‘I think the expression “most of them” more or less covers it,’ the Intelligence Director said. ‘Ever since the Shah was deposed Iran has succeeded in irritating almost everybody for a lot of different reasons. That’s why sanctions have been imposed against the country by the European Union, by America and by almost anyone else who’s ever had anything to do with the ruling regime. And of course the big worry for the West is that Iran is still trying to develop nuclear weapons, despite all the claims that it isn’t. The idea of a nuclear button in the hands of the fanatical ayatollahs is enough to give anyone sleepless nights.’
For a few moments, nobody replied, but then Richter had something like a lightbulb moment.
‘Maybe that’s it,’ he said slowly. ‘Not a nuclear weapon of mass destruction, but a biological weapon that would do almost the same thing and in the same target country.’
‘Which country?’ Simpson snapped. ‘And why?’
‘It’s obvious, and if you all think it through you’ll see exactly why. Well, all of you apart from the Professor here, because I don’t suppose for a moment that he’s ever heard of Stuxnet.’
Chapter 44
Hammersmith, London
Thursday
‘Oddly enough,’ Charles Vernon said, as Richter glanced at him, ‘I have heard of Stuxnet. I think it’s a kind of computer program, but I don’t know what it is, or what its significance is in terms of this discussion.’
Simpson looked across the table at Richter and nodded slowly.
‘That does make sense,’ he said, then shifted his gaze back to Vernon. ‘I won’t tell you the whole story because most of it isn’t relevant. Back in 2010 a couple of security experts found themselves looking at a brand-new computer virus that was like nothing they’d seen before. It was very small and tightly written with no redundant code, and it used four zero-day exploits, hidden flaws in the operating system coding. It was also written in an unfamiliar language, designed to control PLCs – Programmable Logic Controllers – very specialised small computers that manage factory machinery. It was highly specific, and only infected computers attached to one particular kind of machine, a frequency converter that controlled the speed of a centrifuge used to enrich uranium.
‘These two men then discovered that all these infected PLCs were located in the Natanz nuclear plant in Iran and, after gathering data, the virus that became known as Stuxnet delivered its payload. It either slowed the centrifuges down so that they became unbalanced and failed or it sped them up and ran them so fast that the vibration shattered them. And while this was happening the virus displayed entirely normal readings on all the monitoring equipment as the centrifuges fell to pieces. When the technicians tried to shut the centrifuges down, the virus also intercepted the shutdown signal so that the damage continued until the entire system could be powered off. Iran has never admitted how much damage Stuxnet caused, but intelligence sources suggest that over a thousand very expensive centrifuges were destroyed, and the Iranian nuclear weapon production programme was held up for at least two years. It was a highly specific and extremely effective cyberattack carried out by a really clever piece of software.’
‘Finish it,’ Richter said. He didn’t express any surprise at Simpson’s concise description of the Stuxnet event. His boss frequently pretended to be virtually a Luddite when it came to anything involving computers, but what he had just said gave the lie to that, and reinforced Richter’s long-held opinion that Simpson was devious to a fault.
‘What?’
‘You’ve explained the “what” and the “how” and you’ve hinted at the “why”, though that was always pretty obvious. But what you haven’t said is “who” and that’s crucial. Who built and launched Stuxnet?’
The Intelligence Director opened his mouth to speak, but Simpson beat him to it.
‘I see what you mean,’ he said, then glanced back at Vernon. ‘What was obvious to Richter a couple of minutes ago is now obvious to me as well. Though it’s never been publicly admitted, in the intelligence community the authors of the Stuxnet virus have been tentatively identified, and at least we do know their nationalities. It was a joint project between some of the best computer brains in America and, crucially, in Israel.’
Richter took up the story.
‘The Iranians aren’t stupid. Misguided, in our opinion, yes, and fanatical, obviously. But what they’re not is stupid. They’ve known from pretty much the first moment that their centrifuges at Natanz starting falling to pieces that they were suffering an unusual attack from an unfamiliar angle, and they would have worked out really fast where that attack had originated from. If they had managed to fabricate a working nuclear weapon, their first target, even before Stuxnet appeared on the scene, would probably have been Israel. What Stuxnet would have done was just to ensure that Israel would be firmly in their sights. They know that and the Israelis know that, which is why when Israeli intelligence believes that they’re finally close to fabricating a working nuke, I’m expecting their air force to spend most of its time over Iran flattening anything that looks even slightly like a weapon storage facility or a rocket launcher or an aircraft that could carry such a weapon. And fuck knows what will happen then. But a limited nuclear exchange in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean regions between Israel and Iran is a definite possibility. And maybe other states there might decide to stick their oars in as well, buying nukes from Russia or North Korea so they can join in the fun.’
Vernon nodded. Although it was not his field, he could immediately see where this particular argument was heading.
‘If you’re going to ask me about this putative bioweapon being used to target the population of Israel, the answer is yes, it probably could be. I’m not familiar with the detailed demographics of Israel, but the impression I have is that people of the Jewish faith are probably more likely to marry other Jews than they are to marry Gentiles. That means there’s a good chance of a genetic marker being identified that would allow Jews to be specifically targeted.’
‘Just how specific are we talking about here?’ Simpson asked. ‘We’ve been discussing targeting a genetic subgroup, but could you manufacture a bioweapon that would only affect a much smaller number of people within that subgroup?’
‘That’s an interesting concept,’ Vernon agreed, ‘and I did hear something a few years ago that suggested the idea was being considered. Before Osama bin Laden was taken out by the Americans, there were apparently high-level discussions at places like the Centers for Disease Control and Fort Detrick in America about trying to modify a strain of the influenza virus, probably Streptococcus pneumoniae, to carry a lethal payload but which would only affect him. How realistic that project was I have no idea, because I wasn’t involved in it, but the fact that it was even being talked about suggests that the scientists involved thought it was achievable. Mind you, it would have been a long and expensive operation, and one obvious concern was that if there was any mutation of the virus – and Streptococcus pneumoniae has a tendency to mutate very easily, which is why a different strain of flu virus has to be produced every year in the autumn ready for the winter season – we might have been looking at another flu pandemic like the one of the beginning of the twentieth century with potentially millions of deaths.
‘The idea of creating a specific biological assassin, if you like, would be a lot more difficult to do and I doubt if any country would be willing to spend the money and effort needed to try to achieve it, except in the most extreme of circumstances. We know that the Americans wanted bin Laden dead for what he’d done and for that reason the money and scientists might have been found to achieve that result. But in the end it was a couple of bullets that brought the result America wanted with far more certainty. And that result was able to be filmed and documented so that there was no doubt that the objective had been achieved. If bin Laden had simply died of a flu virus in a cave somewhere in the Hindu Kush ten years ago, we might not even be aware of the fact today, and
we might still be hunting his ghost and jumping at shadows. But what we’re talking about right now is targeting an entire nation, or at least most of that nation, with a biological weapon of mass destruction, and that would be much easier from a technical standpoint.’
Simpson shifted his glance from Vernon and looked around the table.
‘Right,’ he said, ‘if I’ve understood this correctly, then the idea of creating a biological WMD targeted at a specific genetic or racial group is feasible, and if this weapon has been developed by scientists in Iran, then the most obvious and most likely target is Israel. So we have the identity of the probable aggressor and the target nation, and we know in broad terms that the weapon is some kind of a variant of the original TRAIT vector. We don’t know what the payload is, but we can obviously assume that it will be something fairly unpleasant. So, Professor Vernon, now we really need answers to two questions.
‘First, we know from what you’ve told us that in the TRAIT field trial the vector was administered directly to the selected individuals as an inoculation. Clearly this plot will have to use a very different method of transmission, so how could the Iranians get this modified vector into most of the population of Israel? And, second, can you tell us what the original TRAIT vector consisted of?’
‘The second question is easier to answer than the first,’ Vernon said. ‘The scientists involved looked at a few dozen different candidates and eventually chose an inoffensive bacterium called Neisseria lactamica. They modified its genetic sequence so that it would have no effect upon anyone outside the target genetic group, and then added the payload, as we’ve already discussed. That was the vector. Of course, we don’t know if the Iranians used the same bacterium or chose something completely different. If they have created a bioweapon, they would probably have picked something far more dangerous to a human being, something known to cause a disease or damage the human body, and modified it so that it would only attack victims who possessed the right genetic markers.
‘The dispersal mechanism is a problem,’ he went on. ‘Back in 1950 the Americans tried a limited form of biological warfare against their own people. One morning the crew on board a US Navy vessel released two different strains of benign bacteria – Bacillus globigii and Serratia marcescens if I remember it correctly – in San Francisco Bay, just to see what would happen. The results were inconclusive but alarming, when numerous people began falling ill in the area downwind of the ship. Because the trial was covert, there was no public acknowledgement of what had been done, and no examination of what people were suffering from, but the conclusions were predictable. If that ship had belonged to a foreign power and had released lethal bacteria in the same manner, there would have been a significant death toll. That was really the first such trial, and it was followed by dozens of others, with bacteria being released in subways, railway stations, airport lounges and even a few sports stadiums. The conclusion was that airborne dispersal, relying on the wind for the direction and distance of the spread, and obviously subject to uncontrollable atmospheric factors like the degree of relative humidity and ambient temperature, was far too inefficient to be relied upon in a real bio-warfare scenario.’
‘It did work for Aum Shinryko when they launched their attack on the Tokyo Metro system with Sarin gas,’ Richter pointed out, ‘but even with large amounts of a lethal agent like Sarin and in a confined space the death toll was surprisingly low.’
‘Exactly,’ Vernon said, nodding. ‘There are too many variables over which nobody has any control. I have no idea how much research the Iranians have done on dispersal mechanisms, but I would be very surprised if they were to attempt to use any form of airborne method. It would be too problematic, far too uncertain and, even if by some fluke it did work, it’s doubtful that it would have any effect on more than a very small percentage of the population of Israel unless the wind speed and direction were absolutely perfect for their purposes, and the chances of that happening would be virtually nil.’
‘So how would they do it?’ Simpson asked.
‘The trick would be getting enough of the agent into every home in the country and making sure that most people inside those flats and houses and other buildings were exposed to it in large enough quantities. So there really is only one possible answer. It’s quite simple and perfectly obvious.’
‘Water,’ Richter supplied immediately. ‘The one thing that everyone is exposed to on a daily basis, whether it’s the spray from a showerhead, water when you’re cleaning your teeth, a drink from the tap, a cup of tea or coffee or even by eating vegetables cooked in water or a washed salad. It’s the one substance that nobody can ever avoid.’
Vernon nodded.
‘It’s the only thing that makes any sense to me, and if the vector bacterium was tasteless and odourless it would be undetectable until the first medical effects became apparent. You should also be aware that it’s possible to toughen certain bacteria so that they are unaffected by water being boiled, so that they would still be infectious in cooked food and hot drinks. Or even to deactivate the bacteria by turning it into a spore so that it would only become active once the water had been boiled. Or two versions could possibly be created, one that would be active in cold water and another that would be activated by heating it. Or the chosen bacterium could be modified to remain dormant but within the body for a period of time – perhaps days or weeks – before it was activated. In short, there are plenty of options in this field that an aggressor could take advantage of, depending upon exactly how the bioweapon was intended to be deployed.’
‘So what do you guys think we should do next?’ TJ Masters asked, he and Moore having taken virtually no part in the discussion. ‘Nuke Tehran or something?’
‘That is an option, I suppose,’ Simpson said, not entirely dismissively, ‘but all we’ve really done here is build a castle in the air and we don’t have any proof that our conjecture is based in reality. We certainly don’t have anything concrete and I’d like to think that even the current President of the United States of America would want more than just an interesting conspiracy theory before he decided to press the big red button. Checks and balances, all that kind of thing. And it’s not easy to see how we can get any kind of proof, and certainly not quickly. Richter – any ideas?’
‘If we’re right about this,’ he replied, ‘we know three things. First, there has to be a biological laboratory somewhere in Iran where this bioweapon has been developed. Finding that wouldn’t be like looking for a needle in a haystack, it would be like looking for a particular piece of hay in a haystack, and a haystack that you can’t get close to because we have almost nobody on the ground in Iran. In short, it could be anywhere. They could stick it in a hospital, on an industrial estate, on an airfield or inside a government building or any one of dozens of other possible locations. The second point is related to the first. As well as developing this thing, they’ll almost certainly have to test it as well, just as Porton Down did with the TRAIT trial, so that they can confirm that it’s working. We might have more luck finding evidence of that. Legoland ought to have a few assets inside Iran, low-level agents and people they could task with checking on any unexplained disappearances from isolated villages, that kind of thing.’
‘I don’t think you’ll find that many Jews in Iran,’ the Intelligence Director pointed out.
‘Based on what the Professor here has told us,’ Richter replied, ‘it wouldn’t be necessary to trial the bioweapon on Jews. Unless I’ve misunderstood, the Iranians could simply identify genetic markers on any racial sub-group and alter the vector accordingly. Once they’d proved that the payload did whatever it was supposed to do, they could then select the Jewish genetic markers, modify the vector and do another trial by snatching a dozen or so victims from Israel or somewhere and feeding the stuff to them as a final confirmation that it worked. If that is what they did, then we might have more of a chance of finding evidence of it, because the Jews tend to look after their own and any ma
ss kidnapping, or however it was done, would have raised a red flag somewhere, inside or outside Israel.’
Vernon nodded.
‘That would work,’ he agreed, ‘though it would be a somewhat lengthy and cumbersome process, to alter the vector, I mean.’
‘You said three things,’ Simpson reminded Richter. ‘What’s the third?’
‘Depending upon how far along they are with getting this bioweapon prepped and ready, they’re going to have to work out a way of getting it into position so that they can dump it into the aquifers or reservoirs or whatever the water supply in Israel is based on. That means a physical presence in Israel and a non-obvious route to get the stuff from Iran to the target area. And I know bacteria are sodding small beasties, but, if they are planning on infecting most of the population of Israel, the Iranians are going to need a lot more than just a couple of test tubes of the stuff. I’m assuming that we’re talking about drums or tanks rather than a few syringes.’
‘The dilution factor is significant,’ Vernon agreed, ‘and they would need a considerable quantity of the vector to guarantee that it would be successful.’
‘Hang on,’ Simpson said. ‘I thought the idea of this bioweapon was that its effects would only become known months or years down the road.’
‘That’s what I think,’ Vernon agreed, ‘but to guarantee its ineffectiveness there’s no substitute for numbers. I don’t know where Israel gets its water from, but if it relies upon the Sea of Galilee, for example, or a subterranean aquifer, the sheer volume of water in those sources would mean adding a massive quantity of the vector. If they didn’t do that, then the vector could end up so thinly spread that only a small proportion of the population would be affected by it, and they might receive such a low exposure that it would have little or no effect upon them. There are so many imponderables and variables in this matter that I really can’t be definitive about any aspect of it.’
Bioweapon Page 27
