In fact, there was a mechanism that might have helped uncover the Nazi rat lines, but it was not being given a high priority. All mail between Austria and Argentina was monitored by the Civilian Censorship Detachment and by the British and French censorship operations. So was all mail between West Germany and Argentina. This had been going on since the war. The Censorship Detachment put together a monthly report to the Pentagon and Colonel Koch on everything it discovered from censoring mail to and from Argentina. A curious thing was that they never found in any of the letters any discussion of how the writers had gotten to Argentina in the first place. They had just turned up, without explanation. It was assumed that many of them were using aliases and perhaps using a prearranged code to convey messages.
Later, Milano discussed the case of the disappearing Nazis with John Burkel. Burkel said that he had never been given any orders or guidance in such cases. His superiors apparently did not consider such questions a matter of local security, which was the CIC's chief mission, or of gathering intelligence on the Soviets.
As his time in Austria ran down, Milano began to worry about the records he might leave behind him. He had never had the slightest doubts about any of his actions, which, in any event, had always been covered by his superiors-though sometimes they had been notified after the fact. The problem was that times change, and what appeared perfectly normal and correct in 1950 might look quite different to someone examining the files twenty or thirty years later. The abrupt changes in official attitudes caused by the rise of McCarthyism in the United States were proof enough that no one could ever be sure what future attitudes might be.
Milano was worried that at some future date his files might be opened and mishandled. He was particularly concerned about the security of the Rat Line. If the files were opened, would the identities of the people who had gone down the line to South America be exposed? Would he and his colleagues be protected from accusations that they had bent the law, or even broken it, in the pursuit of their intelligence mission? There was nothing seriously criminal hidden in the records, but Milano came to the conclusion that actions taken in good faith in 1946 might appear questionable in the cold light of 1966. He had no faith that future investigators would always judge events in the light of the times and circumstances in which they had taken place.
He discussed the issue with his superior, Colonel Koch, who recommended that the Department of the Army be consulted. Milano drafted a memo, which Koch sent to the Pentagon, outlining his concerns and proposing that selected files be destroyed. This was the Army, and Milano and Koch decided they needed permission from Washington before proceeding.
Within a week, a reply came authorizing the destruction of the files. However, the intelligence staff at Army Headquarters ruled that two officers would be sent out from Washington to supervise the bonfire and would review the files before they were destroyed. Milano, Lyon, and Del Greco sorted through the files to select the documents they considered should be destroyed. They chose everything relating to the Rat Line, files concerning the purchase of clandestine interests in local firms, and documents mentioning clandestine operations against other American organizations, such as the abstraction of Milano's file from the U.S. Embassy in Rome after the Patsy and Pete affair. They were very thorough. The only documents that have survived are copies of memoranda sent to other organizations. Everything else was consigned to the flames.
Two weeks before Milano left Austria, Lieutenant Colonel John Jacobs and a civilian employee of the Department of the Army arrived from Washington. They were given all the files to review and spent several days immersed in the history of intelligence in Austria and the Rat Line. Jacobs proved to be an urbane and well-informed officer. He told them that he had been warned before leaving Washington not to be surprised at anything he might discover-and added that, all the same, it was an astonishing story. He said he was surprised to find no evidence that the Operations Branch had ever attempted to buy a banana republic. It seemed to have tried everything else. Dominic Del Greco immediately suggested that the colonel keep his wild ideas to himself: Jim Milano had another two weeks to go, plenty of time to carry them out.
The ever-practical Del Greco converted a fifty-gallon oil drum into an incinerator, by cutting off one end and punching a few ventilation holes in its sides. He set a grate on some bricks in the bottom of the barrel, and then for two days the two visitors from Washington and Milano, Lyon, and Del Greco burned their files. The white smoke rose into the air like the smoke from the Vatican chimney when a pope is elected, as the fire consumed a small part of the history of their time.
All the files concerning the Rat Line held in Salzburg were destroyed when Jim Milano left Austria (see Chapter 20). He had made sure that as few of his superiors as possible knew of the line's existence. However, two memoranda on the Rat Line survived and were discovered by the Ryan investigation. They are published in his report. They are top secret reports by Paul Lyon, dated 1948 and 1950, that survived in the files of the U.S. Forces in Austria.
The first memorandum, dated July 15, 1948, was addressed to Lieutenant Colonel George Schrantz, at his request, by Lyon and Charles Crawford. Schrantz was not informed of all the activities of Milano's Operations Branch, and apparently wanted a document in the file to protect him from any possible future criticism. Milano was shown the memorandum after it had been sent to headquarters and registered his disapproval. Lyon was notably circumspect.
The memo read as follows:
SUBJECT: Rat Line from Austria to South America.
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
1. In accordance with instructions from the Office of the Director of Intelligence, USFA, these agents have attempted to establish a safe means of resettlement of dependents of visitors and VIP personalities.
2. Through the Vatican connections of Father Draganovic, Croat, DP Resettlement Chief of the Vatican circle, a tentative agreement was reached to assist in this operation. The agreement consists of simply mutual assistance, i.e., these agents assist persons of interest to Father Draganovic to leave Germany and, in turn, Father Draganovic will assist these agents in obtaining the necessary visas to Argentina, South America, for persons of interest to this Command.
3. It may be stated that some of the persons of interest to Father Draganovic may be of interest to the Denazification policy of the Allies; however, the persons assisted by Father Draganovic are also of interest to our Russian ally. Therefore, this operation cannot receive any official approval and must be handled with minimum amount of delay and with a minimum amount of general knowledge.
4. On 3 July 1948, these agents contacted the Austrian representative of Father Draganovic in Salzburg, as prearranged. Through the assistance of CIC Salzburg, transportation was obtained and the representative was escorted to Bad Reichenhall, Germany, where he was to meet the German representative of Father Draganovic's organization. However, due to unforseen circumstances, the German representative did not appear. The Austrian representative was escorted back to Salzburg to await developments.
5. On 4 July 48, these agents received a telegram from the U.S. contact in Rome (Fred Martin) that the German representative was arrested while crossing the German-Austrian border on or about 1 July 48. It was the desire of these agents to go to Bad Reichenhall, Germany, to make the necessary investigation, however, due to transportation difficulties, this was not deemed advisable.
6. The status of subject rat line is not settled at this time, however it is felt that with CIC connections in Germany, these agents can assist the German representative and continue their progress as outlined above. NOTE: It is suggested to the Chief 430th CIC Detachment, USFA, that a reassignment of jeeps be made, and that two detachment jeeps be assigned to headquarters. These jeeps could be stationed and utilized by Land Salzburg and Land Upper Austria but be prepared to move upon call from representatives of CIC headquarters. In this manner most of the difficulties in obtaining transportations for such operations can be avoided.
Also, the responsibilities for incorrent use of such vehicles, i.e., police violations, utilizing Government vehicles for pleasure, will be the responsibility of the driver and not the Land Section to which the jeep is originally assigned.
It is believed that in this manner considerable time, personal difficulties, and personality differences could be avoided and assist in the speedy completion of similar missions.
(Signed) PAUL E. LYON S/A, CIC
CHARLES CRAWFORD S/A, CIC
The second of the Lyon memoranda was written two years later. It is rather franker and certainly more informative. It was drafted at Milano's request and is addressed to him, dated April 10, 1950. It reads as follows:
1. ORIGINS.
a. During the summer of 1947, the undersigned received instructions from G-2, USFA, through Chief CIC, to establish a means of disposition for visitors who had been in the custody of the 430th CIC and completely processed in accordance with current directives and requirements, and whose continued residence in Austria constituted a security threat as well as a source of possible embarrassment to the Commanding General of USFA, since the Soviet command had become aware of their presence in the US Zone of Austria and in some instances had requested the return of these persons to Soviet custody.
b. The undersigned, therefore, proceeded to Rome where, through a mutual acquaintance, he conferred with a former Slovakian diplomat who in turn was able to recruit the services of a Croation [sic] Roman Catholic Priest, Father Dragonivich. Father Dragonivich had by this time developed several clandestine evacuation channels to the various South American countries for various types of European refugees.
2. HISTORY OF OPERATIONS.
a. During 1947 and 1948 it was necessary to escort the visitors physically from Austria to Rome from the standpoint of security and to avoid any embarrassment on the part of the US Government which could arise from faulty documentation or unforseen border or police incidents.
b. Documents to assist in the journey of these people from Austria to Rome were secured through S/A Crawford, Reference IRS, Subject: "Debriefing of S/A Crawford", dated 6 April 1950.
c. Upon arrival in Rome, the visitors were turned over to Dragonivich who placed them in safe haven houses being operated under his direct supervision. During this period, the undersigned then actively assisted Father Dragonivich with the help of a US citizen, who was Chief of the eligibility office of IRO in Rome, in securing additional documentation and IRO aid for further transportation. This, of course, was done illegally inasmuch as such persons could not possibly qualify for eligibility under the Geneva IRO Charter. However, after several months, the American suddenly lost his mental stability, through overindulgence in alcohol, and disclosed some of the details of the arrangement to his superiors and other official agencies in Rome which required the undersigned to realign the operation and to discontinue contact with the IRO office. Thus Father Dragonivich was forced to turn to other sources in the National Catholic Welfare Organization. He also secured permits for residence of those persons from the Italian police, permits to travel from Rome to Genoa or Naples, as the case might be, and permits from the Italian Foreign Office for various visas. In short, it can be stated that Dragonivich handled all phases of the operation after the defectees arrived in Rome, such as the procurement of IRO Italian and South American documents, visas, stamps, arrangements for disposition, land or sea, and notification of resettlement committees in foreign lands.
d. As the operation continued, Dragonivich's possibilities for the necessary means, documentation, travel and permits expanded and it became possible to ship the visitors from Austria, thus eliminating personal escort by CIC agents to Rome. A new phase was thus established and an employee of Dragonivich proceeded to Austria, picked up the charges and took them to Genoa where they were placed in safe haven houses to await disposition to South America.
3. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED.
The following difficulties and problems may be expected by those who may become engaged in rat line operations:
a. Frequent changes in travel documents necessary for movement in European countries.
b. Changes in the Italian border control and police supervision of DP's in Italy.
c. Land and sea transportation facilities or lack thereof
d. Opening and closing of immigration quotas by the various countries of South America.
e. The physical condition of visitors and dependents. It may be stated here that it is desirable that all persons be examined for TB, syphilis or other contagious diseases and that the female dependents be cautioned during the evacuation period relative to pregnancy, inasmuch as pregnant women or small children are acceptable only with grave difficulty and at great expense.
f. Marriage Status. In view of the fact that Dragonivich is a Roman Catholic priest and the National Catholic Welfare is involved, the marriage status of male and female must be clearly established, inasmuch as the personalities associated in this operation will not condone any acts contrary to the Church, such as common law marriage, illegitimate children not baptized, etc.
g. Although it might be advantageous to have absolute "control" of Father Dragonivich and his means of evacuation, it may be categorically stated that it is not possible and in the opinion of the undersigned not entirely desirable. Dragonivich is known and recorded as a Fascist, war criminal, etc., and his contacts with South American diplomats of a similar class are not generally approved by US State Department officials, plus the fact that in the light of security, it is better that we may be able to state, if forced, that the turning over of a DP to a welfare Organization falls in line with our democratic way of thinking and that we are not engaged in illegal disposition of war criminals, defectees and the like.
4. COMPROMISES.
a. As stated above, the US citizen, Chief of the Eligibility Once, Rome, was one (Robert Bishop-deleted in Ryan report) who was allegedly a member of OSS during World War II, and who fancied himself as a top intelligence operative in Italy. After his breakdown due to alcoholism, [Bishop] imagined himself as the savior of Italy in view of the danger of a Communist victory during the elections of 1948, thus told stories of how the undersigned could assist in providing large numbers of underground troops, military supplies, sea evacuation, air evacuation and the like. This, of course, caused inquiries as to the exact nature of the work in which the undersigned was engaged. This was explained away successfully in a personal interview with Admiral Mentz, Chief of IRO, Italy, and a full report was submitted to G-2, USFA.
b. The Brazil Expedition was, again, a compromise which was not the fault of operational technique. A female visitor who was inclined to be rather frivolous in her attentions became a public nuisance while under protective custody in Austria and was, therefore, evacuated as a married woman in custody of her amour of the moment. During the voyage, the lady in question changed her mind and upon arrival in Brazil sought assistance and protection from both the Brazilian authorities and the US Embassy. They, of course, were uninformed, inasmuch as it is impossible, due to lack of knowledge of transportation dates, visa quotas, etc., to give prior information as to when the shipments are to be made. The affair was made a matter of official investigation and necessarily other innocent people were involved and returned to Europe.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.
a. It has been the experience of this organization that only one man should be assigned the mission of disposition when dealing with Father Dragonivich. Inasmuch as he, although reliable from a security standpoint, is unscrupulous in his dealings concerning money, as he does a considerable amount of charity work for which he receives no compensation, it is not entirely impossible that he will delay one shipment for one organization to benefit another organization who pays higher prices.
b. Due to the background of Father Dragonivich and the nature of his work, it is not believed practical that the MA's in foreign countries under diplomatic status should become involved with the DP's who land through his channels
of his operation.
c. Each visitor should be thoroughly and properly briefed and preparations for his movement be made in the light of his cover story. Each should be furnished sufficient clothing, some travel money, and advance notice sent through Dragonivich channels to assist in his rehabilitation in the country where he lands.
d. The facilities of Father Dragonivich should be handled as a single operation by one agency and no attempt should be made to control him or his sources for reasons set forth in this memorandum.
FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER
(signed) PAUL E. LYON
IB Operations Officer
(There is an MS annotation: "Copy No. 2 burned 14/4/50-RW.")
An intelligence officer during World War II, COL. JAMES V. MILANO, USA (Ret.), commanded the Military Intelligence Service in Austria for a year and a half after the war. From 1947 to 1950, he was chief of operations for all U.S. forces stationed there. He retired from the Army in 1966. PATRICK BROGAN is a Washington correspondent for The Herald (Glasgow). His previous books include Deadly Business: The Story of Sam Cummings and Interarms, The Fighting Never Stopped, and Captive Nations: Eastern Europe, 1945-1989. Both authors live in the Washington, D.C., area.
The Way Back: The Story of Lieutenant Commander Pat O'Leary GC DSO RN by Vincent Brome
*The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 by J. C. Masterman.
*[Document footnote] Because there is no central file containing the names of all the persons who were assisted into the rat line by the 430th CIC in Austria, there is no way to retrieve the files of those who actually went through it. The conclusion that there is no reason to believe that anyone else with a Nazi background was placed in the rat line is based on a) the absence of any such evidence in files that do exist on rat line; b) the clear recollection of the agent [Neagoy] who took over the rat line for the 430th in 1949 [sic: Neagoy succeeded Lyon in 1950] that both he and, to his knowledge, his only predecessor (who is deceased) [Lyon], handled only defectors from the East (aside from Barbie); c) the clear recollections of the G-2 operations officer from 1945 to 1950 [Milano] that only defectors were put in the rat line; and d) the clear recollection of his successor [Dobson], who served from 1950 through the end of USFA's involvement with Draganovic, that Barbie was the only non-defector handled during his tour of duty.
Soldiers, Spies, and the Rat Line Page 30
