14. For specifics, see chapter 8 in this volume.
15. See the introduction and chapter 10 in this volume.
16. Minor discrepancies for several maxima in figure 1.10 are a function of the juxtaposition of two imperfect data series, for the census population and for the estimated actual population. Moreover, for the Northern and Southern Song, the census population had to be extrapolated from the number of households: records from that period list only adults whereas censuses from other dynasties tend to cover all individuals. See Bielenstein 1987: 49, 78.
17. The scale of the latter effect is probably somewhat exaggerated by underestimates of the relative demographic prominence of pre-Islamic empires that were based in the north of the subcontinent, for the reason given above.
18. For a comparison between (“Western”) Europe and China (“proper”) in terms of the number of sovereign states from 1 to 1800 CE, see Ko, Koyama, and Sng 2018: 288–89, esp. 288, fig. 2 and 289n7 (problematic because their source—https://www.euratlas.net/history/europe/index.html—counts polities within the Holy Roman Empire as “sovereign” or “independent” (288–89, esp. n7), yet omits many of the smaller ones of these formally subordinate entities). Tilly 1992: 45 reckons with between 80 and 500 formally autonomous polities in Europe by 1500. Comparison of the size of the largest cities (generally imperial capitals) in eastern and western Eurasia in I. Morris 2013b: 171, fig.4.7—largely a function of state size—shows a similar divergence after the mid-first millennium CE.
CHAPTER TWO
1. See esp. Doyle 1986: 22 (metrocentric views of empire) and 25–66 (pericentric views). I take for granted the premise—a cornerstone of international relations theory—that international power politics are driven by imbalances in power within state systems as actors (i.e., polities) seek to increase their power for the sake of protection or gain; see 26–30 (systemic views of empire). Doyle 1986: 123–27 discusses merits and weaknesses of these perspectives. Champion and Eckstein 2004: 4–6 briefly survey applications of these categories to the study of Roman expansion.
2. I agree with Doyle 1986: 127 that the drive for empire-building must emanate from the metropole, even though metrocentric approaches are “at best incomplete” (124). For the need to combine different perspectives, see, e.g., Eckstein 2006: 35; Morley 2010: 29–30.
3. See Cornell 2000: 212–13, 217, 219–20 for a concise summary. See also C. Smith 1996.
4. Model: Armstrong 2016: 47–128, esp. 47–49, 73. Beard 2015: 117 calls these groups “chiefdoms and warrior bands,” an apt characterization. See C. Smith 2006 on the nature of clans and how little we can hope to know about them. Land: Armstrong 2016: 129–82.
5. Barker and Rasmussen 1998: 175–76; Torelli 2000: 195–96.
6. Hansen 2000a, 2002.
7. In other cases, the origins of city-state–based empires are more opaque, as in the case of Akkad and Ur III in Sumer or later in Assyria, Carthage, and the Srivijaya empire in Sumatra. Hansen 2000b: 602, 613–14; Gat 2006: 310–13. Scheidel 2016 compares the Roman and Aztec cases.
8. See Cornell 1995: 127–214 for tradition concerning the sixth century BCE; he believes in an Etruscan-led Roman hegemony (309–10). Rome’s territory compared well with those of the southern Etruscan city-states of Veii (562 square kilometers), Caere (640 square kilometers), and Tarquinii (663 square kilometers) (Cornell 2000: 215), as does the size of its capital city (215–16, esp. 216, fig. 5). On the question of Rome’s early size, see Woolf 2012: 35–37, stressing location and proximity to the Etruscans, which produced some form of “hybrid … vigour” (36). In more formal terms, this meshes well with meta-ethnic frontier theory as propounded by Turchin 2003: 50–93; and see chapter 8 in this volume.
9. By 495 BCE, Rome had scaled-up to closer to 950–1,000 square kilometers, or 40 percent of Old Latium, by swallowing three of the other fifteen Latin polities: Cornell 1995: 205.
10. Alliance with Latins: Cornell 1995: 299–301; Cornell 2000: 220. Colonies: Oakley 1993: 19; Cornell 1995: 301–4; Cornell 2000: 213. Volscians and pressure from the interior: Cornell 1995: 304–9; Cornell 2000: 213 (five cities). Character of conflict: Cornell 1995: 309. Plunder and prestige: Woolf 2012: 72.
11. Shift to expansionism: Cornell 1995: 309, 311–13, 319–20. Growing internal cohesion: Armstrong 2016: 183–232. Later reports of the introduction of some form of compensation for military service around 400 BCE, possibly in kind, may well be correct (211–14): if true, this would have facilitated more sustained and broadly based military campaigning.
12. For the sack of Rome, see Cornell 1995: 313–18. The scale of later attacks remains unclear (see 324–25). This makes it hard to gauge the significance of meta-ethnic frontier dynamics in later Roman-led alliance-building.
13. Cornell 2000: 213; Harris 2016: 29 on “oppressive bilateral treaties.” For the image of empire as a rimless wheel, see Motyl 2001: 16–17.
14. For this system, see, e.g., Cornell 1995: 351, 365. The nature and scope of citizenship without vote are not well understood: see Mouritsen 2007.
15. Eckstein 2006: 252 (quote). This created what de facto resembled dual citizenship (of Rome and one’s native local community): see Beard 2015: 165. For Roman openness and the contrast to Greece, see, e.g., Raaflaub 1991: 578; Champion and Eckstein 2004: 7; Eckstein 2006: 246–47, 256, and from a comparative perspective see also Mann 1986: 254.
16. For the crucial importance of scaling-up military cooperation, see Eckstein 2006: 245–57; Beard 2015: 163–68.
17. See Nicolet 1980: 153–69 on the exiguous record, esp. 158: a rate of 0.1 percent might have represented a penalty, and one of 0.3 percent could be imposed on luxuries, which suggests that regular rates may have been very low indeed. However, multiples of the base rate could be levied in times of crisis. Assuming 5 percent annual return on investments, a base rate of 0.1 percent would translate to a 2 percent income tax, or rather 3 percent if two-thirds of assets were productive. Refunds: Nicolet 1980: 156.
18. See J. North 1981: 7 for this point about “complicity.”
19. For low rates of compensation for Roman and Italian soldiers, see the next section.
20. Service: Hopkins 1978: 33–35; Harris 1985: 44–45; 2016: 67. After 200 BCE, half of all men under the age of thirty would have had to serve for ten years to fill the attested military units: Rosenstein 2004: 89–91. Population: Brunt 1987: 44–130 used to be accepted as the canonical reconstruction, which I follow here. His work has now been reinforced and enhanced by de Ligt 2012, who offers the most convincing version of Roman population history. For an argument in favor of somewhat higher tallies in the late Republic, see Hin 2013: 261–97. Much higher totals as suggested by a few revisionists, while not strictly speaking impossible, are less likely overall: for detailed discussion, see Scheidel 2008b and the update in Scheidel 2013a.
21. Mobilization rate: de Ligt 2012: 72–77, at 74.
22. See Tilly 1992: 30 for the two quotes. See 17–20 on his definitions of capital and coercion. He accords the environment a crucial role in determining a given mode of state-building (30). His model applies similarly well to Warring States China. Eich and Eich 2005: 15–16 correctly note the relative suitability of the coercion-intensive mode in much of fifth- and fourth-century BCE Italy. See also Eich and Eich 2005: 25 for the relative lack of intensification of exploitation in the Roman core beyond military labor obligations.
23. Eich and Eich 2005: 24. Terrenato 2019 emphasizes the role of elite co-optation by non-military means.
24. Fronda 2010: 300–307 judiciously stresses how difficult it was to manage these tensions. See Mouritsen 1998 on the limits of integration in Italy down to the early first century BCE.
25. Scheidel 2006: 217–20, esp. 218, fig. 4. Due to the rapid growth of the capital, the potential for voter participation quickly shrank even in the metropolitan core: 219, fig. 5. See also Linke 2006: 71–73. Mouritsen 2001: 18–37 demonstrates the critical importance of public space for our unde
rstanding of the Roman political system, which was thoroughly oligarchic and aristocratic (e.g., Hölkeskamp 2010, and now in general Mouritsen 2017).
26. See Hopkins 1991, on levy, census, and voting as rituals. On mixing, see esp. Jehne 2006: 250–55, 264–66, and also Eich and Eich 2005: 17.
27. Pfeilschifter 2007 is the best discussion. On material benefits see the “Wages of War” section.
28. Estimates in Scheidel 2004: 10–13, and see 21–24 for integrative effects. See also Pina Polo 2006 just for the second century BCE.
29. Scheidel 2006: 224.
30. Tilly 1992: 96–97.
31. Eich and Eich 2005: 19–20. The logistical requirements of near-continuous large-scale campaigning also helped create various types of networks: see Beard 2015: 168. For the question of the degree of state-ness of the Roman Republic, see Lundgreen 2014a, and esp. Lundgreen 2014b. The argument that Roman acceptance or reinforcement of patriarchal power in autonomous households offered a strong reason for men to support Rome (Linke 2006: 74–83; 2014, esp. 85–86) is predicated on the dubious notion that Rome was in a position strongly to affect local social mores, which seems unlikely. No monopoly: contra Eich and Eich 2005: 14.
32. Making states and war: on this process in postmedieval Europe, see Tilly 1992: 67–95. For the concept, see B. Porter 1994: 11–19; Kasza 1996: 364–68; Thompson and Rasler 1999. For application of Tilly’s concepts to Rome, see Eich and Eich 2005: 7–15, esp.14–15. Spin-offs: Eich and Eich 2005: 18. For the segmentation of the citizenry between an urban core and the rest, see Scheidel 2006: 214–17: the share of citizens outside the core rose from zero in the mid-fourth century BCE to 80 percent in the mid-first century BCE (216, fig. 3).
33. Concentration: Eich and Eich 2005: 30–31. Resources: Tan 2017, a vital complement to the narrow view that elaborate state structures were merely unnecessary.
34. See Mann 1986: 22–28 for the concept of social powers (the IEMP model).
35. See Cornell 1995: 327–44; Armstrong 2016: 183–289, esp. 231–32, 287–89. Cf. also Torelli 2000: 196–97 for exclusion of Etruscan bondsmen from military service. Enslavement: Harris 1985: 59, 63; Oakley 1993: 23–25. Slaves replacing bondsmen: Oakley 1993: 26.
36. Mann 1986: 252. Andreski’s 1968 thesis that military participation ratios are inversely correlated with social stratification (39–73) is not well supported by the Roman case: for discussion, see Patterson 1993: 95–97. However, it is certainly true that Roman conquests led to interstratic social mobility (cf. Andreski 1968: 134–38). Religion and war: Rüpke 1990. Temples: Cornell 1995: 381, 384, and now in detail Padilla Peralta 2014: 36–110.
37. Harris 1985: 10–41 is essential. See also the brilliant précis by J. North 1981: 6 (quote) and Morley 2010: 27–29.
38. Harris 1985: 74–93 on senatorial enrichment. Shatzman 1975: 53–67, and esp. 107, in a detailed survey of senatorial fortunes, considered war spoils crucial. See also Rosenstein 2008: 23–24. On the abatement of imperialism after the 160s BCE, see Rich 1993: 46–55.
39. On the question of allied leadership, see Oakley 1993: 17–28; Cornell 1995: 366–67, where he also reports a few concrete examples of direct backing. By and large, however, allied elites were on their own. See J. North 1981: 7 for the point about “complicity.”
40. Harris 1985: 54–104 discusses economic motivations for war, and specifically 101–4 those for ordinary people. See also Morley 2010: 25–29 on the question of motivation. Compliance: Harris 1985: 46–47; Eich and Eich 2005: 25. For this reason the general population had to experience or perceive benefits: Harris 2016: 22–23.
41. See Harris 1985: 60 for these figures.
42. Or propugnacula imperii; see Cornell 1995: 380–83. Subsequent programs from 200 to 177 BCE covered another 40,000–65,000 adult men plus dependents (Scheidel 2004: 10–11), and much more massive state-sponsored relocations both within and outside Italy occurred from the 80s to the 20s BCE, displacing more than half a million Romans.
43. Roselaar 2010: 71–84 considers the fate of the previous owners, and see esp. 79 for ownership by locals. Debt: Oakley 1993: 21–22. Analogy: Woolf 2012: 73. For Qin, see M. Lewis 1990: 61–64.
44. Share: Pfeilschifter 2007: 27. Security: Fronda 2010: 300–307.
45. Requirement: Cornell 1995: 366. Tax rebate: see J. North 1981: 7 for this analogy, followed by Morley 2010: 26. Resources: Eich and Eich 2005: 21, 25–26.
46. For versions of this argument, see Momigliano 1971: 44–46 (allies); J. North 1981: 6–7 (without war the whole system “would have lost the medium through which it existed and hence … would itself have ceased to exist”: 7); Raaflaub 1991: 576; Oakley 1993: 17; Cornell 1995: 366; Eich and Eich 2005: 21. Quote: J. North 1981: 7. Harris’s 1984: 91–92 dissent is baffling.
47. Quote: Bickerman and Smith 1976: 149 via Cornell 1995: 367.
48. Eich and Eich 2005: 24–26.
49. Rosenstein 2004: 63–106, esp. 82–84, on age at first marriage. However, these inscriptions predominantly reflect urban customs and need not be representative of the rural majority: Scheidel 2007c: 400–401 (but cf. Rosenstein 2004: 238n105 and Hin 2013: 178–79). Hin 2013: 169–71 argues that we should not overestimate the negative effects of war losses: military service that focused on unmarried draftees addressed structural underemployment. Older men: Rosenstein 2004: 89–91 on the Second Punic War.
50. Harris 1985: 49–50; Morley 2010: 33–35. In the second century BCE rural citizens largely displaced their urban peers from the military (Jehne 2006: 256), which widened the gap between political and military participation (even) further.
51. Slavery and mobilization: see Finley 1998: 152 on this point; and also Harris 2016: 21–22, 67. Expansion of slavery: Scheidel 2008a: 115–23, esp. 119 for this process in Rome and elsewhere.
52. Scheidel 2011c on the scale of Roman slavery and its supply, and 294–97 for capture in war; Scheidel 2005: 64–71 on Italy in particular; Scheidel 2011c: 292 for their share in the overall population. Hopkins 1978: 99–115 discusses the growth of Roman slave society.
53. I borrow the term “expansion-bearing structures” from J. North 1981: 9.
54. Cornell 1995: 345–47.
55. Samnite vs. Roman manpower: Afzelius 1942: 138–41 (twice as many Samnites on four times as much territory in the 340s BCE), 158 (similarly sized populations in 326 BCE), 171 (2½ times as many people on Rome’s side by 304 BCE). For these conflicts and their consequences, see most recently Scopacasa 2015: 129–58. The specifics of Samnite organization remain opaque: Grossmann 2009: 21–22, and, for the limits of their capabilities, 317–18. But Grossmann goes too far in doubting the existence of more extensive alliances against Rome (134–47); cf. Scopacasa 2015: 138–40.
56. Conquest of Italy: Afzelius 1942: 136–96 (numbers), Cornell 1995: 345–68 (general account); most recently Harris 2016: 23–33. Battle of Sentinum in 295 BCE: Cornell 1995: 361.
57. The section caption is a reference to a famous maxim of the early Roman poet Ennius, moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque. Although many southern allies defected in the early 270s BCE in response to the Epirote campaign, Rome retained control over twice as many Italians as the opposing side (Afzelius 1942: 187), and was able swiftly to replace battlefield losses in a way that neutralized the tactical skills of the Epirote king Pyrrhus—hence the famous notion of a “Pyrrhic victory.” Conflict with Carthage: our main source, the Greek historian Polybius, claims that 700 Roman warships were lost, and while the actual number may have been closer to 500, both of them are enormous: average crew size per vessel ranged in the hundreds.
58. Levies: Polybius 2.23–24. For discussion, see Afzelius 1942: 15–135; Brunt 1987: 44–60; Baronowski 1993; de Ligt 2012: 40–78, esp. 54–55 and 69 for adjustments to 340,000 Romans and 540,000 allies capable of bearing arms out of a free population of close to 3 million (71). For Carthaginian capabilities, see chapter 3 in this volume.
59. Brunt 1987: 416–512, esp. 417–22 (Second Puni
c War), 423–26 (200–168 BCE). Possible inflation of infantry numbers is offset by the omission of naval levies from these tallies. For the demographic consequences of the Second Punic War, see Hin 2013: 142–54.
60. Brunt 1987: 439, 445, 449, 487, 511.
61. European levies: Parker 1996: 45–46. Effective distance between Rome and Philipp calculated from Scheidel and Meeks 2014. European population number: McEvedy and Jones 1978: 18 (whose numbers for antiquity may be a bit too low; see the technical note to chapter 1).
62. Harris 1985: 51–53 on Roman brutality, with reference to Andreski 1968: 117–18, who argues that high military participation rates translate to greater ferocity in war. On pathological violence in different domains of Roman culture, see Harris 2016: 42. Trade-off: Löffl 2011: 48–51, esp. 48. Rosenstein 1990: 179–204 identifies ninety-two Roman commanders between 390 and 49 BCE who suffered defeats against foreign enemies and lived to tell the tale, plus twelve consuls who were killed in battle in defeats between 249 and 50 BCE.
63. Schumpeter 1919: 33 (quotes). Doyle 1986: 156n37 explains the meaning of “objectless disposition,” which applies to much of Roman history, even if Schumpeter himself (correctly) did not classify Rome as a “warrior nation” in his own very narrow definition that in such a state “life and vocation are fully realized only in war” (Schumpeter 1919: 65–69).
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