by Tom Clancy
I wanted the CINC to get a good look at all of this, and especially at what VII Corps units had done.
Farther north, where the British and 1st INF were across the highway, we had seen combat vehicles, tanks, and BMPs, damaged, abandoned, or destroyed. When we cleared the road later, we had to use both the 1st and 9th Engineer Battalions. Following that cleanup, until the mess on the roads around Kuwait City got cleaned up, we used half the four-lane divided highway for about two weeks as a C-130 strip for resupply. Otherwise, in order to reach the 1st INF, they drove all the way through the desert.
As we made our way toward Kuwait City that morning, we flew by other burning oil wells. Hundreds were visible. It was fortunate for us that we were west of the oil fields, since the wind generally blew from west to east, and the smoke stayed out over the Gulf (years later on a trip to India, I learned that they had gotten some of the smoke even that far away). On some days, the wind did blow the other way, and it was like night where we were.
(I even asked our doctors about it, but they predicted that the greasy air would not cause any long-term effects for our troops. Breathing the stuff was about the same as breathing big-city smog, they told me.)
We also flew over the destruction in the desert that had been delivered by the 1st INF as they cut a swath through the Iraqis to Highway 8.
Finally, we came to the coast and passed over the elaborate defenses the Iraqis had built to stop the amphibious landing that never came. On the beaches they had laid out complex obstacles: wire entanglements, concrete tetrahedron blocks, steel tangles, and probably mines (although I could not tell that from the air). To prevent helos from landing, they had erected thousands of telephone poles.
On a later visit to Kuwait City, we visited the abandoned Iraqi III Corps HQ (it was this corps that had been meant to defend against the Marine landing). I saw an elaborate twenty-by-thirty-foot terrain board set up, in color, with terrain relief, and a scaled replica of the beach area, complete with overlaid military grid. I could just picture the commander and all his subordinate commanders and staff going over their defense in precise detail. That deception by our Marine and Navy forces afloat essentially tied down a whole Iraqi corps. It was masterful.
Since all of this was on the eastern part of the city, we would not fly over it with the CINC on the way to Safwan.
We landed at Kuwait City International Airport. As you might expect, it looked as if it had been in a war. Hangars were wrecked, their roofs caved in; there were holes in the walls of other buildings; and wrecked Iraqi vehicles. Except for pitted marks here and there, apparently from cluster bomb munitions, the runway itself was not damaged. But we were careful to stay on the runways or taxi aprons and off the grassy areas in between, because there still might be unexploded ordnance in there.
AT 0930, General Schwarzkopf arrived in a modern civilian Gulfstream jet. It taxied over to our command Blackhawk and stopped, then the CINC came out and down the stairs, and I saluted.
I was a bit uneasy; not only was this a big day, but just the day before he had accused me of disobeying an order; and he had expressed displeasure to John Yeosock at our VII Corps attack tempo early in the war. Despite all that, I was determined to leave the personal stuff out of it and to focus on the day's mission and show him as much as I could of what we had done out here. I figured the last thing we both needed was for me to be taking up time with personal business between the two of us . . . though if he wanted to talk about it, I was ready and more than willing.
Neither issue came up, not then, not ever, in any of our meetings or correspondence.54
FOR the flight up to Safwan, we had arranged a visible show of force. I had a company of Apaches (from our 2/6 CAV 11th Aviation Brigade) to escort us, three on each side of our Blackhawk. We also had ordered Tom Rhame to do the same at Safwan. We wanted to demonstrate to the Iraqis that we had plenty of combat power left if they had a mind to restart anything. From what I had seen of "Moreno" tactics, the Iraqis respected a credible show of force.
As we took off, I let the CINC know I wouldn't bother him with a lot of chatter, since I knew he had a lot on his mind, and that we would fly lower and slower than usual, so that he would have a chance to look around. The conference site was ready, I added, and described the general setup.
"The Iraqis better not ask for much today," he said, "because I'm not in a charitable mood. I'm not in a position to give them much, and they're not in a position to demand much." From that I concluded that he and Washington had the day's events pretty well figured out. I made no attempt to question him on any of it, since it was none of my business unless the CINC chose to discuss it. He did not.
As we flew over the burning oil wells, he was as shocked as the rest of us by that tragedy. "What would possess a people to do something like that?" he wondered aloud.
Shortly after that, we circled to get a closer look at the "Highway of Death." He had nothing to say. Then we went a little west of Highway 8, so that I could point out the destroyed Iraqi equipment. It stretched as far as we could see, and it impressed him. When we reached it, I pointed out the area of the 1st INF division attack, and explained how they had come out of the west after their night attack and laid waste to the Iraqi army all the way to Highway 8. The scene was the same behind the British and the 1st and 3rd ADs, I added.
He was clearly pleased. "Just like we planned it, Fred," he said.
After the CINC said that, I figured that all the problems and confusions of the previous four days had gone away; and I never expected to hear of them again.
Safwan 3 March 1991
We landed on the airstrip about 500 feet down from the tents where the meeting would be held, so that we would not blow them away. General Schwarzkopf quickly got off the helicopter. We drew a crowd of maybe a hundred media people, with cameras and microphones at the ready.
The 1st Infantry Division captured, then arranged the negotiation site at Safwan. When the Iraqi generals rode in U.S. HMMWVs through the cordon of American combat equipment, they saw the might that many of their soldiers had faced in the previous eighty-nine hours.
To my surprise, there was Gus Pagonis, in complete combat uniform, to greet the CINC. Not Tom Rhame, not Bill Carter, not Tony Moreno. Then, as the cameras rolled, Gus and General Schwarzkopf strolled to the tent area, with Gus carefully explaining the largely VII Corps, mostly 1st INF, setup. I quickly fell in on Gus's left.
I was shocked to see Gus grab the CINC and squire him away. Though 22 SUPCOM had certainly supplied some equipment, this was not a 22 SUPCOM (that is to say, a Gus Pagonis) mission. The Big Red One and VII Corps had taken the site from the Iraqis; they'd organized it and set it up; they'd done the work. VII Corps had fought through the RGFC to get here. First INF had fought all night through Norfolk, and had captured Safwan just the day before. It did not seem right to me. I wanted the spotlight to shine that day on our troops who had fought through more than 250 kilometers of desert and destroyed the better part of eleven divisions to get to this site. I flat missed that one.
UNDER Tom Rhame's orders, Bill Carter and the troops had done a magnificent job. We had our show of force. Meanwhile, the 1st INF had arranged to meet the Iraqi delegation at a designated pickup point. They then put them in our HMMWVs, and drove them on a route that took them through a canyon of M1A1 tanks and Bradleys, spaced about twenty meters apart, with soldiers at their crew positions in full battle dress. The airfield was ringed with tanks and Bradleys, also with soldiers at crew stations (two battalions and the cavalry squadron were there). Apaches and CENTAF A-10s were flying overhead, and an additional Apache company was parked on the airstrip. We wanted to be sure that the Iraqi delegation and any other Iraqi units watching got a firsthand look at our combat power.
There was no way they could have missed the sign WELCOME TO IRAQ, COURTESY OF THE BIG RED ONE proudly displayed in front of three Big Red One M1A1s.
The airfield ran generally southwest-northeast. The strip itself
was macadam, about 50 feet wide and 3,500 long. Halfway to the northern end of the strip and on the left were a pair of tents, where MPs would search each member of the cease-fire delegations for weapons. Next to these tents was a separate tent for General Schwarzkopf; in there he could talk to anyone he needed over the secure comms we had set up. Next to his tent were the actual negotiation tents--two standard U.S. Army field tents hooked together. Inside was a standard government conference table, with chairs around it, as well as seating for all the other members of the Coalition who were present that day. On the other side of this arrangement was a VIP tent, where senior Coalition officers could go for short breaks. Directly across the airstrip from the negotiation tent were the three 1st INF M1A1 tanks, with their WELCOME TO IRAQ sign. Next to the tanks was an area for the media, with an MP cordon, to keep it under control.
It had been forty-two hours since 1600 on 1 March, when Tony Moreno and his second brigade, and Bob Wilson and the Quarter Horse (1/4 Cav), had secured the site.
GENERAL Schwarzkopf seemed very sure of himself as he looked around, chatted briefly with the troops, and waited for the Iraqis to arrive. He knew what he wanted to do. That had been apparent to me on the ride up there in the Blackhawk. One of those he greeted was a senior Saudi general, with a clean Kevlar helmet and goggles on top. This, I learned, was Lieutenant General Khalid, the commander of JFC-E and JFC-N. In large measure, General Khalid had been the real glue in the Arab part of the military coalition.
When the Iraqis rode up in our HMMWVs and got out, they gave him a salute, which General Schwarzkopf returned. Through an interpreter, he explained the setup and the first order of business: they would be searched and would have to surrender any weapons. He would also be searched, he explained. They agreed and that formality was accomplished. General Schwarzkopf then led them into the tent, followed by the Coalition delegation.
When I started to enter, I got stopped at the door by the CENTCOM security troops. My name was not on the CENTCOM list, they told me. "I'm going in, name or no name," I told the MP at the entrance, and in I went.
None of the CENTCOM component commanders, Boomer, Arthur, Horner, or Yeosock, was present at Safwan that day, nor was Gary Luck, though all the Coalition allies were there. I knew some, such as Peter de Billiere of the UK and Saleh Halaby of Egypt, but most I did not.
I found an empty seat in the back by the entrance. Gus Pagonis had a front-row seat, but neither Tom Rhame nor Bill Carter was in there.
It was hot in the tent, and I could hear nothing of what was said at the table; I had a hard time staying awake. General Schwarzkopf seemed to be doing most of the talking, and the Iraqis were very still. They nodded now and then but said little.
It was clear to me what was going on. This was a battlefield meeting of the commanders of the opposing forces, to agree on the separation of forces; later, more detailed strategic-level talks would determine the Iraqi penalty for their aggression against Kuwait.
After about an hour, they took a short break. As the Iraqi generals walked by me, I looked into their eyes. These men had the coldest-looking, most impassive expressions I have ever seen on military officers--Vietnam, Warsaw Pact, NATO, Korea, anywhere.
That day I wrote in my journal, "No compassion in the Iraqis' eyes--none. They are ruthless and we should not let them up before we get what we want. Fear they have mistreated our POWs. We must hold them accountable for that. I'd attack to Basra if they did harm POWs."
As they passed, I tried to figure out who these Iraqi officers were. They wore no name tags. Were they RGFC? That did not appear to be so, since they did not wear the red Republican Guards' armbands. Much later, I found out their names: Lieutenant General Salah Abdoul Mahmoud, III Corps commander, and Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim Ahmad, chief of staff of the Ministry of Defense.
I was also still curious to find out how this event had come about in this particular place. Who had picked the site? Was the site important to the objectives to be achieved? What did we want to accomplish here? Who had decided on the Iraqi level of representation? How much negotiation room did General Schwarzkopf have? Who had decided what he would say?
At the time, I assumed the answers to all these questions had been tied together between State and Defense in Washington, and approved by the President. I did not give it much further thought. Later, I would.
After the break, I stayed outside for a while, since I could not hear what was being said anyway, and talked with Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson and Command Sergeant Major Cobb of the 1/4 Cavalry to hear their accounts of the war.
Later, I went back inside and did my best to catch some words, but without any luck. I dozed off from time to time, embarrassed that an obviously historic event, taking place right there in front of me, would not stimulate me more.
General Schwarzkopf seemed to be on top of his game, and I was confident he would do for us what was right. We had done our part.
The talks ended and the tent emptied. They had lasted about an hour and a half.
AFTERWARD, General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant General Khalid held a session with the media, right in front of the Big Red One tanks and their sign. It was skillfully done (I do not recall that Khalid answered any questions), but I was sorry to see that there was no mention of 1st INF or VII Corps, or introductions of any of the soldiers or leaders.
After the press conference, I lost track of General Schwarzkopf for a time, and walked over to talk to some of the soldiers and to tell Tom Rhame and Bill Carter thanks for the great job. While I was talking to them, Toby grabbed me. "General Schwarzkopf wants to see you in his tent," he said.
The CINC wanted me to listen as he reported the results of the talks to General Powell, and also as he gave General Luck his orders, to make sure he did not leave anything out. That way Gary and I would have the same set of orders to implement. (At this point, both Gary and I knew more than our boss, John Yeosock.) I took rapid notes.
Here is a summary of what I wrote:
First was the issue of Iraqi helicopters. At Safwan, the Iraqis made a simple request that they be able to fly from Baghdad to Basra in order to implement the agreement. Since we not only had cut Highway 8 but had also forbidden them any use of military air, they needed some way to get back and forth. No Iraqi helicopters were to be shot down if they had an orange panel on their sides. The helicopter agreement was nothing more than that, and only in that context--a matter of command and control to implement the cease-fire. And that is what General Schwarzkopf agreed to. I do not think he was fooled by the Iraqis that day. He knew exactly what he was doing with that specific request in those circumstances. Later, the Iraqis took advantage of their ability to fly the helos, when they saw we would not do anything about it, and used them to kill their own people. But I think that occurred to them later. That we did nothing then is an entirely different issue.
Then there were a number of other provisions.
There was to be a demilitarized zone two kilometers wide to separate the forces. John Yeosock and Steve Arnold had drawn it on a map used by General Schwarzkopf, and the Iraqis agreed to it.
There were rules of engagement:
* The intent was not to engage if Iraqi forces were trying to get away;
* Vehicles and helos flying an orange panel would not be engaged;
* We were not to get into big battles if all the Iraqi were doing was trying to get out of the theater;
* Bypassed Iraqi units were to be allowed to leave;
* We were to be on weapons hold unless the Iraqis showed clear hostile intent; and
* The Iraqis were not to be allowed to remove ammunition.
General Schwarzkopf also said we would not give up one square inch of Iraqi territory until the permanent cease-fire was signed (and I assumed we got what we wanted). He instructed us to set up a meeting point for radio communications with the Iraqis, and where the two sides could meet to settle any disputes (we subsequently did this at the by-now well-known road ju
nction north of Safwan). General Schwarzkopf emphasized that all forces were to have the right of self-defense. He told me nothing of POW exchanges but I knew that one of his highest priorities was to ensure the safe return of our POWs.
The orders to implement the agreement were now clear to me. General Schwarzkopf had gotten approval from Washington, and Gary and I had what we needed to implement the cease-fire and to remain in Iraq. We would not give an inch until the Iraqis agreed to a permanent cease-fire and to whatever the UN wanted them to do. The CINC was clearly pleased with the way things were going.
(It occurs to me now that it would have been simple on the afternoon of 26 or 27 February for the three of us, plus John Yeosock and Chuck Horner, to have had a similar quick orders group meeting about the end of the war. That way, the CINC could have issued orders about it, and we all would have been clear about their execution.)
