by Rob Harper
All the columns were meant to arrive before Legé at 11am, but Boulard arrived first, soon followed by Beysser. As Charette had been warned of their approach he withdrew with Vrignault to Vieillevigne.73
Over the next few days Charette received another poor reception from the Army of the Centre, and hearing from refugees that the republicans had reoccupied St-Colombin and Pont-James, 15km north of Legé, he decided to set out with his small contingent to attack them.74
Pont-James and St-Colombin 7 May
Labory commanded between 300 and 500 men split between Pont-James and St-Colombin. They were reportedly demoralised, lacked supplies and had limited ammunition.75 Charette marched overnight and on approaching the enemy split his small force in two: the left wing included deserters from 4th Line, followed by men under La Robrie with two cannon; Charette and the cavalry formed the right wing.
Labory claimed he was aware of the enemy’s approach and at 7am sent out patrols to scout the roads and some woods to his left.76 Around 9am he heard loud cries and gunfire so deployed his men and waited in position (probably in Noyers) but it now went quiet and nothing happened for some time. An enemy column eventually appeared on his right but he held them at bay with artillery fire. Then a second column appeared facing his centre, almost immediately followed by a large disorderly mob of armed men on his left. Labory was urged to head for some high ground beyond the village from where he might be able to hold off the rebels, but on route his men became disordered and routed. Only 105 men rallied in Machecoul.
Half of the prisoners joined the rebels and some (notably fifty from the 72nd Line) became firmly loyal to the Vendéen cause.77 Charette marched his prisoners triumphantly to Vieillevigne where he now received a hero’s welcome. On the evening of 9 May he was back in Legé which became his headquarters for the next four months and his recent success enhanced his reputation and would soon increase both his numbers and influence.
The Assault on Palluau 15 May
Although Charette wanted to retake Machecoul, Savin and Joly were not prepared to join him and persuaded him to join them in another attempt on Palluau. They assembled on 14 May and on the following morning advanced in three columns. Boulard’s command consisted of three Bordeaux battalions; eighty from the 110th Regiment; forty from the 60th Regiment, one hundred mounted gendarmes and two 8pdrs.78 Allowing for detachments he fought with 1,184 men.
The first column, under Charette and Vrignault, comprised 2,000 infantry, 80 cavalry and 2 light cannon. They marched on the Legé road and deployed before the other columns appeared. Charette placed himself at the head of the cavalry while his cannon and armed men fired intermittently from behind hedges and trees. Joly was next to arrive and appeared on the Poiré-sur-Vie road.
Boulard had deployed troops north of Palluau on the Legé road and Charette’s guns were so badly aimed that the republicans were heard bursting into laughter.79 They exchanged fire until around 3pm, at which point the republican artillery opened up and the Vendéens retreated behind houses and trees along the road and ignored Charette’s shouts to advance.80
The Assault on Palluau.
The Loroux area sent 300 armed men to join Charette. They arrived on the Legé road and found themselves pushing Charette’s fugitives in front of them. They soon entered into a firefight with the republican tirailleurs.
Joly was making no progress on the right so dispatched 900 men to cut the bridge at La Chapelle-Palluau on the enemy’s line of retreat, but this only weakened his force and enabled the republicans to push his column back.81 A republican battery eventually caused his column to break up and retreat on Poiré.82
Boulard now concentrated on Charette’s column which was extending around his left flank and trying to penetrate the weakly-defended northwestern part of Palluau.
The fiercely independent Savin had deployed on high ground northwest of Palluau but had not made up his mind where best to attack. When Charette’s cavalry came into sight they were mistaken for republicans and Savin’s men opened fire. As a consequence this cavalry, and then Charette’s infantry, rapidly retreated on Legé.83 Savin’s column also withdrew. Charette was pursued by Boulard and attempted to cover the retreat with his cavalry until they were defeated and dispersed by the gendarmes.84
Around 5pm Boulard heard that the La Chapelle-Palluau Bridge had been broken and dispatched some troops who surprised and dispersed Joly’s detachment and repaired the bridge.85
Boulard wildly exaggerated Vendéen strength at 12,000 men and admitted to only 24 casualties against Royalist losses of 150 men.86
Boulard now received news of the defeat at La Châtaigneraie and the rebel march on Fontenay. Knowing his priority was to cover Les Sables he dropped back to La Mothe-Achard, where, on 26 May, he received reinforcements totalling 1,500 infantry and 60 cavalry. Nevertheless, three days later he warned Baudry (then in Challans) that he would soon be pulling back on Vairé and Olonne, leaving posts in St-Gilles and La Chaize.87 Baudry was furious and asked to be put under Canclaux’s orders so he could retake the offensive.88 He had been joined by 2,000 national guards at Challans, who had moved south from Machecoul on 26 May, and a further 600 volunteers were soon to join him from Nantes.89
Charette gathered increasing numbers of followers, including Bulkeley’s small army from the area of La-Roche-sur-Yon, and in the second half of May republicans in Les Sables were claiming Joly had 20-25,000 men, and although this was far from reality it demonstrates the fear the rebels inspired.
At the end of the month the republicans were holding posts from Challans to La Mothe-Achard, with detachments at St-Gilles, La Chaize-Giraud, Saint-Cyr, Avrillé and Talmont. They were also firmly in control of Paimboeuf and Pornic. Reinforcements were constantly trickling in from La Rochelle and also gathering in Nantes. To oppose them royalist posts included St-Jean-de-Monts, Apremont, Beaulieu, La-Roche-sur-Yon and Poiroux, and constant skirmishes were taking place between Beaulieu and La Mothe-Achard.90
Chapter 7
The Republic in Crisis
The National Picture June 1793
Events in Paris drastically and dramatically changed, with direct consequences for the Vendée. The Girondists were ousted from the Convention following the famous Journées of 31 May and 2 June and the Paris Commune gained a stranglehold over the Convention for the coming months. The Girondists were blamed for the growing economic crisis, military defeats, and the betrayal of the generals. Following a foolish threat that Paris would be wiped from the face of the earth, pitting the country (the power base of the Girondists) against Paris, the Girondists gave Robespierre and the Paris Commune the excuse to call on the mob to rise up.
June Campaigns.
The Vendée troubles were cited among the reasons for the arrest of twenty-nine Girondist deputies and the National Convention was now in the hands of the Montagnards, who, influenced by the Paris Commune, would hold power for the next thirteen months and would implement the Terror.
Yet as news of the fall of the Girondists became known, Federalist risings broke out in Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nîmes, Toulouse and Caen. June was to test the revolutionary government more than any month to date and the problems in the Vendée were to escalate significantly.
The Journées of 31 May and 2 June also saw the rise to prominence of the Hébértists, who were to play a prominent role in events for the remainder of 1793 and, with the Paris Commune as their base, were dangerous to any who dared oppose them. Key figures included the Minister of War Bouchotte and his ministerial assistants Ronsin and Momoro. As well as infiltrating the armies in the Vendée with agents from the Jacobins and Cordeliers Clubs, one of their own men had already been campaigning in the region: the former goldsmith Rossignol.
In addition to sending representatives on mission to the armies, on 3 May the Executive Council divided France into twenty-nine regions and sent two commissaires to each. Their role was to keep an eye on all that was going on and send in daily reports. Many came into conflict with r
epresentatives who, as members of the legislature, were unhappy at this threat to their power, so on 18 May the CPS ordered that they be subordinated to the representatives on mission.1 However, it was not that simple and the fierce struggles in Paris were mirrored in the regions: not least in the Vendée, which was located between territories sympathetic to the Girondist cause. As far as the commissaires were concerned, all generals of noble extraction were ‘suspect’ and they were determined to see all such ci-devants expelled from the army.
The Arrival of the Duc de Biron
The Duc de Biron was transferred from the Army of Italy to take command of the Army of the La Rochelle Coast, arriving in Niort on 28 May. Canclaux remained in command of the Army of the Brest Coast from his base in Nantes.
Soon after his arrival Biron wrote to the Ministry of War complaining that he found ‘a rabble of men that it was impossible to call an army’. He reported that some leaders were acting as if in command of their own private armies and that Niort had no supply wagons and no mobile hospital, ‘in a word, no means to make two marches without the certainty of lacking everything’.2 On 1 June he appealed for staff officers in whom he could have confidence, and was convinced that the greatest and most imminent danger was a coastal invasion. He noted that the rebels had evacuated Fontenay but was most concerned that he was being inundated by the continual arrival of very poor quality volunteers.
Of Biron’s 16-17,000 men in Niort nearly 6,000 were in no condition to serve, and of his 1,000 cavalry he felt he could only count on 300 hussars of the Légion-des-Alpes and some Niort and Bordeaux volunteers. On 3 June he set out for Saumur and Tours to meet with the representatives and devise a campaign plan, and on 7 June advised the Ministry of War that several Paris battalions were refusing to join the army until they received their battalion guns.3
His campaign plan was to secure communications between La Rochelle and Nantes and deny the rebels any access to the sea. He considered that the greatest risk was the potential aid the rebels might receive by sea, in particular from the British, and remained firmly of this view in the weeks ahead.
The Army of the La Rochelle Coast was extremely thinly spread: stretching from Noirmoutier to Les Sables d’Olonne, Luçon, La Mothe-Achard, Parthenay, Niort, Thouars, Doué, Saumur, Vihiers and Les Ponts-de-Cé. It consisted of two main commands which operated largely independently: the southern under Chalbos stretched from Noirmoutier to Niort, with its main lines of communication to Le Rochelle and Poitiers, and the northern command under Leygonier stretching from Thouars to Les Ponts-de-Cé. National guards held the Loire crossings from Les Ponts-de Cé to Nantes. Canclaux’s army also seemed to be acting in isolation from the Army of the La Rochelle Coast.
Biron was aware of the low morale of the army, after its succession of defeats, and found it rife with insubordination and political in-fighting. The influence of the Paris Commune was now also evident in the person of Ronsin, who took it upon himself to devise a plan which received the backing of a number of representatives. When Biron arrived at Saumur on 3 June he had little option but to fall in line with Ronsin’s plan.
Ronsin’s plan was to converge on the rebels from several directions while simultaneously covering the coast. Four main columns would be needed∷
• 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry would march from Niort on Fontenay, La Châtaigneraie and Ste Hermine;
• 10,000 infantry and some cavalry were to march from Saumur to Doué, before attacking Vihiers, Argenton and Bressuire;
• 8,000 men would march from Les Ponts-de-Cé on Chalonnes and Chemillé;
• 6,000 men would be formed from troops in Machecoul and La Mothe-Achard and between them they would occupy good positions in the area and be ready to take advantage of any opportunity to defeat the rebels;
• A reserve of 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry would move from Chinon to Thouars to support the other columns in that area;
• National guards from Mayenne, the Loire, Charente-Inférieure and Loire-Inférieure were to move to strategic points in their areas, including along the north bank of the Loire, and be ready to be deployed as needed.
Difficulties were immediately apparent however, because Ronsin’s survey on the state of the army, carried out between 10 and 24 May, highlighted its fragile state (see Appendix 2). The representatives also noted that the national guards were disorganised, lacked training, were badly armed, and were ill disposed towards attacking the Vendéens.
In spite of Biron’s concerns, the Ministry of War demanded action, but he stood his ground and refused to do anything until he had assessed the state of the army for himself. On 9 June he set out for La Rochelle and visited the posts on the coast. To his alarm he soon discovered that only 2,000 of the army’s 15,000 fusils were fit for use.4
The Saumur Campaign
After their victory at Fontenay the Vendéens soon dispersed and the town was evacuated on 28 May. The leaders convened a council of war in Châtillon-sur-Sèvres to decide on their next move. There was some disagreement over what to do next, but reports of increased republican activity around Thouars and Vihiers led them to focus once more on that front.
In spite of the poor state of the army it was Leygonier who had made some initial moves on the Vihiers front and he soon became the target of the Grand Army. Summoning their troops once again the Vendéens assembled around 30,000 foot, 1,200 horse and 24 guns in Cholet. Wounds prevented Bonchamps and D’Élbée from joining them in person.5
The Grand Army set out from Cholet on 2 June marching in reasonably well aligned closed platoons. At their front were twenty-four drummers led by Drum Major La Ruine. Cathelineau was also near the front with the Guidon-Général that always accompanied the staff.6 The main body of the army was preceded by the Division of Bonchamps, Marigny marched with the artillery, and the cavalry followed on behind. Boutillier noted that each parish had its own standard and drummer, and gentlemen were seen covered in white scarves and plumes and sporting white lapels.7
Vihiers 3 and 4 June
Late on 2 June Stofflet reached Vihiers with seventy cavalry and settled down to await La Rochejaquelein and Lescure who had assembled 3-4,000 men and some cannon at Les Aubiers. Two hours after his arrival a body of republican troops appeared from Concourson and forced him to retreat so quickly that he was unable to warn Lescure or La Rochejaquelein.8
Stofflet rallied his cavalry on the Coron road and, when he was joined by 150 more men, he set out to retake Vihiers.9 The republicans were aware of his approach and deployed in line outside the town above the Lys Bridge, but many were drunk.10 The shock of the Vendéen assault routed them and a counter-attack by republican cavalry was repulsed. After this small victory Stofflet wisely dropped back and linked up with the advance guard of the Grand Army at Coron.
On 4 June, with his own division now present, Stofflet set out once more for Vihiers, not expecting to encounter any republicans in the town. Informed of their approach Leygonier marched from Concourson with 3,000 troops.
Madame de la Rochejaquelein considered Vihiers a town of ‘terrorists’ and the civilians certainly cooperated with Leygonier.11 They left the town on his orders while his troops prepared an ambush on the Doué road.
Lescure and La Rochejaquelein’s troops passed through Vihiers having arrived from Argenton a little before Stofflet appeared. According to Deniau they spotted some men on a nearby height moving through the scrubland at a place called Poirier-de-Renard.12 They assumed these were part of Stofflet’s command but, when Lescure and La Rochejaquelein rode ahead to speak with them, the Republicans unmasked a battery of six guns and fired grapeshot at point-blank range.13 Lescure’s horse was hit and some branches were shattered but no one was injured, and instead of retreating the Vendéens rushed and overpowered two guns and captured around eighty men.14
On 5 June the rest of the Grand Army drifted into Vihiers.
Doué-la-Fontaine 7 June
The Grand Army set out for Doué on the morning of 7 June
in torrential rain. Leygonier claimed he only had 3,500 men, but 5-6,000 was probably nearer the truth; he did, however, lack staff officers.15
According to Dupont, Leygonier’s troops deployed covering the Layon crossings to the west of Doué.16 The front of the army was protected by infantry and cavalry pickets; his left flank was around Les Verchers and comprised the Légion-de-la-Fraternité, totalling less than 1,000 men, and the 3rd Republique of 200 men; his centre, at Concourson, was formed by the 3rd Paris of 750 men, 12th Republique (of similar strength) and 4th Orléans of 400 men; his right flank was at Les Rochettes and comprised 15 guns deployed on high ground supported by 598 men of the 14th Charente and 50 from the 8th Hussars. On his extreme right, at St Georges-Châtelaison, was a 750 strong Somme battalion. To the rear, at Soulanger, were two further Orléans battalions totalling about 1,500 men, and east of Doué was a battalion of 800 peasants and a battery of artillery.
