by Ervin Staub
Whoever designed the system had an intuitive sense of the psychology of perpetrators and aimed at diminishing all constraints on their behavior. The prisoners were identified only by numbers.69 As in Nazi Germany, euphemisms were used. The torture chamber was the “intensive therapy room.” A person about to be killed was sometimes said to have “gotten his ticket.” Those who were to be killed were “tranferees.” Prisoners were blindfolded, not only to disorient them and protect perpetrators from recognition, but I believe also to give perpetrators a feeling of total unaccountability and reduce restraint. Perpetrators usually referred to each other by pseudonyms in the presence of victims.
The role of bystanders
Internal bystanders
When the military assumed power, many welcomed it, including the Nobel Prize-winning writer Jorge Luis Borges.70 The coup promised deliverance from difficult life conditions, political violence, and social disorganization, in a society accustomed to military takeovers.b
Most major social institutions collaborated with the military. The judiciary accepted military denials of knowledge about persons whom relatives tried to free by habeas corpus. As Nunca Mas notes, not a single judge visited any place where relatives claimed that their loved ones were held captive. According to a deposition by one abducted and tortured person:
The judge was totally passive, though I was a wreck. Two guards had to support me as I walked and my face was disfigured.... It seems that Judge Carizze approved of the methods used, as he convicted me despite all I said. Some day these judges will have to explain why they took declarations from people completely out of their minds and went to police premises to do it.71
All active opposition was eliminated. The free press, labor unions, the right to strike, the rights to a fair trial and due process, and other civil liberties were suspended. As soon as the military came to power, it issued communiques threatening up to ten years of prison for journalists who transmit information that might demean or subvert the activities of the army. The press, with a few exceptions, accepted censorship and did not report the disappearances. The population kept quiet; essential institutions were silent or cooperated, expressing (or at least allowing the appearance of) a uniformity of views and of support for the military.
Argentinians shared the difficult life conditions, and many of them shared the cultural orientation of the military and the resulting motivation for stability, order, and purification. It is difficult to explain the cooperation of the clergy in any other way. The church officially condemned the methods used by the military but was otherwise silent. Moreover, individual priests are reported to have been present at secret detention centers, even during torture.
The very methods used by the military must have impressed on the population the importance of their cause and the necessity of extraordinary measures: helicopters hovering over buildings from which citizens were taken, tanks surrounding and destroying the homes of supposed subversives. The military said they were doing it all for the sake of Argentina’s children, and the nation joined in or accepted it.
The military also “bought off” the middle class with policies that improved its material condition, for example, monetary policies (subsidizing the rate of exchange) that enhanced its international purchasing power. However, overvaluation of the currency increased foreign imports and drove down domestic production. A recession followed, with a drop of purchasing power, and by 1981-82 the middle class was disillusioned.72
Savage repression also helped to keep the population docile. For example, midwives who told relatives about a child born in captivity to an abducted woman later disappeared. Defense lawyers who were identified as subversives or tried to act on behalf of disappeared persons were assassinated or kidnapped and tortured. The fate of 109 lawyers is still unknown. Others avoided this fate by going into exile.
Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo
The example of the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo shows that opposition was possible. The mothers of disappeared persons began to march every Thursday in the Plaza del Mayo, wearing white scarves, with the names of their children and the dates of their disappearance. There were attempts to silence them. The group was infiltrated and three of its member were kidnapped. The military also began to kidnap their relatives. Despite terrible struggles with their consciences over this, the mothers continued to gather and demonstrate.73 In the end they exerted great influence by calling the attention of the people of Argentina and the world to the disappearances.
One of the leaders of the Mothers was at first completely inactive. She spent every day waiting by the phone to hear about her son. Her daughter and daugher-in-law went to court, trying in vain to use habeas corpus. One day someone said to to the mother, “You are the mother, you have the power, they can’t treat you as they treat your daughter.” This had great impact on her. She started to haunt government offices. There she met other women, joined them, and they moved out to the plaza. Nonviolently, with dignity and courage, they pursued their aim.74
Their power arose partly from their status as mothers, a highly respected role in Argentine society, partly from their courage. Their solidarity made it possible to continue in spite of the dangers. Moreover, they evolved, learning by doing. From concern about their children, they moved to concern about all the disappeared and then a more universal interest in human rights, an expansion of concern to all humanity. The evolution of heroism and of what I have called “good fanaticism” is apparent here.
External bystanders
Many external influences contributed to the mass killing. I mentioned the shared ideology and examples of other South American countries and the common cause of their governments with the Argentine military during the mass killings. The rest of the world had tolerated torture and murder in South America for years, confirming for the Argentine military at least its acceptability, if not its Tightness.c
The United States had no role in creating the policy of disappearances, but its anticommunist zeal helped foster the ideology, institutions, and practices that became the cultural preconditions for mass killing. At the time of President Johnson’s inauguration, Defense Secretary McNamara told the U.S. Congress:
The primary objective in Latin America is to aid, whenever necessary, the continual growth of the military and paramilitary forces, so that together with the police and other security forces, they may provide the necessary internal security.75
Even during the disappearances, some countries withheld criticism, especially the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries: “The representative of the USSR even asked the UN ‘not to put to the Human Rights Commission any denunciation of Argentina’ adding that ‘new things are happening there with the takeover of power by a new government’ (he was referring to the Presidency of General Roberto E. Viola who had been the Army Chief of Staff during the crudest years of the dictatorship).”76 Other nations condemned the disappearances, but did nothing more. When some French nuns disappeared, the French government attempted to gain their release. Promises were made, but they never reappeared. Human rights organizations protested, and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States made a visit in Argentina. However, without the tangible support of nations, such organizations have limited influence, especially once mass killings have begun. By the time the machinery of destruction is in operation, the capacity of bystanders to influence the perpetrators has greatly weakened. The potential for influence is greatest at early stages – in the case of Argentina, during earlier military takeovers characterized by repression and violence.
One of the few exceptions to worldwide indifference was the Carter administration’s strong, vocal policy of support for human rights in South America and elsewhere. The U.S. Embassy was one of the few sources of support for the persecuted; the U.S. government intervened on behalf of individuals and also to halt the policy of disappearances in general. In South America Carter’s human rights policy was credited with an easing of repres
sion. In contrast, it evoked skepticism in the American press.
Conclusions
The culture of the Argentine military and historical conditions created in part by the military gave rise to mass killings. Military self-concept, world view, ideology, and goals, the steps along a continuum of repression over decades, and the machinery of destruction inherent in the military were important contributors. The influential position of the military in Argentine society, both the ceding of rights to them and powerful segments of the population sharing their values, ideology, and goals, was also important. These predisposing characteristics joined with economic crises and political violence to create instability, chaos, and fear. The stifling of pluralism and political repression by the military also contributed. Internal and external bystanders contributed to the evolution of the cultural preconditions or even supported the mass killings.
Their failure in dealing with the economy and the increasing international attention given to their brutality eroded support for the military. Their inclusive definition of victims put many people in danger and further eroded support. After 1979 there were few disappearances. Many of the more obvious targets had already been kidnapped. However, given the seemingly self-perpetuating and frequently expanding nature of such group violence, new targets might have been found if the Argentine people and the world community had not become hostile. In April 1982, the military attacked and occupied the Malvinas, or Falklands, a small group of offshore islands ruled by England but claimed by Argentina, probably in the hope of fanning the patriotism of the masses. To their surprise, England sent a fleet, which defeated the Argentine army and retook the islands. The debacle brought down the military government and put an end to the disappearances. The present democratically elected government in Argentina, by prosecuting at least some of the perpetrators, may have contributed to a world in which governments will not torture and murder their own people.
* * *
a After the demise of the military dictatorship, Raul Alfonsin, the democratically elected president of Argentina, appointed a national commission on the disappeared. The published part of their report, Nunca Mas (never again), describes in detail the methods of abduction, torture, and murder used by the military and the nature and functioning of important social institutions of the society under the dictatorship. This is a document of great importance and provides data to test the explanations I offer here.
b In mid-April 1987, in response to a rebellion by a military unit, President Alfonsin called on the population to show support for his government. Hundreds of thousands of people assembled and demonstrated, expressing intense hostility to the military. As the Guardian, a London newspaper, noted on April 20,1987, “Bitter and rowdy mass protests against military regimes have been held in Argentina, but usually at the end rather than before the beginning of a (military) regime.” The behavior of the people as internal bystanders helped Alfonsin defeat the military threat. Unfortunately, Alfonsin also made concessions to the military by introducing a Due Obedience bill, which argues that junior officers were coerced by their superiors and should be absolved of human rights crimes. Although this might have been, or he might have regarded it as, the only way to save his government, Alfonsin’s capitulation reduced the effects of his other efforts to limit the role of the military in political life.
c I am not suggesting military intervention as a means of influence, but policies that respond to the disregard by a nation of essential values. For an extended discussion see the section on Minimalism in the Relations of Nations in Chapter 16.
15 Summary and conclusions: the societal and psychological origins of genocide and other atrocities
In this chapter I will discuss the extent to which the conception of genocide presented in Part I is confirmed or disconfirmed by the four instances described. What modifications and extensions of it are required? Can genocide be predicted? I will also discuss the psychology of perpetrators and bystanders in analyzing other atrocities, such as torture.
A comparison of the four instances
The model is substantially confirmed in all four instances, although elements vary. Table 2 provides a summary.
Difficult life conditions
In all four instances, life problems were great, although they differed in magnitude and kind. Inflation and deteriorating economic conditions existed in Germany before Hitler came to power, in Argentina, and in Cambodia, and Turkey suffered from persistent poverty. Violence was a common precursor. One common scenario was as follows: economic problems intensified by inequalities in their impact (in Argentina, in Cambodia, and to some degree in Germany), often occurring together with social and political changes, led to intense political conflict and violence (Argentina, Germany) or civil war (Cambodia). In Argentina there was much internal political violence; in the other three instances the genocides took place either during a war (Turkey, Germany) or right after a civil war (Cambodia). In the case of the Holocaust, difficult life conditions contributed by bringing a destructive movement to power. The violence of World War II then intensified the motivation for genocide and reduced inhibitions.
“Difficult life conditions” is an abstraction. Its realities include homelessness, loss of individuality in a mass of needy humanity or standing in line for a job, fear for one’s life and one’s family, the oppressive anxiety of an uncontrollable and unpredictable future, and the disconnection among people who have lost their bearing in the world. Persistent difficulties of life give rise to the complex of motives described in Part I (see Chapter 2, Table 1). In future analyses classification systems and assessment techniques may be developed to specify in more detail which life problems are the most important precursors of mass killing and genocide.
Table 2. Cultural preconditions and progressions in four genocides or mass killings
Cultural preconditions
The cultural preconditions summarized in Table 2 were present to a substantial degree in all instances. Some of them were most evident in the subsystem responsible for the genocide – the Nazis and SS in Germany, the military in Argentina, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. However, there were similar inclinations in the larger society as well. In Germany and Argentina at least, the groups that became the perpetrators were accepted and even admired by the majority of the populations.
The SS was a highly authoritarian, dominance-oriented system, and Germany a strongly authoritarian society. The military in Argentina was also highly authoritarian, as was the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Turkey was also a hierarchial, authoritarian society, although the subsystem responsible for genocide was less clearly delineated.
Cultural self-concept is the most complex of the cultural preconditions. It involves high self-esteem, a sense of entitlement, and underlying insecurity. The setbacks of Argentina and Germany and their belief in unfulfilled greatness,a the Cambodian memory of past glory contrasted with present misery and humiliation, and Turkey’s steady loss of power and influence – all produced societies especially devastated by life problems because of their self-concept. A more detailed specification of the relevant components of the self-concepts and a more formal assessment of the degree to which these characterize various groups are tasks for the future.
Devaluation of the groups that became the victims was always evident. In Germany and Turkey its primary source was deep-seated cultural devaluation, subsequently enlarged by ideology. In Cambodia and Argentina the main source was ideology, built on societal divisions. Again, a system of classification and assessment of the components of devaluation would be useful.
Ideology was important in all four instances. There were both nationalistic ideologies, glorifying the nation, its purity, and greatness, and better-world ideologies, providing a vision of the world and of a type of society meant to improve life for all who follow. Usually, the guiding ideology combined these two. In Turkey the stress was on nationalism, in Cambodia’on a better world. In Germany and Argentina the two were wholly intertwined.
In mono
lithic societies the group is more susceptible to a narrow ideology and a highly specific blueprint for society. In a pluralistic society people are exposed to varied values and beliefs and various ways of resolving conflicts; this makes it unlikely that a single cultural blueprint will be accepted and held with certainty. However, this issue is complex. Life problems and social disorganization may produce an apparent pluralism. The Weimar Republic that preceded Nazi rule was seemingly pluralistic in many ways. However, this “pluralism” bordered on chaos and the collapse of tradition. The underlying, powerful authoritarian cultural tendencies and the desire for order were only temporarily overshadowed by it. It intensified the needs evoked by life problems. Once the Nazis came to power they reestablished a highly monolithic culture and political system.
Ideology was important in all four instances. There were both nationalistic ideologies, glorifying the nation, its purity, and greatness, and betterciety, and a multiplicity of possibilities and identities. Tolerance is greater, and counterreactions to steps along the continuum of destruction are more likely. Pluralism in the larger society offers bystanders an independent perspective. It allows them to exert influence with less danger of ostracism and without having to fear for their lives. Inevitably, there will be potentially destructive elements in any pluralistic society. Even so, pluralism, with its ferment, is more beneficial than a monolithic culture or totalitarian society that limits prespective, prescribes a mode of existence, and insists on its brand of goodness and purity. The only “absolute” in a society should be respect for human rights, including the basic material needs of people, and civil rights.
