by Tom Clancy
Once through this area, the 1st AD tempo picked up dramatically. Its navigation challenges were exacerbated by the lack of GPS--the division mainly had LORAN30 navigation devices. It sometimes took as long as two or three minutes to get accurate readings from LORAN towers (the Iraqis left these towers standing the whole war!). Because of the two- or three-minute lag time of readings, units wandered around some, and made some "S" maneuvers through the already difficult terrain. It was even more difficult for logistics to keep up. In other words, up to now, navigation, refueling needs, and changing division formations had regulated the 1st AD's tempo more than any Iraqi action.
Meanwhile, in order to maintain the momentum of his attack, Ron was about to shift the division formation out of its wedge. What he wanted to do was destroy the brigade of the 26th Division that had been out there refusing the flank while he bypassed with the other two brigades and moved rapidly to al-Busayyah. His third brigade got the mission of destroying the Iraqi brigade.
Finally, all along, he had kept his cavalry squadron well out in front of the division, much the same as I had the 2nd ACR out in front of the corps. He continued to do that now.
"Ron," I said, when he had completed his update, "I want you on Purple before it gets dark today. I'll get 2nd ACR out from in front of you."
"Roger, I understand and do not think that will be a problem," Ron answered.
I recalled then my own original estimate of eight hours from LD (line of departure--in this case, the border) to Purple. After I learned about the navigation problems the division had been facing, as well as the enemy action they'd run into along the way, I realized that my estimate had been overly optimistic.
Still, they had done very well, considering the problems they'd faced. On the twenty-fourth, 1st AD had moved all day. They'd started before 0500, after 2nd ACR had vacated the terrain in front of them, and they'd continued until well after 2100 (the process of collecting and refueling vehicles, plus local security and reconnaissance operations, went on all night). Then the troops were back into it at first light that day. The leaders got even less rest. Now they were about halfway to Purple--maybe seventy kilometers. So when I left Ron, I had every reason to believe they could be there and seize al-Busayyah by dark.
"I also want you to have 1st AD in the northern area of Collins by midmorning tomorrow," I went on to tell him. "It looks as though the RGFC will remain fixed. If that is the case, then our FRAGPLAN 7 will work. You are the northern part of that attack."
Ron gave me a WILCO and said they could do both. They would seize Purple and be in the northern part of Collins by midmorning the next day.
AS he and I were meeting, Ron's division cavalry squadron was beginning a series of actions that went on for the rest of the day. At this point, they were about 20 kilometers in front of the division, close to 80 to 90 kilometers from the border, and about 50 to 60 kilometers from al-Busayyah, and they were already in a fight. During this early action, they destroyed a BMP and captured more than 200 prisoners, then, passing the action over to the newly arriving 1st Brigade, they had pressed on. Soon their Bradleys and Cobras had destroyed several more armored vehicles, including two T-55 tanks, and they had captured additional prisoners, bringing their total to more than 500 in a little less than three hours. More action followed. It kept up until they reached the outskirts of al-Busayyah just before dark.
Al-Busayyah, or Objective Purple, was a key in our planning. It was the major Iraqi VII Corps logistics base--thousands of tons of equipment and ammo there--and an airfield was nearby. After 1st AD took it, Third Army planned to use this area as a logistics base for XVIII Corps and to push supplies up to XVIII Corps through the 1st AD zone in order to avoid the circuitous and much longer route to the west. Getting it also secured XVIII Corps's flank.
In order to protect the follow-on logistics units of both XVIII Corps and 1st AD, I told Ron Griffith to clear the zone of all Iraqi combat units, which he did. Al-Busayyah was a significant battle. Ron attacked it with his 2nd Brigade (Colonel Monty Meigs, commander) and bypassed with the rest of the division so that they would arrive in Collins to the east by midmorning of the twenty-sixth, as I had ordered. Later, Ron told Meigs to leave a task force behind to clear al-Busayyah, and Meigs left Lieutenant Colonel Mike McGee and his Task Force 6/6 Infantry to accomplish that mission, which they did by killing the defending commando battalion after they refused to surrender.
I had given a lot of thought to assigning this mission and this sector to 1st AD. Assigning particular missions to particular units is one of the ways senior commanders influence the outcome of battles and engagements. Who do you put where in the formation and what objectives do you assign? Who is on the outside? Who is in the center? Who can move the fastest? Who needs detailed instructions and who does not? Who exercises initiative and who needs continuing instructions? You also consider the combat power available, the equipment and troops, and the state of training. A big factor is the condition of the troops. Are they tired? Have they been in the lead and in constant combat for some time? What success have they had recently? And have they taken losses? It is no small decision. All units are not the same.
The choice had been between the 1st AD and the 3rd AD. Whichever one it was, the division had to be able to move fast to Purple and to stay in contact on our west with XVIII Corps (to preclude cross-border fratricide and to prevent the escape of Iraqi units). Then, from Purple, I needed them to be able to rapidly turn ninety degrees east into the northern part of the RGFC, if that is what I decided, or else to accomplish such other maneuvers as the situation might demand. Of all my units, they would have the longest move (and maybe an open flank if we turned east, and XVIII Corps did not move east with us). Either division could do these missions, but of the two, I had commanded 1st AD; I knew them; they were a VII Corps division and used to our FARs; and, most importantly, they had been in Saudi longer than 3rd AD. So I picked 1st AD.
That meant I would put 3rd AD in the middle, and because they were getting into theater last, I would initially keep them as corps reserve and give them a wider number of contingencies to plan.
After I left Ron Griffith, I flew about forty kilometers to the jump TAC, manned by Lieutenant Colonel Dave McKiernan and Major Ron McConnell, which was now forward with the lead elements of the 3rd AD, or almost due east of the place where Ron Griffith and I had met. By this time, Stan Cherrie had the main TAC breaking down in Saudi Arabia south of the border and was starting to relocate toward the 3rd AD. Meanwhile, the jump TAC was with the lead elements of the 3rd AD. When I reached the jump TAC, they had no word on the release of 1st CAV, no change of mission from Third Army, and no change in intel from what I had gotten a few hours earlier.
At this point, I made a decision: 1st INF would be the third division in our fist. Now I needed to get them free of the breach and forward behind the 2nd ACR.
My aircraft and two M577s were by then at the jump TAC with its line-of-sight comms, but I anticipated that my main TAC, with its better comms, would be well into Iraq and set up by the time I finished moving around the corps that day and was ready to make the decision on FRAGPLAN 7. That did not happen.
1100 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION BREACH
After the quick stop at the VII Corps jump TAC, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Greenwald, my command pilot, an SOF veteran31 and a ten-year Blackhawk pilot, flew us at about fifty feet over the forty to fifty kilometers to link up with Tom Rhame and Rupert Smith.
With me in the helo were Toby Martinez, my aide; Lieutenant Colonel Pete Kindsvatter, the VII Corps historian and an old 3rd ACR mate; Sergeant Park, who was in charge of the TACSAT radio; and Sergeant John McInerney, who was there for local security, if we needed it. Toby also helped navigate, listened to the corps TACSAT radio net with Sergeant Park when we were on the ground, and sat in on my talks to the commanders, so he could feed the result back to Stan at the TAC.
In the back was a map stand that Toby had gotten two engineer NCOs to buil
d out of scrap lumber with hand tools. They'd painted it a dark red, the only paint they could find. It was close to the width of the helo, about four feet high, and had an acetate cover, under which we slid the 1:250 000 map on which Toby kept the current enemy and friendly situation posted. On the map stand was a small shelf, also covered with acetate, where I could make notes. And there was a crude drawer where we kept all kinds of "stuff," such as granola bars and MREs. It worked, but again it was far from high-tech.
At this point, the main communication available to me in my helicopter was my FM line-of-sight radio (which had about twenty or thirty kilometers' range at the altitude at which we were flying), but Sergeant Park also carried a portable TACSAT radio, which he set up when we were on the ground; the antenna went up like an umbrella. He and Toby would eavesdrop 32 on the VII Corps SATCOM command radio net and make notes on a card for me. We had only one TACSAT in the corps that could be used while flying. Park did a magnificent job keeping the radio working and setting it up in the rain and wind; I decorated him after the war.
When the common folks wanted to put the single air-carried TACSAT on my Blackhawk, I told them no, put it in the 11th Aviation Brigade. They needed the comms on the move for their deep strikes. I could wait until I got where I was going and use the portable, hand-carried TACSAT.
As we flew in, I could see evidence of success all around. Specifically, the 1st INF had pushed their third brigade forward in between their 1st and 2nd Brigades as they expanded left, right, and forward. The three brigades were now abreast of one another on a semicircular line that marked their expanded breach-head line, which they had named New Jersey, forty kilometers into Iraq. By doing this, they had cleared the breach so that the British could flow through it and attack to the east.
Moving a brigade in between two others that are simultaneously moving out of the way, moving forward, and fighting is a great feat of coordination. The 1st INF had done it in less than four hours without incident.
They'd also had additional combat: in expanding the breach head east and north, their 2nd Brigade had attacked into and destroyed the 807th Brigade of the neighboring 48th Iraqi Division.33 In expanding west and north, their 1st Brigade had added to the destruction of the 26th Iraqi Division's 806th Brigade (the 3rd AD, 2nd ACR, and 1st AD also had run over elements of this Iraqi brigade). And I could see overrun Iraqi positions and destroyed Iraqi equipment.
I also could see a steady movement of 1st INF vehicles forward into the newly expanded breach-head area to make room for the British passage. Their biggest challenge, I knew, was handling the thousands of prisoners. Our combat units were just not able to spare the combat power to escort prisoners to the rear. Many times, all over our corps sector, prisoners were disarmed, given food and water, and sent south to the rear on their own. The 1st INF had started that practice here.
As we landed, I could not hear any firing.
Tom Rhame came out to greet me, cigar in hand, obviously animated. Rupert Smith was there as well, clearly ready and eager to get his division into the fight. Tom had a hastily set-up CP arrangement with two expando vans (one each for the G-2 and G-3) and a few other vehicles. His TAC CP was farther forward, closer to New Jersey. We went inside Tom's G-3 van and sat down.
"Boss, this operation is going great," Tom began. "We've pushed out to New Jersey, and Rupert is beginning his passage."
By this time, he went on to report, they had destroyed all of the Iraqi 26th Division, which had been facing them, a brigade from the adjacent 48th Iraqi Division, all artillery in range of the breach, and other unidentified units in the area; and they had marked the twenty-four passage lanes through the breach. They were now clear of the breach lanes and well forward to New Jersey. Tom was really pumped . . . and I think a bit relieved that the breach had gone so well and at such a small cost. He was proud of his troops, and rightfully so. They had trained hard for this mission and had done it superbly.
I was glad to get his report and see it for myself. Because of what we had done so far, now further confirmed by Tom's report, I felt we were building a momentum of success that would fuse with our physical force just as we were hitting the RGFC. Such momentum lifts the whole unit--from platoon to corps. It is contagious. Here, and earlier with Ron Griffith, I was seeing exactly what I had anticipated, and that pleased me a lot.
With the breach successful, the 1st (UK) Armored conducted its passage of lines with the Big Red One, and then attacked to secure the east flank of VII Corps. These attacks would take it into Kuwait.
As he finished, he added, with the same enthusiasm with which he had made his report, "Don't leave us behind, Boss." What a great team we had.
"No chance of that," I said, then told him what I'd come to tell him, that the Big Red One was to become the third division in our fist. "I want you to leave a task force"--a battalion--"in the breach for security, and after 1st UK passes, move your division forward here." Pointing to the map, I gave Tom a location I had picked just south and west of the place where 2nd ACR would be by that time. "Be prepared to make a forward passage through 2nd ACR sometime late tomorrow afternoon to attack the RGFC."
"WILCO." Tom was not one to waste words.
Meanwhile, the British had been moving forward most of the day before and into the night to an area just south of the border berm. Although they had originally planned to come forward on HETs (in order to save wear and tear on their vehicles), they'd realized they didn't have time to load onto the HETs, move forward, off-load, then reassemble the division, and so they had rapidly changed their plans and moved the sixty to seventy kilometers forward on their own power.
They had done a splendid job of adapting rapidly to changed circumstances: they had had to change their plans, get the orders out, move in formation, and get the leaders into huddles to talk about adjusted times for their attack. They'd also needed to talk about the usual "machinery" of passage, such as recognition signals, exchange of routes, fire plans, logistics, co-location of CPs, and face-to-face coordination. There had been many things to get done simultaneously and they'd done them.
Although they'd gotten themselves assembled and ready to move through the breach quickly, however, the quick change in plans had strung the division out a good bit more than they would have liked. In spite of these difficulties, though, they were ready to pass their 7th Brigade through the breach as soon as the 1st INF expanded it forward and cleared their units from the lanes the British needed. As Tom, Rupert, and I met, they had already begun forward movement. I now wanted to explain to Rupert his part in what I had just ordered Tom to do.
Major General Rupert Smith was a fast-thinking, decisive commander, who had his 1st UK Armored Division ready for action. Although he had not had a lot of time in mounted units, he had a nose for the fight and permitted his subordinate units maximum freedom of action at small-unit level to accomplish their mission. I had watched him prepare his commanders in war games. He always sketched out what he wanted done, drew in some basic control measures, then left his brigadiers, Patrick Cordingly in 7th Brigade and Christopher Hammerback in 4th Brigade, to execute. At the moment, they had a series of objectives: to move out of the breach to the east, which would put them into the rear of the Iraqi frontline divisions and into the front and flank of the Iraqi 52nd Division. During the next few days, they performed those maneuvers skillfully, and they were in a series of stiff fights day and night.
I was proud and happy to have the British with us. They were fast off the mark, aggressive, and pressed the attack. I liked them. They were family.
"Rupert," I said, turning to him, "what I've just told Tom means your division must move through here as quickly as possible and clear out so that Tom can move forward."
As soon as he understood my intention, Rupert told me that he saw no problems, and that he and Tom would stay in communications and make it happen. They then estimated that it would take the Brits about twelve hours to make the passage through the breach--four hours long
er than earlier staff estimates. But the estimates had not taken into account the number of vehicles now in the division. With the additional 142nd Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army National Guard from Arkansas, these now numbered about 7,500. Since the British had actual experience of two full-up rehearsals in our recent training, I figured Tom's and Rupert's estimate was accurate.
AFTER I left Rupert and Tom, I huddled for a few minutes at my other jump TAC, which was at the breach.
