by B Krishna
11. While there is, in my opinion, practically no chance of a major attack on India by China, there are certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory, if there is obstruction to this happening. We must therefore take all necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must differentiate between these precautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real attack.
12. If we really feared an attack and had to make full provision for it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise, and it would weaken our general defence position. There are limits beyond which we cannot go, at least for some years, and a spreading out of our army on distant frontiers would be bad from every military or strategic point of view.
13. In spite of our desire to settle the points at issue between us and Pakistan, and developing peaceful relations with it, the fact remains that our major possible enemy is Pakistan. This has compelled us to think of our defence mainly in terms of Pakistan’s aggression. If we begin to think of, and prepare for, China’s aggression in the same way, we would weaken considerably on the Pakistan side. We might well be got in a pincer movement. It is interesting to note that Pakistan is taking a great deal of interest, from the point of view, in developments in Tibet. Indeed it has been discussed in the Pakistan Press that the new danger from Tibet to India might help them to settle the Kashmir problem according to their wishes. Pakistan has absolutely nothing in common with China or Tibet. But if we fall out completely with China, Pakistan will undoubtedly try to take advantage of this, politically or otherwise. The position of India thus will be bad from a defence point of view. We cannot have all the time two possible enemies on either side of India. This danger will not be got over, even if we increase our defence forces or even if other foreign countries help us in arming. The measure of safety that one gets by increasing the defence apparatus is limited by many factors. But whatever that measure of safety might be, strategically we would be in an unsound position and the burden of this will be very great on us. As it is, we are facing enormous difficulties, financial, economic, etc.
14. The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India, is rather naïve. It may mean that in certain circumstances. Those circumstances would depend upon many factors, which I need not go into here. The danger really is not from military invasion but from infiltration of men and ideas. The ideas are there already and can only be countered by other ideas. Communism is an important element in the situation. But, by our attaching too great importance to it in this context, we are likely to misjudge the situation from other and more important angles.
15. In a long-term view, India and China are two of the biggest countries of Asia bordering on each other and both with certain expansive tendencies, because of their vitality. If their relations are bad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but on Asia as a whole. It would affect our future for a long time. If a position arises in which China and India are inveterately hostile to each other, like France and Germany, then there will be repeated wars bringing destruction to both. The advantage will go to other countries. It is interesting to note that both the UK and the USA appear to be anxious to add to the unfriendliness of India and China towards each other. It is also interesting to find that the USSR does not view with favour any friendly relations between India and China. These are long-term reactions which one can fully understand, because India and China at peace with each other would make a vast difference to the whole set-up and balance of the world. Much of course depends upon the development of either country and how far communism in China will mould the Chinese people. Even so, these processes are long-range ones and in the long run it is fairly safe to assume that hundreds of millions of people will not change their essential characteristics.
16. These arguments lead to the conclusion that while we should be prepared, to the best of our ability, for all contingencies, the real protection that we should seek is some kind of understanding of China. If we have not got that, then both our present and our future are imperilled and no distant power can save us. I think on the whole that China desires this too for obvious reasons. If this is so, then we should fashion our present policy accordingly.
17. We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible, however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy. That would be good for Tibet and good for India. As far as I can see, this can only be done on the diplomatic level and by avoidance of making the present tension between India and China worse.
18. What then should be our instructions to B. N. Rau? From the messages he has sent to us, it appears that no member of the Security Council shows any inclination to sponsor Tibet’s appeal and that there is little likelihood of the matter being considered by the Council. We have said that [we] are not going to sponsor this appeal, but if it comes up we shall state our viewpoint. This viewpoint cannot be one of full support of the Tibetan appeal, because that goes far and claims full independence. We may say that whatever might have been acknowledged in the past about China’s sovereignty or suzerainty, recent events have deprived China of the right to claim that. There may be some moral basis for this argument. But it will not take us or Tibet very far. It will only hasten the downfall of Tibet. No outsider will be able to help her and China, suspicious and apprehensive of these tactics, will make sure of much speedier and fuller possession of Tibet than she might otherwise have done. We shall thus not only fail in our endeavour but at the same time have really a hostile China on our doorstep.
19. I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibet’s appeal. I would personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard in the Security Council or the General Assembly. If it is considered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter speaking and accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet, as well as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in the least. It must be remembered that neither the UK nor the USA, nor indeed any other power is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What they are interested in is embarrassing China. Our interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest, we fail.
20. Therefore, it will be better not to discuss Tibet’s appeal in the UN. Suppose, however, that it comes up for discussion, in spite of our not wishing this, what then? I would suggest that our representative should state our case as moderately as possible and ask the Security Council or the Assembly to give expression to their desire that the Sino-Tibetan question should be settled peacefully and that Tibet’s autonomy should be respected and maintained. Any particular reference to an article of the Charter of the UN might tie us up in difficulties and lead to certain consequences later, which may prove highly embarrassing for us. Or a resolution of the UN might just be a dead letter which also will be bad.
21. If my general argument is approved, then we can frame our reply to China’s note accordingly.
J. Nehru
18 November 1950
Post-Script: Nehru always needed a strong man by his side. Earlier in life it was Motilal Nehru, his father; thereafter it was Gandhi, and finally, after Independence, it was Sardar Patel. In April 1950, there was a near revolt by the Bengalis in Kolkata over the Nehru-Liaquat Pact in the wake of communal rioting in East Pakistan, Mountbatten wrote to Patel: “You have for years been the ‘strong man’ of India. With your support Jawaharlal cannot fail. I do not believe there is one man in the country who would stand up to you when you make up your mind…”
Patel was not by Nehru’s side when China annexed Tibet. The US showed its desire to help Tibet by whatever means possible. A weak-hearted, vacillating Ne
hru “requested that Washington refrain from publicly condemning China”. Nehru accepted annexation quietly.
Nehru woke up to the realities of the grim situation in 1962 in China’s undeclared war on India. Nehru’s pride of a non-aligned leader hadn’t permitted him to see what was happening. He was shaken from his long slumber, and in his humiliation he made an abject surrender to US President, J. F. Kennedy, of the grave fear that troubled his mind:
“… the situation in the NEFA Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Se La have been trapped between the Se La Bridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened, and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide, the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.”
The nation suffered great humiliation. But Nehru much more. For him, this was worldwide. Dr. Radhakrishnan echoed the nation’s sentiments most correctly when he stated: “The people listened to Nehru, while Nehru believed the Chinese.” His was a lost mind, and he suffered physically too. He was not the same: ever youthful and sprightly. But he didn’t want to leave his seat of Prime Ministership. He preferred to continue in that pathetic state of mind and body till his death at the end of May 1964. Had Nehru listened to Patel, India’s power and prestige would have been far different. Nevertheless, some may console themselves with the thought: Destiny governs the lives of individuals and nations.
However, in the wake of his humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese, a crestfallen Nehru confessed that he had been “out of touch with the reality in the modern world and living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation”. Nehru further admitted that he “didn’t trust them one bit… they are arrogant, deceitful, hegemonist and a thoroughly unreliable lot. We cannot trust them at all. They are inimical to us…” Did not the wise old Patel tell Nehru all that a month prior to his demise in December 1950? It is a perfect example of people deceiving history and suffering from pain and sorrow later.
14
A BUNCH OF UNPUBLISHED LETTERS
i) Sir Hugh Garrett, ICS
16 August 1968
Dear Mr. Krishna,
I have read with great satisfaction your letter printed in the Daily Telegraph on 16 August. I, who knew him very well, always called him Vallabhbhai. For many years in Ahmedabad I had constant dealings with him. He was, of course, a pillar of the Congress party but that in no way caused ill-feeling on my side, nor, I hope, did he feel any against me.
As an example of our friendly relations, I may relate an incident. He came to see me and related how a fakir had built a tomb in the middle of a road in the city’s outskirts. He said the fakir had threatened him with a sword. He asked if I would deal with the situation. He did not want a police or magisterial case. I accordingly got my car and went to the place and found it as stated. I spoke to the fakir and ordered removal of everything within two hours. I went back and found all done.
Later, of course, I had much to do with him, but I had faith in him. He was honest and frank. I hope he had the same view of me!
Of all the Indians I ever met, I place him as the greatest. His premature death was a shock to me and a terrible loss to India.
Yours sincerely,
Sir Hugh Garrett
(88 years old!)
ii) Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck
4 January 1969
Dear Mr. Krishna,
Thank you for your long letter of 9 December. I apologise for the delay in answering it due to my having been away in Spain and elsewhere since before Christmas.
As to your question about my talk with Mr. Jinnah when I flew up to meet him in Lahore . . . I simply told him that if he persisted in his plan to send the Pakistan army against India, all British officers (and there were many, including General Gracey, the C-in-C, in important posts) would be withdrawn at once as it was inconceivable that British officers, commissioned by the British Sovereign, should lead Pakistani troops against Indian troops similarly commanded. It followed, of course, that, if it came to war between India and Pakistan, all British officers serving with Indian troops would be similarly withdrawn. Confidential orders to this effect had been issued by me to all concerned some time before . . . My concern was as Commander-in-Chief to preserve the safety of the British officers for whom I, and I alone, was finally responsible, irrespective of whatever action the Indian or Pakistan Governments might see fit to take.
Yours sincerely,
Auchinleck
iii) Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst, C-in-C, Indian Air Force
8 January 1969
Dear Krishna,
I have your letter of the 9 December together with your most helpful questionnaire. Reading the letter makes me realise how little I did know of a man whose intelligence, firmness and strength of character I much admired.
My first contact with Sardar Patel was sitting at a conference table in the Governor-General’s House in New Delhi, late August or early September 1947, when on the day in question, Delhi appeared to be in the hands of armed Sikhs. The city was certainly not under control of the police or armed forces.
An emergency meeting had been called to consider and deal with the situation . . . The meeting asked Mountbatten to take the chair and Pandit Nehru sat on one side of him and Sardar Patel on the other.
There was fear in the highly charged atmosphere as views were expressed as to how the Government could regain control. Life in Delhi that day was at a standstill, with rebels in control. Someone expressed a view that was absurd. Sardar Patel laughed heartily and made a remark that caused most of us to laugh. The tension was broken and he followed up with a wise suggestion that brought general agreement. He was the man.
I saw more of Sardar Patel in 1948 and 1949, the period of the first Kashmir war. As you say in your questionnaire, he appealed to me, an Englishman, because he was obviously a man of action, of few words, frank, straightforward and unequivocal. He also had that fierce piercing look in his eye I have seen in the eyes of Winston Churchill and Ataturk [Kemal Ataturk of Turkey].
To me Sardar Patel was no enigma like Mahatma Gandhi. Even Pandit Nehru to me was an enigma if he was discussing Kashmir.
I remember an evening when, in Nehru’s absence abroad, he sent for me, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, to discuss a point relating to the Kashmir war. He was not well and the meeting was in the sitting room of his home and we were alone. He said something to this effect: “If all the decisions rested on me, I think that I would be in favour of extending this little affair in Kashmir to a full-scale war with Pakistan now, and let us get it over once and for all and settle down as a united continent.”
I liked Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and admired him.
Yours sincerely,
Thomas Elmhirst
iv ) General Sir Roy Bucher, C-in-C, Indian Army
24 July 1969
My dear Mr. Krishna,
Thank you very much for your letter of the 14 July. Obviously the repercussions of what happened in Calcutta in August ’46 were very widespread. Inter-communal rioting— slaughtering might be a better word—took place in East Bengal, in Bihar, in Assam, in the Central Provinces, in the United Provinces and finally in the Punjab. I personally never thought that any subsequent Partition of India could be completed without recurrence of inter-communal fighting. What however did become clear from the happenings in Calcutta and elsewhere was that the soldiers of the Indian Army, no matter of what class or creed, could, one and all, be relied upon to carry out their full duty in support of Government. Before these outbreaks, Indian soldiers had not been used in any very large numbers in support of the civil authority.
From my own knowledge, I am quite sure that Maulana Azad’s charge that Sardar Patel was responsible for the murder of the Mahatma was absolutely unfounded. At our meeting in Dehra Dun, the Sardar
told me that those who persuaded the Mahatma to suggest that monies held back in India should be despatched to Pakistan were responsible for the tragedy, and that after the monies had been sent off, the Mahatma was moved up to the first to be assassinated on the books of a very well-known Hindu revolutionary society. I distinctly remember the Sardar saying: “You know quite well that for Gandhiji to express a wish was almost an order.”
I was bidden to his house and there were a number of his Cabinet colleagues present. The Sardar pressed me to order Indian troops into Hyderabad and at once. When I demurred, he obviously was much put about and his colleagues showed extreme anxiety. When I stuck to my point, the Sardar said words to the effect that there would not be a Government of India for very long and that the fault would be Roy Bucher’s. He then said: “Come and sit on my bed and I will tell you a story.” He did just that and his story was a very amusing one about goings-on within the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
I think Mr. Jinnah’s attitude was indicated when he ordered General Gracey to send a Brigade of Pakistani regular troops into Kashmir to catch up with the raiders. General Gracey reported these orders to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck with the result that the latter met Mr. Jinnah in Lahore, I think, and more or less forced him to cancel his instructions.
