If the Shah was looking for proof that he still enjoyed the people’s affection he found it in Mashad, which had remained peaceful throughout the winter and spring. The Pahlavis drove through the city’s crowded streets standing in the back of an open car, receiving the acclaim of tens of thousands of admirers who lined the route tossing bouquets and singing, “Greetings to the king of kings.” The scene was an extraordinary reminder of the Shah’s enduring personal appeal in the provinces. Mashad was far from the intellectual hubbub of Tehran, with its cynicism and snobbery. The city was not a Khomeini stronghold, and its clerical establishment seemed determined to send the Shah a message of support after months of bad news. Like Shariatmadari in Qom, Mashad’s moderates feared Khomeini and looked to the Shah and the army to prevent an extremist takeover. At the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza he reaffirmed his complementary functions as Keeper of the Realm and Custodian of the Faith. “You know about my faith in Islam and my methods of statesmanship,” he told the city’s religious leadership. “My faith is reflected in my words and actions. The Islamic world, especially the Shia community, is of course aware of my other responsibility, which is the protection of the country’s borders and independence.” Then he uttered a warning that in hindsight could only be regarded as prophetic.
If we protect this country we can also protect our religion, our sacred beliefs and our convictions. But if, God forbidding, the country should be rendered shaky, then I fear our religion will be harmed too. There are examples of such an eventuality. But I do not want to mention them.
The senior cleric who replied on behalf of the ulama made the pointed observation that too many young Iranians lacked “sufficient understanding of the true principles of Islam” and were too easily influenced by “distorted views”—a none-too-subtle dig at Khomeini’s call for an Islamic government—and he urged the media and school system to “be more responsive to the need to steer the public away from corrupt views and unethical practices.”
The next day, while the Queen made several spontaneous walkabouts in the center of town, where she was cheered and hugged by the crowds, the Shah took his message to perhaps his most loyal supporters, the factory workers who owed him their livelihoods. He reminded his audience at the Iran National Automobile spare parts complex of how far Iran had come in recent decades, returning to his theme of foreign interference in Iran’s internal affairs and mentioning the country’s division in 1907 between the Russians and British and the 1941 Russo-British invasion and occupation. “If the principles of the [White] Revolution are harmed, not only your children will have to play in dirt, but also you yourselves will be deprived of living,” he reminded the workers. His enemies wanted to “restore the old regime in which workers were ruthlessly exploited, farmers were little different from slaves, women were classed with criminals and the insane, and the country was condemned to eternal backwardness.” The workers rewarded him with rousing cheers and pledges of support for the monarchy. He enjoyed a similar reception at Ferdowsi University, where he mixed with a crowd of a thousand academics amid only light security. As the Shah left the three-hour event he turned to the governor, who had tried to prevent the attendance of twenty leftist professors, and with a mocking smile said, “If only all agitators were like that!”
The Shah returned from his inspection tour of Khorassan Province with a much-needed confidence boost. But he was rattled when a newspaper reporter asked him “why some Iranians felt scared and were leaving the country after liquidating their assets.” This was apparently the first time the Shah had heard that middle-class Iranians were fleeing the country. “What point is there in living abroad as a refugee, even if one is leading a good life?” he asked and reminded them that the “protection of the state required active cooperation on the part of patriotic Iranians as well.” Yet he failed to appreciate the panic gripping Iran’s middle class. The absence of a moderate alternative to the Shah’s rule was driving young people toward extremism. Terrified that religious fanatics were making their bid for power, worried that the Shah was either ill or out of touch, and fearful that the earth was breaking open beneath their feet, the middle class felt pushed and pulled between two extremes. “My God, we would like a decent opposition, a decent alternative, but the idea of the mullahs bringing the mob out to burn the place down is absolutely terrifying,” one middle-class Tehrani told Colin Smith of Britain’s Observer newspaper. In a dispatch he filed in late May 1978, Smith observed that “much of the [religious] protest movement seems to be aimed against the growing secularism of a society where, because oil has made possible what the Shah’s father only dreamed of doing, changes that took centuries in Europe have been telescoped into a couple of decades. Rioters have broken up shops selling televisions, liquor stores, boutiques, cinemas and in accordance with Islamic strictures against usury banks.”
Iran’s secular urban middle class felt the noose drawing around its neck. More cases were reported of young men on motorcycles throwing acid in the faces of women seen wearing Western clothing. The pace of middle-class flight picked up after the Shah’s dismal performance at his press conference. “Bankers suggest that wealthy and middle-class Iranians are prudently transferring funds abroad,” warned the Washington Post. “We’re angry about the Tehran traffic when the shah is spending billions on military gadgets,” said one frustrated Tehran resident. “We’re angry about the pollution in the capital. Face it, everyone has got a complaint.” Prime Minister Amuzegar offered the assurance that the trouble “will play itself out” and “poses no threat” to the stability of the regime. “Many Iranians are not so sure, however,” reported Nicholas Gage of the New York Times, “and some are hurrying to sell property in a declining market in order to send cash abroad. They know that when reformist elements put their liberal, revolutionary and even heretical ideas aside and ally themselves with the mullahs, it means trouble, because the mullahs have the power and influence to threaten the Government.”
17
INTO THE STORM
Nobody can overthrow me. I have the power.
—THE SHAH
The Shah will be gone before I leave.
—U.S. CONSUL MICHAEL METRINKO
To everyone’s relief, except for a strike that closed shops in southern Tehran, the fifteenth anniversary of Khomeini’s June 1963 uprising passed uneventfully. The Shah had rejected Sabeti’s raft of tougher measures, but even the limited arrests of several hundred religious opponents was enough to calm the streets. “Rumors and alarmist reports notwithstanding, Tehran and the rest of the country had a quiet day yesterday,” reported one observer. “Workers went to their factories and employees to their offices. The shops were open; the streets were as usual jammed with traffic.” The government had succeeded in puncturing the rumors and gossip flying about town and the vast majority of Tehranis “gave clear indication that they opt for moderation and that the extremists of any color have little following.”
Hopeful that the “forty-forty” protest cycle had ended, the Shah wasted no time in moving forward with the next phase of liberalization. On Tuesday, June 6, he fired General Nasiri as Savak’s chief and appointed him to the post of Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan. “Political sources said the surprise dismissal indicated the Shah’s displeasure with Savak, and claimed it will probably lead to stricter control on its future activities,” reported the Washington Post. The next day the Imperial Court announced that Lieutenant General Nasser Moghadam, chief of military intelligence, would run the secret police. Moghadam had led the effort to reform the trials of civilian suspects hauled before military courts, and the previous month he had presented Hushang Nahavandi with the report documenting corruption at the highest levels of court and government. The Shah presided over his two-minute swearing-in ceremony but kept his remarks to the bare minimum: “I’m sure you know your job.” No newspaper reporters or cameras were present to record the moment.
From there, the Shah walked out onto Niavaran’s front lawn to deliver his seco
nd major announcement of the day. Waiting for him on the sun-dappled grass under the plane trees were several hundred members of Hushang Nahavandi’s think tank of intellectuals, lawyers, industrialists, and civic leaders. In years past the Shah had dismissed the group as a talk shop. Now he wanted the liberals to know that he was with them. It was at this moment that he removed the mask of authoritarianism with which he had never been comfortable and revealed his true colors as a progressive and social activist. With Savak reformed, the king who had emancipated women, liberated the peasants, enacted profit sharing for workers, and nationalized the forests and waterways was finally free to be himself. He believed that his decision to replace Nasiri with Moghadam had removed the shadow of police state repression. Fresh from his triumph in Mashad, and with the streets quiet, commerce resumed, and classes over for the summer, Niavaran’s warm summer day felt like a fresh start. A burden had been lifted—finally he could be the sort of father to the nation he had always aspired to be. Just before they walked out before the television cameras, the Shah turned to Nahavandi and with a broad smile said, “Well, I hope you’re satisfied.”
“I think Your Majesty made the right choice,” answered Nahavandi.
They strolled into the center of the gathering and the Shah smiled again and shyly remarked, “Who says the intellectuals don’t like us?” He soaked up the cheers and applause.
Nahavandi spoke first. He began by reminding everyone that “the stability and unity of Iran depend upon cooperation between the religious authorities and the monarchy.” He spoke of popular unhappiness with corruption, gently reminding the Shah that “those who surround Your Majesty and are closest to you ought to be exemplars of moral rectitude, virtue and integrity.” Then he pointed out that the Rastakhiz Party had failed in its mission to bring the crown closer to the people and that more than ever the regime had to initiate a dialogue with opposition groups. He ended his remarks by urging the nation “to renew its confidence in the King, to direct us at this decisive turning point, deal with the problems of the present and prepare for the future.”
The Shah said he was “gratified to see you here again in such strength.” He proceeded to deliver his most detailed explanation yet of what he hoped to achieve with liberalization and why he was not worried about street protests. “Eighteen months ago we began to give the people greater freedom and more opportunities in every field,” he told the crowd. “Some say by giving these freedoms we have caused all the commotion and events that we witnessed, that they have led to attacks on banks and window smashing. But this is the price we must pay to achieve maximum freedom. Obviously, this freedom must be within the framework of the country’s laws and sovereignty.… You have surely seen the results of the advancement of freedom. This process will continue and lead to maximum liberty—liberty minus treason.” A decade ago Iran had needed strong leadership from the center to push through reform programs and industrialization schemes in the most efficient and time-saving manner possible. Now, with the first phase of reforms completed, it was time to return power to the people. He was confident that the White Revolution “has led to enough social, political, economic, and cultural progress to sustain such liberalization policies. If such confidence did not exist, the government would not so heatedly pursue decentralization and the promotion of individual liberties.” The Shah complained that more attention was being paid to “troublemakers” than to the reformers in his audience. Once again, he recapitulated Iran’s recent history by reminding his audience of how far the country had come in recent years. He ended by pledging his support for measures that would respect constitutional conventions and ensure the separation of the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches of government.
The Shah’s speech was a tour de force. “This was the first time that the Monarch has directly replied to those who are known to have reservations about the overture towards greater freedom of debate and dissent that began nearly two years ago,” wrote journalist Amir Taheri in the pages of Kayhan. “It is now clear that the critics of liberalization will either have to find stronger arguments than broken windows or step aside, allowing those who understand and support the process to continue with the current reforms and changes of attitude.” Liberalization had never been intended as “a tactical move” but was the result of the Shah’s carefully considered assessment that Iran was not the country it had been fifteen years ago and that the political system had to be reformed. The Shah’s view was that some unrest was to be expected as controls on speech and assembly were loosened. “Disturbances began to spread, first on university campuses and later in the streets and bazaars,” wrote Taheri. “Part of this was, no doubt, the work of traditional opposition groups that had remained dormant for many years. But a good part was also due to an accumulation of discontent with tight control, over-centralization, lack of sufficient open debate and a general feeling that corruption and inefficiency together with arrogance have struck the bureaucracy. All this had to come out in the open.” Part of it came out in “aimless riots” that received widespread coverage in the international news media. But most dissent has been “aired in a responsible and constructive manner.” Millions of Iranians were debating the country’s shortcomings and ways of overcoming them. Part of this process was taking place within the Rastakhiz Party. In the media, articles critical of the system could now be published. Even state-owned television has “encouraged and organized a series of pertinent debates on various aspects of the nation’s life.” Tension with the clergy was also natural. “Periods of disaffection between the government and the Shi’ite clergy have punctuated Iran’s history during the past 400 years. But both sides have always succeeded in sorting out their differences in the end. Seen from every angle it appears impossible to counsel against liberalization. If anything, the counsel of wisdom would be aimed at speeding up the process, giving it more tangible form on the way.”
In laying out his vision for Iran’s future, the Shah hoped to rally the disaffected middle class, consolidate the support of workers and farmers, and reassure his foreign allies that he was committed to liberalization. His view that riots were the price of progress found support from prominent foreign scholars and academics, most notably Iranologist George Lenczowski, who taught political science at the University of California–Berkeley. In May 1978 Lenczowski visited Tehran in his capacity as chairman of the Hoover Institute’s Committee for the Middle East and assured his Iranian audiences that the recent violence was actually proof that the Shah’s policies were working. Such dissent was “unthinkable in a totalitarian system,” which was why it was not seen in the Soviet Union. Nor was he especially worried about the resurgence of Islam throughout the region or “any basic conflict between the Iranian clergy and leadership … judging by the notions of progress nursed by the regime, very close cooperation between Church and State in Iran seemed the most natural option.” The Shah felt encouraged by Lenczowski and others to believe that the best antidote to unrest was more and not less liberalization. He had always been impressed by academics boasting Ivy League credentials, and now they confirmed his own instincts to stay on course. He seemed not to grasp that having set down his sword and shield he was walking naked into the storm.
* * *
SIX DAYS AFTER the Shah’s June 6 speech, Israel’s ambassador Uri Lubrani sent Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan a memorandum that warned the Pahlavi Dynasty was doomed. “Many feel that an accelerated process of challenging the Shah has started; this process is irreversible and will ultimately lead to his fall and to a drastic change in the structure of the regime in Iran,” he warned. “It is very difficult to estimate time scopes and my personal estimate, which is not based on any objective factors, is that we speak, more or less, about five years.” Lubrani’s pessimistic report recommended that Israel start looking for oil elsewhere and prepare to walk away from its extensive military and commercial investments in Iran.
* * *
AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN TOOK the opposite view. On t
he eve of his departure for a summer-long vacation in Mexico he wrote a long memorandum to the State Department in which he assured his colleagues that while the Shah was not yet “out of the woods,” the end of unrest was in sight. Tougher security measures and the Shah’s effort to find common ground with Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari and moderate ulama had eased tensions and yielded results.
Sullivan and his political counselors Lambrakis and Stempel were anxious to start their own dialogue with Shariatmadari. Sullivan played tennis on Tuesdays with Hossein Nasr, Queen Farah’s cultural affairs adviser, and knew him to be well connected in clerical circles. Sullivan, Nasr recalled, “began to pester me for a meeting with Shariatmadari independent of the government. It really began after Tabriz. He picked my brains. He wanted to meet these people.” Nasr was coolly indifferent to the ambassador’s overtures. Sullivan had more luck with Mehdi Bazargan, leader of the Liberation Movement of Iran and the only mainstream opposition leader inside Iran who everyone assumed had Khomeini’s ear and shared the Marja’s confidence. On May 25 diplomat John Stempel was introduced to Bazargan at the home of an associate, and they talked about the Shah’s liberalization and the Carter administration’s human rights policy. Bazargan admitted that opposition groups had taken advantage of the “open space” to test the limits of censorship and the regime’s tolerance of dissent. They had felt encouraged when Parviz Sabeti’s Savak agents stood on the sidelines and did nothing. Bazargan insisted that Savak and not the religious underground was behind the riots around the country.
Both sides were pleased with how the meeting went. Stempel went back to the embassy to tell his colleagues that Bazargan was someone they could do business with. Bazargan in turn said he “looked forward to a dialogue with the American embassy and was quite pleased with the initial talk.” Following the discussion, Bazargan’s associate Mohammad Tavakoli confided to Stempel that moderates like Bazargan were in a race against time against young hotheads and supporters of Khomeini were were pushing for an open confrontation with the regime. Six months ago, he explained, the Mujahedin and Fedayeen had almost given up on the prospect of peaceful change in Iran. When Stempel asked how he knew this to be true—was Bazargan in contact with these same terrorist groups?—Tavakoli became vague, “indicating the LMI had learned this from ‘friends.’ I did not press the point.” Tavakoli assured Stempel that the Islamic movement opposed to the Shah was basically pro-Western and “it would be a pity if the Shah drove it into the hands of other hostile forces.”
The Fall of Heaven Page 44
