Among other things, the Stasova-Sorin letter recalled that Central Committee sessions of 1917 and 1918 had not been recorded verbatim:
Rough notes were kept by three members, Stasova, Sverdlov and Ioffe, who themselves took part in discussion and were therefore unable to keep a detailed and substantive account. The words inserted by the secretaries in Lenin’s speech of 23 February [1918], ‘Stalin is wrong when he says we cannot sign’, and the phrase attributed to Comrade Stalin at the same session, ‘We might not sign, but begin peace negotiations’, both represent a misunderstanding and are in plain contradiction to all the speeches Comrade Stalin made on the Brest-Litovsk peace.88 The minutes of the meeting of 23 February are in the hand of Ioffe, who was at the time a rabid Trotskyist who fought tooth and nail against signing a peace accord and was of course not concerned to ensure maximum accuracy and thoroughness in writing down the speeches of his opponents, Lenin and Stalin.
Sorin and Stasova then offered to make the necessary corrections in any new editions of Lenin’s works on this subject.89 It is not hard to imagine the nature of such corrections.
In reality, during the Brest-Litovsk talks Stalin took a passive, centrist position, waiting to see how things would turn out. After he became Lenin’s successor it was important for him to reshape the past in order to show himself as a true Leninist, while Trotsky’s line must be shown as treacherous. This despite the fact that at the Seventh Party Congress on 8 March 1918, Lenin himself had said:
I must touch on Comrade Trotsky’s position. There are two sides to his activity: when he began the talks at Brest, he exploited them brilliantly for agitational purposes and we were all in agreement with him. He has cited a conversation he and I had, but I want to add that we had agreed to hold out until the German ultimatum, and give in after the ultimatum … Trotsky’s tactics, as long as they were aimed at procrastination, were correct; they became incorrect when it was announced that the state of war was terminated and the peace treaty was not signed.90
Stalin had not even been present at that congress, and could thus have had no influence on the outcome of the debate as to the rightness or otherwise of the decision to sign the Treaty. In 1938, though, it would have been a simple matter for him to produce a fake telegraph tape in order to alter the historical record, in order to enhance his own image and to continue the work of dismanding and destroying Trotsky’s.
Before the second round of talks began on 30 January 1918, Trotsky was well aware that the Soviet government was ever more deeply divided over the question of war and peace. On 8 January a meeting of Bolshevik leaders and a number of delegates from the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets had been aroused to fierce debate by Lenin’s ideas on the peace talks. Voting had resulted in fifteen for Lenin’s position, a separate peace which met Germany’s territorial demands; thirty-two for ‘revolutionary war’; and sixteen for Trotsky’s line of ‘neither peace nor war’. The next day the Central Committee had debated the issue and voted two for ‘revolutionary war’, eleven against, and one abstention. Twelve were for prolonging the peace talks, with one against. Nine favoured Trotsky’s line, with an equal number opposed.
Trotsky was as committed as ever to his idea of permanent revolution. On 13 January a combined session of the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Left SRs in the government took place at which a majority voted in favour of Trotsky’s formula, which was then proposed at the Third Congress of Soviets. It was a formula derived entirely from a ‘revolutionary’ assessment of the world situation, but revolution in Europe at that moment was less likely than it appeared to Trotsky. He told the delegates at the Third Congress of Soviets:
A genuinely democratic and universal peace is only possible when the victorious world revolution erupts. We believe in it … We are going late tonight to Brest-Litovsk in far better conditions than when we left there. We have obtained the opportunity to tell Kühlmann that his militaristic quarantine, by which he was hoping to protect the land-owners of Kurland from the contagion of revolution, is ineffectual, as has been shown by [the revolutionary events in] Vienna and Budapest. Nor shall we meet there the representatives of the [Ukrainian government], as the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of Soviets has recognized the Council of People’s Deputies as the only body empowered to negotiate for peace … They cannot threaten us with an offensive, as they cannot be sure the German soldiers will take part in one. We shall go on demobilizing our army without hesitation, for we are continuing to form the socialist Red Guards.
He ended his speech in characteristic manner:
And if German imperialism attempts to crucify us on the wheel of its military machine, then … we shall appeal to our elder brothers in the West and say: ‘Do you hear?’ And the international proletariat will respond—we firmly believe this—‘We hear!’91
As if ideologically hypnotized, Trotsky had been pushed into an extreme leftist position by his faith. Despite having lived so long in Western Europe, and having persistently criticized the social democrats for their indecision and their flirtation with reformism, after the victory of October his belief in the inevitability of revolution in Europe was reignited with renewed force. And it was this revolution, he believed, that would fatally weaken the Central Powers.
In his writings, Trotsky maintained that at the joint Bolshevik-SR meeting on 25 January it was his view that had prevailed, but no documentary record of that meeting has been found.
On his return to Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky wrote to Lenin: ‘We declare we end the war but do not sign a peace. They will be unable to make an offensive against us. If they attack us, our position will be no worse than now … We must have your decision. We can still drag on negotiations for one or two or three or four days. Afterwards they must be broken off.’92
Still believing in the imminence of a European revolution, Trotsky would not accept the counsel of his military advisers, Admiral V. Altfater, General A. Samoilo and Captain V. Lipsky, nor the possibility of a new German offensive. Even after Count Czernin, the head of the Austro-Hungarian delegation, had come to him secretly at his quarters and warned him that the Germans were preparing an offensive, urging him, ‘They will advance! Don’t fool yourself!’, he would not alter his position. Whether this was due to an exaggerated faith in his own judgement, or to his doubt that the Germans were capable of renewed fighting, or a desire to shock the world, or an attempt to provoke a revolutionary mood in Europe, or simply a mental lapse, it is impossible to state with assurance. One thing is certain, however, and that is that the Brest-Litovsk epic revealed Trotsky’s highly original approach to a fraught situation. It also revealed his self-confidence. Zinoviev remarked on this when he wrote: ‘Trotsky sometimes creates the kind of political platform on which only one man can stand, Comrade Trotsky himself, for on that platform there is literally no room even for those who think like him.’93 Trotsky not only loved the revolution, he loved to be at its centre.
On 10 February 1918 General Hoffmann instructed his aides to hang a map on the wall showing which Soviet territories the Central Powers proposed to annex. Trotsky was faced with a dramatic choice. The Germans had made it plain they would countenance no more procrastination in the talks and would ‘act in accordance with their national interests’. On that memorable last day of Trotsky’s presence at the talks, he issued a concluding statement full of revolutionary conviction and passion. Departing from his usual custom of speaking without notes, he stuck to his prepared text:
We are removing our armies and our people from the war. Our peasant soldiers must return to their land to cultivate in peace the fields which the revolution has taken from the landlord and given to the peasants. Our workmen soldiers must return to the workshops and produce, not for destruction but for creation. They must, together with the peasants, create a socialist state.
We are going out of the war. We inform all peoples and their governments of this fact. We are giving the order for a general demobilization of all our armies opposed at pr
esent to the troops of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. We are waiting in the strong belief that other peoples will soon follow our example.94
A deafening silence fell on the delegates, broken only by General Hoffmann’s exclamation, ‘Unerhört!’ (—Unheard of!’). Trotsky’s terms were indeed unprecedented: the war would cease and the army be demobilized, yet the peace treaty remained unsigned. In calm response, Trotsky stated: ‘We have exercised our authority and are returning to Petrograd. Here is the text of the official declaration of the delegation of the RSFSR on the cessation of war.’ The document he laid on the table read:
In the name of the Council of People’s Commissars, the government of the Russian Federal Republic informs the governments and peoples united in war against us, the Allied and neutral countries, that, in refusing to sign a peace of annexation, Russia declares, on its side, the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as ended. The Russian troops are receiving at the same time an order for a general demobilization on all lines of the front.95
As the delegates started leaving the former officers’ mess where the talks had taken place, the head of the German delegation, Kühlmann, stated in a loud, threatening voice that in view of what had happened, military action would be resumed. Without turning his head, Trotsky retorted, ‘Empty threats!’
After he returned to Petrograd, Trotsky was deeply convinced that he had both secured Russia’s exit from the war and dramatically put imperialism to shame. Despite the harsher terms now proposed, with Turkey claiming a number of Transcaucasian provinces into the bargain, he seemed unable to accept that his position was based on purely moral grounds and took no account of the cynicism of politics. Intoxicated by his ‘success’ at Brest-Litovsk, on 16 February he said in a speech at the Petrograd Soviet:
Let Kühlmann go back to Germany and show his workers his treaty and explain to them why our signature is not on it. I regard an advance by German troops against us as extremely unlikely, and if you reckon it in percentages, then it would be ninety against and ten for … To send German troops to Russia now, when Russia has publicly declared that it has left the state of war, would unquestionably mean provoking a mighty revolutionary protest by the German workers … The step we have taken in relation to the security of our country is the best one to take at this moment.96
Deep disappointment was swift in coming. On 18 February, only two days after Trotsky’s euphoric speech, Austro-German troops began an advance along their entire front without encountering any resistance. A somewhat shaken Trotsky sent an urgent note to the German government:
Today, 17 February, we have heard … from General Samoilo … that on 18 February at twelve noon a state of war will be resumed between Germany and Russia. The government of the Russian Republic assumes that the telegram we have received did not originate from the people whose signature appears on it, but is a provocation … We request clarification of this misunderstanding be given on the radio.97
There was, however, no misunderstanding, and German boots were soon tramping through the streets of Dvinsk, Minsk, Pskov and dozens of other Russian towns and villages. Trotsky’s self-confident, revolutionary and open diplomacy, and his boastful ‘90 per cent’ assurance that the Germans would not advance, had been exposed as costly posturing.
In the evening of 18 February, after a fierce debate with the Left Communists, the Central Committee by seven votes to five, with one abstention, supported Lenin’s decision to sign the ‘indecent, predatory’ treaty. Next day, 19 February, Trotsky prepared the text of a cable to the German government which both he and Lenin signed. It stated: ‘The Council of People’s Commissars finds itself compelled, in the present circumstances, to declare its agreement to sign a treaty on the terms proposed … at Brest-Litovsk. The Council of People’s Commissars declares that a reply to the precise terms of peace proposed by the German government will be given without delay.’98 Simultaneously, Trotsky carried out Lenin’s instruction to write an appeal from the Sovnarkom, to be signed by Lenin, entitled ‘The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger’, for publication in Izvestiya on 22 February.
Trotsky later recalled that the draft of the appeal had been discussed with the Left SRs, who were offended by its title. Lenin, on the other hand, thought it excellent: ‘It shows at once that our attitude to the defence of the fatherland has shifted 180 degrees. That’s just what’s needed.’
One of the final points in the draft called for the execution on the spot of anyone who gave assistance to the enemy. The Left SR Shteinberg, who had inexplicably been swept into the revolution and even into the Sovnarkom as People’s Commissar for Justice, objected to this as ‘contrary to the spirit of the uprising’. ‘On the contrary!’ Lenin exclaimed, altering the stress on his words to add irony, ‘this is precisely the real revolutionary spirit. You surely don’t think we’re going to come out of this as victors if we don’t use the most severe revolutionary terror?’99
The Bolshevik leadership was acting in two directions: first, to sign a just peace as quickly as possible, and secondly to form units of the Red Army and partisan detachments to repel the forces of intervention. On 21 February, when the German ultimatum was received, it became clear that the conditions on offer were even more onerous. Berlin postponed the deadline for forty-eight hours. The Central Committee met on 23 February. Lenin’s proposal to accept the new terms immediately was supported by seven, with four against and four abstentions. The vote must have been influenced to some extent by his threat to resign as Chairman if his resolution was not passed. Still, he won his majority only because Trotsky and his supporters abstained.
The same day the full government, the All-Russian Executive Committee, met and debated until the next morning. Here Lenin succeeded in getting a majority of 126 to 85, with 26 abstentions. He and Trotsky at once cabled Berlin their acceptance of the conditions and announced that a new Soviet delegation would be on its way to Brest-Litovsk. The new team was composed of G. Sokolnikov as its chief, G. Petrovsky, G. Chicherin and L. Karakhan, with A. Ioffe, V. Altfater and V. Lipsky as consultants. It had proved difficult to find delegates, as no one wanted the ‘honour’ of signing the devastating, if unavoidable, treaty. The delegation left on the morning of 24 February. The railway had already been destroyed in places and part of the journey had to be covered by hand-cart or even on foot. Sokolnikov refused to enter any further discussion of the terms, and signed the treaty on 3 March, declaring that the whole world would see it as an act of imperialistic violence.
Whatever he would say later about this important episode of his life, Trotsky’s position was undoubtedly more damaging than Lenin’s had been, although both of them would be vindicated by the end of 1918, when the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties collapsed and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was annulled. Lenin had in effect foreseen that the Treaty would not last long, and he was right. Trotsky later acknowledged Lenin’s foresight in general terms, but still maintained that his own position had not been altogether wrong.
Trotsky’s position on Brest-Litovsk was best expressed in his speech to the extraordinary ‘secret’ congress of the Party that took place on 6-8 March 1918 with forty voting delegates, and that finally supported Lenin’s line only after he had spoken no fewer than eighteen times. Trotsky spoke for an hour on 7 March, and made a statement on the following day. His speech was extremely frank and consistent in revealing his mistakes and partiality, as well as his intentions and judgements. Describing the general situation in the country, he declared: ‘However clever we are, whatever tactics we invent, we can only be saved in the full sense of the word by a European revolution.’ Of his reasons for abstaining at the Central Committee on 23 February, he stated that ‘on the question of whether there are more chances on that side or this, I think there are not more on the side Comrade Lenin is on.’ He then tried in effect to show that he had carried out the Party’s orders. ‘Everyone, including Comrade Lenin, told us: “Go and tell the Germans to make their f
ormulations clear, condemn them, and at the first opportunity break off the talks and come back.” We all saw this as the essence of the negotiations … there was only one voice in the Central Committee calling for an immediate signing of the peace, and that was Zinoviev’s … he said that by procrastinating we would made the terms of peace worse, so we should sign at once.’ Trotsky repeated that his formula, ‘neither war nor peace’, had been correct: ‘If I were made to repeat the talks with the Germans on 10 February, I would repeat what I have done.’
He went on: ‘We are retreating and rearming ourselves, as far as it is within our strength to do so. We are carrying out the scenario envisaged by Comrade Lenin; we shall withdraw towards Oryol, evacuate Petrograd and Moscow. I ought to tell you that Comrade Lenin has said that the Germans want to sign the peace in Petrograd. A few days ago we were thinking along those lines … The capture of Petrograd is a real threat, and for us it would be a terrible blow … Everything depends on the speed at which a revolution in Europe is provoked and developed.’ He stressed that the decision on this question in the Central Committee had depended on his vote, ‘because some comrades shared my position. I abstained and in that way showed that I was not going to take upon myself the responsibility for a future split in the Party. I would regard it as more sensible to withdraw than to sign a peace that would have created a fictitious breathing-space, but I cannot take responsibility for leadership of the Party in such circumstances.’
Trotsky Page 17
