The goal of Israeli hegemony was inextricably tied to the expulsion of the Palestinians. According to Yinon, the policy of Israel must be “to bring about the dissolution of Jordan; the termination of the problem of the [occupied] territories densely populated with Arabs west of the [river] Jordan; and emigration from the territories, and economic-demographic freeze in them.” He added, “We have to be active in order to encourage this change speedily, in the nearest time.” Like many Israeli advocates of transfer, Yinon believed that
Israel has made a strategic mistake in not taking measures [of mass expulsion] towards the Arab population in the new territories during and shortly after the [1967] war …. Such a line would have saved us the bitter and dangerous conflict ever since which we could have already then terminated by giving Jordan to the Palestinians.2
In a foreword to his own translation of Yinon's piece, Israel Shahak made the interesting comparison between the neoconservative position and actual Likudnik goals.
The strong connection with neoconservative thought in the USA is very prominent, especially in the author's notes. But, while lip service is paid to the idea of the 'defense of the West' from Soviet power, the real aim of the author, and of the present Israeli establishment is clear: to make an Imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim of Sharon is to deceive the Americans after he has deceived all the rest.3
Israeli foreign policy expert Yehoshafat Harkabi critiqued the war/expulsion scenario – “Israeli intentions to impose a Pax Israelica on the Middle East, to dominate the Arab countries and treat them harshly” – in his very significant work, Israel's Fateful Hour, published in 1988. Writing from a “realist” perspective, Harkabi believed that Israel did not have the power to achieve the goal of Pax Israelica, given the strength of the Arab states, the large Palestinian population involved, and the vehement opposition of world opinion. Harkabi hoped that “the failed Israeli attempt to impose a new order in the weakest Arab state – Lebanon – will disabuse people of similar ambitions in other territories.”1 Left unconsidered by Harkabi was the possibility that the United States would act as Israel's proxy to achieve this goal.
The chance to use America as Israel's proxy came with Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Iraq had been supported and armed by the United States during its war with Iran during the 1980s and continued to receive such support in the war's aftermath. With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, American policy would swiftly change. President George H. W. Bush denounced Saddam's move and the United States quickly made preparations to send troops to Saudi Arabia to protect the kingdom from an attack that was alleged to be imminent. Israel was ecstatic and called for strong American measures, with President Chaim Herzog even calling upon the United States to use nuclear weapons. But Israel did not fully trust that the United States would carry out a military attack. On December 4, 1990, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy reportedly threatened the United States ambassador, David Brown, that if the United States failed to attack Iraq, Israel would do so itself.2
Neoconservatives took a leading role in promoting a U.S. war against Iraq, setting up the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, co-chaired by Richard Perle along with former New York Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz, which focused on mobilizing popular and congressional support for a war. Neoconservative war hawks such as Frank Gaffney, Jr., Richard Perle, A. M. Rosenthal, William Safire, and The Wall Street Journal emphasized in the media that America's war objective should not be simply to drive Iraq out of Kuwait but also to destroy Iraq's military potential, especially its capacity to develop nuclear weapons, which was Israel's fundamental objective.3 Patrick J. Buchanan pointed out the link between the neocons advocacy of war and the interests of Israel when he made the controversial remark that “There are only two groups that are beating the drums for war in the Middle East – the Israeli Defense Ministry and its amen corner in the United States.”1
The Bush administration accepted the arguments that Iraq should not only be forced to leave Kuwait but should also be disarmed of its major weapons, addressing the Israeli goal of maintaining a monopoly of military power in the Middle East. The neocons, however, wanted more: the removal of Saddam Hussein and the American occupation of Iraq. However, despite the urging of then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and then-Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to adopt a military plan to invade the heartland of Iraq, this was never done, in part because of the opposition from General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Norman Schwarzkopf, the field commander.2 Moreover, the U.S. had a UN mandate to liberate Kuwait, not to remove Saddam. To attempt the latter would have caused the warring coalition to fall apart. America's coalition partners in the region, especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia, feared that the elimination of Saddam's government would cause Iraq to fragment into warring ethnic and religious groups. This could have involved a Kurdish rebellion in Iraq spreading to Turkey's own restive Kurdish population, while the Iraqi Shiites, falling under the influence of Iran, would increase the threat of Islamic radicalism in the region. In 1998, the first President Bush would explain his reason for not invading Iraq to remove Saddam thus: “We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger …. Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land.”3
Neocons remained dissatisfied with the outcome in Iraq and throughout the 1990s they pushed for the elimination of Saddam Hussein as, apparently, a first step in the destabilization of Israel's enemies throughout the region. A clear illustration of the neoconservative thinking on this subject is a 1996 paper developed by Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser, and others, entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” and published by an Israeli think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. It was intended as a political blueprint for the incoming government of Benjamin Netanyahu. The paper stated that Netanyahu should “make a clean break” with the Oslo peace process and reassert Israel's claim to the West Bank and Gaza. It presented a plan by which Israel would “shape its strategic environment,” beginning with the removal of Saddam Hussein and the installation of a Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad, which would serve as a first step towards eliminating the antiIsraeli governments of Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.1 It is to be noted that these Americans – Perle, Feith, and Wurmser – were advising a foreign government and that they joined the George W. Bush administration: Perle was head, and now a member, of the Defense Policy Board; Feith is (outgoing) under secretary of defense for policy; and Wurmser worked first under Feith and then in the State Department, and is now in the Office of the Vice President. It is noteworthy that while in 1996 Israel was to “shape its strategic environment” by removing its enemies, the same individuals have now proposed that the United States alter the Middle East environment by removing Israel's enemies. It would seem that the United States is to serve as Israel's proxy to advance Israeli interests. As newspaper columnist and former senior editor of Newsweek and president of United Press International, Arnaud de Borchgrave, maintained: “The 1996 document provided the strategic underpinnings for Operation Iraqi Freedom seven years later.”2
A key neoconservative umbrella group that would be in the forefront of urging war on Iraq was the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), which was founded in 1997 to promote a strategy for American military dominance of the globe. The PNAC was initiated by the New Citizenship Project (NCP), which was an affiliate of the Project for the Republican Future, a conservative Republican think tank founded by Bill Kristol. Kristol was the chairman of the PNAC, and Robert Kagan, one of Kristol's close associates as a contributing editor of The Weekly Standard, was one of the directors. The NCP and the PNAC were headquartered at 1150 17th St., NW, Washington, D.C., which was also the headquarters of the AEI.3 Many figures who would become prominent war hawk
s in the current Bush administration were associated with the PNAC: Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, I. Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Zalmay Khalilzad.1
On January 26, 1998, the PNAC sent a letter to President Clinton urging him to take unilateral military action against Iraq and offering a plan to achieve that objective. It especially called on the President not to go through the UN Security Council. “American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council,” the letter said. Among the letter's eighteen signatories were Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Elliott Abrams, Richard Armitage, Robert Kagan, Bill Kristol, R. James Woolsey, and Richard Perle.2
After the Clinton administration failed to take action on the suggestions, a second open letter to President Clinton dated February 19, 1998, was made public. It included an expanded list of forty names; among those signers added were John Bolton, Douglas Feith, Michael Ledeen, and David Wurmser. It was sent under the banner of the resurrected Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, which had played a major role in promoting the 1991 Gulf War. The letter was more detailed than the one of January 26, proposing “a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime.”3 It continued: “It will not be easy – and the course of action we favor is not without its problems and perils. But we believe the vital national interests of our country require the United States to [adopt such a strategy].”4
Unsatisfied with Clinton's response, the Project for the New American Century wrote another letter on May 29, 1998, to former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Republican Majority Leader Trent Lott, with almost the same signatories as the January PNAC letter to President Clinton, saying that
U.S. policy should have as its explicit goal removing Saddam Hussein's regime from power and establishing a peaceful and democratic Iraq in its place. We recognize that this goal will not be achieved easily. But the alternative is to leave the initiative to Saddam, who will continue to strengthen his position at home and in the region. Only the U.S. can lead the way in demonstrating that his rule is not legitimate and that time is not on the side of his regime.1
Numerous bills were put forward in Congress to provide aid to the Iraqi opposition to Saddam's regime. Ultimately, President Clinton would only go so far as to support and, in September 1998, sign the Iraq Liberation Act, which allocated $97 million for training and military equipment for the Iraqi opposition. Neoconservatives saw that as insufficient. As Richard Perle wrote, “… the administration refused to commit itself unequivocally to a new strategy, raising questions as to whether any meaningful shift had occurred in U.S. policy.” The Iraq Liberation Act, nonetheless, was sometimes cited as a legal justification for the American war on Iraq in 2003.2
In September 2000, the Project for the New American Century issued a report, “Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century,” which envisioned an expanded global posture for the United States. In regard to the Middle East, the report called for an increased American military presence in the Gulf, whether Saddam was in power or not, maintaining that
the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.3
The report struck a prescient note when it observed that “the process of transformation is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.”4
The neoconservative war vision far transcended Iraq, and was openly directed to all the Middle Eastern enemies of Israel, and assumed a common identity with Israel. As David Wurmser wrote in an article that came out in January 2001, just prior to the start of the Bush administration:
Israel and the United States should adopt a coordinated strategy to regain the initiative and reverse their region-wide strategic retreat. They should broaden the conflict to strike fatally, not merely disarm, the centers of radicalism in the region – the regimes of Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Tehran, and Gaza. That would reestablish the recognition that fighting with either the United States or Israel is suicidal. Many in the Middle East will then understand the merits of being an American ally and of making peace with Israel.1
Neoconservatives would come to power with the advent of the George W. Bush presidency. Ironically, the first President Bush was not seen as a friend of Israel and had rejected neoconservative demands that the United States remove Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War in 1991. The elder Bush and his advisers were seen to be close to oil interests which sought stability in the region in contrast to war. Furthermore, his close confidante and National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, would become a major opponent of the move toward war on Iraq in 2002 and 2003.2
While it was assumed that the elder Bush's advisors would control the foreign policy of the younger George Bush, this proved not to be the case. And neoconservatives began to exert their influence in Bush circles early in the campaign. Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle managed to obtain leading roles in the Bush foreign policy and national security advisory team for the 2000 campaign. Headed by Soviet specialist Condoleeza Rice, the team was referred to as the “Vulcans” – named after the Roman god Vulcan whose statue graced Rice's hometown of Birmingham, Alabama. The name conveyed the image of toughness and power, as intended.3
Bush admitted that he had little knowledge of foreign policy. Nor was it apparent that he had the interest or ability to learn. Journalist Christopher Hitchens would describe Bush in 2000 as “unusually incurious, abnormally unintelligent, amazingly inarticulate, fantastically uncultured, extraordinarily uneducated, and apparently quite proud of all these things.”4 Given his ignorance in foreign policy, it was apparent that George W. Bush would need to rely heavily on his advisers. “His foreign policy team,” neocon-servative Robert Kagan observed during the campaign, “will be critically important to determining what his policies are.” As columnist Robert Novak noted, “Since Rice lacks a clear track record on Middle East matters, Wolfowitz and Perle will probably weigh in most on Middle East policy.”1
But neoconservatives had to battle others for access with Bush and do not seem to have won him over to their positions during the campaign. Significantly, Bush did not reveal a distinctively neoconservative foreign policy during the 2000 campaign. In fact, he did just the opposite, explicitly eschewing an interventionist foreign policy aimed at changing regimes and societies. Bush frequently criticized the Clinton administration for “nation-building” – an activity dear to the hearts of neoconservatives. Nation building was not the proper role of the military, Bush told a crowd on November 7, 2000, one day before the election. “I'm worried about an opponent who uses nation building and the military in the same sentence. See, our view of the military is for our military to be properly prepared to fight and win war and, therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place.”2 The speech was an explicit criticism of the Clinton administration for allegedly stretching the military too thin with peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans. Moreover, Bush argued, it was just improper for the United States to dominate other countries. As Bush stated in his second presidential debate with Al Gore: “I just don't think it's the role of the United States to walk into a country [and] say, 'We do it this way; so should you.'”3 Any attempt to dictate to other countries, Bush maintained, would be counterproductive. “If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation but strong, they'll welcome us.”4
Furthermore, during the campaign Bush never suggested that terrorism was a major problem or claimed that Clinton had been lax on this issue. And Bush never placed any emphasis on the danger of Iraq. No mention was made of Saddam's allegedly brutal treatment of his people. Like Al Gore and the Clinton administration, Bush simply said that
the United States should continue to contain Iraq through sanctions. In short, Bush's foreign policy views differed fundamentally from those of the neoconservatives. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke in America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order observe that “when Bush turned to the neoconservatives after 9/11, he came as a convert, based on intuition and personality rather than deep convictions.”1
Condoleeza Rice, who headed Bush's foreign policy team, also expressed views that ran quite contrary to the neocon interventionist position on Iraq. In an article in the January-February 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, Rice wrote that “rogue nations” such as Iraq and North Korea “are living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them. Rather, the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence – if they do acquire weapons of mass destruction, [they] will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.”2
While some neoconservatives served as Bush's foreign policy advisers, the actual favorite candidate for a number of leading neoconservatives during the 2000 campaign was Senator John McCain, Bush's Republican rival in the primaries, who did express openly neoconservative positions.3 As Franklin Foer, editor of the liberal New Republic put it:
Neo-Conned! Again Page 15
