By the time Hill arrived at Veracruz, a thousand troops had already departed for Mexico City. The column, commanded by Major Folliott T. Lally, had started inland back on August 6, but it quickly ran into trouble in the guerrilla-infested country between the coast and Jalapa. After being attacked by at least 1,200 Mexicans under Padre Caledonia de Jarauta on August 10, the beleaguered column waited two days at the National Bridge for reinforcements that never got through from Veracruz. Lally’s men had to fight their way the remaining forty miles to Jalapa, and by the time they arrived on August 20, they had suffered ninety-two casualties. Lally’s experience is an indication of the wisdom of Scott’s decision to cut off his communication with the coast. Had he tried to keep supplies and troops moving from Veracruz to the interior, guerrillas would have constituted a serious enough threat to siphon off needed men and matériel. Lally’s situation finally improved in late September when Brigadier General Joseph Lane’s force of 1,700 men and more than 150 wagons overtook his column west of Jalapa. Lane was an Indiana politician who had received a commission as a colonel of volunteers in 1846 and had fought admirably at the Battle of Buena Vista. When he received orders from Washington transferring his brigade from Zachary Taylor’s army, he hurried to Veracruz, then got his bulky column moving inland on September 19. His presence in Veracruz coincided with that of Hill, who was assigned to a contingent of six hundred infantry and cavalry that had left the coast two days behind Lane’s column.8
Lane skirmished with a guerrilla force, killing seven of them before moving on to the National Bridge. He remained there for four days, then moved through Cerro Gordo to Jalapa. The ground around Cerro Gordo remained littered with cannonballs, spiked cannon, and other artifacts of the battle. Hill traveled with Louisiana volunteers, and he recorded that on their second day out, some of the volunteers burned a hacienda that they thought was Santa Anna’s—“wantoness entirely uncalled for and unjustifiable.” The road from Veracruz to National Bridge bore evidence that an army had passed through: strewn about were clothing, worn-out shoes, broken wheels, canteens, and knapsacks. In some places the debris lay more thickly than in others, indicating spots where wagon trains had been attacked and cut off by guerrillas. The surrounding terrain, with its thick chaparral and natural defensive positions, was the most “favorable country for ambuscades, surprises, etc.” that Hill had ever seen. And when he saw that most of the ranches along the road had been destroyed by passing American troops, he understood why many of the inhabitants turned into guerrillas, “ready to murder the first straggler.” These troops, two hundred miles away from the theater commander, neither knew nor cared about the restrictions that pacification dictated. Besides, this was guerrilla warfare, and the rules were different. But alas, the partisan activities of the Mexicans proved inadequate to stop the passage of American troops, and Hill concluded that “they have not the courage to avail themselves of [opportunities] . . . and allow the country to be overrun by a handful of invaders.” Many of the houses that Hill saw along the road were thatched buildings made of straw and poles. “They are very respectable chicken coops and thats the way I account for the people being so chicken hearted,” he wrote.9
When Hill’s column got to within four miles of the National Bridge, one of their wagons broke down. Hill had been in command of fifty mounted volunteers who made up the rear guard, and they were ordered to stay behind with the wagon while the rest of the troops marched beyond the bridge and set up camp. Then they would send back help. It was about 7:00 P.M., and the fact that they were in guerrilla-infested country made Hill and company nervous. Hill dismounted his men and instructed them in setting up a defensive position. For three or four hours, all went well; the volunteers were diligent and followed Hill’s directives. However, after the passage of time had lessened their sense of danger, they began to grumble about being left behind, and they increasingly discussed riding on to reunite with the rest of the men, in violation of their orders. By midnight, some of them started readying their mounts to leave, and Hill knew that he had to do something. His appearance alone should have been sufficient to keep the men in line. He wore a sombrero, “flaming red flannel shirt,” red-trimmed boots, and an “immense pair of Mexican spurs.” Even more impressive was the arsenal that he had strapped to his body: a pair of pistols in holsters at each side, two more stuck in his belt, a butcher knife, and his officer’s saber. “I was as villianous a looking rascal as ever there was,” Hill thought. Without saying a word, Hill mounted his horse, walked it over to a position blocking the road, and turned to face the men. Still silent, he loosened the fastening of his saber and unholstered two of his pistols. There he sat with pistol in each hand quietly, staring at the men and they staring back at him. “[W]e thus passed half an hour, it seemed to me an age, interchanging compliments with our eyes, they afraid to advance expecting the first man to be shot, and I the Lord knows what I intended to do. I expect that I was as much frightened as the men, but force of discipline led me to do what I did.” While thus engaged, horses and wagons returned to carry them back to camp.10
At their bivouac near the bridge, they received a message from General Lane instructing them to join him at Jalapa as soon as possible. Lane had discovered that the isolated American outpost at Puebla was under siege, and he wanted to gather his men, overtake Lally’s column, and rush to the scene of action. Scott had left 2,200 men in Puebla in early August under the capable leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Childs, a West Point graduate with over thirty years of military experience. Childs’s garrison consisted of one company from each of the Second Artillery, Fourth Artillery, and the Third Dragoons, and six companies from the First Pennsylvania Volunteers. Along with a handful from the spy company, Childs commanded a total of about four hundred able-bodied men. But the remainder of the garrison, 1,800, consisted of the sick and wounded, who were too incapacitated to continue with the main army. Puebla was really a detached and isolated hospital facility, but its continued possession by the Americans made it a vital anchor on Scott’s otherwise abandoned line of communication. Many of the men left behind were disgruntled that their orders required that they stay behind with the convalescent soldiers, but Scott had predicted that they would be attacked. The Puebla troops soon discovered that he was correct.11
Since Scott’s departure, Childs had been dealing with escalating problems from a Mexican force of four thousand under the partisan leader General Joaquín Rea. On August 26, partisans captured several hundred animals from the mule pen, and an ad hoc collection of thirty-two teamsters, army followers, and soldiers took off after them. But it was a trap, and twenty-four of them were killed or captured in an ambush not far from the city. Then on September 5, Rea made the remarkable request that his men be allowed to occupy a portion of Puebla to protect the inhabitants from guerrillas bands, and he assured Childs that he would be bound to the terms of the armistice that was in force at that time in Mexico City. Childs refused. By the eleventh, sporadic musket fire between the opposing sides erupted, and on the night of the thirteenth and fourteenth, as Santa Anna evacuated the capital, Rea infiltrated parts of the city and drove away many of the cattle and sheep, thus beginning the month-long siege of Puebla.12
Childs concentrated his men in three strongholds. One was in the northeast quadrant of the city, near one of the main plazas where he established his headquarters. It consisted of the Cathedral de San José, which served as the primary hospital for the sick and wounded; across the street was a two-story government building made of stone and suitable for defense. The other two American positions were on the city’s northeastern edge at Fort Loretto and Guadalupe Heights. When the Mexicans took control of portions of the city, they punished the residents who had cooperated with the Americans. Girls who had been too friendly to the occupiers had their heads shaved or in some cases their ears cut off. By the sixteenth, Rea had surrounded the city and barricaded streets around the American positions. When Childs refused his surrender demand, Rea be
gan repeated attacks on the strongholds, especially targeting the Plaza de San José. The Mexicans launched repeated attacks over the next week, forcing the outnumbered defenders to remain under arms around the clock. Within days of the fall of Mexico City, bulletins began to circulate among the Pueblans announcing the defeat of Scott’s army and calling on the citizens to rise up and crush the Yankees.
Santa Anna arrived on September 22 with additional troops and with a determination to continue the war by seizing Puebla and trapping Scott in the capital. For a second time, Childs refused to surrender, and he countered Santa Anna’s arrival by putting a musket in the hands of every able-bodied convalescent soldier. For several days, Mexicans kept up fire at the American positions around the clock as they gradually tightened their grip around the city. The outnumbered Americans fought tenaciously to hold onto their positions, and as their food supply dwindled, their situation became increasingly desperate. During the siege, Lieutenant Theodore Laidley’s actions were typical of the able-bodied American troops: he rarely slept, never disrobed, and ate very little. He manned his artillery most of the time and only occasionally napped next to his gun. In the first week of October, the beleaguered and hungry Americans held onto their pockets of the city, hoping that aid would arrive.13
Lane was still in Veracruz when the siege started, but his march inland proved fortuitous. By the time he collected all the available troops and incorporated Lally’s men, he had a force that numbered over three thousand. When Santa Anna learned of Lane’s approach, he took most of Rea’s siege force and marched east to set a trap for him. He posted his men in Huamantla thirty miles from Puebla and waited for an opportunity to surprise Lane’s force in a mountain pass. However, Lane discovered Santa Anna’s presence and diverted his troops to Huamantla, where on October 9, the advance elements of his column under Captain Samuel Walker fought a street battle with a much larger force of Mexican lancers. Hemmed in on all sides, Walker’s men held on until the main column arrived to drive the enemy away, but Walker was killed in the battle. In retaliation for the loss of Walker and a dozen other men, Lane allowed his men to plunder the town. They broke into houses and shops, took whatever they wanted, raped the women, and killed the men. It was a drunken orgy of violence and destruction that appalled young Lieutenant Hill. “Twas then I saw and felt how perfectly unmanageable were volunteers and how much harm they did,” he remembered.14
Three days later, on October 12, Lane’s force reached Puebla. As they approached, some of the Mexican troops melted away, but others stayed, requiring a brisk street-to-street fight to drive them out. Much of the hostile fire came from rooftops and windows. Some of the residents were happy to have the siege raised, but others joined in the fight when Lane’s men entered the Puebla streets. As Hill’s unit marched into town, two men and a woman stepped out onto a balcony with escopetas and pistols in hand. From their appearance, one an old man and the other two in their twenties or thirties, Hill assumed them to be a father and two children. All three of them raised their weapons and fired at the Americans, but before they could duck back into the house, they were killed by return fire. After clearing the city of hostile troops, Lane’s men repeated their shameful pillaging as if it was a right earned by victory. After the battle, they commenced “plundering without restraint,” and one disheartened American simply commented, “This is disgraceful.” However, most of the men saw nothing wrong with it, as even some of the volunteers of Childs’s garrison joined in. “Some made out very well,” remembered Jacob Oswandel, who took only “a splendid gentleman’s shawl,” which he kept as “a great relic” of his war experience. Next morning drunken soldiers continued to stagger through the streets, some in priest’s robes and others in women’s clothes.15
Lieutenant Hill, apparently easily taken by the fairer sex, frequently referred to Mexican women in his letters home. On the day the siege was lifted, Hill was searching a house for enemy soldiers, and when he opened the door to one room, he found several women hiding. One of them he described as “the most glorious vision ever beheld. And such eyes! . . . My heart melted before their glance like snow before the rays of the noonday Sun. . . . I felt like kneeling at her feet and yielding myself a prisoner of war to the all potent power of beauty.” Hill finished his search with the young lady at his side and later made other visits to the house. “Tis needless to say that I have used all endeavours to cultivate my acquaintance with this fair segnorita.” However, he believed that the “most angelic” women he had seen were back in Jalapa. He recalled that the effect of the ladies of that town “on one’s nerves is magical, almost causing a fit of delirium,” and he quickly concluded that Mexican women have the “sweetest eyes in the world.” Despite his praise of—or lust for—Mexican women, he formed a low opinion of Pueblans in general, referring to them as “scoundrels” and “assassins.” Murders of lone American soldiers who walked the streets at night were commonplace.16
When Lane lifted the siege of Puebla, the greatest threat to Scott’s security in Mexico City also ended. The little garrison that desperately held on to Puebla against all odds fought as gallantly as the troops under Scott’s immediate command, but their role has been largely forgotten. During the month-long siege, American casualties totaled seventy-three. As historian Richard Bruce Winders asserts, Colonel Childs’s stubborn band “held the key to Scott’s survival . . . [and] prevented the American army in Mexico City from being stranded.”17
These events in the towns and on the road between Mexico City and Veracruz signaled a different kind of war. The troops and supplies that began to move inland in August and September were the Americans’ first attempt to travel through these guerrilla-infested areas since Scott severed his ties to the coast in July. The number of partisans, already numerous in early summer, had grown, and their ability and determination to resist the invaders increased in kind. Now with his army firmly lodged in Mexico City, Scott intended to use the roads again, and regularly, as he reopened his line of communication to his base at Veracruz. With more troops arriving, he could now afford to do what his limited numbers prohibited earlier, which was to garrison towns along the way. Not only that, but he also established fortified posts, especially in areas where guerrilla activity was most prevalent. Beginning in mid-October and over the following weeks, the commanding general positioned some of his new units at places like Perote and Rio Frio, and he sent additional troops to Puebla. He also authorized the establishment of several strong points between Jalapa and Veracruz, two of them at the National Bridge and San Juan. Each location had at least 500 to 750 men, and some had more. From each strong point, troops began to sally forth looking for guerrilla units in a nineteenth-century version of search and destroy, and as illustrated by the actions of Lane’s men, the guerrilla war that waged along the roads was harsh and ruthless. Technically American troops were still required to respect the property of unoffending Mexicans, but with a wink and a nod, officers sometimes looked the other way as atrocities occurred. Of course, the heavy hand of war freely and fairly came down on guerrillas and those who cooperated with them.18
Several weeks after the occupation of the capital, Scott issued a harsh order designed to facilitate the passage of troops and supplies along the roads. Because American troops needed the use of roads “infested” with “atrocious bands” of partisans who “under instructions from the late Mexican authorities, continue to violate every rule of warfare observed by civilized nations,” Scott ordered that “no quarter will be given to known murderers or robbers, whether guerillas or rancheros, and whether serving under (obsolete) commissions or not.” In his Memoirs, Scott responded to critics of this tough policy by noting that “in Mexico, . . . the outlaws, denounced in the order, never made a prisoner, but invariably put to death every accidental American straggler, wounded or sick man, that fell into their hands.” He pointed out that such a response to guerrilla activity is “a universal right of war.” The movement of troops and trains increased during the
fall as travel became safer, and by February, John Meginess proclaimed, with some exaggeration, that the guerrilla bands between the capital and the coast had been dispersed.19
An incident involving Manuel Dominguez’s spy company illustrates that despite the depredations that accompanied the unconventional war, the Mexicans knew that as a rule, the Americans adhered to the rules of warfare. Three months after the fall of Mexico City, the spy company was engaged in the countryside tracking down the remnants of the Mexican regular army, and after one skirmish, they captured several of the enemy. When Dominguez ordered the prisoners bayoneted, an American officer stepped in and stopped them, although he was roughed up by Dominguez’s men in the process. Members of the spy company had to content themselves with taking jewelry, horses, and other valuables. Next day the American officer had departed, and Dominguez once again threatened to execute his captives, but he ceased when the enemy soldiers reminded him that the Americans would punish him if he carried out his unlawful intention.20
The guerrilla war, fostered by the government, supported by many of the priests, and fed by a sizable portion of the population, remained a concern throughout the Mexico City campaign. Now in the postcampaign occupation phase, it became even more so, even if it never posed a significant threat to the army’s operations. While the partisans had the ability to hamper, and on rare occasions stop, the flow of supplies, the antiguerrilla activities authorized by Scott and executed by Joseph Lane, Jack Hays, and others kept the roads open, thus preventing the bulk of the army from leaving a predominantly conventional posture. One study indicates that by the end of November, the troop buildup in central Mexico had brought the strength of American forces to over 24,000, with perhaps as much as 25 percent of that number engaged in some form of counterguerrilla activity.21 That indicates that the partisan activity, although fragmented and unorganized, constituted a force to reckon with. This aspect of the war cannot be brushed aside as insignificant. However, the fact that fully three-fourths of Scott’s army remained engaged in non-guerrilla-related activities demonstrates that he was not forced to change his strategy or abandon his conventional tactics. In other words, the guerrilla war was a constant nuisance, but only that.
A Gallant Little Army Page 36
