He immediately sent a courier to battalion headquarters and dispatched a lieutenant to the La Prayelle center of resistance. But the lieutenant failed to establish contact.36
Meanwhile fighting along the river intensified. General Grandsard later explained that the Germans crossed the Meuse in the southern part of Wadelincourt at 1500 hours, then the northern part at 1545 hours.37 Personal accounts of German and French participants, however, suggest that they crossed in the north and then later in the south.
When the Germans attacked at 1500 hours, fire from the Voie Ferrée strong point stopped them initially from crossing in the middle of Wadelincourt and forced them to seek protection. When Staff Sergeant Rubarth's men started crossing the Meuse slightly north of the Pont du Bouillonnais (which was located about 500 meters southeast of the bridge at the railroad station), the battalion commander of the 2/295th, Captain Gabel, sighted them and requested fire from a forward observer from the 45th Artillery Regiment. He was told, however, that communication links with the artillery had been cut. Gabel hurried to two other observers in the immediate area and requested fires from them. Both replied that their lines had also been cut. The battalion commander finally had to fire flares to request artillery support.38 The loss of communications with the artillery had severely handicapped the French defensive effort. Though the results of the artillery fire are not known, Sergeant Rubarth and the other men of the 10th Panzer Division crossed the river successfully slightly north of Pont du Bouillonnais, and others crossed later at the island in the Meuse near Wadelincourt.
Defenders near the bridge at Pont du Bouillonais came under heavy pressure very early. Lieutenant Thirache, who commanded the Eglise strong point southeast of the bridge, explained that during the heaviest bombardment from the aircraft, he and several of his men pulled back toward the south and sought shelter in the park around the house of the village mayor. When the bombardment let up around 1530, he and his men started to return to their positions but immediately came under German fire from one of the walls of the park. They moved to another position but again came under fire from their front.39 Their pulling back had undoubtedly facilitated Lieutenant Hanbauer's successful crossing of the Meuse.
Along the river, the commander of the 6th Company felt the strongest and earliest pressure against his company's left flank. Though the Héron strong point on Captain Leflon's right (south) continued to fight energetically, only one bunker on his left (northern) flank continued firing. In the center, across from the island in the Meuse, the strong point of the Voie Ferrée soon stopped firing and was apparently captured by the Germans. When fire began pouring into the company's command post, Leflon concluded that his position was about to be surrounded.
At 1730 hours he decided to withdraw his company to the battalion's stopping line. Pulling back under fire, he and his men moved toward the next line, probably in the 2/147th's, rather than the 2/295th's area. Lieutenant Thirache and his men also pulled back at 1730 hours from their position near the church in Wadelincourt. Receiving fire from their right and left, they followed the streambed of the Ruisseau du Moulin to the rear. But they did not find what they expected. Leflon explained, “To my astonishment, the stopping line was not occupied. I encountered no one.” He and his company continued moving to the rear, halting only after they encountered Captain Carribou and his men deep in the Bois de la Marfée.40
Though the positions along the river were abandoned, the strong point of Etadan around Hill 246 continued to hold. Beginning about 1730 hours, enemy fire increased, especially direct fire from tanks against the firing ports of the bunkers. Pressure against the strong point came from two directions. German infantry infiltrated north of Etadan along the Ruisseau du Moulin, the same route used by Lieutenant Thirache's men. They also attacked directly against the strong point in a southwesterly direction, threatening to cut the position into two parts, but they were stopped by effective French fire. Finally, at 1800 hours, having exhausted his ammunition and receiving strong pressure on his left and left-rear, the commander of the strong point ordered his men to fall back on the stopping line.41
The German infantry that infiltrated along the Ruisseau du Moulin also helped place heavy pressure against the La Prayelle strong point near Hill 247 in the 2/147th's area. The defenders at La Prayelle had stopped the German attack for a time around 1700 hours, but according to General Grandsard, the Germans moving along the Ruisseau du Moulin went around the strong point from the east and attacked its flank and rear.42 The personal account of the commander of the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, however, states that his company seized Hill 247 by attacking from the northwest. What probably happened was that elements from the 10th Panzer Division conducted a successful attack against the bunkers just to the northeast of Hill 247, thereby giving the French the impression that the main attack came from the northeast. In any case, after overrunning La Prayelle and Etadan, the Germans now faced another line of resistance between the French cemetery and Noyers.
At 2000 hours Captain Gabel received a telephone call from Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud telling him that a counterattack would take place in his sector. A company from the 3/295th would attack from the French cemetery and retake Wadelincourt. A little while later, another call from Pinaud changed this order. Units from the 3/295th would seal the gap between the 2/147th and the 2/295th.
At 2200 hours the 10th Company of the 3/295th arrived at Gabel's command post. Shortly thereafter, the battalion commander of the 3/295th arrived, as did two infantry platoons and three machine gun sections from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion. Gabel immediately placed these units on the left of his battalion. The substantial strength at the cemetery and at Noyers, however, was not matched farther to his left. Gabel was appalled to discover that Captain Carribou of the 2/147th only had about fifty men and three 25mm antitank guns.43
The reinforcement of the regiment's right flank strengthened Gabel's battalion. In some of the day's most desperate fighting, the French finally managed to stop the Germans along the line between the cemetery and Noyers.
In the area around La Boulette and the Bois de la Marfée, however, the Germans continued to press forward.
THE BREAKTHROUGH AT FRÉNOIS
The left flank of the 147th Regiment became the seam through which the German infantry cut easily and quickly. While Balck's 1st Infantry Regiment moved across the two and a half kilometers from the Meuse to Bellevue in about three hours, it moved across the three kilometers from Bellevue to Cheveuges in about four hours. The speed of the penetration along the boundary between the 147th and the 331st regiments came partially from the Germans’ exploiting the failure of neighboring French units to work together closely. But their rapid progress also came from the poor fighting performance of the units along this seam, particularly the companies from the 331st Regiment, including those that were attached to the 147th Regiment.
The beginning of the German breakthrough came not only from the capture of the key bunkers near the Chateau of Bellevue area but also from the capture or abandonment without fighting of several bunkers in the Frénois center of resistance. In the 2/331st's area at Bellevue, the 5th Company, 2/331st Infantry, occupied the line of bunkers that comprised the battalion's second line. These bunkers extended from the north-northwestern slope of Hill 247 to the road junction at Bellevue. Between 1700 and 1800 hours, the 5th Company came under heavy pressure on their right and left flanks from the Germans. The 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion, Gross Deutschland Regiment, captured the large bunker (number 103, commanded by Lieutenant Verron) 200 meters south of the road between Bellevue and Torcy shortly after 1745 hours, and elements of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment pushed through the woods just east of the road junction at Bellevue around 1800 hours.
In war, one can never predict the effect of luck, but for the 55th Division, an unlucky break for the 5th Company had a profound effect throughout her defenses. During the intense aerial bombardment
, a lucky bomb had hit the command post of the 5th Company, killing twelve soldiers.44 While other factors may have been influential, the fighting spirit of the 5th Company thereafter seemed to be less than other companies in Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's sector. The company offered some resistance to the Germans, but its willingness to fight was far less than what the safety of France required. Unfortunately, it occupied a critically important center of resistance in the direct path of elements of the 1st Panzer Division, and its weak defense did little to slow the German advance.
Lieutenant Charita, commander of the 5th Company, desperately attempted to strengthen his defenses by integrating the men of the 7th Company, 2/147th, into them, as they fled south from the fighting around Glaire and Villette, but he had little success. His left flank came under attack from the 1st Infantry Regiment around 1700 hours, and his right flank came under pressure from the Gross Deutschland Regiment around 1700 hours. One of the key bunkers on his left was number 7, which had two machine guns and which was slightly forward of Frénois and east of the crossroads at Bellevue. This bunker exists today, and it shows no damage. The soldiers in it apparently fled without having received German fire. With this position abandoned, or at least having offered little resistance, the infantry of the 1st Regiment could push forward almost another two kilometers before encountering the defenses on La Boulette. On the 5th Company's right, infantry from the Gross Deutschland Regiment captured bunkers 7 bis, 7 ter, and 104. Perhaps the best thing that can be said about this company is that it did perform better than some of the other companies of the 331st Regiment in the Sedan sector.
Against the wavering and crumbling French resistance, the Germans pushed forward relentlessly. The 1st Battalion of the German 1st Regiment concentrated their efforts in the area west of Bellevue toward Croix Piot. The 2nd Battalion moved west of Frénois and along the road toward La Boulette. The 3/1st Infantry pushed forward just to the east of Frénois, securing the flank of the forces moving toward La Boulette.
The entire French line between Wadelincourt and Bellevue collapsed between 1700 and 1900 hours. To the east of Frénois, the defenders at La Prayelle around Hill 247 initially halted the attack of the elite Gross Deutschland Regiment.45 But pressure from the Gross Deutschland Regiment and the 10th Panzer Division enabled the Germans to overcome the French resistance at La Prayelle and to capture the remainder of Hill 247 around 1900 hours. Clearly, the remarkable attack by Staff Sergeant Rubarth and his handful of men played a significant role in the capture of this critical terrain. When the fortifications fell east of Frénois and at La Prayelle, the Germans moved swiftly to reinforce their success at Frénois and Bellevue. With the fortifications of the French second line of resistance behind them, they moved forward rapidly.
To enlarge the narrow breakthrough at Frénois, the Germans hooked around behind the defenders west of Bellevue. As mentioned previously, the 2/331st occupied the left side of the 147th Regiment's defensive front in the Glaire-Bellevue-Frénois area. To its left, the 331st Regiment defended the area between Bellevue and Villers-sur-Bar, which was known as the Villers-sur-Bar subsector. The 3/147th occupied the right side of the 331st Regiment's defensive front, and thus was on the left of the 147th Regiment and the 2/331st. Captain B. Crousse commanded the 3/147th in the Donchery area.
The 3/147th had four companies assigned or attached to it: the 9th and 10th companies of the 3/147th and the 1st and 3rd companies of the 1/331st. With a third of his mortars, two 25mm cannon, and two infantry platoons of the 3/147th organic infantry and heavy weapons company attached to another battalion, Captain Crousse retained control of only two-thirds of the mortars and five 25mm cannon from that company. Crousse, nevertheless, had a slightly larger unit (four companies plus) than any of the battalions in the 147th to his right.
Crousse organized his position into four centers of resistance, two along the river and two to the rear (on line but arranged in depth). The two centers of resistance on the river were La Crête on the right, occupied by the 9th Company, 3/147th, and Faubourg on the left, occupied by the 10th Company, 3/147th. The two in the rear were La Boulette, occupied by the 3rd Company, 1/331st, and Croix Piot, occupied by the 1st Company, 1/331st. Each company commander further divided his area into smaller strong points.46 The battalion prepared itself for an attack from its front across the Meuse and did not expect its greatest danger to appear on its right flank and rear.
Of Crousse's four companies, the 9th Company, 2/147th, occupied a particularly crucial position—as subsequent events unfolded—at the La Crête center of resistance, just west of Bellevue. The 9th Company had been pulled from its position along the principal line of resistance for training and was finishing up its last day of training when the German attack through Luxembourg brought it back into the position of resistance. It was initially placed in the second line behind the Meuse until French commanders became concerned about the weakness of the company from the 331st Infantry that had replaced it along the Meuse. It was then moved back into its center of resistance in front of Donchery but did not arrive until 0700 hours, 12 May.47
The 3rd Company, 1/331st, commanded by Captain Litalien, also occupied a crucial position in the center of resistance at La Boulette, and it too had only been in place for a few days when the Germans attacked across the Meuse. Most of the trenches in the company's area were too shallow and lacked cover, and Litalien later noted, “No work had been done for several months on the position.” On the morning of the 10th, despite the alert, the majority of his men were sent to work with the engineers on completing a large concrete bunker and were gone for much of the day. Then on the 12th, Litalien was told to prepare to be relieved by a company from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion and to move to a new position about four kilometers to the west. During a time when every moment was precious, Litalien spent the day searching for the commander of the company to be relieved and then discovering the order was incorrect. Not until the morning of the 13th did he receive word to continue his work at La Boulette.48 That evening the withdrawal of his company opened the way for the Germans to move forward toward Cheveuges and Chehéry.
On the right of the 9th Company and the 3/147th, French defenses began to collapse around 1800 hours on the 13th. When the Germans began attacking Lieutenant Verron's bunker near Bellevue around 1745 hours, they also continued pushing forward. The thrust of their attack was simultaneously around both sides of Frénois and into the flank of the La Crête center of resistance west of Bellevue. Instead of hitting the first two bunkers in La Crête along the Meuse, they hit the two bunkers directly to their rear. Then they moved against the two forward bunkers by attacking them from the rear.
The German tanks that were from the 2nd Panzer Division and arranged along the railway north of Donchery greatly assisted the infantry as it moved against the bunkers. When the infantry moved into the rear of the bunkers, the tanks had already severely damaged several of them and, perhaps more importantly, kept the others from firing to protect nearby bunkers from infantry attacks. Several were silenced by highly effective fire pouring into their firing ports. Of the two bunkers first captured by the Germans in Crousse's area, one had been badly damaged by tanks around 1630 hours. As the Germans moved parallel to the river, they ended the last resistance in the La Crête center of resistance by 1915 and in the Faubourg center of resistance by 2230 hours.49
While the strong points in La Crête were still under heavy attack and after those in Bellevue had fallen, the Germans pushed through the woods of Frénois. Soldiers from the 1st Infantry Regiment infiltrated along the streambed of the Ruisseau des Boucs to the west of Frénois. With machine guns firing from the corner of Bellevue and providing them cover, they came in behind the strong point just south of Hill 196 (about one kilometer northwest of the heights of La Boulette) and assaulted it from the rear.50 The French soldiers in this position were from Captain Litalien's 3rd Company, 1/331st.
At the same time the Germans continued to push along both sides o
f the road running south from Bellevue, the main route from Sedan to Vouziers. The attack along the route initially progressed quickly. One kilometer south of Frénois, however, the high terrain to their front dominated the Germans’ movement, and their forward movement soon slowed. Suddenly the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Balck, appeared with his adjutant and pushed the soldiers forward. The 2nd Battalion moved forward with the 8th Company on the right and the 6th Company on the left. The 9th Company prepared to move against any surprise enemy attack.51
As they moved forward toward La Boulette, the Germans fought against the left flank of the 2/331st. At 1900 hours they captured a lieutenant west of Frénois. At 1930 they threw grenades toward the French platoon of Lieutenant Langrenay of the 7th Company, 2/331st, on the northern slope of La Boulette. After pulling back and occupying another position that was tied in on the west with a unit from the next battalion and on the east with a platoon from the 5th Company, 2/331st, Langrenay withdrew, this time because Germans were bypassing his platoon on the right. The Germans on the right of his platoon probably came from the 3/1st Regiment. By 1930 his platoon had been pushed back near the top of La Boulette along the edge of the wood line of Bois de la Marfée.52
To the left of Langrenay's platoon was the 3rd Company of the 1/331st Infantry under the command of Captain Litalien. This company occupied the La Boulette center of resistance in the 3/147th's area. Litalien, who was later warmly praised by his battalion commander and by the commander of the infantry for the 55th Division, described what happened to his company:
The [enemy's] fires progressively increased in intensity, and we had great difficulty containing the German advance, [which was] very superior in numbers, and which finally progressed even more rapidly despite the unleashing of final protective fire by every automatic weapon. At 2130 hours the Germans were thirty meters from the center of resistance…[and] completely overran the left and began to move on the right with infiltrations along the route to Vouziers.53
The Breaking Point Page 24
