The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean

by Carolina Lopez-Ruiz

  Thus, soft power strategies were essential, too—most of which were already employed by the Carthaginians elsewhere. Phoenician kinship links were important to Carthage in Spain, as elsewhere, hence the special attention given to Gades and its cult of Melqart (Diod. Sic. 25.10.1; Liv. 21.21.9, 28.37; Rawlings 2005). With the Iberians, no kinship links existed, of course. Both Hasdrubal and Hannibal created them, by making marriage alliances with key Iberian communities (Diod. Sic. 25.12; Livy 21.11.13, 24.41.7; Bellón et al. 2016: 73), as was also done by Carthaginians in Africa (Polyb. 1.78; Liv. 29.29.12, 30.12–15; Liv. Per. 50.10; App. Pun. 27–28). Further, Hasdrubal had the Iberians assert a relationship with him, by acclaiming him as strategos autokrator (Diod. Sic. 25.12). Presumably the Iberians swore an oath; perhaps Hasdrubal took the opportunity to display his authority and create relationships through feasts, gifts, and arbitration. Another prominent mechanism of Carthaginian control was more heavy-handed: hostage taking. Relatives of local leaders were held in major centers, such as New Carthage and the Saguntine citadel (Polyb. 3.97–99; Liv. 22.22). Iberians sent on military service in Africa and in Italy also functioned as hostages (Liv. 21.21.10–13). This, too, continued earlier Carthaginian strategies in Sicily and Africa (e.g., Diod. Sic. 23.5, 24.10.2). Separated from their local context, these conscripts became totally dependent on their Carthaginian generals for maintenance and survival, and potentially the booty and experience that would allow them to increase their standing if they ever returned home. (For the Phoenicians and Carthaginians in Iberia, see also chapter 38, this volume.)

  Most of these strategies focused on creating bonds with local elites, rather than with the people as a whole. It was the elites whose relatives were taken as hostages or wives. It was they who paid the price for rebellion, as Indortes’s death shows. It was probably fairly elite Iberians who were in a position to serve in the Carthaginian armies. In turn, the special relationships with the Barcids probably enhanced these elites’ power within their communities, like Amusicus, leader of the Ausetani, who chose to abandon his community and flee to Hasdrubal when he was defeated by the Romans in 218 bce, rather than make terms (Livy 21.61).

  The relationship between the Barcids and the government in Carthage is very unclear: were the Barcids under the control of Carthage (Polyb. 3.15.8; Liv. 23.27.9–12), essentially independent of Carthage (Fabius FrRH 1 F22; Huss 1985: 276; Eckstein 2005), or a de facto military monarchy in control of the whole Carthaginian empire (Hoyos 2003: 59, 75–80)? The uncertainty is exacerbated by ancient efforts to blame the way the diplomatic dispute over Saguntum in 218 bce escalated into the second war with the Romans on Hannibal and his family—the “wrath of the Barcids” (Fabius FrRH 1 F22; Nep. Hann. 2). But it is a bit of a moot point. The Barcids and Carthage were exceptionally entangled and mutually dependent. In their own conduct, the Barcids made an effort to emphasize that they acted in concord with Carthage. The foundation of New Carthage emphasized the close relationship between Iberia and the African home city (Huss 1985: 276; Hoyos 2003: 79–80). The accessions of Hasdrubal and Hannibal were affirmed by authorities in Carthage (Diod. Sic. 25.12.1; Polyb. 3.13.3–4). In 215 bce, Hannibal had a group of “the mighty ones” with him to swear to the treaty with Philip (Polyb. 7.9.4; cf. Liv. 22.58). The Barcids had a free rein in Iberia, but it had been normal to entrust Carthaginian generals in Sicily with substantial autonomy (e.g., Diod. Sic. 19.71.6–7; Just. Epit. 22.2-3); Iberia was farther away and its internal dynamics much less familiar. The Barcids had made themselves indispensable to Carthaginian control in the region through the personal relationships with their soldiers and with the Iberians, and the Carthaginians would probably have struggled to remove them if they had wanted to. However, Iberia was equally a long way from Carthage; the Barcids could hardly micromanage the political agenda of the capital. They had influential, outspoken opponents among “the mighty ones,” like Hanno the Great and Hasdrubal the Kid (Liv. 21.3–4.1, 23.12, 30.42.11–15; App. Pun. 50). Hasdrubal Barca’s visit to Carthage in 238 bce saw his attempts at reform rebuffed (Fabius FrRH 1 F22), while Livy has Hannibal profess his ignorance of Carthaginian political life in 202 (Liv. 30.37.8–10). It is true that a majority of the members of the Carthaginian council in this period and nearly all the generals were closely linked to the Barcids (Liv. 21.4.1, 23.12.6–8), but this “Barcid faction” were allies, not stooges, whose knowledge and connections were essential for supplies and support. In 218 bce, the Romans gave them the opportunity to blame Hannibal for the dispute over Saguntum and keep the peace. They refused to do so. As Hannibal marched over the Alps, they dispatched ships for Sicily (Liv. 21.49–51).

  The Second War (218–201 bce)

  The course of this second war is exceptionally well studied, often through the eyes of Hannibal (Diod. Sic. 26–28; Nep. Hann.; Liv. 21–30; Plut. Fab. Max., Marc., Cat. Mai.; Sil. Pun.; App. Ib. 4–38, Hann., Pun. 7–67; Flor. 1.22; Cass. Dio 13–17; Zon. 8.21–9.14; Lancel 1995: 380–404; Hoyos 1998: 174–259; Hoyos 2003: 87–178; Fronda 2010; Rawlings 2011; Edwell 2011; Barceló 2011; Miles 2011a: 235–323; MacDonald 2015). When the dispute over the Saguntum exploded into war in 218 bce, Hannibal suddenly and unexpectedly crossed the Alps and invaded Italy, scoring a series of victories, culminating in the annihilation of eight legions at Cannae in 216. Despite bringing many of Rome’s allies into revolt, opening up additional theatres in Greece and Sicily in 215, Hannibal was unable to overcome the Roman manpower advantage, fully demolish the Roman alliance system, or threaten the city of Rome. He was slowly pushed south, while the Romans raided Africa, reclaimed their revolting allies (Syracuse in 212, Capua in 211, Tarentum in 209), and advanced into Iberia, where New Carthage was taken in 210. In 207, at Metaurus and 203 in Insubria, reinforcements from Iberia were defeated before they could link up with Hannibal, who evacuated his last toehold in Italy in 203. Scipio Africanus invaded Africa in 204, where he was supported by King Masinissa. After Hannibal was defeated at Zama in 202, the Carthaginians surrendered.

  The Carthaginian plan had probably been to avoid the collapse of the Carthaginian alliance systems in Africa and Iberia by fighting the war on Roman territory and breaking the Roman alliance system first, thereby neutralizing the Roman manpower advantage and prompting their surrender (Fronda 2010: 34–52). This plan responded to the problems faced in the first war, but also to the Carthaginians’ own nightmarish memories of the disruption of their African alliance system during the conflict with Agathocles in 310 bce, Regulus in 256 bce, and the Mercenaries in 241–238 bce. Hannibal actively encouraged Roman allies to switch sides, by ostentatious mercy to Italian prisoners of war (Polyb. 3.77), the use of civic freedom rhetoric (Polyb. 3.77; Liv. 21.52.4, 21.58.2, 22.7.5, 23.7.1–2, 24.1.13, 25.8.7; pace Erskine 1993), and promises to extend the power of major centers (e.g., Liv. 23.10.2). Hannibal constructed a self-representation centered on Hercules/Herakles, which appealed to Italians and Greeks, from his familial relationship with Melqart (Rawlings 2005; Miles 2011b). Similar strategies were used in Sicily, except that there the Carthaginians could also reactivate old alliances with western Sicily and Agrigentum (Livy 21.49.5, 21.50.10). The whole approach demonstrates the deep understanding the Carthaginians had of Italy and the Roman alliance system.

  The plan ultimately failed. When Hannibal extended the hand of friendship to those disfavored by the Romans, he threatened the position of those whose power was based on their links to the Romans. Promises to enhance the power of the major regional centers, like Capua, Arpi, and Tarentum, understandably concerned the smaller centers in those regions (Liv. 24.1.1; Fronda 2010: 50–52). When Hannibal did convince states to rebel, he gained a liability more than an asset—he needed to devote money, time, and men to defending the communities from any Roman counterattack, diluting his manpower further (e.g., Liv. 23.20.1). The war was expensive in men and money for the rebels, too (Robinson 1964; Fariselli 2002: 334–40). As with the Libyans in the Mercenary War, defection was a serious problem for the Italians a
nd Hannibal.

  The Carthaginians also failed to keep the Romans out of their territories. Already in 218 bce, Roman armies had seized bulwarks in northern Iberia and Malta (Liv. 21.51, 60). Carthaginian resources had to be redirected away from Italy—in 215, an armada assembled to reinforce Hannibal had to be sent to Iberia instead (Liv. 23.32.5)—or those other areas had to be abandoned—as in 208, when Hasdrubal abandoned Iberia to make his doomed march on Italy (Polyb. 11.1–3; Liv. 23.46–51). Ironically, the Roman victory in Iberia and Africa was based on the same strategy of taking the war to them, breaking up their alliance systems by impressive victories and promises. In Iberia, the Scipiones stepped into a personal relationship with the Iberians, like that of the Barcids, especially after they gained control of their hostages (Liv. 22.22.4, 24.49.7–8, 26.49–50). The Iberians’ attempt to acclaim Scipio king (Polyb. 10.40) invites comparison in particular with the acclamation of Hasdrubal mentioned earlier. In Africa, the Romans manipulated the rivalry between the Numidian leaders Syphax and Masinissa, which the Carthaginians had earlier encouraged (Liv. 24.48–49, Hoyos 2003: 59–60). Thus, in both contexts, Roman victory resulted from their success in understanding, manipulating, and subverting the Carthaginians’ systems of control to their own benefit.

  The Recovery and the Third War (201–146 bce)

  The aftermath of the second war saw another rapid economic revival (Lancel 1995: 404–49). The city made several large gifts to Rome over the next few years, including an offer in 191 bce to pay off the entire indemnity from the second war in a single instalment—a sum of 8,000 talents (Liv. 33.19.2, 33.47.1–2, 36.4.9, 43.6; cf. App. Pun. 67, 72–73). Excavations on the southern slope of Byrsa hill reveal “unprecedented building activity” in the early second century: streets were repaved and rearranged; sumptuous houses erected, with wall paintings in the Pompeian First style and Egyptian faience (Docter et al. 2007: 95–97). Insofar as conclusions can be drawn from a single neighborhood, the picture is of exceptional prosperity. The evidence of transport amphorae shows that loss of imperial control had limited bearing on economic interactions. Carthaginian amphorae continue to appear in quantity along the Spanish coast and in western Sicily. At Carthage, far fewer imported amphorae are found and there is a large increase in agricultural sites in the hinterland (Bechtold and Docter 2010: 99–101; cf. App. Pun. 69; Plaut. Poen. 977–1020). One cause of the revival, then, might be the more efficient use of the Carthaginian hinterland to produce cash crops for export, which might explain various anecdotes about Carthaginian olives and figs in this period (Aur. Vict. Caes. 37.2–3; Plin. HN 15.20; Plut. Cat. Mai. 27). Livy emphasizes political and financial reforms by Hannibal as suffete in 196 bce, which seem to have dramatically reduced embezzlement by making membership of the judicial council of the 104 annual and elective (Liv. 33.45–47; Hoyos 2003: 190–202). Expenses were probably also significantly reduced by the fact that the Carthaginians were no longer allowed to possess an expensive military.

  The period was dominated by clashes with Numidian king Masinissa, who continually took advantage of divisions within the city, his friendship with the Romans, and his military strength to encroach on territory that the Carthaginians considered their own (Polyb. 31.21; Liv. Per. 42, 47; App. Pun. 67–69; Kunze 2011). Except in 180 bce, Roman embassies intervened before violence occurred, but the Carthaginians found these embassies excessively biased toward Masinissa; Polybius and Appian concur. Thus, they refused to allow the arbitrators sent in 157 bce, who included Cato, to render judgment at all. The embassy reported back to Rome that they had noted large-scale military preparations, including “a lot of material for ships” (Liv. Per. 47; Plut. Cat. Mai. 26; App. Pun. 69). A number of embassies from the Numidians affirmed this picture, connecting it with an uprising by the son of Syphax, an ancestral enemy of Masinissa and Rome, and Roman investigators affirmed the military build-up, including its naval dimension, which of course was not necessary for fighting Numidians. In 151 bce, war broke out with Masinissa, in which the Carthaginians deployed either 25,400 or 58,000 men in alliance, but they were badly defeated (Liv. Per. 48; App. Pun. 70–73). The diplomatic exchanges that followed led directly into the Third Punic War of 149 to 146 bce, which was largely the siege of the city and ended in its capture and destruction in 146 (Polyb. 36, 38; Diod. Sic. 32; Liv. Per. 48–51; App. Pun. 74–136; Flor. 1.31; Cass. Dio 21; Zon. 9.26–31; Lancel 1995: 412–27; Le Bohec 2011). The defection of the ever-loyal Utica to the Romans in 150 is a sign of how terminal Carthage’s position was at that point, but also demonstrates how much more effectively the situation could have been navigated (Polyb. 36.3; App. Pun. 75). The Carthaginians had been trapped in an impossible situation by Masinissa and the Romans—but between the refusal to accept Roman arbitration (i.e., authority), the decision to make war on a Roman ally, and the expansion of the army and navy in contravention of the postwar settlement, the Carthaginians had made it easy for them to justify their predations.

  The sheer irrationality of a military build-up encourages suspicion that it was a rhetorical invention, but it has received striking confirmation from archaeology. This reveals that the Cothon, the massive fortified, artificial harbor complex, known from Appian and from archaeology, which still survives as the Salammbo lagoons, was built in these last years (App. Pun. 96, 127; Hurst and Gibson 1994; Hurst 1994). The complex consisted of a rectangular basin for commercial traffic measuring ca. 100 by 350 m, linked by a channel to an inner, torus-shaped harbor structure with a diameter of 308 m, consisting of 170 shipsheds for warships. The seaward side is protected by a large fortification wall, terminating in a 425 by 100 m artificial platform, called “Falbe’s quadrilateral.” The construction of this complex in this period is so provocative that attempts have been made to date the complex’s construction to the Second Punic War, treating the evidence for construction in this period as “refurbishments” (Hoyos 2003: 223–24). But such refurbishments would still amount to a large-scale project—and a serious violation of the enforced demilitarization.

  The Carthaginians were, then, engaging in openly provocative behavior. Why did they do this when the Romans were so strong and so easily provoked? At the start of this chapter, I presented a Carthaginian elite worldview, which stressed the benevolent supremacy of the Carthaginians over other peoples, which manifested as sea power and the control of movement. An important aspect of Carthaginian encounters with the Romans in this period is the way in which the Romans repeatedly—and probably intentionally—subverted this world view. In 264 bce, they were told that they literally could not cross the Strait of Messina. Then they did (Diod. Sic. 23.2.1). The debate about treaty rights misses the point. The Roman victories at sea and the Roman invasion of Africa in 255 bce not only cost many lives but also showed Carthage impotent where they expected themselves to be most powerful. A sign of the fury this provoked is found in a ship which sank at the Battle of the Aegates in 241 bce and has recently been excavated. The vessel had been captured and incorporated into the Carthaginian force (probably in 249 bce), but it was originally Roman and bore an image of Roma or Minerva on the ram. The Carthaginians had violently scratched out her face (Tusa and Royal 2012: 43). The series of Roman demands in the 230s and 220s—not to reclaim that island, not to cross this river, not to besiege those people—were affronts (Liv. 21.44.5–8). In neither 264 nor 218 bce were the Carthaginians looking for war, but when they were provoked, they hardened their stance, rather than giving way, just as much as the Romans did. Much like Lycurgan Athens, the demilitarized, subservient condition forced upon Carthage after the Second War was unacceptable as a permanent state—even if it was broadly prosperous, and even if the alternative was destruction.

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