No less of one is the idea that, after Bush in June 2005 both renewed his commitment to “completing the mission” (though it was already “accomplished”) and refused to discuss a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, the U.S. would be dealing honestly with insurgents who are reported to have “'[focused] their main demand' [in discussions with U.S. officials] on a guaranteed timetable of U.S. withdrawal” (Priest, loc. cit.).
It is, finally, interesting that some reports have “[o]ther parts of the U.S. government, including the State Department and CIA … holding secret meetings with Iraqi insurgent factions” (Priest, loc. cit.), while others say that State Department officials at the U.S. embassy in Iraq “refuse to negotiate with insurgents or mediate between militants and the Iraqi government” (Mariam Fam, “U.S. Embassy in Iraq Refuses to Negotiate, Associated Press, July 1, 2005, online), even as the Iraqi “President” maintained that “[t]he Iraqi government has nothing to do with the negotiations with insurgents” (“Talabani Distances Himself from U.S. Talks with Insurgents,” Agence France-Presse, June 28, 2005, online).
The upshot of this circus may very well be to create an acceptable political context for U.S. government's search for an escape from the Iraq mess, especially in light of Rumsfeld's admission that “victory” is not really our object in Iraq, as there is “no military solution to ending the insurgency” (Priest, loc. cit.). One wonders how the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in harm's way feel about how their leader has re-characterized their mission and that of their 1800 fallen comrades.
1. Priest, loc. cit.
2. An argument can be credibly made that even the current administration and associated neocon ideologues understand the inability of the current Iraqi “government” to deal with the situation in Iraq as it exists. Recently, the Iraqi “Justice Minister” Abdel Hussein Shandal accused the U.S. government of delaying Saddam Hussein's trial because, he said, perhaps referring to purported American support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war, “[i]t seems there are lots of secrets they want to hide” (Associated Press, “U.S. Attacked Over Saddam Access,” CNN.com, June 22, 2005). The assertion is not vaguely credible, for the U.S. has been in the forefront of those pushing for a war-crimes trial for Saddam, and the kangaroo-court that is set up to try him is essentially an American creation. Furthermore, the U.S. has been highlighting his role in allegedly exterminating Kurds in Halabja and elsewhere for years, without hesitation. If there is any conscious delay being injected into the process, it may in fact be because the Bush administration knows that the assassins and terrorists of al-Dawa and SCIRI, should they get an opportunity to put their hands on Saddam, will likely waste no time in executing him, not just in vengeance for his suppression of their subversive activities and his brutal (according to some) response to assassination attempts, but as a way to crush the Iraqi resistance through depriving it of its main icon. It is possible that the Bush administration sees Saddam as its ace in the hole. If there is one person who can bring the resistance to a halt, who can bring order back to Iraq, it is Saddam Hussein. The neocons may be crazy, but they are not unintelligent.
1. Priest, loc. cit.
2. Boot, loc. cit.: “The biggest weakness of the insurgency is that it is morphing from a war of national liberation into a revolutionary struggle against an elected government.”
THE EDITORS' GLOSS: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld recently stated (London Financial Times, August 1, 2005), in response to the idea that the occupation of Iraq (among other things) gives rise to grievances that actually cause terrorism, that “coalition forces operate in Afghanistan and Iraq at the request of democratically elected governments.”
But as Mark Gery details, the “democratically elected” government now in power in Iraq was put there by America and its allies, not by Iraqis: first by an invasion in contravention of the UN Charter and customary international law, and then via an “election” in which people were free to vote for whomever we permitted to run for office. Not coincidentally, these “allowable” candidates were mainly those who for years had conspired with the U.S., Iran, and Israel to overthrow Iraq's recignized government through bombings and assassinations, before we did it for them.
That “terrorists” are now in charge doesn't appear to matter to the American government. On Meet the Press (March 13, 2005) Tim Russert asked Condoleezza Rice if she was concerned about the terrorist past of the new “Prime Minister,” Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and his Dawa Party. “He's an elected official,” she replied, and “he has been very tough on the kind of terrorist activity that has been carried out by people like Zarqawi.” Russert insisted: “So if he was a terrorist in his past, that's forgotten?” Condi's knowledge of recent Iraqi political history was on display here in all its grandeur: “Well, I don't know about the immediate past or about his past.” She continued, “A lot of people in that period … who were fighters against Saddam Hussein were branded with various labels.” Ah yes. Gratuitous labels. Like “terrorist.”
The fruits of our electoral politics are becoming increasingly well known. Vivian Stomberg, executive director of the MADRE womens'rights group, felt compelled to admit that “the state of Iraqi women's human rights is worse today under U.S. occupation than it was under the notoriously repressive regime of Saddam Hussein” (Detroit Free Press, August 10, 2005). She defended her assertion admirably, proving what a disaster the recent American experiment in “nation-building” has become, and how much worse it might get with Iraq's new “constitution” looming ahead.
Before being “liberated” by U.S. forces, Iraqi women enjoyed rights to education, employment, freedom of movement, equal pay for equal work and universal day care, as well as the rights to inherit and own property, choose their own husbands, vote and hold public office. Ironically, these fundamental rights stand to be abolished in a “democratic” Iraq that has been ushered into being by our government.
CHAPTER
39
The Politics of Electoral Illusion
………
Mark Gery
“What do I do with democracy? Does it allow me to walk across the street without fear of being kidnapped, or being shot at, or being mugged or robbed? Would democracy feed my children? Would democracy allow me to quench my thirst? The U.S. has not done anything at all to improve the life of Iraqi people …. The shocking thing is that the conditions after 22 months of occupation are a lot worse in every single aspect of life than with Saddam Hussein after 12 years of sanctions.”
—Ghazwan Al-Mukhtar,
retired engineer, Baghdad1
ON JANUARY 30, 2005, some millions of Iraqi citizens went to the polls and cast their votes for a Transitional National Assembly. The body's ostensible purpose would be to choose the country's new interim leaders and write a new constitution.
George Bush described the election as “a great and historical achievement.” Was it? Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, writing in Pravda on January 31, 2005, had one of the most insightful commentaries on the President's remark. If that were so, he wrote, “it says little for [Bush's] powers of judgment. In fact, this election confirms the worst-case scenario, a partition of Iraq, formerly held together by the Ba'ath government and now deeply cleft in three separate sections.” Indeed, one might be tempted to ask whether President Bush's desire “to end tyranny in the world” is really sincere. We have heard about “Iraq and democracy and freedom,” but we never hear about the repressive systems in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Pakistan or of any other American ally. Could it be that the vision of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger – that “Middle East oil is too important to be left in the hands of the Arabs” – has in fact been the leitmotiv of American foreign policy for decades, and that the hue and cry for selective “democracy” is simply the latest instrument for prizing control of Arab oil from Arab hands? A look at the difference between what has been claimed about the great success of the January 30, 2005, election and what has really been achieved by it gives us
reason to suspect as much.
The Context of the Election
What Does International Law Say?
One of the most glaring features of Iraq's election was its obvious and blatant conflict with international law.
Following the 2003 invasion of the country by Anglo-American forces, Iraq was officially under foreign occupation. As such, it became subject to a whole group of edicts stemming from the 1907 Hague Convention, the Fourth Geneva Conventions (1949), and other documents of international law. As a signatory to the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the United States, the primary occupying power in Iraq, is legally bound to abide by their mandates in its administration of the country.
Since the chief purpose of this election was to change the Iraqi constitution (as U.S. representatives have repeatedly made clear), it was an illegal enterprise from the beginning. Article 43 of the annex to the fourth Hague Convention states that an occupying power can take no action that changes the laws of a country under its control: an occupier must “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”1 The Fourth Geneva Convention, hammered out after World War II, sharpened this point, saying, “The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.”2 While Iraq's legitimate constitution, drawn up by the Ba'ath Party (“Ba'ath” being the Arabic word for “rebirth”), says much about realizing pan-Arab socialism for the Iraqi people, it contains nothing that could possibly be construed as threatening U.S. security or contravening the letter or spirit of the Geneva accords.
Yet many of Iraq's laws have already been changed in accordance with American wishes.
On September 19, 2003, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, issued Order 39, ordering, among other things, the privatization of many state-owned enterprises. Order 40 set in motion a process by which a number of Iraqi banks were to be available for purchase by foreign banking institutions. These and other proclamations stand in direct opposition to Iraq's constitution, which outlaws the privatization of key state assets to anyone but Arab citizens.1
Some may claim that elected Iraqis now call the shots in Iraq and that they, not American authority, will be responsible for implementing such sweeping changes in Iraqi law.
Such a view stands in stark contrast not only to international law, but to our own rules for warfare and occupation. According to American military law, as long as our forces occupy another country, we retain the status of a “belligerent occupant” and cannot employ any form of “puppet government” to sidestep the obligations placed upon us under international law.
The U.S. Army's Law of Land Warfare makes this clear:
The restrictions placed upon the authority of a belligerent government cannot be avoided by a system of using a puppet government, central or local, to carry out acts which would be unlawful if performed directly by the occupant. Acts induced or compelled by the occupant are nonetheless its acts.2
In other words, a “government” instituted or propped up by the American authority in Iraq cannot evade the limitations placed upon it by international law simply because it calls itself an “Iraqi government.” The protests that came from UN officials in the days prior to the elections against the distribution by American military personnel of materials “urging Iraqis to vote in the country's elections” further illustrate the issue and highlight how even individuals who supported the election were concerned that it might be seen as a U.S.-orchestrated event.3 In this light the boasting by Iraq's new “Transitional” President that the “provisional Ba'athist constitution of 1970” has been replaced with the “transitional Administrative Law, a progressive liberal interim constitution,”1 is simply more evidence of the restructuring of Iraqi society being accomplished under the eyes (and arms) of American occupiers.
The central issue underscoring the election's illegality and illegitimacy in the light of international law is the well-known and openly admitted fact that the U.S. went to war against Iraq in order to change its government; this aim in and of itself is illegal under international law,2 and it is the principal reason why the election of a new government is necessary in the first place: the U.S. abolished the previous one, and now finds it necessary to facilitate the installation of a successor. As prominent international lawyers such as Curtis Doebbler, Esq., Ph.D., have noted, “Until this question of the illegality of the use of force against Iraq has been decided, all actions that emanate from the illegal acts cannot be accepted.”3 This no doubt includes the recent Iraqi elections.
Eric Margolis, writing the day after the elections, put it neatly:
No election held under a foreign military occupation resulting from an unjustified war is legal under international law. During the cold war, elections staged by the Soviets after invading Afghanistan, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were rightly denounced by the U.S. as “frauds” and the leaders elected as “stooges.”4
The American line is no different as regards Syria and Lebanon. On March 4, 2005, the White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, made the point very clear: “… in order to ensure that the Lebanese people have free and fair elections, Syria needs to get out.” Substitute “Iraqi” for “Lebanese” and “U.S.” for “Syria” and the conclusion is obvious: in order to ensure that the Iraqi people have free and fair elections, the U.S. needs to get out.
Until then one may rightly question the validity of any election in Iraq accomplished under both de facto and de jure American occupation.
History Repeated
Members of the Bush and Blair administrations have claimed that the Iraq vote was the country's first democratic election in 50 years. While it is true that an “election” occurred during the reign of King Feisal II (1953–1958), the King and his aides were bound to administer the vote within the framework laid out by a cadre of British “advisers” who had been stationed in the country for decades. According to historian Sandra Mackay, Feisal II was viewed as “a malleable monarch” by Britain “through which they could rule Iraq.”1 The 1955 “election” there, organized by the “American and British-appointed monarchy to select an advisory body[,] had no executive or legislative power. Its only function was to provide a façade of legitimacy to the puppet regime,” as noted by a statement issued on February 2, 2005, by the International Action Center.2 At any rate, a mere three years later the monarch was overthrown: “The ancien régime was swept away. The royal family was gunned down in the palace yard, and the Prime Minister, Nuri, literally was torn to bits by the mob.”3
The present situation is not dissimilar. Some have referred to the January 30 election as a “demonstration,” not unlike what the U.S. has orchestrated in the past in places like Honduras and Vietnam. Speaking of these historical examples, Frank Brodhead, co-author with Edward S. Herman of Demonstration Elections: U.S.-StagedElections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador;4 wrote:
The purpose of these elections – organized, financed, and choreographed by the United States – was to persuade U.S. citizens and especially Congress that we were invading these countries and supporting a savage war against government opponents at the invitation of a legitimate, freely elected government. The main purpose of a demonstration election is to legitimize an invasion and occupation, not to choose a new government.5
It would be difficult to refute the suggestion that the Iraq election was not also a “demonstration election.” As we noted above, the raison d'être of the American invasion was the disestablishment of Iraq's previous (i.e., pre-invasion) government. That vision necessarily shaped, and continues to shape, post-invasion policy. One instrument of that policy, though criticized for its impetuousness, was the “Supreme National De-Ba'athification Commission,” set up by the Iraqi Governing
Council and headed by Ahmad Chalabi. Criticism notwithstanding, the policy remains effectively in force: as Douglas Feith, outgoing under secretary of defense for policy at the Pentagon, stated a year after the invasion, “the Saddam Hussein regime is gone and is not coming back.”1 The U.S. policy of “de-Ba'athification,” he said, is a way “of communicating to the Iraqis that the Ba'ath regime is gone and is not coming back.” Essentially this means that the political landscape in post-invasion Iraq is open to the participation of those who are content to take part in the U.S.-enforced expulsion – and continuing exclusion – of Iraq's pre-invasion government and broader political organization. Insofar as this status quo is maintained by the American occupation, it wouldn't be a stretch to see the election as merely a ratification of the occupation and the essential transformation of Iraq's government – the very activity forbidden by international law. Brodhead connects these dots in a way that's hard to argue with:
Neo-Conned! Again Page 104
