84. [Freud's Kafka-like vision of the psyche's subjection to an implacably punitive regime is vividly reflected in the language here ( see above, On the Introduction of Narcissism, note 32).]
85. This proposition is only superficially paradoxical. It simply says that in its capacity for good and evil alike, the nature of man far exceeds what he himself believes to be possible, that is, what his ego is aware of on the basis of conscious perception.
86. [See above, pp. 111f.]
87. [Inhalte des Über-Ichs. For a note on Freud's use of the word ‘Inhalt’, see below, Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear, note 21.]
88. [See above, p. 121.]
89. [Entladungen. Freud uses the same term in Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear: see below, p. 178.]
90. [Ichgestaltungen – another of Freud's more inscrutable compounds. The Standard Edition offers ‘ego-structures’.]
91. [See Beyond the Pleasure Principle, above, p. 89.]
92. [This statement signals the beginnings of an important shift in Freud's concept of fear. See Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear, below, pp. 160, 280, and especially 229f.]
93. [‘Consciential’ is defined in the OED as both ‘rare’ and ‘obsolete’ – but no apology is tendered for its revival here, since without it Freud's teasing neologism Gewissensangst is practically untranslatable. Freud expands on his notion of Gewissensangst in Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear; see below, p. 214, and the relevant footnote.]
94. [Freud is alluding to Wilhelm Stekel, Nervöse Angstzustände und ihre Behandlung (Nervous Anxiety States and their Treatment, Berlin and Vienna, 1908), p. 5.]
95. [For definitions of ‘objective fear’ and ‘neurotic fear’, see Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear, Chapter XI, Section B: ‘Fear: Supplementary Remarks’.]
96. [Freud's term is Sehnsucht-Angst – not a compound noun in which one component is attributive of another (like Gewissensangst, see above, n. 93), but an equal conjunction of the two component nouns. In Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear Freud will dwell at length on the combination of longing and fear that afflicts infants in the absence of the mother; see below, pp. 205f.]
Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear
1. [The word ‘inhibition’ (like its German equivalent Hemmung) owes its primary modern meaning as well as its prevalence entirely to Freud, and exemplifies the spectacular impact of his ideas on our vocabulary and perspectives. Here, as in so many other cases, however, it is necessary to look beyond the Freud-inspired accretions of meaning and recognize that his own use of the term is essentially pre-Freudian. In fact he took the word directly from the prevailing terminology of science, particularly physiology, where it had a straightforward mechanical/technical meaning – as is clearly reflected in his comment here (cf. the definition cited in an OED quotation dating from 1883: ‘By inhibition we mean the arrest of the functions of a structure or organ, by the action upon it of another, while its power to execute those functions is still retained, and can be manifested as soon as the restraining power is removed’).]
2. [The Standard Edition re-jigs the syntax here and makes Freud say explicitly that ‘positive’ = ‘symptom’ and ‘negative’ = ‘inhibition’; there is no such explicit linkage in the original.]
3. [Freud's word Angst has always been something of a shibboleth for translators. James Strachey and his colleagues followed the lead of their early predecessors and opted for ‘anxiety’ in almost all cases, and as a result ‘anxiety’ has long since established itself as a specialist term with a meaning quite distinct from its meaning in ordinary language (see the relevant OED entry); thus, for instance, ‘anxiety neurosis’ is now the inescapable translation for Freud's term Angstneurose. But the fact remains that in the great majority of cases Freud uses the word Angst in its normal sense – which corresponds very closely to English ‘fear’, and which does not cover ‘anxiety’ in the ordinary sense of the word (indeed, when Freud means ‘anxiety’ he uses the standard word Angstlichkeit: see p. 163 and note 14, and p. 220 and note 61). For this reason, ‘fear’ is the word generally used throughout this present translation.]
4. [Trauer. The Standard Edition routinely renders this term as ‘mourning’ (most notably in the title ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (‘Trauer und Melancholie’)) – but ‘mourning’ is much too closely associated with death and the grief of bereavement to fit Freud's use of the word Trauer.]
5. [Freud's language is particularly revealing in this sentence in which the ‘ego’, the ‘super-ego’ and the ‘id’ are all adduced: whereas both the ego and the super-ego are personified, the id is conspicuously not; unlike the other two it seems to be visualized not as a purposive agent, but rather as a kind of space within which dark forces hatch their plots. See above, The Ego and the Id, note 28.]
6. [unliebsam. The Standard Edition curiously and incorrectly translates this word as ‘reprehensible’ (and a little later as ‘undesirable’).]
7. [Formation.]
8. [Freud defines this phenomenon elsewhere (in the context of hysteria) by reference to people ‘in whom any cause of sexual excitement provokes feelings consisting mainly or wholly of unpleasure’ (‘Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse’ (‘Fragment of an Analysis of Hysteria (Dora)’, 1905).]
9. [See above, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, note 23.]
10. [This formulation is recondite, but no more so than Freud's own coinage Triebrepräsentanz, which reflects his hypothesis that drives as such inhere in the soma, and are accordingly only ‘represented’ rather than actually present within the psyche – a hypothesis clearly signalled in his reference to ‘the notion serving as the vehicle of the disagreeable impulse’ in the opening paragraph of this Chapter (see also the Editor's Preface to ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ in Standard Edition, vol. 14). The OED entry for ‘representamen’ offers an illuminating quotation (dated 1846): ‘The representation, or, to speak more properly, the representamen, itself as an… object exhibited to the mind.’]
11. [See Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: New Series (1933), Lecture 7: ‘On the question of a Weltanschaung’.]
12. [OED: ‘Any of the series of guide-books issued by Karl Baedeker (1801–59) at Coblenz, or by his successors; also applied loosely to any guide-book.’ The word entered English quite quickly: the earliest attestation in the OED is 1863. It acquired notoriety in the Second World War: in the ‘Baedeker raids’ the Luftwaffe bombed cities rated with three stars in the Baedeker guide to Britain!]
13. [This oxymoron is another of Freud's sardonic little jokes at the expense of philosophers.]
14. [Angstlichkeit. See above, note 3.]
15. [See above, The Ego and the Id, note 10.]
16. [‘Illness-gain’ is a bizarre construction – but no more bizarre than Freud's own neologism Krankheitsgewinn. For Freud's theory that neurotics take refuge in illness because of the ‘gain’ that it brings them, see, for example, his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–17), Lecture 24.]
17. See ‘Analyse der Phobie eines funfjährigen Knaben’ [‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy’, 1909].
18. [Angstentwicklung. The term mimics standard scientific expressions such as Gasentwicklung (‘evolution/generation of gas’), and as such is plainly meant to denote a distinct and specific process within the psyche. This is demonstrated particularly clearly in the first sentence of Chapter IX below.]
19. [‘refuse’ and ‘refusal’ in these two sentences both render the verb sich versagen – a crucial term in Freud's vocabulary, and one that is well exemplified here. See also above, On the Introduction of Narcissism, note 23.]
20. ‘Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose’ [‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, 1918].
21. [This lengthy phrase (‘the particular notions attaching to the individuals’ fear’) is a rendering of Freud's laconic neologism Angstinhalte – and reflects a nasty crux that repeatedly faces the translator throughout this essay. The problem lies in Freud's special use of the word
Inhalt (plural Inhalte). In ordinary usage the word simply means ‘content(s)’, as in a book or a jar of marmalade. ‘Contents’, however, connotes something objective, whereas Freud almost invariably uses the term to denote the subject's reading of their psyche, the subjective notions or ‘meanings’ that we attach to psychic phenomena – in this case fear. Freud's thinking here is clearly all of a piece with his idea of the ‘representamen’ (Repräsentanz): see above, note 10; see also the penultimate paragraph of this essay.]
22. [Realangst. This term of Freud's has always given translators a headache; ‘objective fear’ does not capture it precisely, but seems a better fit than the woolly phrase ‘realistic fear’ used throughout the Standard Edition. See also Freud's comments on the matter, below, pp. 235f.]
23. [See above, On the Introduction of Narcissism, note 20.]
24. [Ich-Angst. See above, p. 229.]
25. [‘It is not clear’; formerly a standard term in both English and German judicial usage: ‘a verdict given by a jury in cases of doubt, deferring the matter to another day for trial’ (OED).]
26. [See above, Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through, note 3.]
27.[Entladung. See above, p. 145.]
28. See ‘Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose’ [‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis’; the case in question is discussed at the very beginning of the work, which was first published in 1913.]
29. [See The Ego and the Id, above, pp. 131f.]
30. Cf. Reik, 1925, p. 51 [Theodor Reik, Geständniszwang und Strafbe-dürfnis].
31. [See above, On the Introduction of Narcissism, note 23.]
32. [Freud's graphic term is das Ungeschehenmachen: rendering something ‘un-happened’ that has in reality already happened. ‘Obliteration’ is not ideal, being less a translation than a paraphrase – but a serviceable one, especially given that ‘obliterate’ originally meant ‘blot out of remembrance’ (OED). (The Standard Edition skews the concept by rendering the phrase as ‘undoing what has been done’: nothing at all is ‘undone’, but is simply made ‘invisible’ – as Freud goes on to explain.)]
33. [Freud's phrase (motorische Symbolik) is easy to translate – but not so easy to understand.]
34. [The word is Freud's (fakultativ); see the relevant OED definition: ‘Used by scientific and philosophical writers for: That may or may not take place, or have a specified character.’]
35. [See Chapter IV of The Unconscious.]
36. [See also below, note 46.]
37. [Freud's wording here is Lebens- oder Todesangst. The latter term is straightforward: Todesangst simply means ‘fear of death’. Lebensangst, on the other hand, is problematic. In normal psychiatric usage it means ‘neurosis caused by fear of not succeeding in life’ – but this can scarcely be the meaning Freud intended here in the context of ‘traumatic neurosis’ often involving a ‘life-threatening danger’. Just for a change, the Standard Edition comes to a similar conclusion, and offers ‘fear of death (or fear for life)’.]
38. [See the penultimate paragraph of Chapter II; see also The Ego and the Id, Chapter V.]
39. [First World War.]
40. [See the closing paragraphs of The Ego and the Id.]
41. [See below, Chapter XI, Section C, ‘Fear, Pain, and Sorrow’.]
42. [But see above, p. 160, where Freud puts this argument more cautiously.]
43. [Angstbereitschaft. See above, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, note 30.]
44. [Erinnerungsbild. The Standard Edition characteristically uses a recondite formulation, viz. ‘mnemic image’ – but this is misleading as well as arcane: Freud is not alluding to the phenomenon of ‘mneme’ (defined in the OED as ‘The capacity which a living substance or organism possesses for retaining after-effects of experience or stimulation undergone by itself or its progenitors’); he simply means the image of the mother retained by the baby.]
45. [The phrase ‘the… subject's perceptions’ is yet another attempt to capture the meaning of Freud's deceptively simple term Inhalte; see above, note 21.]
46. [Here, as in the similar reference on p. 196, Freud seems on the face of it to imply that ‘consciential fear’ and ‘social fear’ are synonymous terms; a few pages later, however, he describes them as distinct sub-sets, one endogenous, the other exogenous: see below, p. 214, and the corresponding note (56).]
47. [This curious formulation is Freud's own – and is no less odd in German than it is in English.]
48. [Todes-(Lebens-)Angst. In this instance Freud seems to mean the word Lebensangst in its normal sense: see above, note 37.]
49. [Here, as at the end of the previous chapter, Freud sees our relationship with our super-ego as the sole element in our fear of death – but his dualistic vision of the super-ego is epitomized by the fact that it is figured here as a kind of Nemesis, whereas earlier it was represented as the direct opposite – as a kind of guardian angel.]
50. [Freud's term here is Instanz – and he used the same key term in the preceding paragraph, in the phrase rendered as ‘[parental] voice’. See above, On the Introduction of Narcissism, note 32.]
51. [See The Ego and the Id, above, p. 147.]
52. [See above, The Ego and the Id, note 10.]
53. Differentiating the ego and the id inevitably also reawakened our interest in the problems of repression. Up until then we had been content to focus on those aspects of the process that bore on the ego – withholding from consciousness and from motor activity, formation of surrogates (i.e. symptoms); as for the repressed drive-impulse itself, we assumed that it remained unchanged in the unconscious for an indefinite period of time. Our interest having now shifted to the fate of the repressed drive-impulse, we suspect that it is by no means routine, indeed perhaps not even common, for things to remain thus unchanged and unchangeable. The original drive-impulse was certainly inhibited and deflected from its goal by the repression process. But did it none the less remain within the unconscious in rudimentary form, and prove resistant to those influences in life that tend to change and diminish things? Do those old wishes thus still endure whose earlier existence we know of through psychoanalysis? The answer appears both obvious and irrefutable: the old, repressed wishes must still exist in the unconscious, since their offshoots, namely symptoms, are palpably still at work. But this answer is insufficient, for it does not allow us to determine which of the two available possibilities is the correct one – that is, whether the erstwhile wish now makes itself felt solely through its offshoots, having transferred its entire cathectic energy to them, or whether it is also still present and active itself. If the fate that it suffered was to be entirely used up in cathecting its offshoots, then a third possibility presents itself, namely that it was reactivated by regression in the course of the neurosis, however inappropriate to the prevailing circumstances it might happen to be. These are by no means idle considerations: numerous aspects of psychic life, both normal and abnormal, seem to call for such questions to be raised. I became aware of the difference between the mere repression of an old wish-impulse and its actual eradication while writing my paper ‘Der Untergang des Ödipus-Komplexes’ [‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex’, 1924].
54. [See ‘Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunter-schieds’ (‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes’, 1925).]
55. [The Standard Edition has a footnote by the editor asserting that Freud means a close connection between fear and neurosis – but the whole thrust of the passage makes it clear that he means fear and symptom; see especially the third sentence of the fourth paragraph of this chapter!]
56. [Freud considerably helps us to understand his otherwise problematic concept of ‘consciential fear’ (Gewissensangst) by defining it here as ‘endopsychic’, and differentiating it from ‘social fear’ (soziale Angst). The Standard Edition seriously distorts this important notion by variously rendering it as ‘moral fear’ and (even more dubiously) ‘fear of conscience’: Gewisse
nsangst is not derived from society's mores, nor is it fear of conscience, but an endogenous form of fear arising directly out of that indwelling (and mysterious) form of knowingness that we term ‘conscience’, Gewissen.]
57. [This context demonstrates Freud's use of the word Motiv with particular clarity (‘woher kommt die Neurose, was ist ihr letztes, das ihr besondere Motiv?’). See above, Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through, note 11.]
58. [This strikingly allusive epithet is Freud's own (unangetastet).]
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings Page 33
