by Ian Uys
“A and D companies led by Lieut-Col MacLeod at the same time moved rapidly into Delville Wood on our right. Our artillery had been brought forward and put up an intensive barrage on the enemy infantry advancing from Guillemont. Many of our Field Artillery fired with open sights and inflicted serious damage on them.
“From this day onwards German gunners drenched Longueval, Delville Wood and the back areas with shells, almost obliterating the wood and reducing the houses in the village to rubble. Within 24 hours no wall of any house was higher than three feet. All of the hundreds of trees in the wood were reduced to a tangle of greenery and stumps. Not one tree was intact. The whole area was a shambles.
“Under this unbelievable rain of shells we had to clear paths and small communication trenches of rubble to bring up ammunition and what replacements we could find for the casualties. It was not possible to bring out the wounded for hours at a time, and then a lot of them were killed or wounded again on their way to the back lines.”
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Captain R Anderson was later to write his observations on the holding of Delville Wood. “Men did not show enough eagerness in digging themselves in, probably they were not aware of the large number of enemy opposing them. It would have been better to have paid less attention to the approach of the enemy in the distance and to have persevered in getting good protection as soon as possible.
“Lewis guns had very poor protection. Trenches along the northeast side were in some cases never connected up and there was a lack of sandbags. Probably well-protected and well manned machine-guns would have proved as effective with less than half the men who actually manned the very bad trenches.”
Chapter 6 — In-fighting
Sunday 16th
Throughout the night the troops in Delville Wood had dug entrenchments. The soil was matted by roots and wire and they made slow headway with their entrenching tools. By daybreak a semblance of two-man trenches ringed the wood.
At 12.35 am Gen Lukin was ordered by Gen Furse to block the northern entrance to Longueval. The 11th Royal Scots (27th Brigade) would push northwards through the village to link up with the South Africans who would have advanced north from the Princes Street line.
Between North Street and Flers Road lay an orchard which was strongly held by the enemy. This had to be taken if Longueval and the wood were to be secured.
In order to win and hold Delville Wood it became obvious that the village would have to be taken and held. Similarly, in order to take the village the wood would have to be held. Without them the stability of the right wing of the new front was endangered. No fresh troops were available so the job had to be done by the tired and battered battalions who were there.
Accordingly Gen Furse ordered Lukin to liaise and operate together with the 27th Scottish Brigade.
The concerted attack was launched at 10 am. The Cape Regiments A and B Coys under Captains Jowett and Miller rose from their trenches and charged forward — to be met by a hail of machine-gun and rifle fire.
The attack wavered and then broke in the face of the withering fire. Those not killed or wounded tried to return to their positions. Many men found themselves pinned down by the German fire, so crawled into whatever cover they could find.
Many acts of heroism were to take place that morning. One of these was when Lieut Arthur Craig led a bombing party against a German trench. He was wounded and most of his men killed. Craig lay in the open under machine-gun fire. Privates Faulds, Baker and Estment then went to his aid and dragged him back to cover. Baker was badly hit during the rescue attempt.
The troops who fell back to the trenches on Princes Street had to endure shell fire for the rest of the day. It was impossible to bring up rations, ammunition or water or to evacuate the casualties owing to the shell fire.
Major Hunt’s two companies returned to the brigade and were ordered into Delville Wood by Dawson, to reinforce the 1st SAI Battalion’s B and C Coy positions on Princes Street. They endured the shelling during the day and retired to the Longueval sunken road that evening.
General Lukin went to Longueval and Delville Wood to meet with his three battalion commanders. He was told that the men were exhausted and replied that there was no likelihood of their being relieved for another two days. On his return to Brigade HQ Lukin advised Divisional HQ of the state of the Springboks.
Fighting continued in all areas of the wood. Heavy shelling, particularly on the perimeters, blew trees over and smashed the shallow entrenchments. The South Africans were subjected to artillery fire and sniping throughout the day.
On the evening of the 16th orders were received that all infantry was to withdraw to south of Princes Street and east of the Strand so that the Corps heavy artillery could bombard the German positions. The aborted attack of that morning would then be repeated.
General Furse had requested the Corps to fire their heavy guns on Longueval at 4 am, but was overruled by Gen Rawlinson who ordered the bombardment for 11 pm on the 16th. This had to be postponed to 12.30 am owing to the difficulty of withdrawing infantry hurriedly from the village.
The German 153rd Regiment attacked at 11 pm. Many South Africans used five or more rifles taken from the dead and wounded and by a heavy fire repulsed the attack.
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General Lukin’s report for the day mainly concerned the fighting in the north-west corner of the wood.
“Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner having reported very heavy casualties in one company during the night, the Officer Commanding, 1st SAI (Col Dawson), was ordered to send a further company to reinforce the 2nd SAI.
“On the morning of the 16th (2.35 am) orders were received that the northern approach to Longueval must be closed at all costs, and for this purpose the South African Brigade would ‘complete their capture of the northern perimeter of the wood at once and advance westwards until they join hands with the 27th Infantry Brigade at North Street (the continuation of the village main street), making good against the enemy to the north every yard of their advance westwards. Similarly, the 27th Brigade will advance their connecting line northwards until they join hands with the South African Brigade at North Street’.
“I was instructed to concert measures with the GOC 27th Brigade and ‘to exert the utmost energy to carry out this order at once’.
“It was arranged, in conjunction with the GOC, 27th Brigade, that two companies of the 1st SAI should attack the enemy from the line of Princes Street northwards, keeping to the right of North Street, and that simultaneously the enemy should be attacked in the sector to the left of North Street by the 11th Royal Scots — the attack to be launched at 10 am.
“The 2 inch Trench Mortar Battery was to assist by a preliminary bombardment; the GOC, 27th Brigade, did not favour a bombardment by artillery.
“This attack failed as the 11th Royal Scots were held up by a strongly wired stone redoubt, and the two companies of the 1st SAI by machine-gun fire.
“When I was in Longueval that afternoon Lieut-Col Dawson, Commanding the 1st SAI, represented to me that his men were very exhausted and asked whether it was not possible that they could be relieved soon. I told him I had been informed by the divisional commander that there was no likelihood of our being relieved for a day or two.
“It was evident to me, however, that what Lieut-Col Dawson said was true, and that the men were very fatigued.
“I accordingly, on my return to headquarters, sent a telegram to division on the subject, adding that I had received reports from my battalion commanders in Delville Wood drawing special attention to the same fact as regards their men.
“At 10.30 pm orders were received to withdraw all infantry in the village to the south of Princes Street, and in the wood from the area west of the Strand, in order that we might ‘bombard with safety to ourselves the northern edge of the village and the northwest comer of the wood’. The bombardment was to last until 2 am, at which hour the infantry were to assault.”
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Sergeant Leonard Arrons led h
is carrying parties in and out of the wood and personally witnessed the fighting at close-quarters.
“Next day our boys were fighting in the woods. Talk about murder! It was indescribable. Our chaps went to their death like heroes. They swept from the parapets and gave the Huns no quarter. Sniper, machine-gun fire, shells — nothing could stop them; and it is said nine German battalions of their finest troops were hurled against our boys en masse, but to no avail.
“Here I must mention the Padre — our chaplain. During the whole time we were in action he worked among the wounded, regardless of himself; in shell fire, machine-gun fire, or snipers, he unceasingly worked like a Trojan, and if ever a man deserved a VC he does; I have a profound respect for parsons, and he in particular, one of the best men that ever lived.
“Our stretcher-bearers worked like superhuman men, in fact every South African was wonderful.
“When you see your comrades blown to pieces, you can just imagine the feeling. During that time with my party — I was carrying right into the firing line — I saw thousands of shells, and sometimes it was very trying.
“A shell would fall among the party. A shout, a rush to help the wounded, a few killed, but the remainder push on, and all along the road shells would continuously fall.
“We went through Longueval Village, which was ablaze with shells falling and snipers galore. And yet the work went on.”
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A second mortar was set up in Longueval, about 50 yards from the first and 250 rounds were fired. Two snipers ceased to fire and one leg was seen to somersault through the air.
Gordon Forbes had a bit more to say. “In Capt Jameson’s gun team No 2. Went up to trenches in Longueval and dug a gun emplacement. Did some firing. Just settled down for night when got orders to move to Royal Scots trenches, which were overcrowded and had to go back to our own quarters near Montauban. Carmichael killed. Only 123 men left out of 1st Regiment.”
The unit’s diary records that “On the evening of the 16th all mortars were removed from Longueval and returned to headquarters.”
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The day began badly, as recorded in the unit’s diary.
“Lieutenant Willmer called in at Brigade HQ early this morning to report that he had lost himself in the wood while taking his two teams to the north-east corner, and that he had run into some Germans who opened fire on him. He had a slight wound in the hand and the teams had scattered and had been lost in the dark. During the day the men of the teams began to appear at Brigade HQ, there having been one or two casualties amongst them. I ordered them to return and report to Lieut Bailey in the wood.
“In the evening I went up and under instruction from the brigade got one of Lieut Patrick’s guns at the northern edge of the wood to keep firing on a road running from Delville Wood to High Wood on which the enemy were reported to be digging in. It was most unpleasant in the wood as 5.9s were dropping everywhere. Lieut Bailey and Sec-Lieut Cuthbert were wounded today.
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Private James Simpson and his gun-team were in for an unpleasant surprise that morning. “All that night we never had a single flare light put up on the whole of the long front of the wood to assist us in watching for any approach of the enemy. The result was that just as dawn was breaking we discovered that the Germans had advanced to about 50 yards and had dug themselves in.
“This could never have happened had we the flares to guide us to use the machine-guns on them. Flares did go up on our extreme right and left, and at times it looked as if we were surrounded. In the early morning we could see the enemy digging himself in, and then look up at us. Some were only about 40 yards away, and we had no wire between us.
“How sleepy we all felt, and I had the greatest difficulty to get some of the (3rd) Regiment fellows to awake and warn them that the enemy was so near. They did not seem to care, they were so tired.
“It was about 4 am that I got hit by a bullet (in the left forearm). I simply dropped everything, rushed over to the gun, and the boys bound up the wound. All I wanted was to get away. I had to walk back to Maricourt to the big dressing-station before I could receive proper treatment, about six miles. On the way I fainted three times.
“While passing through the ruined village one of the Seaforths, also wounded, gave me some water from my bottle to bring me round. I remember he was wonderfully happy, for he had received a Blighty.
“After coming round I sat down for a bit, but he was too impatient to get on, so he left me, but he hadn’t gone more than 15 yards when a shell burst, killing him and left him lying in a big water hole, completely submerged except for a small portion of his kilt, so he will be one of the missing.”
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Private Ivan Merle McCusker, 24, of Victoria West was in charge of a Lewis gun. He was 6 ft tall, weighed 173 lbs and had a scar on his forehead, possibly due to his job as a developing shift boss on the mines. Although originally in A Coy, 3rd SAI, he was transferred to the machine-gun section and attached to B Coy. In a letter to his father he recalled their passing through Montauban.
“There was not a wall left standing; everywhere fallen masonry and trees. The shells had fallen so thickly that the shell holes overlapped to such an extent that we had to walk through them, there being no part of the ground that had not been rent asunder.
“Some of these holes were about 10 feet deep and 20 feet in diameter. The Germans had some splendid dug-outs in the village, which our shells had not touched. We stayed that night in the old German last-line trench of the first line of defences.
“On the morning of the 16th, at 1.30 am, we moved on to the Longueval Village and Delville Wood. The previous morning the other two brigades of the 9th Division had taken the village and a part of Delville Wood. What a horrible sight the village was. It was battered almost as much as Montauban, but the dead were still lying thick in it; some men, battered out of all semblance of man by a huge bursting shell, lying in grotesque attitudes, probably some yards from their legs or arms.
“Well, we went on into the wood, up to where the Camerons had entrenched themselves. Well, we took the rest of the wood without losing many men or much fighting. The regiment here took some 200 prisoners. We then established ourselves on the fringe of the wood. The (4th) Regiment came up and reinforced us some while after. The (1st) and (2nd) were somewhere to our left. I am not sure whether they took their part of the wood. Anyhow, I am dealing now about the (3rd) and (4th). The Germans were, of course, shelling us all the time, and we were losing a lot of men.
“Meanwhile they were massing about eight or nine regiments for a tremendous counter-attack. As you know, I am No 1 on the gun, and so I am in charge of it, and of course do the actual firing. My No 2 was Charles Hugo, from Beaufort West. He was as game as a fighting-cock. Well, I managed to fire over 3,500 rounds into Germans in massed formation at ranges varying from 300 to 800 yards.
“So I guess I put over 300 Germans out of action with my little Lewis before I was hit; the targets were too good to miss, and the Lewis is very accurate. It is a fine gun, and is aptly described as ‘the hose of death’. Well, the shelling was getting heavier and heavier; shells were bursting all around us and very, very near. I said to Hugo: ‘Charles, our numbers are up.’ He just grinned. Not long after, about 4 pm, a 5.9-inch shell plunged right amongst us, and put my whole gun-team out of action.”
McCusker was hit by a shell fragment, just over the crest of his hip. Private C N Hugo is also recorded amongst the wounded.
One of the machine-gunners captured by the Germans was a young Jew, Pte Joel Emanuel, 18, who was a learner printers’ compositor from Durban. Emanuel had joined A Coy of the 2nd SAI, however was transferred to the 28th Machine-Gun Coy.
In the face of a counter-attack L/Cpl James Taylor’s crew of five were killed or wounded. He carried on alone until the gun jammed, then removed it to safety for repairs.
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The 1st SAI’s A and B Coys were to suffer heavily in the fighting on the 16th. The battalion’s w
ar diary describes what happened.
“C and D Coys were early today put under the orders of the OC 2nd SAI for the defence of other portions of Delville Wood. At 6 am orders were received from brigade-major SA Bde that the portion of the town in possession of the enemy was to be attacked at 10 am. The Royal Scots attacking from the west and two companies of the 1st SAI from the south. There would be a preparation by trench mortars and stokes guns.
“The necessary arrangements were made and orders were issued that at 10 am a bombing section should rush across from the trench marked D into the German trench about 40 degrees to the north and bomb along it. A Coy advancing to the north from the trench E and one platoon of B Coy from the trench D, the objective being the northern boundary of the wood. Two companies of the 4th SAI were to be in support.
“At 10 am a start was made by all of these except the platoon of B Coy which was delayed by a platoon of D Coy which had got into the trench by mistake. The parties advancing came immediately under an exceedingly heavy machine-gun fire from not less than three machine-guns and were practically annihilated. No further progress was possible and although the trench mortars and stokes guns fired on the enemy’s position at intervals throughout the day, the machine-guns were not silenced.
“The two companies of the 4th SAI had been instructed to remain in support along Princes Street but for an unknown reason did not do so and some parties of them occupied the trench marked EE. It had also been arranged that the company of the 1st SAI which was holding the line of the Strand, under the orders of OC 2nd SAI should advance to the west, but they also were held up by machine-gun fire. At sunset no progress had been made nor was there any hope of making any.”
