by Tom Clancy
After I left Tom, I flew into Iraq to link up with Colonel Don Holder and the 2nd ACR Command Group. By now it was about 1715. We flew over attacking 1st INF units, stretching back as far as I could see. Some were moving forward through newly cleared lanes; others were waiting to pass through. When we reached the border, we headed northwest over the 3rd AD, which was now crossing the border and making its way through the berm (we could also see part of the 1st AD). The vehicle movement visible to me was slow, and many vehicles were stopped--but that was not that unusual in a large unit movement and attack. After we passed over the 3rd AD, we flew over nothing but empty desert until we reached the 2nd ACR.
From 1015, when I'd last talked to Don, the regiment had seen some action against the deep brigade of the Iraqi 26th Division, about twenty kilometers from the line of departure. The Iraqi division commander had had to fight the Big Red One and the 2nd ACR simultaneously from two directions, with few workable communications. The 2nd ACR was continuing to attack while I visited with Don.
The 2nd ACR had captured some officers, he reported, engaged enemy armored vehicles with their aviation and close air support, and their helos had taken some fire. From 1430 until later that evening (a report I got after returning to the TAC), Troop L on the regiment's eastern flank had fought nine engagements over a space of twenty kilometers against T-55s, BMPs, infantry, and bunkers. They had destroyed one T-55, a BMP, and a PT 76 (a Soviet-built light amphibious tank), and taken approximately 300 prisoners. They had also refueled twice and gotten some fifteen ammo tractors stuck in the soft sand.
I gave Don the status of the 1st AD and 3rd AD behind him since I had just flown over them. I figured it would take them most of the night to close in behind the regiment, even unopposed. Don and I talked about the wisdom of his continuing the attack that night. Though I wanted to continue, I was aware of the growing gap between the now-fast-advancing regiment and the rest of the divisions. It was now at least twenty kilometers, and the gap was about to grow, since the regiment was now in full deployment and moving, while the divisions were in the process of squeezing themselves through the berm and getting into their formations.
Based on the rapid movement of the regiment, and their success this day, Don's recommendation was to continue aviation and artillery throughout the night but to stop forward ground movement. In that way, the divisions could close up behind the regiment and remain concentrated for our closure on Phase Line Smash, another fifty to seventy-five kilometers ahead, the next day.
Phase Line Smash, about 150 kilometers from our starting point on the Saudi-Iraqi border, was the last reference line we had drawn before we anticipated significant combat with the RGFC. It was a control measure for me to get the corps into whatever attack configuration I decided on to attack the Guards. Smash was named deliberately, because that is where we anticipated "smashing" into the RGFC. It was like a line of departure for our attack, and by the time we reached it, I wanted us to be rolling through it without stopping. Because I had Smash there, I was able to meter the movement of units so that they would reach Smash at about the same time for a concentrated attack.
What Don said made sense, and I told him I'd let him know later, but for now I wanted him to slow his rate and continue aviation and artillery attacks well forward to keep the Iraqis off balance. What I wanted to do in the meantime was check the progress of the 1st INF to see if they were getting any artillery fire from the Iraqis and if they might be vulnerable by not continuing to move.
Meanwhile, all the Iraqis had seen so far was a cavalry regiment and two brigades of the 1st INF. That meant that the RGFC still did not know what was bearing down on them. The less the Iraqis knew about the size of the force descending on them, the less would be their sense of urgency to organize a fortified defensive line. I wanted to stay hidden from them for as long as possible. If I continued moving the 2nd ACR forward, and in so doing tipped off a larger force to their presence, and if I could not then bring my own larger force into a coordinated attack before the Iraqis got big units in the way, it would make for some tougher going.
In addition, on 19 February, I had told Don Holder that if he was successful on Smash and found a soft spot in the Iraqi defenses, he should not be surprised if I blitzed him directly to Objective Denver on Highway 8. In my mind that possibility still remained for the following day. I wanted the regiment fresh for it.
I left and was back at the TAC just at dark.
When I got there, I got a quick, informal update of our situation:
The 1st INF Division had reached Phase Line Colorado, which meant they were halfway through the breach mission, or about twenty kilometers deep. At this point, Tom had two brigades abreast, with the rest of the division strung behind, all the way back into Saudi. To make room for the British, we had planned to expand the breach head another twenty kilometers north, to Phase Line New Jersey, and also expand it west and east. That would allow the 1st INF to move all its vehicles through the lanes and into this expanded area. To get that much area required three brigades on line, which meant Tom had to bring the 3rd Brigade through the cleared but not yet marked lanes, then attack forward with the two lead brigades northeast and northwest so that they could open up the middle for the 3rd Brigade. That was no easy maneuver, especially in contact with the enemy, and especially at night, but it was necessary, both to ensure that the area was totally secured and free of any artillery in range of the breach, and to finish passing the Big Red One through the breach and make room for the 1st UK.
I was pleased with the operation so far. But I also knew the risk of moving a brigade in between two others and attacking forward twenty kilometers at night from Colorado to New Jersey without any preparation or warning. And so I was beginning to question the wisdom of continuing the attack at night. . . . Once again, the wasted minute. We could have gone earlier than 1500. I would not have been in this situation if we had. But that was past. I had to deal with now.
Meanwhile, 1st INF aviation ranged far beyond Colorado into Iraqi depths, and 1st INF artillery fires also were striking deep. By 1800, the 1st INF had reported more than 1,000 prisoners, a rough count, as no one was particularly worried about statistics at this point. The division so far reported no losses of its own.
Things had gone far better than we had expected. Better still, the Iraqis had still not used chemical or bio.
I got an equally encouraging report from 1st AD. Ron Griffith reported that their cavalry squadron had crossed the Iraqi border at 1434, following the 2nd ACR. By 1500, sixteen D-7 combat engineer bulldozers had cut 250 eight-meter-wide lanes through the border berm (they had been working for ten hours). The division was passing through. At this point, Ron had the division in a wedge formation, with one brigade at the tip and two following on each side. By 1800, the lead elements of their brigades had moved about fifteen kilometers into Iraq, and they were continuing to move. Their cavalry squadron had actually moved sixty kilometers into Iraq that day.
Third AD movements also were continuing. Butch Funk (still corps reserve at this point) moved his column of brigades behind 2nd ACR. As his elements streamed north into Iraq, Butch had his division band at the border berm playing cavalry music. So far, the division had reported some minor enemy contact and had taken some prisoners bypassed by 2nd ACR.
When I called John Yeosock at 1810, I reported all this, and I also advised him we would more than likely suspend offensive operations for the night, but would continue other combat operations, such as aviation and artillery, as well as finish the passage of the remainder of the two armored divisions across the berm and into Iraq. We would then resume offensive operations at first light. He concurred without discussion. John usually said that tactical decisions were up to me, since I was closer to the action, and then he supported them. My report was quick, with little deliberation: a routine affair, and then I went on to other duties.
I called Don Holder and confirmed that I wanted him to cease offensive movement, but to con
tinue artillery fires and aviation attacks forward.
A few minutes later, Ron Griffith, who had monitored the order to the 2nd ACR to cease forward movement, called me at the TAC to ask if the order also applied to him. I told him yes.
I did not actually think that decision through as well as I had Don's. As it happened, I could just as easily have ordered Ron to continue . . . even though elements of 2nd ACR were in front of him, and he could not have gone far. To allow 1st AD to continue to move toward al-Busayyah and Objective Purple, I would have had to order Don Holder to uncover in front of 1st AD tonight (since 2nd ACR had moved their elements forward all that day, by about 2000 many of their ground elements were actually out from in front of 1st AD; 2nd ACR aviation, however, was still operating there). Yet since I figured it would take most of the night to get all that done and would possibly cause some fratricide, I told Ron to stop. I really did not think we would net any advance time by uncovering and advancing that night, and I also knew that Ron would continue to move his division forward through the border berm well into the night, refuel, get orders out, and continue the attack at first light. Besides, our intelligence indicated little reaction from the RGFC.
We had one disappointment that day. The 11th Aviation Brigade reported that they could not execute CONPLAN Boot that night. When we had gotten the word to go early, we had caught them moving both FAARPs (Forward Arm And Refuel Points, temporary fuel and ammo sites meant to be set up and broken down quickly) and aircraft forward, in anticipation of attacking the following night. There was no way they could go tonight. Too bad. The weather was still good, and that attack really would have helped on the east.
Our casualties so far were one soldier KIA and one WIA in the 1st INF, three soldiers WIA in 1st AD, and two soldiers WIA in the 2nd ACR from the DPICM incident earlier, when they had run over our own munitions. These were our first, but regretfully not the last, casualties from our own unexploded ammunition on the battlefield as we advanced.
Meanwhile, I had forecast we would be at Phase Line Smash the next day. At that point we would know whether we had been successful in surprising and fixing the Republican Guards. Late in the day, I would make the decision about which FRAGPLAN to use to destroy the RGFC. As for now, I was continuing to maneuver the corps to keep all my options available until the following afternoon. All of this was clear to my commanders. It also was in the heads of my two key maneuver operators at my command nodes, Stan Cherrie at the TAC and John Landry at the main CP. In short, I was pleased at our progress to this point and felt good about the coherence of our formations and our logistics, even though we had had to advance our attack by fifteen hours.
One last piece of maneuver remained. Did I order Tom Rhame to continue to attack to New Jersey? I got both Tom and Rupert Smith on the TACSAT radio from the TAC:
Enemy contact was light, Tom told me, and they had taken many prisoners. I asked him about continuing.
"I recommend we wait until daylight," he answered, "to avoid the night passage forward of 3rd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division." Tom had gotten his 3rd Brigade from northern Germany in USAREUR. "We can have New Jersey secured and be set to support a passage of the 1st (UK) AD by noon on the twenty-fifth."
When I talked with Rupert Smith shortly afterward, he concurred. He could use more time--and daylight. All day he had been aggressively moving his division forward. Considering his unplanned early move forward with his almost 5,000 vehicles, he preferred a late-morning passage. When they had moved forward, they'd been arranged in column--i.e., they were pretty strung out. Then they'd had to regroup for the twenty-four-lane passage through the breach, and coordinate that passage, and then later they'd had to link up and get fires coordinated with the U.S. 142nd Artillery Brigade of about 600 vehicles from the Arkansas National Guard, with their two eight-inch battalions and an MLRS battalion. Following their participation in the breach prep fires, I had ordered the brigade to be in direct support of the British. It had turned out to be a great combat arrangement (even though it had sparked some laughs when the British troops and our troops from Arkansas and Oklahoma talked on the radio).
After I thought for a moment about what Rupert and Tom had told me, I ordered Tom to continue his attack at first light. He would then pass the British through at noon tomorrow.
I knew this was a gamble, but it was the best choice I had then, given the alternatives. Here is how I weighed them quickly in my head.
On the one hand, it was a gamble not to continue. If the Iraqis fired chemical or biological agents into the breach that night, then we would not be able to recover from it. In addition, if the Iraqis had already discovered the strength of the wide enveloping attack, it would give them twenty-four to thirty-six hours to set their defenses more skillfully, and to make our coming attacks more costly.
By continuing, we might keep them from firing those chemical or bio-logical weapons, and we would get to the RGFC twelve hours sooner. But continuing was also a gamble.
The major phase lines used by Fred Franks to control the movement of forces within VII Corps. To further coordinate their actions, subordinate units supplemented these measures with graphics of their own (2nd ACR named all its phase lines after beers, for instance, and 1st INF after states). The legend indicates the average distance between the phase lines, which was dependent on the location of the force.
By continuing, we could get ourselves physically tangled up expanding the breach at night--by trying to fit a brigade in between two others while marking cleared lanes and moving the rest of the Big Red One forward. While we were untangling them, our enveloping force would be so far ahead, they would hit the RGFC while we were still getting the British through the breach. Even if the two armored divisions were successful in staying close behind the 2nd ACR, the rear of the enveloping forces would still be vulnerable to Iraqi attack from the east. In addition, the situation would prevent needed fuel from coming through the breach, and cause the enveloping attack to grind to a halt at the beginning of their RGFC attack. It also would deny our two armored divisions fire support from the two artillery brigades, which would be stuck behind the breach and thus be unable to join them for the RGFC attack.
It also was possible that the two divisions would not be able to close quickly behind the rapidly advancing 2nd ACR. In that case, the regiment would likely find itself way out ahead of those two follow-on divisions, and it would hit the RGFC, alert them, and give them time to react before I could mass the corps.
All in all, I thought the gamble was far greater if we continued that night than if we continued the next day. I would gamble that we had silenced all the Iraqi artillery and that, even if they noticed, the RGFC would probably underestimate the size of our force and that our three-division fist would overcome any time advantage on the RGFC side and smash them anyway. It was more important to preserve the three-division fist.
One other consideration operated as I made this decision. In the back of my mind, the idea was forming that if I did not get the 1st CAV in time, the third division of my three-division fist would be Rhame's Big Red One.
I recalled something Tom Rhame had said to me before the attack: "Boss, don't leave us behind in the breach." It was beginning to look as though Tom would get his wish.
Though the Big Red One had always seemed a possibility for that mission, I couldn't make that choice until I knew how much the breach mission had taken out of them. If they'd taken heavy casualties, for instance (some estimates had them losing up to a brigade total in the breach), it would have been impossible to use them for my third division.
As it happened, the 1st ID's casualties turned out to be unexpectedly low. Though I never expected casualties as high as some of the estimates, I still anticipated more than Tom actually reported--which was the best news I got all day. Now that it was clear that the division was in relatively good shape, I wanted to preserve them for use against the RGFC. Continuing that night might remove that option.
I consulted my co
mmanders, but it was my decision alone. It was the right one.
AT about 2000, the G-2 reported that all the Iraqi heavy units had remained in place. This included the three RGFC heavy divisions, the 12th AD, the 46th MECH (actually the 10th AD), the 52nd AD, and the 17th AD. There was, however, a report that a brigade of the Hammurabi was moving out for training. Based on tendencies we had studied from the Iran-Iraq War, such a move was usually a precursor to some offensive maneuver: they would set out from their locations, do some training--what we called rehearsals--and then attack. That got my attention.
Why? Because it was an indicator that the Iraqis might not be going to defend in place after all, but would try some kind of maneuver against us, a capability they still had. In that case, I would have chosen some other maneuver besides FRAGPLAN 7.
What did all this add up to? There was no indication at this point of an RGFC retreat. Of the three options we had originally given the RGFC, we were down to two. Every indication was that they were going to stay and fight from where they were or maneuver against us. It heightened my sense that I needed to keep the corps balanced to preserve my options for the attack tomorrow.
