By sending units forward to defend in the Poix-Terron–Bouvellemont–Chagny region, however, Trinquand chose to occupy ideal defensive terrain that lay in the line of hills running south of Singly and Vendresse. He also had placed his thin line of two battalions and a demi-brigade of horse cavalrymen directly in front of the 1st Panzer Division and the southern part of the 2nd Panzer Division. Though outnumbered and facing relatively large enemy armored forces, many of his men occupied strong positions with choke points where the German advantage in tanks was partially nullified by their having to pass through broken terrain and narrow roads. The French soldiers near Chagny on his right flank occupied a particularly strong position. Moreover, Trinquand eventually had three antitank companies to support the equivalent of three battalions that were under his control.
When Lieutenant Colonel Bailly, commander of the 1/152nd Infantry, arrived at his designated position between Bouvellemont and Chagny on the 14th, he placed his 1st and 3rd companies near Bouvellemont and Baâlons, respectively, and at noon on the 15th (as ordered by Trinquand) sent his 2nd Company northeast toward Chagny. He apparently told the 2nd Company to send a patrol into Omont, if possible. Around 1300 hours when the 2nd Company reached Hill 250 along the road that ran east-west from Bouvellemont to Chagny, it came under heavy enemy fire and quickly dug in atop the hill. As the infantrymen placed accurate fire into the attacking Germans, elements of the 11th Cuirassiers of the 5th Light Cavalry Division, which had been engaging the German 1st and 2nd Panzer regiments at Chagny, withdrew to their strong position. A horse cavalry troop from the 1st Cavalry Brigade had also participated in the defense of Chagny, and after suffering particularly heavy losses, it too withdrew toward Hill 250.44 The intermingled units soon turned aside an attempt by the Germans to move forward along the single narrow road that ran from Chagny to the heights that included Hill 250. They also blocked an attempt by enemy infantry to bypass the village on the west.
Toward the west-northwest, the 2/152nd Infantry came under heavy attack about the same time on the 15th from elements of the 2nd Panzer Division. Before the battalion reached Poix-Terron, German tanks came from the direction of that village around 1230 hours and assaulted its 5th and 7th companies. The 7th Company had reached the banks of the Vence River near Montigny-sur-Vence (three kilometers west of Poix-Terron) and watched helplessly as a company of French FT-17 tanks of World War I vintage charged gallantly forward along the road toward Poix-Terron and was decimated. Despite the sacrifice of the ancient tanks, the Germans forced the 5th and 7th companies to withdraw. Some of the withdrawing soldiers moved into La Bascule, a small village at the road junction about three kilometers south of Poix-Terron, where they fought alongside elements of the 208th Regiment from the 53rd Division.
When German tanks attacked La Bascule, French 25mm antitank guns turned them back momentarily, but after being encircled, the defenders again withdrew around 1500 hours on the 15th.45 This withdrawal enabled elements of the 2nd Panzer Division to move beyond the line of hills through which the 1st Panzer Division was still trying to pass. Around 1800 hours the remnants of the 2/152nd Infantry halted at Wignicourt, about six kilometers south of La Bascule.
Farther to the west, elements of the 3rd Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs came under heavy pressure around 1900 hours in the town of Faissault (ten kilometers southwest of Poix-Terron), probably from German elements that had previously moved through La Bascule and continued moving toward Rethel. Using six guns from a newly arrived antitank company extremely effectively, the French cavalrymen halted about a dozen German tanks. After pulling back beyond the effective range of the French antitank guns, the Germans used the longer range of their main guns, however, to destroy the French antitank guns. After the tanks destroyed all the guns and set the village on fire, the French quickly withdrew.46
Earlier, around 1730 hours, the German 1st Infantry Regiment and a few supporting tanks from the 1st Panzer Division began pressing against Bouvellemont and Baâlons. The two villages sat astride routes through the line of hills in front of the Panzer division. As the French cavalry pulled back, elements of the 15th Regiment of Dragons Portés withdrew into the two towns and became intermingled with the 3rd Company, 1/152nd Infantry, at Baâlons and the 1st Company at Bouvellemont. The defenders at Bouvellemont managed to hold out longer than those at Baâlons, but after 1800 hours heavy artillery fire wracked the village of Bouvellemont. At 2000 hours the commander of the cavalry elements received word to evacuate the village, and the French pulled out at 2115 hours, about the time the Germans launched their final assault.47 Both companies from the 1/152nd Infantry withdrew a few kilometers south toward Jonval and then about ten kilometers south to the Aisne River.
The 2nd Company and elements of the 11th Cuirassiers remained on Hill 250 near Chagny for the remainder of the night. At 0500 hours on the 16th, they received orders to withdraw and soon joined the rest of the 14th Division along the Aisne River.48 Despite heavy losses, the two battalions had done more than the entire 53rd Division to delay the Germans.
Although Colonel Trinquand later claimed the two battalions of the 152nd Regiment had destroyed “about thirty” tanks,49 filling the gap between the Second and Ninth armies had been an impossible task. The Germans were pushing hard toward the southwest to reach Rethel, and even though the French halted them at Chagny, they eventually pushed around and through the defenders at Baâlons, Bouvellemont, Poix-Terron, La Bascule, and Faissault.
Though the 14th Division had performed fairly well with only one regiment on line, it too had failed to halt the Germans, and its successes came as much from its having occupied favorable terrain and having had an unusually large number of antitank weapons as from other qualities. Even if it had succeeded, the entire front to its north was crumbling, and the division did not have the strength to keep the Germans from going around their left flank.
THE 2ND ARMORED DIVISION
As events west of Sedan reached the crisis point, much depended on the 2nd Armored Division.50 As part of the General Reserve, the division did not receive a warning order to leave its position near Châlons until the evening of the 11th. Along with the 1st Armored Division, it was to act as a reserve for the forces rushing into Belgium. Because of the French preference for using their highly developed railway network for moving heavy equipment, rather than using tank transporters, the tanks and other heavy vehicles moved by railway flatcars, while wheeled vehicles moved by roads.
The move of the 2nd Armored Division to the north was supposed to begin on the evening of the 13th, but the railway flatcars used to transport tanks and heavy artillery pieces did not arrive on time. They had been used to transport the 1st Armored Division to the north, and until they returned, the 2nd Division's heavy vehicles had to wait. Meanwhile, the wheeled elements, comprising most of the division's supply and service units, proceeded separately at 2200 hours.
Unexpected actions by the Germans, however, soon forced the French High Command to reconsider the planned use of its three armored divisions and resulted in a new mission's being given to the 2nd Division. The crossing of the Meuse by the Germans on the 13th forced the French to counter the surprise move. Shortly before 0900 hours on the 14th, General Georges’ headquarters gave Army Group 1 control of the armored division so it could conduct a counterattack against the German crossing made at Houx (just north of Dinant and about forty kilometers east-southeast of Charleroi). The division would supposedly disembark at Charleroi beginning at 1000 hours on the 14th and close in by noon on the 15th. Assuming the move occurred as planned, the attack would begin on the morning of the 15th.
Because the division could not be transported to Charleroi on time, the commander of the division, General Bruché, informed Army Group I at 1050 hours on the 14th that the division would not be ready to attack on the 15th. Believing an attack against Houx had to be made quickly, Army Group 1 switched the counterattack mission from the 2nd Armored to the 1st Armored Division. The 2nd Armored Division becam
e available for another mission, and notes of actions taken in the headquarters of Army Group 1 indicate that it was slated to reinforce the First Army.51
While General Bruché was visiting the command post of the First Army, his Chief of Staff learned—much to his surprise—that the division would be placed under the control of the Ninth Army. Instead of being informed of this by the commanding generals of Army Group 1 or the northeastern forces, the armored division was told by transportation authorities in Valenciennes. Without telling General Billotte in Army Group 1, Georges or his headquarters apparently decided to place the division under the Ninth Army. At 1400 hours on the 14th, the division was sent a telegram informing it (but not yet formally ordering it) of the possibility of being employed in the area of Signy-l'Abbaye. The formal order was sent at 1720 hours.52 Army Group I apparently did not learn of the new mission for the armored division until it received a copy of the order from Georges’ headquarters, which formed Touchon's field army.
The railway movement of the division began around 1400 hours on the 14th, even though its final destination was not known until after the arrival of the telegram, which was dispatched at about the same time. Though the loading and departure of some twenty-nine trains was scheduled to end around midnight, difficulties continued to increase for movements by railway. As trains arrived sporadically and departed quickly after loading, the train that was slated to carry the last element in the division had not arrived by nightfall on the 16th, so the commander of this echelon (a battery of artillery) decided to make a road march to Signy-l'Abbaye (a distance of about seventy kilometers). While continued aerial bombardment by the Germans did not halt railway movement, it did force delays.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Armored Division's wheeled vehicles had departed for Charleroi on the 13th at 2200 hours, but were halted at 0900 hours the following morning. That afternoon around 1700 hours, the commander of the wheeled-vehicle column received word to move to Signy-l'Abbaye and departed at 1900 hours on the 14th. The wheeled vehicles actually moved toward Rocquigny (about twelve kilometers west of Signy-l'Abbaye), which was the designated location of the support units and command post of the division.
The panic and fleeing of troops from the Xth Corps and 55th Division soon affected this move. As one of the convoys moved forward, it encountered some of the numerous troops fleeing from the east. Because of the panicked soldiers’ warnings about the imminent arrival of German tanks, the convoy commander decided to move his convoy—which did not have combat elements—to the south of the Aisne River. Though other convoys followed him, a few continued on to Rocquigny.53
With the division's wheeled units thus widely scattered, tanks and heavy artillery pieces began arriving late on the 14th. By 0630 hours on the 15th, six trains had arrived. Half the remaining twenty-three were en route, but the other half had not yet departed. By 1900 hours eight more trains had arrived.54
As trains continued to bring elements of the 2nd Armored Division into the area, they began unloading at diverse and sometimes widely separated locations. To compound the division's difficulties, the unexpected advance of Reinhardt's XLIst Panzer Corps passed through the center of the large area in which the trains were being unloaded. This advance split the combat elements of the division into two halves, one of which was above the Liart-Montcornet line and the other below. With some of the wheeled vehicles still south of the Aisne River near Rethel, the division in fact was split into thirds, with the combat elements bearing no resemblance to two groups and being in fact scattered on both sides of the Liart-Montcornet line.
Around 0100 hours on the 16th, General Keller arrived at the command post of the division and stated that Touchon had ordered forces in his field army to withdraw toward the Aisne River. Since the 2nd Armored Division had become part of Touchon's army around noon on the 15th, Keller ordered the division to move as many elements as possible in the same direction. By the morning of the 16th, on the south side of the Aisne, the division had its headquarters, most of its support elements, one company of tanks, three B-1 tanks, a battery of artillery, two companies of infantry, and the headquarters of both demi-brigades. On the northern flank of the German advance, the division had five tank companies and one infantry company. The other companies were either en route or had not managed to link up with the remainder of the division.55
The attempt to use the 2nd Armored Division in an attack against the flank of the German advance had failed miserably.
Much of the responsibility for the failure belongs to the numerous changes in mission and destination for the armored division. Between the 11th and the 15th, General Bruché had been ordered first to act as a reserve for the advance into Belgium, then to support the First Army, next to counterattack toward Dinant as part of the Ninth Army, then to assemble at Signy-l'Abbaye as part of the Ninth Army, and finally to become part of Touchon's army.56 Because of the rapid changes in orders, without any attention being paid to space and time factors, and because of the complexities of moving troops separately by railway and road, the 2nd Armored Division never fulfilled any of the orders it received.
A precious and strategically important unit had been wasted. If the division had moved by road from Châlons to Dinant (about 165 kilometers) or to Signy-l'Abbaye (about 90 kilometers), the chances of it arriving intact, earlier, and combat ready were excellent. Despite this possibility, the French High Command preferred to move the tanks by rail. With the tanks’ reputation for being fragile and for consuming large quantities of fuel, railway transportation seemed the better alternative. The experience of the 2nd Armored Division, however, clearly demonstrates that luck, friction, and the actions of an enemy often make the most appealing alternative the worst choice.
At 0800 hours on the 16th, a report to General Georges’ office informed him of the status of the 2nd Armored Division. The report provided the location of seven out of the twelve tank companies in the division. The seven companies were scattered on the perimeter of an area that resembled an oval with a height of about sixty kilometers and a width of about eighty. The original move to Signy-l'Abbaye had only been about seventy kilometers. While the report did not indicate how long it would take to assemble the scattered elements of the division, it did end on an unnecessarily positive note: “Good morale.”57
OPENING THE ROAD TO THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
During the evening of 15 May, General Touchon concluded that his meager forces could not halt the Germans north of the Aisne River. This fact had been made unmistakably clear to him during the day when he had tried to drive around to Rocroi on the northern flank of the German penetration. Just outside the village of Rozoy (ten kilometers east of Montcornet), a French sergeant halted his vehicle and warned him that German armored reconnaissance vehicles were several hundred meters west of his position. As he turned his staff car south toward Rethel, the Germans noticed him, and he fled under their machine gun fire.58 This spot was slightly less than twenty kilometers west of where his forces were supposed to halt the Germans and almost beyond the area in which three additional infantry divisions were supposed to begin disembarking on the following day.
Touchon's coming under unexpected enemy fire undoubtedly affected his confidence in his ability to halt the Germans. The incident provided concrete evidence that the enemy was moving much more rapidly than anyone thought possible.
When he arrived at his headquarters around 1900 hours on the 15th, Touchon received a message dated 1800 hours from General de Lattre, which said the Germans held Poix-Terron and the 53rd Division had “disintegrated.” Recognizing the inevitable, Touchon telephoned Georges’ headquarters and obtained approval for his forces to withdraw south to the Aisne. At 2300 hours he sent a message by telephone to de Lattre ordering him to place his division along the Aisne but to retain a bridgehead at Rethel.59 About the same time, the 36th Infantry Division began moving into position on the right of the 14th Division.
When the remnants of the 53rd Division reached the Aisne River, General Et
cheberrigaray placed all the elements of his division that were able to fight at the disposition of the 14th Infantry Division. In fact, this was little more than a portion of the division's artillery and its engineers.60 As de Lattre had reported, the division had “disintegrated.”
During the night of 15–16 and the morning of the 16th, the French established a new defensive line running east-west along the Aisne River, and little or nothing stood in front of the Germans as they raced west toward the English Channel and into the rear of most of Army Group 1. On 16 May at 1800 hours, General Georges issued new orders to General Touchon and General Henri Giraud (who had replaced General Corap as commander of the Ninth Army). The order directed that a counterattack be conducted on the following morning with the 1st and 2nd Armored divisions.61 Since the order did not correspond with reality, the counterattack never occurred. Georges’ reasons for issuing an order that could not be implemented remain unclear.62
Despite Georges’ having issued orders that indicated a misunderstanding of the strategic situation, he did issue several orders on 16 May that accurately described the situation. One of these stated, “As a result of events occurring on 16 May in the region of Mézières, an enemy exploitation relying on mechanized vehicles appears to be taking place between the Aisne and Oise [rivers].”63 Another message explained, “It is important to slow down as soon as possible all exploitation of this first [sic] success and prevent the enemy [from moving] in the general direction of Givet-Paris.”64 Unfortunately, the French could not move sufficient forces in time from its left flank in Belgium to the area of the German exploitation.
In a desperate attempt to respond to the unexpected German thrust through the French center, Army Group 1 with the concurrence of the High Command ordered the First Army and the B.E.F. to pull back on the 16th from the Dyle toward the Escaut River.65 Tragically for the Allies, the distance from the Dyle River to Abbeville, where the Germans soon cut off communications between the Allied left and right, was much farther than the distance from Montcornet to Abbeville. Thus, on the morning of the 16th, the Germans were closer to Abbeville than the Allies. No matter how grand the effort from the Allies, they could not move faster than the Germans.
The Breaking Point Page 40
