchery across the Meuse, the bunkers at Bellevue and Glaire delivered deadly fire into the flank of the exposed infantry units and stopped their movement. Encouraged by this result, the men in the bunkers were elated, but they soon came under heavy aerial bombardment again.
Around 1645 to 1700 hours, German dive bombers concentrated their attacks primarily against the bunkers along the second line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt. The largest bunker at Bellevue (number 103, the one occupied by Verron) received a direct hit by a bomb but was not heavily damaged, though the explosion injured some of its occupants. Despite numerous sorties, a direct hit on at least one bunker, and the burning of the houses next to the bunkers, the well-protected defenders remained capable of resistance, but the absence of infantry to protect them made them extremely vulnerable. The occupants of bunker 42, which was several hundred meters north of the Chateau at Bellevue and almost directly in the path of the Germans, apparently recognized their vulnerability and chose to flee rather than fight.
Moving in the ditch along the road from Glaire and through the woods along the river bank near Bellevue and initially bypassing bunker 42 bis in Les Forges, infantry from the German 1st Infantry Regiment moved past bunker 42 and made contact with Verron's bunker about 1745 hours. The bunker was located about 100 meters south of the chateau. The first indication Lieutenant Verron had of their presence was the exploding of a grenade in an air vent of his bunker. In furious close-in fighting, the defenders’ machine gun was put out of action, and Verron soon concluded he had no choice but to surrender. After he and his men left the bunker one by one, they watched helplessly as the Germans launched an attack on other bunkers.17
While some of the German infantry continued moving south, others eventually attacked another bunker (number 104), which lay about a kilometer to the east of Verron's bunker. This was a key bunker, for it could fire in all directions, including in the direction of Verron's bunker. As long as the French in this bunker continued to resist, the Germans could not widen their penetration or move large numbers of troops forward. This bunker fought longer and much more desperately than Verron's. Around 1845 hours, according to French reports, but at least an hour earlier according to German reports, the other bunker fell, having fired more than 10,000 cartridges and having more than 50 percent of its personnel killed or wounded.18
Despite this spirited resistance, the Germans controlled the important crossroads at Bellevue by 1800 hours. They had already begun moving beyond Bellevue and into the rear of the defenders just west of th
e road junction. Thus while some attackers concentrated on bunker 104 and the widening of the breach, others moved west parallel to the river and south toward La Boulette.
According to a staff officer of the 1st Panzer Division, Major von Kielmansegg, the Germans considered the defenses to their front (which included bunkers 103 and 104) to be the French principal line of resistance. This defensive line extended along the line of bunkers from Frénois toward Wadelincourt.19 They did not realize that the French had failed to finish this line and convert it into an extremely powerful principal line of resistance. By punching through the defenses along the Meuse and pushing forward to the crossroads at Bellevue, they had already fought through much of the strongest defenses. When von Kielmansegg rode across the battle area on the morning after the Germans had captured Bellevue and Frénois, he noted the damage to the chateau, and in his written account stated that the “first infiltrations” through the principal line of resistance had occurred here.20
Shortly after his capture and still some minutes before the fall of bunker 104 at Bellevue, his captors ordered Lieutenant Verron to follow a German sergeant. Moments later, he arrived before a German general who was peering over a map and talking into a radio to a small aircraft that circled above Frénois. The general looked him over from head to foot, and after having apparently satisfied his curiosity, issued an order. Verron was returned to his men, never understanding why a German general wanted to see a captured French officer but not to talk with or interrogate him.21
Nonetheless, the German general was located only a few hundred meters from the decisive action that was now taking place around Frénois. In contrast, the French generals remained far to the rear. General Lafontaine, commander of the 55th Division, operated out of his command post at Fond Dagot, about eight kilometers from the bunker line at Frénois. General Grandsard, commander of the Xth Corps, operated out of his command post at La Berlière, twenty kilometers south behind the heights of Mont Dieu. General Huntziger, commander of the Second Army, operated out of his command post at Senuc, forty-five kilometers to the south. Over the next two days, all the generals came forward at one time or the other to get a first-hand account of the ongoing action, but none approached the fighting as close as the German general who wanted to see Verron.
The Breaking Point Page 22
