by Ervin Staub
Positive reciprocity is unlikely when ideologies of antagonism and a conflict mode are dominant. First, to initiate positive action requires some trust that the other will reciprocate in kind. Second, to reciprocate a positive act, the actor’s intention must be judged benevolent. The greater the mistrust between parties, the less is it possible to test another’s intention by unilateral positive acts. Research shows that individuals, at least, will not reciprocate a kind act if they see its motivation as selfish (including the desire to gain benefits by inducing reciprocation.)25 Correspondingly, they will retaliate less or not at all if they perceive a harm-doer as having acted thoughtlessly or the harm as an unintended by-product of some action.26 Alternatively, parties may justify their unwillingness to reciprocate positive acts by expressing mistrust, when the real reason is that their true motives conflict with the positive acts required to reciprocate. Mistrust was the stated reason for the U.S. refusal to stop testing in response to the Soviet suspension of nuclear tests in the mid-1980s; the United States claimed that the Soviet Union stopped only after a long series of tests that gave it an advantage.
To change a malignant mode of relating, nations must begin a process of positive reciprocity starting from the most basic level. They must move from diplomatic contact, to tourism and cultural exchanges, to cooperation in joint enterprises, to mutual help. Over time, motivations that support conflict should diminish, and the desire for cooperation and peace should increase.
Having identified the cultural preconditions for war (and genocide), we must evolve cultures without them. In the next two chapters I discuss an agenda for creating nonaggressive, cooperative, and caring individuals and social groups. Cultural changes together with planetary interrelatedness in economies, in communication, and in facing the nuclear threat may create readiness for an international system that functions as a world community.
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a In discussing war (and peace) I will consider past realities and future possibilities, using U.S.-Soviet relations as an example of conflict and antagonism.
b The group of sixty- to seventy-five-year-old Germans in Trier showed intense involvement in our discussion. After nearly four hours, only one had left; I had to stop the discussion because of other obligations. My impression was that many in the group had never had this kind of discussion before. As a result, they had only very partially restructured or reorganized their original experience in light of the full knowledge about the Hitler era that later became available to them.
The group of students had also failed to work through the past and integrate it with the present. Most of the students had little historical knowledge about the details of the Hitler era and even less “personal knowledge” handed down to them by the older generation. National self-awareness requires processes of exploration within the society.
c The image of the enemy has become a widely used concept. In my view, while images of the enemy are important in maintaining and enhancing hostility, they are just one component of a broader ideology of antagonism. Moreover, it is important to identify the roots of enmity and hence of enemy images – a central goal of this book.
d The vision of minimalist practice may seem idealistic. However, ideals are essential in the creation of new realities. Minimalist practice and the evolution toward positive connections among nations described in Chapter 18 can progress together and reinforce each other.
17 The nature of groups: security, power, justice, and positive connection
What characteristics of cultures and individuals and what social arrangements and relations among nations are required for caring, connectedness, and nonaggression among subgroups of societies and among nations to become both strongly held values and realities of life? How might we promote them?
Social change requires highly committed people, guided by ideals. Since abstract ideals can become destructive, these ideals must remain connected to the welfare of individual human beings. There are many examples of the influence of such commitment. A group of abolitionists in the first half of the nineteenth century greatly influenced attitudes toward slavery. Their ideals conflicted with the practice of slavery and the beliefs and values of much of society.1 By clearly expressing their ideas and bravely suffering abuse, they impressed other Americans with their character, and ultimately the virtue of their cause. More recently civil rights activists have had a similar impact. Many rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe became highly committed, and some influenced even perpetrators.
Serge Moscovici’s research suggests that by expressing and enacting values to which they are committed, a minority can affect the attitudes of the majority. If their beliefs and values are extreme relative to those of the majority, substantial change can still occur, although at first mainly in basic orientations (e.g., blacks are also human beings) rather than attitudes and values that directly guide behavior.2 The research on bystanders and the real-life examples I described also show that people can powerfully influence others.
In working to diminish group violence, and especially the nuclear threat, people often focus on short-term goals. Arms control and crisis resolution procedures are realistic goals. However, a lasting decrease in the likelihood of war or genocide requires deeper changes in consciousness and perspective, in personalities, culture, and institutions. Such changes require long-term goals and a vision of the road leading to them.
Theories of social change abound, but our knowledge of how to bring it about is limited. Actions often have unintended effects. But some movements for change are successful. Perhaps sensitivity to existing realities must be added to a focus on the desired outcome to foresee the pyschological and social consequences of a course of action.
The United States is the place I know best. Whatever its imperfections, the democratic nature of U.S. culture and society makes change possible. Given the power and influence of the United States, its practices and policies can greatly affect international relations and influence the internal practices of other countries, for the worse or for the better. For all these reasons, I will use the United States as the main example in discussing an agenda for change. However, the discussion applies to other nations as well.
Assumptions about human nature and the nature of societies
Does human nature or the nature of social groups limit the possibility of cooperative, caring, nonviolent relations? As I have noted, some philosophers, social thinkers, and psychologists assume that humans are good by nature, others that they are selfish, uncaring, or aggressive. I have stressed my view that human beings have genetic potentials for both altruism and aggression, which evolve through socialization and experience.
Theorists have also discussed the nature of groups and the implications of human nature for group behavior. Andrew Schmookler, in The Parable of the Tribes, offers “selection for power” as a central evolutionary concept. He says that social selection is not random, like biological selection; its main principle is power. It is likely to “discard those who revere nature in favor of those willing to exploit it. The warlike may eliminate the pacifist; the ambitious the content. . .modern industrialized powers will sweep away archaic cultures.” Given the unprecedented capacity for growth developed by civilized society, “a Hobbesian struggle for power among societies became inevitable.” In Schmookler’s view, the “problem of power is inevitable in human societies... .Inequalities of power lead inevitably to corruption, and human affairs tend naturally to create inequalities of power.”3 In the long run competitive strivings inevitably dominate over cooperative ones.
Reinhold Niebuhr, in his 1932 classic Moral Man and Immoral Society, argues that there is a “basic difference between the morality of individuals and the morality of collectives, whether races, classes or nations.”4 Collectives have a brutal character. In groups egoism and self-interest resist all moral or inclusive social interest.
Our contemporary culture fails to realize the power, extent and persistence of group egoism in human relations. It may
be possible, though it is never easy, to establish just relations between individuals within a group by moral and rational suasion and accommodation. In inter-group relations this is practically an impossibility. The relations between groups must therefore always be predominantly political rather than ethical, that is, they will be determined by the proportion of power which each group possesses at least as much as by any rational and moral appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group.5
Even the individual’s capacity for altruism is subverted by the group. The ethical paradox of patriotism is that it “transmutes individual unselfishness into national egotism... .The unqualified character of this devotion is the very basis of the nation’s power and of the freedom to use power without moral restraint.” Critical loyalty to the group is very difficult to achieve, and the group frowns upon it. Another source of support for the group is that individuals try to fulfill egoistic needs and elevate themselves through the nation. Still, unity even within nations is difficult to achieve, partly because privileged groups are concerned with their own self-interest, not the interest of the whole nation. “National unity of action can be achieved only upon such projects as are either initiated by the self interest of dominant groups, in control of the government, or supported by the popular emotions and hysterias which from time to time run through a nation.”6
This is a highly pessimistic view. The history of the twentieth century may make it seem realistic. Niebuhr criticizes social scientists for unrealistic belief in the possibility of radical change by “reorganization of values” or by socializing the young. However, it may be Niebuhr’s assumptions that are incorrect.
Life arrangements vary greatly. The evolution of societies can lead to more or less differentiation among members and more or less justice. India is currently struggling to eliminate the pervasive differences institutionalized in the caste system. In the United States tremendous changes in race relations have resulted from the civil rights movement. Slavery, once common in many regions of the world, has essentially disappeared. Some once warlike nations, for example, Denmark and Sweden, have had harmonious internal and external relations for many years. Although the struggle for power and wealth and a forceful defense of privilege are often dominant in the behavior of both individuals and groups, the desire to create just and caring societies appears again and again, and not only among those who lack privilege.
An alternative view of individual and group potentials
Individuals’ and societies’ assumptions about human nature and the nature of groups will significantly shape their realities. Our assumptions determine how we perceive others’ actions. Seeing the world and human beings as hostile, we may perceive ambiguous acts as threatneing and friendly acts of individuals or groups as devious and manipulative. Perceiving others’ actions as hostile we act to defend ourselves. We escape or aggress. Others’ reactions to our actions confirm our original assumption. Through a cycle, which is often a vicious cycle but can instead be a benevolent one, we create and maintain our realities.
There are basic human needs for material and psychological security, for a positive view of the self and of one’s group, for a world view that offers comprehension. The experience of insecurity arises not only from actual threat but from the very fact of otherness. Since establishment of an identity as an individual and member of a group is both inevitable and desirable, the potential for feeling threatened and for devaluing others is always present. Since human societies and individual relations are rarely static, especially in the modern age, the needs and motives that arise from change are also ever present. Schmookler in his Parable of the Tribes suggests that if among neighboring groups one begins to arm, the others will be threatened and will have to follow suit. However, as much of this book suggests, the experience of threat can arise from psychological and societal sources, without real external threat.
Power offers protection against attack. It also assures persons and groups that they can fulfill their basic needs. Are the motives for power and dominance and wealth basic and fixed, or are they strong because they ensure security and the fulfillment of other important needs? Can they be replaced or superseded?
Abraham Maslow offered a conception of a universal hierarchy of human needs, from safety, the most basic need, to esteem, creativity, and self-actualization.7 Maslow’s “higher” needs seem more like important potentials that may or may not evolve as a function of experience. Although the exact nature of an individual’s hierarchy is certainly affected by nurture and not only by our shared genetic makeup, the need for safety or security is basic. A related need is efficacy and control, the capacity to influence events. This need is greater if the environment is perceived as hostile. Even if actual control is limited, the illusion of control is essential.8 Power and dominance and wealth and privilege offer the reality or illusion of security and control.
Humans are malleable. Given insecurity in childhood and authoritarian child rearing, the need for security, power, and control can become profound motives, persisting through life. In a benevolent environment, however, the needlike quality of security, its imperative force, may be lost. This is true of collectivities as well as individuals. Deep individual connections to others and the experience of benevolent persons and institutions result in feelings of safety and trust. Connection and community offer deep satisfaction and can become valued and even dominant in the hierarchy of motives. As heroic self-sacrifice proves, the values of community, caring, and connection can supersede the need for security. Moreover, in a benevolent environment both individuals and groups can acquire confidence in their ability to gain security and fulfill essential motives through connection and cooperation.
To this end society must offer the opportunity to fulfill human potentials as well as basic needs. For example, part of the human potential is striving for spirituality or transcendence, a seeking that goes beyond the material and visible and beyond the boundaries of the self. Transcendence can be sought through human connection and community. The more a society offers opportunities for transcendence by positive means, the less likely that it will be sought in destructive movements.
Even in the most benevolent society, the experience of frustration is inevitable. All of us suffer from external constraints, limitations in our abilities, or inner conflicts. All suffer injustice at times. All suffer the pain of separation or loss and experience threats to the psychological self. How people respond to this depends on past experience and present circumstance. Their response is more constructive if they trust their own capacities and the world. People can even take frustration as a positive challenge and proceed with constructive efforts to fulfill blocked goals – or relatively painlessly relinquish goals that are not in their power to fulfill.
Trust within a group does not necessarily lead to good relations with other groups. Trust and connectedness arise from “proximal” experiences. Members of different groups usually have no such direct, proximal ties. Trust must evolve through a history of contact, cooperation, and friendly relations.
Without it groups need power to feel secure and power often comes to be valued for its own sake. The “selection” of leaders contributes to this. Those who seek and succeed in achieving leadership tend to have stronger motivation for power than other group members. Because power strengthens feelings of security within the group (and possibly fulfills an ideal self-concept), leaders who successfully use or enhance the group’s power please members and strengthen their own leadership position. All this is not inevitable, and I will later discuss ways to strengthen the values of connection and cooperation between groups.
Relations between the individual and the group
Individuals often give up autonomy, responsibility, and decision making to their group and leaders. The group often helps people fulfill hopes and desires that they cannot fulfill in their individual existence. It hones desires for self-aggrandizement and its fulfillment through the group, partly because this enhances loyalty.
Social identity often embodies hopes, desires, and ideals different from individual goals and identity. In addition, giving the self over to the group can diminish a burdensome identity and give people an oceanic feeling of connectedness, of breaking out of the confines of the individual self.
Can the relationship between individuals and the group change? It is important that people acquire a critical consciousness, the ability to see their group’s imperfections as well as strengths. Then their loyalty to the group may be expressed in attempts to improve it, rather than insistence on its virtues. Such critical loyalty may seem incompatible with the aim of strengthening the group as a community, but it is not. In well-functioning families the members can express their own needs and beliefs without rebellion, and conflicts can be resolved. The same can happen in larger groups. Close ties can provide the security to oppose potentially destructive ideas and practices. The group may come to regard such opposition not as disloyalty but as service to itself.
Important societal issues
Social justice and life problems
The awareness of injustice motivates people to seek justice, and sometimes also to take revenge. However, conditions that would be defined as cruelly unjust at one time are accepted as fair at another time. Besides, just-world thinking and other psychological processes may make both victims and bystanders see unjust suffering as fair or deserved. Depending on the culture and traditions of a society, what is regarded as the “right” input (contribution) and outcome (reward) of different parties greatly varies. If the culture regards inequality as natural and right, if the work expected of the less powerful is not unbearable, if their basic needs for food and shelter are met, and if the culturally accepted standards for their treatment do not permit excessive cruelty and the powerful party abides by them, the experience of injustice may never arise.
